European Situation.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

13 April 1939 · House of Commons debate on the European situation · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on April 13, 1939, responding to the Prime Minister's statement, backing guarantees to Greece and urging fleet vigilance and a defensive alliance including Soviet Russia.
Main themes
Anglo-Italian Agreement, Italian invasion of Albania, guarantee to Greece, dispersal of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiralty vigilance at Easter, timing of aggression on holidays, failure of intelligence reaching Ministers, subjugation of Bohemia, alliance against aggression, inclusion of Soviet Russia in a peace bloc
Duration
~19 min
64th percentile
Words
2,294
64th percentile
Sentences
95
60th percentile
Readability
54
74th percentile
Grade
11.9
43rd percentile
Syntax
3.17
69th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
37th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 78%73%
  • Institutional 12%12%
  • Ceremonial 7%6%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

95 sentences in 20 paragraphs

I find myself in general agreement with the Prime Minister's statement on Government policy this afternoon, so far as it goes. I do not press my right hon. Friend to denounce the Anglo-Italian Agreement, which he made when he parted with my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) and assumed himself the main direction of our foreign affairs. It would no doubt be very painful to the Prime Minister formally to repudiate an instrument on which he staked so much. The Agreement, of course, has been violated in every material respect by Italy, but I do not feel that anything would be gained by a denouncement with bell, book and candle at this juncture. It certainly represents a sincere, if hitherto unrequited attempt, on the part of Great Britain to dwell on terms of amity and friendship with Italy and with the Italian people in the Mediterranean Sea. I think the Government are quite right to let this Agreement stand De bene esse, as the lawyers say. This is a term of art which they apply to things that do not matter very much. In spite of the bad faith with which we have been treated by the Italian Government, I am still not convinced that Italy has made up her mind, particularly the Italian nation, to be involved in a mortal struggle with Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean.

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We must remember that if we have had an unpleasant experience at the hands of the Italian Government, Germany had a much more grievous experience of Italian policy at the outbreak of the Great War. That wears an agreeable aspect in British recollection, but a somewhat different impression of what occurred is sustained in Germany. It may be assumed that Germany would like to make sure of Italy by getting her into a war with the Western Powers before any main strokes were delivered in the central or north European theatre. I am afraid we have reached a point when we are bound to look at matters in this somewhat realistic way. If it is in the Nazi interest that this should happen, it seems to me not in our interest to facilitate their task. As long as the Government have no illusions about the Agreement with the Italian Government, I shall not press them to take the step of denouncing it merely to relieve their natural feelings of indignation at the manner in which they have been treated. We can readily imagine that it must have been a great disappointment and surprise to the Prime Minister to be treated in this way by a dictator in whom he placed particular trust, and in whom he advised us to place particular trust. Every one knows that his motives have been absolutely straightforward and sincere. We all sympathise with him, and we all sympathise with ourselves too.

I am also in agreement with the practical steps which the Prime Minister has announced on behalf of His Majesty's Government to give a guarantee to Greece and to make even more effective arrangements with Turkey. The validity of this guarantee rests, of course, mainly upon British sea power and upon the fact that the British and French Fleets combined have a superiority in the Mediterranean which might well be considered decisive, in the absence of unknown factors which at present we cannot accurately measure, but which I do not believe will be decisive. Here I really must ask the Government to maintain a continuous state of vigilance in the Mediterranean, a state of vigilance appropriate to the tension which exists and to the strain which undoubtedly is being put upon our naval power. I cannot feel that the dispositions of the British Fleet in the recent crisis conformed to the ordinary dictates of prudence. Last Tuesday week before we separated Lord

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Stanhope, the First Lord of the Admiralty, made a speech which caused alarm. It was not a very happily phrased speech perhaps, but it at any rate indicated that the most extreme conditions of vigilance were being maintained in the Home Fleet. The crews of anti-aircraft guns were not allowed even to leave their posts in order to attend an entertainment in their own ship.

What was the condition of the Mediterranean Fleet at that time? There is no secret about it. The facts have been in all the newspapers. They are known at home and abroad. The position of every ship which puts into any foreign port is known and telegraphed. I am not giving away anything that is not absolutely known, and I think it should be understood here as well as it is understood elsewhere. Moreover, the Fleet has now been concentrated, and therefore it is quite safe, but it is extremely necessary, to avoid future difficulties, to discuss what actually happened when the Albanian stroke was delivered. According to published statements in the newspapers of all countries, facts which are not in the slightest degree secret or official, the Fleet was scattered from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. Of the five great capital ships one was at Gibraltar, another in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the remaining three were lolling about outside various widely separated Italian ports, two of them not attended by their protective flotillas. The destroyer flotillas themselves were dispersed along the European and African shores, and a number of cruisers were crowded in Malta harbour, without the protection which is given by the powerful anti-air batteries of the battleships. I do not understand at all how this situation, which has now been rectified, was allowed to arise.

After all, we are in very serious times; not a time for merely passing the time of day. I was astounded to see what has happened, and I did not believe it until I saw it proclaimed in the newspapers. It has been rectified. The Fleet is now absolutely secure and prepared. How can you reconcile the extreme extra precautions, the vigilance, taken at Portsmouth, with the simultaneous carrying out of the long published routine programme of the Admiralty for the Easter period? It was published, I believe, in February, exactly where they were all to go, and it

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was carried out as if nothing was to happen, and at the same moment the Home Fleet is told "No, you cannot have leave." At the very time that the Fleet was suffered to disperse in this manner it was known that the Italian Fleet was concentrated in the Straits of Otranto and that troops were being assembled and embarked on transports, which presumably were intended for some serious enterprise. It is incredible to me that, when all this intelligence had come to hand and when the First Lord of the Admiralty considered that a state of tension existed requiring the utmost precautions at home, the Mediterranean Fleet was not concentrated, and at sea. These matters touch the very life of the State and I trust that improvidences of this character will not be repeated in the anxious months which lie before us.

I want to draw the attention of the House to the "timing" of the Italian stroke. The British habit of the weekend and the great regard which the British pay to the holiday season which accords with a festival of the Church, is studied abroad. You can see it on many occasions, and that moment is the dangerous moment. I do not suggest that for this particular stroke in Albania Good Friday was selected out of any desire to insult that day, but undoubtedly it was also the first day after Parliament had dispersed and consequently no immediate question could be raised. It was also a day when it was known that on that day the British Fleet, according to the programme which it was carrying out in a perfectly calm and peaceful manner, would be dispersed in all quarters; and from every point of view they were able to say, "The coast is clear." I can well believe that if our Fleet had been watching these events before they happened— after all it is before events happen that you want to be ready, not afterwards—I can well believe that if our Fleet had been concentrated and cruising in the southern part of the Ionian Sea, the Albanian adventure would never have been undertaken. Instead of their gathering the transports and men and our Ambassador in Rome going to see Count Ciano and saying, "What is the meaning of all this?" we should have had the Italian Chargé d' Affaires visiting the Foreign Secretary here, and saying, "We are very much surprised to see the apparition of a great united concentration

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of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean waters, not far from the mouth of the Adriatic Sea" Then it might be that explanations would have been interchanged, and that some steps could have been taken with perfect safety which would have given us at any rate a chance to recover something like the initiative in foreign policy.

Here let me say a word about the British Intelligence Service. After 25 years' experience in peace and war I believed it to be the finest service of its kind in the world. I believe the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), who had supreme responsibility in those years, will corroborate me. I have always believed, and foreign countries have always believed, that it was the finest in the world. Yet we have seen both in the case of the subjugation of Bohemia and in the case of the invasion of Albania that apparently Ministers of the Crown had no inkling or at any rate no conviction of what was coming. I cannot believe that this is the fault of the British Secret Service. Several days before the stroke at Bohemia was made, Nazi intentions were known in many countries throughout Europe. The whole time-table was laid down, the whole programme was known beforehand. Similarly in the case of Albania, the Italian concentration and preparations were reported repeatedly in the Press. We sneer at the Press, but they give an extremely true picture of a great deal that is going on, a very much fuller and detailed picture than we are able to receive from Ministers of the Crown. At any rate, it was quite well known that gathering of troops and ships was taking place in the Eastern ports of Italy. There was much talk that Albania was the quarry, although I quite agree that you could not tell in what form the assertion of Italian authority over Albania would be exerted, or to what extent the late King of Albania and the Albanian people would make themselves accommodating parties to what took place.

How was it that on the eve of the Bohemian outrage Ministers were indulging in what was called "sunshine talk," the golden age prospects? How was it that last week holiday routine was observed at a time when, quite clearly, something of a very exceptional character, the consequences of which could not be measured, was imminent? I do not

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know. I know perfectly well the patriotism and sincere desire to act in a manner of perfect rectitude and render valuable services to the country which animates Ministers of the Crown, but I wonder whether there is not some hand which intervenes and filters down or withholds intelligence from Ministers. Certainly it was so in the case of the German aeroplane preparations four years ago. The facts were not allowed to reach high Ministers of the Crown until they had been so modified that they did not present an alarming impression. It seems to me that Ministers run the most tremendous risk if they allow the information collected by the Intelligence Department, and sent to them I am sure in good time, to be sifted and coloured and reduced in consequence and importance, and if they ever get themselves into a mood of attaching importance only to those pieces of information which accord with their earnest and honourable desire that the peace of the world shall remain unbroken.

The great majority of the House, I believe, supports the Government in the policy which they are now adopting in building up a strong alliance of nations to resist further acts of aggression. I welcome very much the language used on this matter by the Prime Minister this afternoon. He has an absolute right to the aid of all in the country in carrying out that course. I pointed out, the last time we discussed these matters, how great were the dangers of being caught whilst this process was incomplete. The essence of such a policy is speed and vigour. If it is not carried through with the utmost speed and vigour it would be better not to have started upon it at all. You can purchase short periods of perilous isolation. We have taken the opposite course; and this is no time for half measures. There is absolutely no halfway house. If peace is to be preserved there seem to be two main steps which I trust are already being taken or will be taken with more decision immediately. The first, of course, is the full inclusion of Soviet Russia in our defensive peace bloc. When the right hon. Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair) dwelt on the point of Russia and emphasised it, I heard a sort of commotion behind me. I heard the Noble Lady the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) express her dislike of any contact with

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Bolshevik Russia. Where was this dislike when she paid a visit to Soviet Russia with Mr. Bernard Shaw?