National Service (Amendment) Bill

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

1 December 1948 · House of Commons debate on the National Service (Amendment) Bill · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on December 1, 1948, in the National Service (Amendment) Bill debate, attacking the Government's defence planning and asking what became of surplus wartime weapons and equipment.
Main themes
Criticism of Attlee government's defence planning, appointment of the Secretary of State for War, ministerial turnover in the Service Departments, role of the Chiefs of Staff, shortage of weapons and equipment, fate of surplus rifles after V-E Day, conservation of artillery and anti-tank guns, neglected vehicles in occupied Germany, ammunition stocks and material sunk at sea, case for a moderate efficient peacetime Army, men weapons money and time
Duration
~12 min
42nd percentile
Words
1,419
42nd percentile
Sentences
68
45th percentile
Readability
64
93rd percentile
Grade
9.3
14th percentile
Syntax
2.96
42nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
19th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 47%41%
  • Geopolitical 39%34%
  • Ceremonial 7%6%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 13%

68 sentences in 16 paragraphs

Phrases which he used have run all over the country. The "tinker's cuss" was a household word, and he has made that homely and necessary instrument of an honoured profession common to the daily usage of all classes in the land. He had, however, undoubtedly gained political popularity with the Left Wing of the Socialist Party, those gentlemen below the Gangway who attend in ever smaller numbers and with ever less enthusiasm every week. A place had to be found for the right hon. Gentleman at short notice. This struck the knell of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw. He was the man for whom the bell tolled. The appointment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Seaham to be Secretary of State for War compares very well with the appointment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) to represent us at the United Europe meetings.

We all understand the difficulties of a party leader in these times when he has not only to conduct government, but to preserve general good feeling among all his supporters. In these appointments I must say it seemed to me that the Prime Minister put party first, party second and party third and national and even international affairs were included, for the completion of the narrative, amongst the "also rans." I thought the appointment of the present Secretary of War was surprising. I believe the Army is better entrusted—. I know the right hon. Gentleman's good points as well as what everybody knows. I believe that the Army would be better entrusted to men who are not engaged in the most bitter strife of politics. Nor should the War Office be regarded as a receptacle for Ministerial failures. However, a change was made, and we now have the right hon. Gentleman endeavouring, on the one hand, to rally the whole nation in a recruiting campaign, and at

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the same time pouring out taunts and insults on the majority of his fellow countrymen.

I am one who holds that Parliamentary Ministers have a great part to play in the organisation of the Defence Forces. We all remember the unique contributions made by Mr. Cardwell and Lord Haldane to our military system. It would not be fair to lay the blame on any of the Ministers who have flitted through the Service Departments in the last three years. Not one of them had a chance to master even the rudiments of the problem which is vast and intricate and requires long study and much knowledge. I have shown already how the tasks of the Chiefs of Staff were rendered impossible by the rapid changes of plans and of "ceiling," and how uncertainty was prolonged and even deepened by the proper introduction of the National Service Act and the sudden and unforeseen alteration of the period of service. Not only the Chiefs of Staff but the political Ministers themselves were rendered quite powerless to comprehend the problem by the brief period during which they each held office.

The responsibility—and I regret to put this in a pointed way to the right hon. Gentleman—rests upon the Prime Minister as the first Minister of Defence for some time, and upon the present Minister of Defence, but especially upon the Prime Minister, who gained a practical knowledge of the problem during the five years of war, and who also had a distinguished record as a regimental officer. The burden lies upon him for the lack of planning and for the lamentable situation in which we stand today in the Services.

In making an Army, three elements are necessary—men, weapons and money. There must also be time. The Government have had three and a half years—certainly three effective years. Three years would not be enough to make an Army from a defeated and demilitarised nation, but it is quite enough to make an Army of whatever size may be chosen, out of a nation whose mighty Armed Forces are mobilised but which are being demobilised, and which has a vast surplus of experienced commanders and trained technicians. There is no reason why these three years should not have given us a moderate Army. I say a moderate or

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even a modest Army, for I have never urged gigantic figures for a permanent peace-time Army in this country. It could not be done with all the other burdens we have, but there is no reason whatever why these years should not have given us a moderate and highly efficient Army, including an effective field force. There has been the time; time has not been lacking.

Let me look at the three elements, one by one. Take, first, weapons, with which I include many forms of equipment. We are told there is a great shortage of weapons and equipment, that what is available is not balanced and that we cannot efficiently arm such formations as we have. We are told that we cannot give what is required for, and what we have promised to, our Allies on the Continent. We are warned that it would be a detraction from our export capacity to set the war factories even moderately in motion again. When I laid down my duties as Minister of Defence in July, 1945, we had a vast supply, a measureless supply, of equipment and weapons of all kinds. These were continually being brought up to date under the hard pressures of war.

What has happened to this enormous mass of material? I ask the Prime Minister: where are the rifles which, on V-E Day, armed 4,600,000 troops and Home Guards of this country alone? Are they in oil? Have they been reconditioned? Are arrangements made to keep them fit? There is no difficulty in keeping rifles. They do not go sour, like milk. They can be put away in oil, and can be left for 20 or 30 years and can soon be made efficient again—you never know when you might want them. We all remember the quarter of a million American rifles which were such a godsend to us in this country in 1940. They were nearly 30 years old. In addition to these 4,600,000 British home rifles at the Armistice, there were all the rifles surrendered by three million German who surrendered in two or three days, at the end, to Generals Alexander and Montgomery.

The same is true of other forms of equipment. What has happened to those latest models of tanks, of which great numbers were being turned out by our factories at the end of the war? No doubt better ones could now be designed. I have long experience in this matter, and

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I can assure the House that it is most improvident to get rid of the vital weapon you have, until you have a better one to put in its place. What has happened to the enormous masses of artillery of all kinds, especially anti-aircraft guns, and, so far as the Continent is concerned, I would say especially, of anti-tank guns? These comprise scores of thousands of weapons which would not become quickly outmoded and which do not spoil. Of course they require a certain expense to look after, but they do not spoil.

After the First World War, when I went to the War Office I put away all the medium and heavy artillery that had been made and everybody completely forgot about it. It cost hardly anything to keep, and then it came out and was of great use and value when we had to make provision for the defence of this country against the possibilities of invasion in 1940 and 1941. Have these great masses of cannons been properly conserved, and not left to rust and deteriorate like the rows of motor vehicles which, I am told, are being left to rust and rot away as they stand unattended in car parks along the autobahns of occupied Germany?

What has happened to the countless thousands of tons of ammunition which, at the end of the war, lay in our bases overseas, or in depots in this country and along our country roads? What has happened to the material of all kinds which was being turned out, after the war had stopped, by our own factories as a legitimate method of bridging the transition period from war to peace? I ask the Government: is it not a fact that great masses of material were taken out to sea and sunk?