- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate in London on February 7, 1951, attacking the Labour government's decision to vest the iron and steel industry on February 15 and urging that vesting be postponed.
- Main themes
- Early vesting date for steel nationalisation, national rearmament and defence, Iron and Steel Federation's continued control, party motives of the Labour government, Attlee's responsibility, Minister of Supply's powers of postponement, nine-month interval promised before vesting, compensation for publicly quoted steel companies, valuation disparity between quoted and private firms, call for a General Election
- Duration
- ~13 min
- Words
- 1,508
- Sentences
- 63
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 11.5
- Syntax
- 3.11
- Vocabulary
- 2.15
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other63 sentences in 19 paragraphs
There are many other things that matter, some perhaps even more, but as a broad, fundamental element in the whole process of national rearmament, a smooth-running, efficient steel industry, under experienced and capable management, is not only paramount, but indispensible.
I have long sought for the true explanation of the strange decision of a Cabinet containing several experienced men to choose so early a vesting date for steel at the very moment when they were appealing for the help and co-operation of all parties in the national rearmament and defence. The conjuncture seemed perverse and unnatural in the extreme. I see no alternative but that this is a manœuvre for party purposes of a complex but, none the less, obvious character. The Socialist left wing have to suffer much nowadays. They have to vote £4,700 million of additional expenditure for rearmament; they have to support voting with the Americans in branding China as an aggressor; they have to vote for the rearmament, within limits, of Germany to defend herself and to take part in general European defence; they have to call up nearly 250,000 men from the Class Z Reserve—although they compromise by making it for only 15 days, which if it does no good, cannot do much harm; they have had, through the policy of the Foreign Office, to support Egypt against Palestine with weapons sorely needed here at home.
They have had to do a lot of things they do not like, and which are contrary to their native promptings. Their leaders felt they could he held together only by the bringing forward of this specific cause of party antagonism which would appeal to the strong, inherent, factional emotions which range below the Gangway. I repeat what I said the other day, that this unpatriotic step is being taken by the Prime Minister to
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placate his unhappy tail. Hon. Members opposite will not get out of it all by laughing.
What defence does the right hon. Gentleman suppose that this will give him at the bar of history, or even before his fellow countrymen in the near future, if the British and United Nations' sky continues to darken? I have had my share of responsibilities in public life. While my strength remains I should not shrink from bearing them again, but it is no extravagance of rhetorical expression if I say that I would rather be banished from public life for ever than be responsible for the action which the Prime Minister is taking in asking the House to vote for the 15th February vesting date tonight. I earnestly trust that Parliament will restrain him. So tremendous a situation, such awful hazards, such an unworthy contribution—I can hardly believe that the Attlee who worked at my side for more than five years of a life and death struggle is willing to have his reputation injured in this way.
I feel emboldened to hope that, perhaps, the worst will not happen. Perhaps, we can hear more from the Minister of Supply. Is it, I ask him, a fact that, instead of this inadequate and almost absurd Corporation taking over the direct control of sections of the steel industry in the near future, so far as rearmament is concerned, the existing body, that has served us so well, which comprises not only the 92 firms to be nationalised but, at least, 400 others, may be allowed to carry on its vital service to the whole industry and to the nation? I know he is going to follow me, and I hope that he will deal with this matter. Will they be allowed to carry on, not only for a few transitional months, but for an indefinite period? How else can the Minister of Supply work out the intricate and comprehensive plans for rearmament—now overdue, but the prime responsibility for which falls upon him and upon his Department?
So far as it goes and so long as it lasts any movement in this direction would represent a concession not only to our views, wishes and arguments, but, even more, to the brutal and urgent necessities of defence with which the Government are confronted, and which, whatever they
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say, they will have to obey. If there is any foundation for what I have said, I hope that the Minister will tell us. If not, he should, surely, contradict me when he speaks, for if it be true that this continuance of control of the Iron and Steel Federation is to be maintained indefinitely it cuts the ground from under his own feet, and all the more is our action vindicated; and our intention to Note against the vesting of steel will be strengthened and not weakened by the course which may be forced upon the Government through physical facts. However, we shall, perhaps, hear more about this later.
But, I ask, what is the point of persisting in the transfer of ownership at this moment? It can only be, as I have said, a party point of the narrowest character. To give the nation no more control than it has already over the whole industry, we have merely to pay out about £300 million of stock, which must be manufactured by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to persons who are now investing their money in a business in which they have confidence and which has served us all so well.
Let us, therefore, look closer into the question of the acceleration of the act of vesting now to be imposed upon us. What is all this hurry for? I do not mind the hon. Gentleman's discourtesy. He takes as much as he can get from the House of Commons and gives as little as possible to it. Surely it would be wise and reasonable, even now, to postpone the vesting, at least within the latitude allowed within the Act? The Government always led us to believe that there would be a period of approximately nine months between the appointment of the Corporation and the vesting date. I have all the necessary quotations here from speeches by Lord Hall in another place and by the Minister of Supply at that Box. So far, the Corporation has been in existence for only four months.
Another five months could easily have been allowed—nine was the figure always mentioned—and much might have happened in that time to settle the outstanding difficulties. If in 1949 it was thought that vesting should not take place until nine months after the appointment of the Corporation it is surely unreasonable,
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in the infinitely more complex and disturbing conditions of today, to attempt to vest within four months. The Minister of Supply dwelt upon the feature of the Act that gives him latitude; he said that there may be industrial or political developments which may make it harmful for the iron and steel industries to transfer on that date, in which case the Minister of Supply has power to postpone the date of general transfer. What foresight! And what a waste of foresight! The Prime Minister and his Government have resolved to enforce the vesting date and to disdain the latitude which their own Act allowed them at the earliest moment.
This decision has brought in its train a host of troubles which can only be ended by a General Election, for which we shall continue to strive without a day or night's cessation. It has brought many stresses and losses upon us which are unfair. Let me give an instance or two. Out of the 92 firms that are to be nationalised over half are not publicly quoted securities and the rest are publicly quoted. The publicly quoted companies are to be bought out at their Stock Exchange value at the dates prescribed. Some of them have had very hard treatment. Those who have suffered most have often been those who had taken most thought for the future and been very sparing in the distribution of dividends, in response to appeals made from the Government benches. This has told against them. But the private companies, over half the 92, were accorded the right to appeal to arbitration—a similar right being exercised, of course, by the Minister.
We on this side have always maintained that the Stock Exchange value for publicly quoted securities is not a fair basis of compensation. At the same time, those securities which are not publicly quoted and have had to be assessed by agreement between the firms and the Minister of Supply, are being much more equitably dealt with than the publicly quoted securities. Under the terms of the Act, both classes of security are supposed to be valued on the same basis, but how does it all work out? For example, in the case of the 24 larger public concerns whose shares are publicly quoted, the compensation represents 75 per cent. of the book value of the net assets.
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In the case of the nine private companies for which agreements have already been made by the Minister of Supply—
