Mr. John Dugdale'S Statement

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

8 March 1948 · House of Commons debate on the Navy Estimates · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 8, 1948, in a naval debate, attacking the Government's secrecy over Royal Navy strength and its belated adoption of his 1945 proposal for a 150,000-man Navy.
Main themes
Secrecy about Royal Navy strength, Dilke Return and suspended naval returns, absence of enemy fleets since VJ Day, dual peacetime and wartime function of the Navy, Admiralty value for money and manpower, naval personnel Vote A figure of 150,000, Government delay in adopting 1945 advice, Socialist Government drift and mental inertia, Soviet submarines, comparison with 1914 and 1939 disclosure practice, withdrawal from Palestine
Duration
~16 min
54th percentile
Words
1,890
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Sentences
92
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Readability
63
92nd percentile
Grade
9.7
17th percentile
Syntax
3.01
48th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
25th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 49%49%
  • Institutional 43%43%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

92 sentences in 22 paragraphs

(Woodford)

I think the House will have formed a favourable impression of the speech delivered by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. His father was for many years a brother officer of mine in the Oxford-shire Yeomanry, and I am glad, on personal grounds, to see him acquit himself with distinction in the House of Commons.

Let me say at the outset of my remarks this afternoon that I have not sought any information from the Government or the Admiralty—who might well have been willing to supply it if I had asked them—about the naval matters which are under discussion. I prefer to depend entirely on statements which have already been made to the public, and upon my own knowledge, which enables me to interpret those statements. It is customary on these occasions to compare the strength of the Navy with that of other fleets, built and building. Today that is impossible, because there is no enemy, no enemy at sea. All our former enemy navies are sunk beneath the waves, or distributed among the victors. The Soviet Navy has not yet taken shape, except, perhaps, for submarines, about which there should be serious consideration. But for the rest, the United States and France are in the closest harmony with us, and the German, Italian and Japanese Fleets do not exist. So there is no enemy against which to match the strength of the British Fleet, and this has

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been true since "VJ Day" in August, 1945.

Therefore, the strength, or non-existence, of other fleets at this time affords us no measure of the force which we should maintain. On the surface of the waters there is no enemy. But the Navy has a dual function. In war it is our means of safety; in peace it sustains the prestige, repute, and influence of this small island; and it is a major factor in the cohesion of the British Empire and Commonwealth. The tasks which the Navy has performed in peacetime are hardly less magnificent than those they have achieved in war. From Trafalgar onwards, for more than 100 years Britannia ruled the waves. There was a great measure of peace, the freedom of the seas was maintained, the slave trade was extirpated, the Monroe Doctrine of the United States found its sanction in British naval power—and that has been pretty well recognised on the other side of the Atlantic—and in those happy days the cost was about £10 million a year.

I wonder, therefore, as there are no enemies, no enemy battle fleets to be taken into consideration, why the Socialist Government should be so anxious to conceal the facts about the Navy and our naval power. Why, if there are no immediate enemies, should exceptional secrecy be preserved about our naval strength? Such secrecy was not thought necessary by men quite as capable as the present Minister of Defence in bygone years. Why, then, in these days, when there is no enemy possessing a naval power, should returns be refused like the Dilke Return, which were freely given to Parliament up to the eve of the wars of 1914 and of 1939? The Dilke Return has been suspended, and I am told there is but one copy of the Navy List in the Library. In 1914 our ratio to the German Fleet was only 16 to 10 in battleships. On mobilisation, we had 64 battleships, and the enemy about two-thirds of that. A Fleet action which might upset the whole future of the world at the very outset was our main pre-occupation. But that did not prevent the Government of those days from presenting to Parliament a fair and full statement of our naval strength. Why, then, does the Government shrink from doing it now?

All through the year 1939 there was great anxiety, as there is now, but all the

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full returns to which the House of Commons had been accustomed were presented, and I do not think we suffered at all from telling the truth to Parliament and to the world. There is something to be said for telling the truth to Parliament. This is a country governed by Parliament and finance and control of expenditure have always been the traditional and effective means by which the. House of Commons has brought its authority to bear upon policy and to shape its course. But, now the Socialist Government say that their naval plans are so secret that they cannot practise the frankness shown by the Liberal Government on the eve of war in 1914, or by the Conservative Administration in 1939.

The whole of this policy of concealment is silly. It only makes people ask themselves "What have the Government got to hide? If there are no enemies it must be their own shortcomings and administrative failures that they wish to hide." There is no doubt a lot in this, but when I come to examine these matters more closely I cannot find it an altogether convincing explanation, because the real strength of the Royal Navy is far above what the Government has lately made it out to be. This argument of secrecy is fraudulent, but it arises not from malice, but from stupidity. Nothing that the Government could conceal about the Navy, its strength or its weakness, could be so bad as what they have themselves proclaimed to the world. Nothing they could tell to foreigners would be so disparaging to British interests as what they have already said themselves about the strength of the Fleet.

My criticism today of Socialist Admiralty policy is twofold. First, the Admiralty never gave so little fighting value for so much money or so many men, and secondly never was such value as there is, so ill-presented to the world. I am always shy of criticising Governments about their mistakes in this changing scene— —this is a test I commend to hon. Members—unless I am on record as having warned them and advised them beforehand. Therefore, I have no compunction in reading what I said three years ago about the naval strengths we should maintain. In the autumn of 1945, not quite three years ago, I said:

I take the Navy first. On existing plans, allowing for intake, on 31st December, this

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year, the strength of the Navy would be 665,000 of whom 55,000 are women so that the Navy would even retain 448,000 at the end of June, 1946. I am astounded that such figures should be accepted by His Majesty's Government. I know no reason why Vote 'A' of the Navy should exceed the figure at which it stood in the Estimates of 1939, namely, 133,000. We had a fine Navy at the outbreak of war. I was sent to the Admiralty, at a few hours notice, on 3rd September, 5939, and that is what I found, relatively to the forces of other countries against whom we were matched, or likely to be matched. I have yet to hear any argument which justifies our planning to maintain, or maintaining, at the present time—unless it be in connection with the Fleet Air Arm—a larger naval force in personnel than we had at the beginning of the late war. I remember that at the height of the Nelson period, in the war against Napoleon, we reached a Vote A of 148,000, and that, oddly enough, was the figure that I was responsible for reaching in August, 1914. Let us take, as a working figure, 150,000."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd October, 1945; Vol. 414, C. 1690.]

That is where I was then, and that is where I stand now, although getting on for three years have passed. Then the Government tossed their heads in scorn, and the present Minister of Defence—this was before he had reached the "piffle and poppycock" stage—pawed the ground, sniffed and snorted in a manner of complete disdain that a figure such as that could possibly be mentioned in connection with the Royal Navy.

I prescribed 150,000 as a general figure. Now the Minister of Defence tells us that 145,000 is to be the permanent strength of the Navy. Why not have done it then? Yes, let the Government ask themselves. Why had they not the wit and prescience and knowledge of the subject to take the proper steps then? Now, when 30 months have passed, much has been lost. Hundreds of thousands of men, costing scores of millions of money, were kept in the naval service and on our Navy Estimates without any need or without any reason except the incapacity of Ministers to understand the problems with which they were confronted.

Now the Government accept my figures of 30 months ago. They took two years to clear out of Palestine after they were told to do so. Now they accept these figures of 30 months ago. They are to regulate, so they tell us, the permanent future of the Navy. Was it not a pity not to take these decisions in 1945? Think of all that would have been saved, think of all that would have been gained, by

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the release of men to build up our country's industries in the short intervening time before the American Loan ran out. I have not made the calculation of how many scores of millions of pounds and hundreds of millions of man-hours would have been saved if the Government and the right hon. Gentlemen opposite had done then what I advised them to do, and what they are now doing.

But there has been no policy, no control, no guidance, just jolting along, living from hand to mouth and from day to day. It has just been drift and mental inertia, and this is not only typical but an extremely precise instance which illustrates this point. It is typical of the degeneration of our affairs and administration throughout our whole country and in every branch of our national life. And how ill-timed is this new conversion of the Government to what I told them three years ago. They could hardly have hit it off worse. In fact, it is the record of misfits. When the world was safe on the morrow of our victory the Government and the Admiralty squandered our money on keeping up a vast strength against nothing. Now that danger revives, according to the speeches of almost every important Minister, they are found in the process of casting away the numbers and strength of our Forces.

Contrast the European scene of 1945 with what we see today. Contrast the problems of our foreign policy with the naval armaments policy presented on these two dates. Then there was no danger, but the Government had not the enlightenment to make the necessary reductions to ensure an adequate foundation for the Fleet. Now, when fears and dangers grow, they make, last year and this year, immense reductions. It is a strange inversion of thought for which there is, as far as I can see, no explanation except muddle and drift. If His Majesty's Government had done what I advised them to do in 1945, they would today have their Navy growing in strength and integral cohesion; they would be approaching that period of which the Parliamentary Secretary spoke just now when we should, in fact, have something like a Home Fleet in commission again.