- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 8, 1948, in the Navy Estimates debate, censuring the Government's scrapping of older battleships, its use of manpower and Admiralty staff growth, and its lack of naval policy.
- Main themes
- Scrapping of the older capital ships, weakness of the Home Fleet, retention of old ships as reserve and insurance, wartime value of the Nelson and Valiant, 50 American destroyers of 1940, naval manpower of 145,000 men, men ashore versus afloat, growth of Admiralty officials, lack of Government naval policy, Fleet Air Arm planning, call for parliamentary scrutiny of expenditure, censure of the Socialist Government
- Duration
- ~22 min
- Words
- 2,628
- Sentences
- 112
- Readability
- 62
- Grade
- 10.7
- Syntax
- 3.17
- Vocabulary
- 2.07
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other112 sentences in 28 paragraphs
I would rather conclude my argument. The hon. Gentleman will no doubt have a great opportunity to deal with his point in Debate.
On top of this declaration of the weakness of the Home Fleet, and the very great reduction in our squadrons in various quarters of the globe—the Government do not like to publish figures of that, but, of course, foreigners have no difficulty in finding out what British ships are on the various stations; the British public is the only public which does not know these facts—on top of this, we come to the scrapping, announced with so much gusto, of the older ships of the Fleet. The Parliamentary Secretary spoke of the scrapping after the last war and used the figure 39 for several years. In those days battleships were counted by tens whereas they are counted now by units, by ones. There were 60 or 70 battleships and cruisers, and so forth, in existence then, and all had been kept for a very lengthy time. When all had been scrapped which was scrapped, a very large reserve remained. What the Government have done is to scrap the whole reserve of capital ships. The hon. Gentleman was perhaps not entitled to go beyond the statement that only five of the "Queen Elizabeth" class capital ships were to be scrapped, but I understand that the "Malaya," the "Ramillies"—I have forgotten all their names—are to be scrapped as well.
We should be very foolish to get rid of ships like the "Nelson" and the "Valiant," on which a lot of money has been spent, and to keep the ships on which no repairs have been done of a great character for a great many years. But I take it that they are all to go, the whole 10 of them, including the "Renown." That leaves no material
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reserve at all. The "Queen Elizabeth," the two "Nelsons," the "Renown," and the "Royal Sovereign" arc all consigned to the scrap heap. I suppose that the Minister of Defence will reply to this Debate.
One may first ask, and I should like to have some answer to this precise point, whether, if such a measure were necessary, this was the right moment for it. Was it the right moment to announce this wholesale clearance and destruction, when we really ought to make the most of all we have got? Was it right to proclaim such a decision to the world? I wonder how the Foreign Office felt about it, or whether they were consulted. I wonder how the Colonial Office felt about it—because all people keep their eyes on the British Navy. Why was it necessary to blurt it out at this time? There was no hurry. Many of the ships would not go to the knacker's yard for nearly two years. There was not the least hurry to bring out this wholesale destruction of these historic units at this juncture. The Government perfectly well could have let that question rest, whatever decision they had reached in their own minds. Nothing effective could be done, in many cases, for at least two years. I, therefore, hope that some of them may yet be saved.
I have some experience in these matters because twice on the first night of two great wars I have sat in the First Lord's chair at the Admiralty, and well I know how in the hour of crisis one looks around for every item of strength that can be scraped together. A set of short-term half-wits in time of peace, may brush away old vessels with all kinds of penny wise, pound foolish arguments and, if they have the political power, I have no doubt that they will find many experts to testify that these vessels are useless, especially if the experts have a hope that they are going to get new ones built in their place, which they are not.
But, when war comes, that is not what you feel. Before the second Great War, I think I prevented by speeches in this House, the destruction of several ships which a year or two later we found most useful. I remember that very old vessel the "Centurion," battered by target practice for many years, playing an important part in our plans for resisting cross-Channel invasion, and she was moved to Plymouth for that very purpose.
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There are such things as "expendables." There are occasions on which an old ship structure can perform a great feat of arms, and where it would be wrong to risk an up-to-date capital unit of the Fleet, of which there are nowadays so few that they can be counted on the fingers. I am told also that these old battleships might conceivably become strongly armoured launching platforms for guided missiles to be discharged. There are many uses to which they could be put. There is plenty of room in the bases. Why could they not rest there for a while? Why, anyhow, did the Government want to blurt it out now?
Then, there were the 50 American destroyers, which were bought at high cost in 1940. They had lain for a quarter of a century in the shipyards and bases of the United States. The United States put them by for a rainy day, as they might come in handy, and now they have become what everyone realised at the time they would be—an important factor in our fortunes, and a very useful counter in the hands of the United States. If the United States had followed the purblind policy now proposed by the British Admiralty under the direction of the Socialist Ministers, these 50 destroyers would have been scrapped 25 years before as mere junk. My experience has been that it is always better to keep the old ships or, at any rate, the best of them—I will not say that we should keep them all, and we did not do that last time—but to keep the old ships, because the cost of maintaining them in the various degrees of care and maintenance is nothing as compared with their insurance value, and still less to the part they may play in some grievous emergency.
With these preliminaries, let me now come to the particular vessels, or some of the particular vessels. "Nelson" and "Rodney" are only 25 years old, and they were the strongest ships of their kind when they were built. The "Queen Elizabeth" and the "Valiant" were. virtually rebuilt barely eight years ago at a cost almost equal to what I asked the House of Commons to vote for them when they were first laid down in 1912. It was a case of building a new cask round the old bung-hole, but they cost between £2 million and £3 million, I think, only a few years ago. I remember how eagerly we awaited their return to
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the Fleet in 1940, and we all know what a part they played in the war. I do not recommend complete reconstruction now, but it is very wrong to throw them away. These battleships are symbols of power. Perhaps battleships are only symbols of power now, but they count as invaluable resources, and they are considered in every country, friendly or hostile, throughout the world. There is an indefinite and unknowable value in old ships. No foreigner can tell what part they can play, what part they could play after a year or 18 months of reconstruction, or find out accurately what is being done to them at home.
But now the Government have proclaimed a clean cut; they have gloried in stripping themselves to the bone. All that sense of a latent, indefinable strength in the background is precipitately and incontinently swept away. This has been greatly to the detriment of British influence in the world in time of peace and it would certainly be deeply injurious in any naval war. Even in this plan of cutting us down to the bone and rigidly and starkly exposing the limits of our strength, the Government have no policy. The "Valiant" is now ordered to the scrap-heap, but it is only a year or two ago that the Admiralty demanded and obtained from this House £250,000 to give her far-reaching repairs and modernisation, which were carried out. That £250,000 has been taken from the taxpayers, earned by the toil and skill of the working people and squandered in repairs by the present Government on this one ship alone. Think of all those workmen refitting this ship, working upon hard steel, so many hours, days and months, only to find at the end of their toil that the result is immediately consigned contemptuously to the scrap-heap.
This particular episode of the repair and refitting of the "Valiant" is exactly like using 1,000 skilled men to dig a hole in the ground, and then, when they have dug it, using them again to fill it up. Why, even in the convict prisons, the idea of useless labour has been rightly condemned and abolished. In the convict prisons, yes; but not in the Admiralty under the present administration. They are welcome to their slogan "Scrap the lot"; for my part, I prefer, when I look at that Front Bench, Lord Fisher's famous dictum, "Sack the lot."
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I return to the question of manpower. Three years ago, I mentioned a figure of 150,000 as the rough, overall measure for the Navy and its Air Arm. The Government now tell us that they are aiming at a permanent strength of 145,000 men, including the Fleet Air Arm, or whatever they call it now. There is nothing between us in numbers, and I am content with that figure. I have said that I thought, three years ago, that that should be the figure, and now, at last, they have come down to it I hope that, with this apportionment of men—and, after all, it is the men whose numbers govern the money Vote at a time when there is no large new construction programme—it should be possible to maintain an adequate Navy under present conditions and having regard to the whole world situation.
How are these men being used? We had some figures, which I had not heard before, from the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon. I see that, three years ago, I hazarded a guess that at that time there were nearly as many men of the Navy ashore as afloat. That was brushed aside; but it was admitted by the Parliamentary Secretary on 1st March, only a week or so ago, that, out of 143,500 men, 84,700 were ashore, which is more than half the total numbers now demanded in Vote A. All this cannot be covered up by talk of the importance of research, which nobody denies, and the development of social services and amenities, by the need of training and retraining men ashore rather than afloat, or by the Air Arm of the Fleet.
All these count, but most careful examination should be made. The prime purpose of the Navy is its war strength, the safety of the country and its power and fame. The House of Commons should go into these matters with rigour and persistence. Something was told us about some committee. I was not quite clear about it. Some committee has been set up by the Government in order to give them a bouquet. Some of the very nice things which the committee said about them were read out to us. I had not heard about this committee; I would like to see a committee of the House of Commons have a look at these matters themselves, as they would have done in almost any other Parliament than this. It is not a popular part of our duties to pare and prune, but there ought
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to be ceaseless pruning and paring of the non-combatant Departments, not only in the Navy, but in the Army, and, believe me—although I am not dealing with it here—in the Air Service, which is producing the very minimum of results for the enormous sums entrusted to it.
In these last three years, instead of cutting down to a necessary permanent peace level as soon as possible after the victory, and thus letting the Navy work up efficiency on that basis, year by year, there was no policy or plan. The Navy was cut down by successive steps, each of which was announced as permanent at the time. As soon as one basic manning figure was fixed, it was found impracticable to adhere to it, and another was announced. The unfortunate Board of Admiralty have been driven from pillar to post, and have really had no chance of making well-thought-out and thrifty schemes. Planning has been made quite impossible. This reaches its extreme in the Fleet Air Arm, which has had to devote its time to making one plan after another with great labour and then tearing them up, because a further Cabinet decision had been reached, without ever being able to implement any particular scheme.
The efficiency of British administration in the Fighting Services has sunk to its very lowest level at the present time, and no one in the Government has the mental grip and vitality to reform and restore it. Although there is no enemy on the seas —this is a matter to which the Parliamentary Secretary did not refer, though it might have come under his attention at any moment—there are nearly three times as many officials, naval and civil, at the Admiralty and its ancillary establishments as there were on the outbreak of war in 1939. Here are the figures: 4,950 before the outbreak of war, and 12,650 today. All that these three times as many officials can produce is a pitiful admission—and an untruthful admission —that there is not one single battleship "operational" at the present time. There are nearly 8,000 additional clerks and officials employed on managing the Navy compared with what there were at the outbreak of war, when for less men and less money a far larger Fleet was made efficient. I must say that the number of naval officers has not increased: that is creditable to the profession. But what has
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happened has been this enormous growth of civilian officials of all kinds who have been superimposed, and who make work for themselves and their descendants every day they sit in their office chairs. The whole presentation of the Admiralty staff is a scandal, which any House of Commons worthy of its financial responsibilities should probe, scrub and cleanse.
I have been shown unofficial calculations, which anybody can make for himself, that an equivalent number of men to these 8,000, differently trained and employed—and, no doubt, much less well remunerated—could man two battleships, four cruisers and ten destroyers, now all laid up. It is the duty of the House to cut into this abuse and excessive top-hamper.
To sum up—I am obliged to the House for listening to me for so long; I had not thought I should be so long—I accuse the Socialist Government and Admiralty administration, for which they are responsible, of giving altogether inadequate value in fighting power for the men and money provided by Parliament. Secondly, I accuse them of disparaging our naval strength at a time of increasing danger by their public pronouncements and by their wholesale and precipitate destruction of our material reserves and resources. Thirdly, I censure their misuse—uneconomical and wasteful misuse, lush indulgence in misuse—of the manpower provided. And, finally, running through it all, I censure the lack of policy and comprehension which in this as in other spheres, has led our country down to levers of inefficiency which we have never plumbed before.
