- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on November 15, 1934, opposing a procedure proposal giving more power to Committee Chairmen to select Amendments, and defending the rights of private Members and minorities.
- Main themes
- Selection of Amendments by Committee Chairmen, proposed panel of ten Chairmen of Committees, powers of the Speaker and Chairman of Committees, rights of private Members and minorities, risk of partisan Speakers, Parliament's role in preventing bad Bills, the Kangaroo Closure versus selection of Amendments, shuttlecocking of Bills between Committee and House, surrender of powers to the Executive, government's large majority
- Duration
- ~19 min
- Words
- 2,304
- Sentences
- 71
- Readability
- 47
- Grade
- 14.9
- Syntax
- 3.50
- Vocabulary
- 2.07
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other71 sentences in 20 paragraphs
—were capable of conducting the business of the House to a very large extent without undue interference by the Executive. Ordinary Members were chosen by the Committee of Selection from other ordinary Members, because of qualities which had become known in the ordinary course of Parliamentary business, to discharge the function of a Chairman of Committee. That was the idea. The whole procedure was in the hands of the House as a whole, and was left there unmanaged either by the executive government or by the august authority of the Chairman of Committees, which have been limited to the major and main aspects of our Parliamentary life. This proposal seems to have the elements of creating a peculiar class of Members who specialise in selecting Amendments and other matters of Parliamentary procedure, and who would be, as it were, removed by an invisible but no less perceptible barrier from the ordinary run of the Members of the House of Commons. Whether that is a good thing or not every Member must judge for himself, and I am not at all seeking to pronounce in any decided manner upon it.
It is a new feature altogether that there should be in the House 10 Members associated with the Chairman of Committees and with the Deputy-Chairman, all under the nomination of Mr. Speaker, and who would, as it were, specialise in this class of work, and that those responsibilities will be transferred to this special class from the general body of Members of the House of Commons. It must be well worthy of consideration by the House whether any slight gain in efficiency—I fully admit that there is same—is not more than offset by the change in Parliamentary custom and tradition. On-this, let me point out that while everyone has the greatest confidence in your decisions, impartiality and great knowledge of the aptitudes of Members of all parties, we cannot legislate upon the basis that you will always be the occupant of the Chair.
We have to think also of the future in dealing with the Procedure of the
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House of Commons. Parliaments come and go, and there have been many precedents in our history for the election of partisan Speakers. Indeed, the greatest strife and struggle, when a new Parliament began its labours, used to be that which occurred in choosing a Speaker who would be the effective agent of one party or another. Suppose that a period should come of violent political strife, a period of revolutionary change, when there would be a whole mass of enormous Bills to be passed through, with all the Committees working at once, as well as the House, with the greatest activity; and suppose that a Speaker were appointed by the dominant and triumphant party, and the whole of the 10 Chairmen of Committees were equally so appointed. The conditions would be wholly different from any that we live in at the present time, arid it seems to me that in these hypothetical but possible conditions you might easily get a sort of uniformity throughout the whole of the chairmanships of these Committees which would be very detrimental to the fair play which is the right of minorities, and might conceivably be even more detrimental to the prosperity and well-being of the State. I think, Mr. Speaker, that on the question of the creation of a special corps d'elite of chairmen under your eye or the eye of your successors, as against the practice of letting it, as it were, well up from the good sense and good feeling of the ordinary Members of the House of Commons, the House should balance the two alternatives in their minds before they give their decision.
I come now to what is to my mind the much more important question of the powers which are to be given to this new class of Chairmen of Committees. The hon. Gentleman who represented the Liberal party made, in his interesting speech, no concealment of the fact that this is a very important change, and not the sort of change that ought to slip through without anybody in the House even taking the trouble to mark it. Although we may see our liberties and rights fading away, or falling away, step by step, and although we may have no power to resist the will of the administration in collusion—or rather, I will not say in collusion, but in association—with the will of their political opponents, nevertheless it is only right that the
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steps on this downward path should be registered and marked, and that Parliament and the public should be well aware of what they are doing.
This kind of proposal, if my right hon. Friend will allow me to say so, arises from what I think is a wrong view of the major functions of Parliament. Parliament is not a mere apparatus for passing Bills. A not less important function is preventing bad Bills from passing. Parliament has many functions apart from its legislative function, and it seems to me to be absolutely essential that people should not try to shape our procedure as if perfection would be attained when legislation was most easy. Most Bills, I believe, cost money, lose votes, create officials, and worry the public, and certainly Parliament has to stand between the great mass of the public and the strong pressure of organised sectional interests, or organised party interests, which from time to time endeavour to imprint their special wishes, or convictions, or fads, upon our Statute Book.
The practice of Parliament must be judged, not by quantity, but by quality. You cannot judge the passing of Bills by Parliament as you would judge the output of an efficient Chicago bacon factory. Out of doors this ignorant idea is much cherished, and you frequently hear people say: "Why don't they sit all the year round, and pass all the Bills they are asked to pass?" But the country would be thrown into great confusion if there were not corrective counter-checks, and if there were not Conservative elements in the country which are not anxious to see continuous rapid change, and all our affairs thrown into a state of flux. It is important, in a well-governed country like this, where so much has been achieved in the past, that a certain amount of time should be given for people to accommodate themselves to circumstances, and for troubles and difficulties to pass away, rather than that they should always be dealt with by petulant and impatient legislation.
In the last 25 years out of the 34 that I have been in the House—indeed, almost since I was first elected, but in the last 25 years particularly—possibly I have conducted through this House more legislation, social and other, than anyone except perhaps the right hon. Gentleman
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the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and possibly my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain). I have done it in all sorts of conditions, sometimes when there were the most tremendous controversial issues at stake, and when the two great parties, with only a majority of 100 between them, were ranged upon these benches fighting every inch—every Clause, every Sub-section, every word, every syllable, almost every comma; and I was never aware that it was not possible for the Government of the day, with patience and with a reasonable use of their Parliamentary powers, to get their legislation through. What has happened all of a sudden to this Government that it is not able to get its legislation through? I should have thought that the Government had no difficulty about getting their legislation through—that their only difficulty was to think of good legislation to bring before us. What is the trouble? When the Government have this overwhelming power, this colossal majority, this perfervid affection and agreement by the Opposition, what is the need for coming forward at this juncture and making new prunings from the limited shrub of the rights of private Members and of Parliamentary liberty? I have heard nothing from my right hon. Friend which shows us where we are. It looks to me as though we were called together for a month to deal with matters which I imagine would far better have been left undealt with, and, there being a little spare time, this additional improvement in the powers of the Executive and of the Government, in conjunction with the Opposition, over the House of Commons, has been thought to be a very good topic to introduce on one of the closing afternoons of our Session.
I have never argued, and never will argue in this House that a minority should have the power of resisting the settled will of Parliament by dilatory processes, but that has never been the case. They ought not to have that power, they have never had it, and they have not got it now. Surely the Government have quite enough power at the present time, without seeking to add to that great mass of authority which in many respects they seem unable to use. This proposal that the House should make a further surrender of its powers and rights to the Executive—for that is what
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it comes to—must also be judged in connection with the decision which the Government enforced upon the House, or extracted from the House, about moving Bills from the consideration of a Committee upstairs down to the Floor of the House, or, as one may imagine per contra, from the Floor of the House to a Committee upstairs. That is a principle which has now been established by the House. It seems to me that a very unsatisfactory situation will arise if, when great Measures are going through the House, parts of them are shifted upstairs, and then parts of them are brought down here—a new Parliamentary process which I venture to define, even before it is put into practice, as shuttlecocking—moving Measures from a Committee to the House and back again, so that neither the Committee nor the House will give full, comprehensive study and debate to the Measure in its integrity, but only to a clipped and shorn series of proposals, some dealt with upstairs and some dealt with here. Proposals of this kind, used by an unscrupulous Government, or a Government which desired to carry through really revolutionary legislation, might perhaps at no great distance of time be found to be of immense consequence to all of us who sit here.
It seems to me that the proposal to extend the power of selecting Amendments to the Chairman of Committees upstairs ought to he very carefully watched by the House. I must say that I myself prefer the Kangaroo Closure. I believe that the Kangaroo Closure is a perfectly effective agent for the passing of Bills, and greatly preferable to the power of selecting Amendments. I remember that we used it a great deal in the struggles before the War, and, although it often excited anger, it is not the same kind of thing as the arbitrary power of selecting Amendments. [HON, MEMBERS "The Guillotine."] I am not talking about the Guillotine at all; I am talking about the Kangaroo Closure. Let us be clear about the terminology. By the Kangaroo Closure I mean the power of the Minister to move, with the assent of the Chair, that a Clause, or even two Clauses, shall stand part down to a certain line or word. The Kangaroo Closure moves on along the face of the Clauses, and it is a very great power. It cuts out all the Amendments relating to the parts which have been dealt with up to that point.
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But I would put it to the House and to my right hon. Friend that, with all its severity, the Kangaroo Closure rests in the hands of the House, because the House has immediately to pronounce upon it. A vote is put to the House, and it is the act of the House; and, if a lot of Amendments are cut out, they are cut out by the House. If after the Closure has been carried and a second Division has been taken, there is great feeling in the House—and I have often seen it on these occasions—it is open to those who are opposing the Bill to obtain the assent of the Chair to a Motion to report Progress or to adjourn the Debate. It is then possible to consider the matter, and very often some easier arrangement is made, and some reparation afforded on the Report stage to those who have been prevented from discussing important Amendments.
I consider that the Kangaroo Closure, severe as it may be, and perfectly capable, as it is, of carrying the largest legislation—we carried the Home Rule Bill and the Parliament Act under it—is entirely adequate, and is preferable to what occurs now, which, although I need scarcely say it, is perfectly agreeable to everyone because of the great fairness and discretion and scruple with which it is administered, is inherently an arbitrary procedure. Any number of Amendments may be simply ignored without any reason being given, or any power or right on the part of any Member to ask for reasons or make a protest. To extend that power to these ten Chairmen upstairs, who are to be controlled by the Chairman of Committees and the Deputy-Chairman, is, I think, unduly and needlessly to curtail the rights of the House. It is, of course, quite easy to understand why hon. Gentlemen opposite support all this. They look forward eagerly to the assumption of power; they have a firm belief that they will be able by passing Bills to make everything much better for everyone in this country—
