Debate On The Address.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

28 November 1934 · House of Commons debate on the Address · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill moved an amendment in the House of Commons in London on November 28, 1934, during the debate on the Address, arguing that Britain's air defences were inadequate against German rearmament and urging a stronger air force.
Main themes
German rearmament in the air, inadequacy of British air defences, danger of bombing of London, incendiary bomb attacks, civilian panic and evacuation, retaliatory air power as deterrent, comparison of British and German air strengths, convertible civil aircraft, vulnerability of aerodromes, scientific research into air defence, collective security through the League of Nations, delay in the government's expansion programme
Duration
~50 min
94th percentile
Words
6,020
94th percentile
Sentences
234
92nd percentile
Readability
54
74th percentile
Grade
12.3
49th percentile
Syntax
3.27
80th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
19th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

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  • Institutional 22%19%
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  • Social 5%4%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 15%

234 sentences in 59 paragraphs

I beg to move, at the end of the Question, to add the words:

But humbly represent to Your Majesty that, in the present circumstances of the world, the strength of our national defences, and especially of our air defences, is no longer adequate to secure the peace, safety, and freedom of Your Majesty's faithful subjects.

To urge the preparation of defence is not to assert the imminence of war. On the contrary, if war were imminent preparations for defence would be too late. I do not believe that war is imminent or that war is inevitable, but it seems very difficult to resist the conclusion that, if we do not begin forthwith to put ourselves in a position of security, it will soon be beyond our power to do so. What is the great new fact which has broken in upon us during the last 18 months? Germany is rearming. That is the great new fact which rivets the attention of every country in Europe, indeed in the world, and which throws almost all other issues into the background. Germany is rearming, that mighty Power which only a few years ago, within our own experience, fought almost the whole world, and almost conquered. That mighty Power is now equipping itself once again, 70,000,000 of people, with the technical apparatus of modern war, and at the same time is instilling into the hearts of its youth and manhood the most extreme patriotic nationalist and militarist conceptions. According to what we hear, according to what we are told and what comes in from

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every quarzter, though little is said about it in public, Germany has already a powerful well-equipped army, with an excellent artillery, and an immense reserve of armed trained men. The German munition factories are working practically under war conditions, and war material is flowing out from them, and has been for the last 12 months certainly, in an ever broadening flow. Much of this is undoubtedly in violation of the treaties which were signed. Germany is rearming on land; she is rearming also to some extent at sea; but what concerns us most of all is the rearmament of Germany in the air.

In my Amendment other aspects of defence besides the air are comprised, but I shall confine myself absolutely to the danger from the air. I shall be specially careful not to exaggerate. Indeed, I hope that every statement that I make will be admitted to be an under statement. I shall try my utmost to keep within the limits of what is really known and proved. Let us, first of all, look at the dimensions of the danger as it affects this country at the present time. However calmly surveyed, the danger of an attack from the air must appear most formidable. I do not accept the sweeping claim of the extreme votaries of the air. I think that a great many statements which are made are calculated to frustrate the purpose of reasonable precautions by presenting the problem as if it were one which was insoluble. But without accepting these claims no one can doubt that a week or 10 days' intensive bombing attack upon London would be a very serious matter indeed. One could hardly expect that less than 30,000 or 40,000 people would be killed or maimed. I see that General Seely, now known as Lord Mottistone, in the other House made some calculations on this subject. They were said to be of a reassuring character. But even those reassuring figures and calculations, I think, at least justify the statement I have just made, that a week or 10 days of this kind of intensive attack would result in 30,000 or 40,000 being killed or maimed.

The most dangerous form of air attack is the attack by incendiary bombs. Such an attack was planned by the Germans for the summer of 1918, I think for the time of the harvest moon. The argument in favour of such an attack was

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that if in any great city there are, we will say, 50 fire brigades, and you start simultaneously 100 fires or 80 fires and the wind is high, an almost incalculable conflagration may result. The reason why the Germans did not carry out that attack in 1918 must be stated. It was not at all, as Lord Mottistone suggested in another place, that our air defence had become so excellent that we were protected against it. It was because the advance of the Allied Armies, with the British Army in the van, already confronted the heads of the German State, the Imperial Government of Germany, with the prospect of impending defeat, and they did not wish to incur the fury of retribution which would follow from such a dreadful act of power and terror as that which would have been involved in such a raid. Since those days the incendiary thermite bomb has become far more powerful than any that was used in the late War. It will in fact, I am assured by persons who are acquainted with the science, go through a series of floors in any building, igniting each one simultaneously.

Not less formidable than these material effects are the reactions which will be produced upon the mind of the civil population. We must expect that under the pressure of continuous air attack upon London at least 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 people would be driven out into the open country around the Metropolis. This vast mass of human beings, numerically far larger than any armies which have been fed and moved in war, without shelter and without food, without sanitation and without special provision for the maintenance of order, would confront the Government of the day with an administrative problem of the first magnitude, and would certainly absorb the energies of our small Army and of our Territorial Force. Problems of this kind have never been faced before, and although there is no need to exaggerate them, neither on the other hand is there any need to shrink from facing the immense, unprecedented difficulties which they involve.

Then there are the questions of the docks of London and the estuary of the Thames. Everyone knows the dependence of this immense community, the most prosperous in the whole world, upon the Eastern approaches by water. I need say no more about that. We

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studied it very carefully in the War, and I have not the slightest doubt that it has weighed very much on the minds of His Majesty's Government. It ought not to be supposed that the danger of an air attack, assuming that such a thing occurred—I am only making an assumption and not by any means saying it will come to pass—would necessarily be confined to London or the area around it. Birmingham and Sheffield and the great manufacturing towns might all be made the subject of special study, and every part of the country is equally interested in whatever measures of security can be taken to provide against such a peril. Not less dangerous than the attack upon the cities and the great working-class areas and upon the manufacturing centres, would be that directed upon the dockyards and the oil fuel storage which, unless proper precautions are taken, as I trust they have been or are being taken, might actually paralyse the Fleet, with consequences which no one can fail to perceive.

Therefore, I suggest to the House in this first part of the argument, that the danger which might confront us, however moderately put, would expose us not only to hideous suffering, but even to mortal peril, by which I mean peril of actual conquest and subjugation. It is just as well to confront those facts while time remains to take proper measures to cope with them. I may say that all these possibilities are perfectly well known abroad, and no doubt every one of them has been made the subject of technical study. I, therefore, have stated to the House as briefly as possible—and I trust I have not overstated the case—the kind of danger which reasonably ought to be taken into consideration should, unhappily, a breakdown in European peace occur.

I come to the second part of my remarks which deals with the much more difficult and much more debatable question of what remedy can be applied. What measures can we take to provide against these very great perils, or at any rate mitigate and minimise their effects? I do not think, to give a personal opinion, that it is much use planning to move our arsenals and factories over to the west side of the island. When one considers the enormous range of foreign aeroplanes and the speeds at which they travel—200, 230 and 240 miles an hour—

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it is evident that every part of this small island is, I will not say equally, but almost equally, within range of attack. If enormous sums of money were spent in displacing our arsenals from their present position, it might well be found that before this cumbrous process was completed, improvements in aeroplanes would have more than discounted any advantage which might have been gained. The flying peril is not a peril from which one can fly. It is necessary to face it where we stand. We cannot possibly retreat. We cannot move London. We cannot move the vast population which is dependent on the estuary of the Thames. We cannot move the naval bases which are established along our southern coasts with the great hereditary naval poulations living around them. No doubt, where new factories were being created the factor of distance would be an important consideration, but in the main I am afraid we shall have to face this peril, whatever it may be, where we stand.

I think it would be a great mistake to neglect the scientific side of defence against aircraft attack—of purely defensive action against aircraft attack. Certainly nothing is more necessary, not only to this country but to all peace-loving and peace-interested Powers in the world and to world civilisation than that the good old earth should acquire some means or methods of destroying sky marauders. It is a matter which is of interest to us all that we should be able to meet this present menace which no generation before our own has faced, which shakes the very fabric and structure of all our civilised arrangements, and, by spreading fear and danger far and wide, makes it more and more difficult to preserve security and tranquillity in the minds of the different great States. If anything can be discovered that will put the earth on better terms against this novel form of attack, this lamentable and hateful form of attack-attack by spreading terror throughout civil populations—anything that can give us relief or aid in this matter will be a blessing to all.

I hope that the Government will not neglect that aspect of the question. There is a committee, I have no doubt, studying it. It ought to be the strongest committee possible, it ought to have the greatest latitude possible, and it ought to

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be fed with the necessary supplies to enable experiments of all kinds to be made against this danger. I have heard many suggestions with which I would not venture to trouble the House now, but they ought to be explored and explored thoroughly and with all the force of the Government behind the examination. It ought to be not merely a question of officers of a department doing their best, but of the force of the Government, and I do hope that my right hon. Friend when he replies will tell us that steps of this kind will be taken; that there will be no danger of service routine or prejudice or anything like that preventing new ideas from being studied, and that they will not be hampered and subjected to so many long delays as were suffered in the case of the tanks and other new ideas during the Great War.

The fact remains that when all is said and done as regards defensive methods—and all that you can say now has been said already—pending some new discovery, the only direct measure of defence upon a great scale is the certainty of being able to inflict simultaneously upon the enemy as great damage as he can inflict upon ourselves. Do not let us under-value the efficacy of this procedure. It may well prove in practice—I admit you cannot prove it in theory—capable of giving complete immunity. If two Powers show themselves equally capable of inflicting damage upon each other by some particular process of war, so that neither gains an advantage from its adoption and both suffer the most hideous reciprocal injuries, it is not only possible but it seems to be probable that neither will employ that means. What would they gain by it? Certainly a Continental country like the one of which I have beep speaking, with large foreign armies on its frontiers, would be most unwise to run the risk of exposing itself to intensive bombing attacks from this island upon its military centres, its munition establishments and its lines of communication at a time when it was engaged or liable to be engaged by the armies of another first-class Power.

We all speak under the uncertainty of the future which has so often baffled human foresight, but I believe that if we maintain at all times in the future an air power sufficient to enable us to inflict as much damage upon the most

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probable assailant, upon the most likely potential aggressor, as he can inflict upon us, we may shield our people effectually in our own time from all those horrors which I have ventured to describe. If that be so, what are £50,000,000 or a £100,000,000 raised by tax or by loan compared with an immunity like that? Never has so fertile and so blessed an insurance been procurable so cheaply.

Observe the reverse of the picture. Assume that one country has a powerful air force and that the other has none, or that the other country has been so decisively beaten in the air that it has hardly any air force left. Then not only war machines but almost any flying machine that can be fitted to carry bombs will be employed to go over and to torture every part of the State and the community in that other country until it surrenders all that is asked from it. Absolute subjugation could in the end be enforced by such air attack, once a country had lost all power to fight in the air. Once complete ascendancy in the air had been secured, the victor Power might almost at leisure pick out any aircraft factory and make a special study of it, an intensive attack upon it, and thus there could be no recovery. It is almost the only form of war that we have seen in the world in which complete predominance gives no opportunity of recovery. That is the odious new factor which has been forced upon our life in this twentieth century of Christian civilisation.

For all these reasons, it seems to me, and I submit to the House, that we ought to decide now to maintain, at all costs, in the next 10 years an Air Force substantially stronger than that of Germany, and that it should be considered a high crime against the State, whatever Government is in power, if that force is allowed to fall substantially below, even for a month, the potential force which may be possessed by that country abroad. That is the object with which I have put this Amendment on the Paper. I am not going into other questions than those with which I am specially concerned to-day, but I must just mention that if, to this provision which I have suggested, you add those measures towards collective security by what I would call placing special constables

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upon the dangerous beats in Europe and perhaps later on elsewhere, under the aegis and authority of the League of Nations, I firmly believe that we may have it in our power to avert from this generation the supreme catastrophe of another war. The idea that we can intervene usefully in sustaining the peace of Europe while we ourselves are the most vulnerable of all, are the beggars in fact, is one which cannot be held firmly by any man who looks at this in the faithful discharge of his duty.

I have now spoken of the danger, and I have indicated, as far as I can see, what is the only remedy or mitigation which is in our power, and I have suggested that it is a good and effective mitigation and a very reasonable security. I now come to compare the actual strengths, present and prospective, of Great Britain and Germany, as far as I have been able to form an opinion about them. Here again there is no reason to assume that Germany will attack us. In fact, the German people have very friendly feelings in many ways towards us, and there is no reason at all why we should expect that they would attack us; but it is not pleasant for us—I will put it to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition—to feel that it may soon be in the power of the German Government to do so unless we act.

I will not dwell this afternoon on the character of the present German Government, because the House knows it all, and there is no need to repeat all that. I will content myself by saying that the decision of a handful of men, men of the 30th June, is all that is required to launch an attack upon us, if such an attack were possible, and that only the shortest notice or no notice at all could be counted upon. Never in our history have we been in a position where we could be liable to be blackmailed, or forced to surrender our possessions, or take some action which the wisdom of the country or its conscience would not allow it to do. Never have we been in a position where we could be subjected to that or, alternatively, have to face the horrible ordeal I have tried, very briefly, to place before the House. It is a danger to all Europe that we should be in that position, and I do not think His Majesty's Government ought to put us or leave us in such a plight, where we, with our wealth and Empire, exist on the good

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behaviour and good faith, which may not be lacking, but which may not be present, of the present rulers of Germany. I am sure our people are not willing to run such risks, and yet, as I am going to show, I think indisputably, this is the kind of danger which is coming upon us in a very short time unless we act upon a great scale and act immediately.

According to the Treaty of Versailles, the German Government are not allowed to build any military aircraft or to organise any military air force. Now this stipulation was intended to be a protection to the other countries and for their greater security and assurance, but it has in fact become an additional danger. What was meant for a safeguard for the Allies has in fact become only a cloak or a mask for a potential aggressor. With any other country, the facts about its air development would have been stated quite promptly. We could have put an unstarred question on the Paper as to the strength of the air force of France, or the United States, or any other country. It fact, the League of Nations collects these figures. It is part of the process of waging war against war that there shall be full disclosure, that people shall know where they stand, at any rate, if you cannot remove fear, that at least you can remove suspicion. With any other country this would make no difficulty, but it is just because Germany is under this special disability. I understand how it has arisen. It has not been considered etiquette, or at any rate the Government have shrunk hitherto from stating the facts which they know well—I am sure they know—about the German rearmament, and very naturally, because, if the Foreign Secretary had said there was this or that that they were doing contrary to the Treaty, he would immediately have had to make good his statement, or perhaps stand by his statement, that he was charging a great Power with a breach of the Treaty, and I can understand that until certain disclosures which have been made on the Continent had been made, it was necessary for the Government to proceed with great caution in this respect.

But the time has come when what was meant to be a protection for others must no longer be a cloak or a mask for Germany. The time has come when the mystery surrounding the German rearmament must be cleared up. We must

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know where we are. The House naturally in these matters leaves the main responsibility to the Executive, and that is quite right, but at the same time it cannot divest itself of responsibility for the safety of the country, and it must satisfy itself that proper measures are being taken. I will therefore this afternoon assume the duty of stating what, to the best of my belief, are the strengths and programmes of the German military air force which is being built up in contravention of the Treaty, and I invite my right hon. Friend the Lord President to confirm, correct, or contradict me when he speaks, as I believe he is going to do immediately after I sit down. If he does not contradict me or correct me, the House should assume that the statements which I make are true or at any rate that they are under-statements; that is to say, I have not revealed the real state of things. In order that my right hon. Friend might be able to deal effectively with these issues and might not be confronted with them abruptly in the House, I sent him in the last week précis of the exact points which I propose to put to him, and I understand that he has had an opportunity of consulting with the high expert authorities upon this matter.

I therefore assert, first, that Germany already, at this moment, has a military air force—that is to say, military squadrons, with the necessary ground services, with the necessary reserves of trained personnel, and material—which only await an order to assemble in full open combination—and that this illegal air force is rapidly approaching equality with our own. That is my first submission to the Government and to the House. Secondly, by this time next year, if Germany executes her existing programme without acceleration, and if we execute our existing programme on the basis which now lies before us without slowing down, and carry out the increases announced to Parliament in August last, the German military air force will this time next year be in fact at least as strong as our own, and it may be even stronger. Thirdly, on the same basis, that is to say, both sides continuing with their existing programme as at present arranged, by the end of 1936—that is, one year further on, and two years from now—the German military air force will be nearly 50 per cent, stronger, and in

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1937 nearly double. All this is on the assumption, as I say, that there is no acceleration on the part of Germany, and no slowing down on our part. So much for the comparison of what may be called the first line air forces of the two countries.

I come to the second line—civil aircraft which are capable of being used for military operations, the dual purpose machines, as they are called in Germany. Here the story is very much worse for us. Germany has already between 200 and 300 machines of long range with great speed, 220 to 230 miles an hour, which are now ostensibly employed, or actually employed, many of them, in carrying mail bags and to some extent in carrying passengers, which machines can be converted into long-distance bombers of the highest efficiency in a few hours. All that is necessary is to remove some parts of the passenger accommodation and fit bomb racks in their place. Those bomb racks, I told the House five months ago, are already made and kept in close proximity to the machines. That is the position at the present time. Germany has already between 200 and 300 of these machines. This time next year the number will have risen at least to 400 of these machines, which in the case of war will be a direct addition to the German military air force.

Against that we, as I understand, can set nothing that is in the slightest degree comparable for military purposes. Our civil aviation is valueless for war purposes. Indeed, it has been the custom of Ministers and others to boast of this fact as proof of our pacific intentions, if, indeed, proof were needed. Everyone knows that we have built for comfort and for safety, and without the slightest contemplation of convertibility. Therefore, I assert, and I invite the Government to contradict the statement if they can, that by this time next year, taking both the military and the convertible civil aircraft into consideration, Germany will have a substantially stronger Air Force than we. Frankly, I do not think that the country has prepared itself to realise this fact. The conditions in 1936 and 1937 if the German convertible machines are added to the military machines, will be that the German Air Force will, of course, be far more adverse

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to this country than the purely military figures, which are bad enough, that I gave a few moments ago.

I come to what I may call the third line—the ordinary civil aviation. It is difficult to compute the value of this for war, but it represents reserve pilots, mechanics, landing grounds, factories, aerodromes and a general familiarity with the flying art, which is, indirectly, of great importance. I think you may say that civil aviation bears the same relation to the fighting force as the mercantile marine has for so many generations borne to the Royal Navy. It is quite certain that the German pool of civil aviation, from which a military air force can be expanded and developed, is already far larger and far more closely related to military purposes than ours. The principle underlying German civil aviation, and all the regulations and subventions, point to their being made efficient for rapid transformation into military machines, or, as far as possible, into training machines.

Nor is Germany neglecting defensive preparations. Air alarm arrangements, gas drill and so forth are taking place all over Germany as well as in many other parts of the Continent of Europe. The House must not miss the bearing of this upon retaliation, upon the protection one can get from the power of retaliation, because if of two populations, both exposed to attacks of this kind—which God forbid—one has all kinds of protection which enable it to avoid the loss of life, it is perfectly obvious how great will be the injury to the one unprepared. I know that the Government have been considering this matter, and I understand the reason why nothing has been done is the fear of frightening the population. I say that it is much better to be frightened now than to be killed hereafter. It is much better to be frightened before it happens than when the danger actually comes to pass.

There is another point which, I notice, was referred to in a Question and Answer in the House to-day. I am assured that many of the German aerodromes are proof against air attack. They build earth concrete embankments round the shelters where the aeroplanes are stored, so that the place is quite safe; where as you have only to look at our aerodromes for our Air Force to see that they are vulnerable to any attack of that

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kind, and might be put out of action altogether. Anyone, however pacific he may be, must admit surely that there is no proper protection of our aerodromes. I think that this is a primary and an urgent duty of the Government. I heard the Debate the other day upon the devastated areas of our country. Many suggestions were made for remedying the situation. Suppose there is a great deal of work to do in earthing up these aerodromes which will have to be constructed, why not give it to those unemployed people? Recruit 20,000 or 30,000 men from those areas on good wages, and let them go about the country and do this necessary work, instead of being employed on relief work and so forth. Let them act, not as unemployed, but as a labour reserve, and let them go forward and revivify their own homes by sending back the wages which they earn by doing the most necessary and urgent of public tasks. I throw that out by the way.

I have now completed my review of the two countries and I invite my right hon. Friend the Lord President to state, if I am wrong, where I am wrong, and to what extent I am wrong. But I cannot leave this subject without also referring to another cause of anxiety. So far, I have dealt with what, I believe, is the known, but beyond the known there is also the unknown. We hear from all sides of an air development in Germany far in excess of anything which I have stated to-day. As to that, all I would say is: Beware. Germany is a country fertile in military surprises. The great Napoleon, in the years after Jena, was completely taken by surprise by the strength of the German army which fought the war of liberation. Although he had officers all over Germany the strength of the army which fought him in the Leipzig campaign was three or four times as strong as he expected. Similarly, when the Great War broke out, the French general staff had no idea of the reserve divisions which would be brought against them. They expected to be confronted by 25 army corps; actually more than 40 came against them.

It is never worth while to underrate the military qualities of this most remarkable and gifted people, nor to underrate the dangers that may be brought against us. I only say it does not follow that, in stating the figures I have to-day, I am not erring grievously

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on the side of under-statement. It sounds absurd to talk about 10,000 aeroplanes, and so on, but, after all, the resources of mass production are very great, and I remember when the War came to an end the organisation over which I presided at the Ministry of Munitions was actually making aeroplanes at the rate of 24,000 a year, and planning a very much larger programme for 1919. Of course, such numbers of aeroplanes could never be placed in the air at any one moment, nor a tenth of them, but the figures give one an idea of the scale to which manufacture might easily assume if long preparations have been made beforehand, and a great programme of production is launched.

The danger I have dealt with. I have mentioned the remedy so far as it can be described, and I have compared the two air forces. But what have we done in the last year? This is the last aspect with which I wish to deal. We had a Debate last March, and there was a good deal of anxiety expressed. My right hon. Friend the Lord President made a very weighty declaration, and he broke the back of the Debate. But in the evening the Debate revived, and a great deal of anxiety was expressed for a more explicit statement, and my right hon. Friend showed a little less than his usual imperturbable urbanity and patience, and said, "If you are not satisfied, you can go to a Division." What was the use of going to a Division? You might walk a majority round and round the Lobbies for a year, and not alter the facts by which we are confronted. What happened after the March Debate? Very little—so far as I can see, nothing happened for five months. Then we came to July. In July, the right hon. Gentleman came down to the House with the full authority of the Government and announced the programme; of the 42 new squadrons to be added to the Air Force in five years. I pointed out there and then that this scheme did not propose to strengthen the Air Force even by one additional squadron before 31st March next, and only by 50 machines—that is to say, 50 machines in their proper squadrons with all their reserves, and so on—by 31st March, 1936. Another five months have passed, and we now know that nothing has been done, and that nothing will be done before 31st March which will involve a Supplementary

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Estimate. I am well aware of all that has been rightly said of the complication of this service and the necessity of preliminary preparation, and so forth. 1 will deal with that not now, but when an opportunity occurs upon the Air Estimates. I submit to the House that to continue this dilatory process in the present situation, even for a few more months, and certainly for another year, will deprive us of the power ever to overtake the German air effort. I therefore invite His Majesty's Government to tell us, firstly, what are the facts; and, secondly, if the facts are admitted, what will be their action?

I have only one more thing to say, and I address myself to the Liberal and Labour Oppositions. We read almost every day—certainly every week—in their great popular newspapers the most searching and severe criticism of the existing German regime. Nowhere is that criticism put with greater force and ability and from no quarter is it, I believe, more resented by the present rulers in Germany because it is in the main true. Things are said which are capable of raising the deepest antagonism, not in the breasts of the German people, because they have nothing to say as to their own destiny, but in the breasts of those powerful men who control the people. How can hon. Members opposite reconcile that criticism with the other parts of their policy, which is to cover with contumely and mockery and odium every attempt to secure a modest and reasonable defence to maintain the safety of the country? I have not always found myself in full agreement with this House of Commons, but I have never lost all hope that it will prove itself to be what its creators hoped for it, a great House of Commons in the history of the country. The election which brought this House into power was one in which the greatest number of voters ever called upon to record the franchise in this country voted, above all things, for the maintenance of the strength and the security of their native land. That was the emotion which brought us into power, and I would venture to say: Do not, whatever be the torrent of abuse which may obstruct the necessary action, think too poorly of the greatness of our fellow countrymen. Let the House do its duty. Let the Govern-

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ment give the lead, and the nation will not fail in the hour of need.