National Service (Amendment) Bill
Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom
- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on December 1, 1948, during the debate on the National Service (Amendment) Bill, criticising the Labour Government's demobilisation and defence planning since 1945, especially for the Army.
- Main themes
- Failure to plan a peacetime Army, post-war demobilisation policy, men kept idle with the Colours, cost to the taxpayer, shifting manning ceilings, National Service Act 1947 and the cut from 18 to 12 months, industrial conscription in peacetime, frequent changes of Service Ministers, Secretaries of State for Air, Secretaries of State for War, Army cadres and formations
- Duration
- ~14 min
- Words
- 1,657
- Sentences
- 67
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 11.6
- Syntax
- 3.18
- Vocabulary
- 2.02
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other67 sentences in 22 paragraphs
I wish I could have an opportunity of affording the proof. That, however, is a date upon which it rests
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with the Prime Minister to advise the Crown. In 1945, however, as I say, the relations were good, and in my opinion the Government made a mistake—a view which I expressed at the time because I do not try to be wise after the event—in not taking advantage of the situation. I think they made a mistake in believing it necessary to adhere pedantically and rigidly to the scheme of demobilisation to which we have all agreed. But the Government did not take my advice, and the result was that throughout 1946 and a large part of 1947, many hundreds of thousands of men were kept uselessly with the Colours, instead of being able to return to industry where labour was urgently needed.
This policy gravely injured our economic revival and it imposed upon the taxpayer a fruitless charge—I cannot estimate it exactly—of many hundreds of millions of pounds. When giving my figures for the Navy, Army and Air Force—150,000 for the Navy, 1,000,000 for the Army, 400,000 for the Air Force—I naturally allowed a wide margin, and I carefully safeguarded myself by saying that I spoke without knowledge of any later changes in the foreign situation, and that the Government must put that first.
However, during a period when there was no urgent sign of the approach of danger, whatever latent facts may have existed, the Government kept great numbers of men with the Colours who were not needed. They might have come home a year earlier— I say so. But since then, as danger has grown—or, at any rate, as the situation has become more alarming—they have cut these numbers down far below the figures which I thought they might prudently have attempted to reach in 1945 and in the beginning of 1946. There has not been the slightest foresight in this matter; in fact, our policy has been attuned with extreme refinement and nicety to run in exactly the contrary direction to the normal course of events.
After a great war—and we, unhappy generation, have seen two in our lifetime—when a whole nation had been mobilised, the first task before a Minister of Defence is to have a good plan made for a peace-time Army, having regard to the anxious and disturbed conditions
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which undoubtedly follow a vast struggle. Such a plan must provide first, for garrisons abroad; second, for the creation of a moderate permanent establishment with strong cadres at home, and, thirdly, the means of expansion in time of danger or war.
The failure to make this plan is the root of all our troubles. That is the fact. I shall speak today only about the Army, although the Bill deals with all the Services. The Navy has little need of National Service; the. Air Force cannot use it even on an 18 months' basis with any great advantage. However, I do not wish to go into those complications today. The Navy and Air Force are different problems. I say that the time to lay down the plans for the post-war Army and to decide the scales of that Army, and to shape the units and formations of that Army, was during 1946. As the vast war-time army melted away, such structural elements as were indispensable to the new Army should have been carefully, and even at very high cost, preserved.
I do not say for a moment that this would not have been expensive, but the savings which could have been made by a more rapid run-down in the first 12 months after the war, would far more than have paid for the necessary special measures which had to be taken to induce the necessary key men to re-engage for a lengthy period in order to form the cadre and structure of the much smaller peacetime organisation which had to be created. I do not say that the numbers of the peace-time Army should have been as high as I stated in October, 1945, when many of my hon. Friends thought I was running a risk in giving actual figures. I thought they might be considered as an intermediate stage. But within those figures, or lower figures, it should have been possible to create a strong, lasting structure and to adhere to it in steadfast manner, however the winds might blow.
Alas, instead of trying to reach a permanent foundation for our Army, and, indeed, for the Armed Forces, at this stage, the Government drifted with events, swayed this way and that way by the gusts of the storm—and there are fierce gusts in the times in which we live. When the period of economic and financial stringency came along and frightened them out of their wits they
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began to issue a succession of orders to diminish the numbers of the Armed Forces. What are, I believe, in the latest jargon called "the ceilings," meaning the top numbers of men you may have, were altered so rapidly and with such inconsequence that the Army authorities, still more, the Naval and Air authorities with their far more complicated organisations, had no means whatever of making any plans; as soon as one plan was made, it was swept away by further changes in the total strength to be permitted. In consequence, the war-time Army melted away without any peace-time Army arising from it, as one might imagine the new Phoenix springing up from the flames which had consumed the old.
The introduction of compulsory military service of 18 months in 1947 was a courageous and necessary Measure, and one which will lastingly stand to the credit of the first Socialist majority that has sat in this House of Commons, but the change to 12 months 48 hours later was an entirely different conception. It threw all the ideas again into the melting pot. It must be remembered, however, that we have not yet used the National Service Act of 1947. I understand that it comes into operation only on 1st January, 1949. In the meanwhile, the Government have acted with their war-time powers. These war-time powers gave them ample and, indeed, plenary authority and discretion in regard to the use of manpower.
They have even, in the industrial field, done what I never believed would be possible until this class war, namely, introduced industrial conscription in time of peace—introduced it, but have not gone very far with its application. They have power, authority and complete control over manpower, power to delay dismissals from the Forces, power to call up, and so forth, but with all this power at their disposal, they have not been able to make any plans for the creation of an effective military system, based upon units and formations, which can grow, ripen and mature with every month that passes.
We cannot possibly make an Army apart from formations and apart from units, and time is needed, as with plants, for them to gather their full strength and splendour. Since 1945, the Government have not only had no
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defence plans of their own, but by their irresponsibility and constant changes have deprived the Service Chiefs of the possibility of making, let alone carrying out, any reasoned plan for the re-establishment of our Defence Services on an organised system.
I have drawn attention before to the repeated shifting of Ministers at the Air Ministry and at the War Office. There have been three Secretaries of State for Air. The third sits opposite me now, and I valued greatly the friendship of his father. There have been three Secretaries of State for Air and three Secretaries of State for War in the last three years, and none of these was, I think, specially picked for his knowledge, ability or experience. At the Air Ministry we began with Lord Stansgate, whom we knew well in this House as Mr. Wedgwood Benn. He spent the great part of his tenure at the Air Ministry trying to get rid of our interests in Egypt—"liquidate," I think, is the proper expression. After that came the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Mr. P. Noel-Baker), who was also absent on diplomatic work for a very large part of his time. Now we have the present Air Minister, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson), who has not been there long enough to accomplish anything on which he can be judged, or even really to look round the Department and its establishments with any thoroughness. Three Air Ministers in little more than three years.
The same thing happened with the Army. I must admit that there were rapid changes in the Army during the war in the Secretary of Stateship, but there was always a pretty steady control from the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff over all the Armed Forces. Continuity was not lacking, but continuity has not even been possible to conceive at the War Office during the last three years. The first Secretary of State for War was my right hon. Friend the Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Lawson). I will only say that he was a man generally liked by all who knew him. He had at least one qualification in having been a driver in the Royal Artillery in the first world war. But, apart from that, and with great respect to him if he is in the House, one cannot feel that he was in
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all ways equal to the enormously difficult task which lay upon him of bringing home one vast Army and making a peace-time permanent Army out of its elements. The Prime Minister evidently reached that conclusion when, after 14 months of service, he removed my right hon. Friend from his post and replaced him by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger).