Iron And Steel Bill

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

16 November 1948 · House of Commons debate on the Iron and Steel Bill · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on November 16, 1948, opposing the Government's Iron and Steel Bill and accusing ministers of unfair compensation and of timing nationalisation for party advantage.
Main themes
Compulsory purchase of steel shares at market value, compensation for small investors, alleged artificial depression of steel share prices, vesting date of 1 May 1950 in Clause 11, Parliament Act and the timing of the General Election, Cabinet divisions over nationalisation, Labour's 1945 election mandate, Lincoln Evans and the Iron and Steel Confederation, Chancellor of the Exchequer and the capital levy, party tactics of the Socialist Government
Duration
~12 min
42nd percentile
Words
1,435
42nd percentile
Sentences
71
47th percentile
Readability
58
83rd percentile
Grade
10.4
25th percentile
Syntax
3.04
53rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.19
47th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 55%51%
  • Economic 36%34%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Geopolitical 2%1%
  • Ceremonial 2%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

71 sentences in 20 paragraphs

There may only perhaps be 300,000 steel shareholders, but they have their rights and are entitled to justice. The great mass of small investors do not watch the market from day to day and their holdings are not speculative in any sense. They place their money where they think it will be safe and fruitful and thus make provision for old age and darker years. Hardship is inflicted upon them when they are forced, against their wishes, to change their investment. But, in the case of steel, the conduct of the Government in buying compulsorily at the market value is

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not only unfair, but it seems actually dishonest. We assert, and it is our sincere belief, that by their threats of steel nationalisation they have artificially depressed the value of steel shares.

But there is more than that. By the appeals which the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Ministers have made to the leading firms not to increase but to "plough in" their dividends and the co-operation which they have received in consequence, they have definitely affected the market prices. Now they propose to expropriate at this artificially restricted price. What is peculiarly reprehensible about the transaction is that those who hearkened most to the Chancellor's appeals on national grounds—and we all know how heavy are the burdens he carries—will be the ones to suffer most. They will, indeed, suffer in exactly the proportion of the response they made to what was thought to be an appeal in good faith and good will and on grounds of patriotism and national interest. This is indeed a refinement of inverted justice.

It is not only the principle of compensation that is affected, but the personal conduct and political good faith of the Ministers concerned. Such conduct, unless explained or justified, deprives them of the right to speak in the national interest or to be believed if they do. The Bill prescribes the date at which the Government are to take over the assets of the companies concerned. There may be some significance about this date. I will venture for a moment to probe. Clause 11 fixes it at 1st May, 1950, or any later date in the 18 months following the passage of the Measure. First May, 1950, is evidently timed, not in relation to the process of taking over the steel companies or anything like that, but to the date of the General Election or to the date of the completion of the legislation under the processes of the Parliament Act.

Thus it serves a double party purpose. It gives the Government the utmost span of office, and at the same time presents the nationalisation of steel as the direct issue at the General Election. Other motives are more a matter of conjecture. To my mind the fixing of this remote date seems to have been the means by which the differences in the Cabinet were adjusted between the extreme

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nationalisers and the more sober and responsible Ministers. The Chancellor was a little belated in his laugh at that. He must not miss the cues which are set for him by the Lord President. It was possible, no doubt, to reach accord in the Cabinet on the basis of, "If we win the election, the steel Bill will become law, and those of us who choose to go on will be masters of the industrial future of Britain. If we lose the election we shall be out anyway, so there is no need to split among ourselves now." I suggest to the House that interpretation of otherwise difficult events.

A Bill for the nationalisation of iron and steel, which, the Government assume, has to go to and fro between the Houses under the Parliament Act, just ekes out the time. They can explain to their followers, having settled their internal difficulties, "We must hold on together until we have got it through." Such are the calculations which have involved the fate and prosperity of this vital key industry in the vortex of party struggles. It is for this purpose that the Government have not hesitated to disrupt the constitutional settlement which was reached 30 years ago in the Parliament Act. I say that this is not an economic Measure conceived in a view, right or wrong, of the national interest, but a party dodge to hold that gang together where they sit until they have run the full length of their term.

None of us have any right, let me say, to assume at this stage what the action of the other House will be, especially in relation to a Measure that cannot come into effective operation until the electors have pronounced upon it. We are evidently in the presence of elaborate political calculations and manœuvres of the Socialist Government, who are primarily concerned with their own party interests. The question of keeping the steel industry in state of prolonged uncertainty, and any consequent injury to the public interest that may arise therefrom, does not seem to have complicated Ministerial discussions in any way. I read in the newspapers that Mr. Lincoln Evans, a trade unionist of note, the Secretary of the Iron and Steel Confederation, said three days ago:

Unfortunately the fixing of 1st May, 1950, as the vesting date means inevitably that steel

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nationalisation is to be made a major issue at the next General Election, and the industry is therefore to become a focal point of a bitter political conflict. We would have preferred it otherwise.

That is the statement of a man who certainly has the right to be listened by the party opposite when he testifies.

The Government say, "We are forced by our mandate. We told the electors in our election pamphlet 'Let us face the future' that we included the nationalisation of iron and steel. Therefore, we are entitled, nay bound, to use our majority to place a Bill for that purpose on the Statute Book." It is difficult to believe that this issue bulked largely even in Socialist minds at the General Election of 1945. I do not suppose that many of the electors concerned themselves with it at the time. There had been no election for 10 years. The bulk of the voters believed the promises which were lavished upon them. The victorious armies wanted to come home after all their toils.

So, steel was in the programme, but to pretend that it was an issue to which the electorate consciously directed their minds, or upon which they were instructed by political discussion, is humbug. On these lines it would be sufficient for the Socialist Party, at future elections, to put in their programme the word "etc." after any catalogue of legislative reforms. I say that the mandate which they derived from the electors at the 1945 election was as soon as possible to put the country on its feet again, to make us independent of foreign charity and to free us from undue war-time restrictions and severities.

I end with the same proposition that I submitted to the House at the beginning. This is not a Measure conceived and brought forward in the interests of the community or the State. It is a feature in party tactics intended to keep the Socialist left wing as far as possible in order, and the Government as long as possible in office. We had another example of this in the Budget. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who also deals with all our economic policy, and so often calls upon us all to help him, had to pay his way with his supporters for what seemed in many respects a sensible Budget, by putting in something spiteful which would satisfy

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the Left wing and would convince them of his continued ardour in the class war. Hence the capital levy, with all its unfairness and injury to saving. It is no use the Chancellor pretending that he introduced this on its merits. I rate his intelligence too highly. It was a sop which he had to fling to Cerberus.

Here now, in this Bill, is another instance of the same behaviour on a far larger scale. The Socialist Ministers must have something new to feed the flame of party strife and to prove that they still hate and are trying to maul the other half of their fellow-countrymen. The one thing that fills their minds, the one thing which they fear and shrink from, is the General Election, which is coming upon them, and which will end in obloquy and censure their dismal and evil reign.