- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on February 7, 1951, in the debate on the Iron and Steel Act, arguing the Labour Government had no mandate to nationalise the steel industry.
- Main themes
- Absence of a mandate for iron and steel nationalisation, Iron and Steel Act, arbitrary selection of 92 firms, Minister of Supply's lack of principle, disruption of the steel industry, steel industry as a model of efficiency, Iron and Steel Federation, programmes of development and research, steel output without extra coal demand, vesting day of 15 February, national survival and defence
- Duration
- ~10 min
- Words
- 1,226
- Sentences
- 57
- Readability
- 55
- Grade
- 10.9
- Syntax
- 3.02
- Vocabulary
- 2.15
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other57 sentences in 17 paragraphs
They certainly were not, but it was because the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends thought they were that they abolished them. We all recall the remarks of the Secretary of State for Scotland on the subject at that time.
So I say, where is the mandate?—not in the 1945 programme, not in the vote of the people in 1950, nor in the House of Commons votes here in our present distressed assembly. It certainly does not, I think, await the Socialist Party when they are forced, as they will soon be, to appeal to the electorate. There is no mandate which is not an abuse of the term, and no obligation whatever on the Prime Minister and the Government to proceed with what I believe in their hearts they know to be an unwise and unfortunate Measure. Events have cast upon the Government fearful responsibilities which they seem to have willingly accepted. No one who has the welfare and even the safety of the country at heart would do other than respect them if they laid aside every impediment and strove only for national survival against perils which no man can measure, and which grow ever nearer and ever more grave.
I cannot recollect any more strange jumble than that into which Parliament has been plunged by the bringing forward now of the Iron and Steel Act. Ninety-two firms have been chosen out of the
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whole iron and steel industry. They represent about half the labour employed, but they dovetail, penetrate and permeate all the rest in such a manner as to affect and disturb the whole. No principle has governed the selection of those firms who should be in or out. When the Minister of Supply was asked in February, 1949; how he arrived at the split-up of the industry, he said:
We have found this the most convenient and practical method of achieving our purpose.… Our purpose is to get the preponderant parts of the basic sections of the industry with a substantial and proportionate and appropriate part of the finishing processes."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee C, 1st February, 1949; c. 612.]
But that is not a principle. It is the negation of a principle. It is merely the expression of a personal purpose and an individual point of view. Anyone can say, "This is appropriate," or "This is proportionate," and his opinion will no doubt in certain cases deserve consideration. But here we have the mass of this vast and infinitely complex business, upon which not only our economic life, but possibly even our physical existence, depends, and it is cut in twain in a rough and ready way on no principle but the arbitrary personal judgment of a Minister, and for no purpose but party politics at a moment of grave danger.
It is commonplace to say that the steel industry has served, and is serving, us well. It is expanding production, especially in exports; its prices are cut lower than almost any other country; it has nearly half a century of peaceful progress and goodwill between the management and the wage earner—a great measure of common comprehension exists among them today; it has a well defined and established relationship with the State, including the fixing of prices and the direction and emphasis of effort. All this we have achieved here in the British steel industry. It should be taken as a model Why should it be turned topsy-turvy? Why this industry, of all others, and now, at this time, of all others? These are surely questions which have often been asked and they embody one great question which we must try to answer here tonight.
I talk of the disruption of the iron and steel industry advisedly. I shall explain that. Custom and experience have set clear boundaries to the industry. These were
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perhaps most sharply defined in the days of the war-time Iron and Steel Control, and this experience has particular relevance to defence. That control defined the iron and steel industry as stretching from iron ore production up to an immense variety of steel products, which I shall not try to enumerate. This same area of the industry came under the control of the post-war Iron and Steel Board and over it the Ministry of Supply at present has long exercised extensive powers of control. The powers of control have been accepted willingly.
On the industry's side, the firms have similarly been organised for the provision of common services such as imports, the consideration of development plans, arrangements to meet the requirements of consuming industries, statistics, etc. The Iron and Steel Federation covers the whole range of steel processes. The Joint Iron and Steel Council deals with common services in relation to the foundry pig iron and iron foundry industry. These organisations have been developed for many of the very purposes specified in the Iron and Steel Act and have enabled the Ministry of Supply to carry out, in relation to the whole of the industry, the responsibilities which the Act now seeks to throw upon the new State Corporation controlling only a section of the industry. Is that not a very rough thing to do?
The second main feature of the Act is that it gives the Minister powers to give directions to the Corporation and particularly mentions the duty of agreeing with him programmes of development, training and research. In all these fields of activity the industry is at present working on programmes agreed with, or satisfactory to, the Ministry of Supply. These programmes are in full course of achievement, and unlike any programme that can be drawn up by the new Corporation, they relate to the whole output of the industry and not merely to the arbitrarily selected sections.
The third subject on which programmes under the Act have to be agreed with Ministers is research. Here again, the industry is already well in the van. It has the largest industrial research organisation of any industry in the country. I have seen no criticism made by any Government spokesman that there is something lacking and that it is urgently
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necessary to proceed with some new type of organisation for the purposes of research. But here again this organisation relates to the whole production of all the firms in the country, and the working out and establishment of some separate research arrangement for the 92 scheduled companies can only cause confusion and certainly cannot be hastened by making 15th February the vesting day.
There is one recent proof of the growing efficiency of the British steel industry in its relation to coal. Every day we are exhorted to save coal and at the same time to increase production. It seems almost incredible that the steel industry should have been able to do both. In the last two years—1949 and 1950—it has increased its production by more than 1½ million tons, from about 14½ million tons to over 16¼ million tons, but—and note this—without making any increased demand upon our nationalised coal supplies. Could we have a greater service to the Government? Could there be a truer measure of economic efficiency, progress and refinement? Every supporter of coal nationalisation on the benches opposite should be grateful to the steel industry and to the Executive of the Steel Federation for the example they have set.
