Schuman Plan

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

27 June 1950 · House of Commons Debate on the Schuman Plan · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, as Leader of the Opposition, spoke in the House of Commons in London on June 27, 1950, in the Schuman Plan debate, urging Britain to join the Paris conference and attacking the Labour Government's refusal.
Main themes
British refusal to join the Schuman Plan conference, Conservative and Liberal Motion versus Government Amendment, French Document 10 assurances on treaty ratification, Labour Party executive pamphlet on European unity, Socialist hostility to the European Movement, supranational authority over coal and steel, Franco-German reconciliation, risk of German domination without Britain, British wages and levelling up, Third Force and neutral bloc, Empire and Commonwealth priority
Duration
~49 min
94th percentile
Words
5,857
94th percentile
Sentences
246
93rd percentile
Readability
55
78th percentile
Grade
11.4
38th percentile
Syntax
3.02
50th percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 55%49%
  • Institutional 22%20%
  • Ceremonial 12%11%
  • Economic 10%9%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 11%

246 sentences in 86 paragraphs

(Woodford)

The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said that he would recall the Debate from its more discursive aspects to the Motion and the Amendment which, after all, are matters which we have got to settle tonight, and I was very glad to hear him say so. When he strays into these biographical spheres, I will only venture to say that it appeared to me that he seemed to lay too much upon my burdened shoulders. I did hope that I might get away with nothing more serious than a charge of foresight; but apparently I actually set matters in train so that they occurred in accordance with my predictions. If it be so, that I have in my words such mysterious and latent power, I hope he will pay the utmost attention to what I am about to say.

Those who accept responsibility for the Motion on the Order Paper represent, according to the figures of the recent General Election, a majority of 1¾ million

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of voters over those who support His Majesty's Government; and I might say that my feeling is that, on the whole, the balance of arguments have shown at least an equal superiority on our side. At the end of this Debate, I still retain the impression that the fundamental issues which have been raised have sprung largely from the mismanagement of our affairs, and that a competent administration would never have needed to thrust them upon us at this time.

The peculiar feature of this Debate is that it turns on a very small practical point, or a group of very small practical points, and at the same time raises in our minds many of the fundamental issues with which the future of a peaceful world is interwoven. When we study the White Paper of the Government's parleys with France, and consider it together with the apologia or explanation which our Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to tender to the American public, one really wonders why all this trouble has arisen between friendly Governments, and whether it could not have been avoided if there had been a Foreign Secretary fit to do his work or a Prime Minister able, amid graver preoccupations, to keep a grip on what was going on.

I did not like the attitude of the French Government in springing this large question upon us so suddenly, or in making pedantic stipulations before sitting in council with their wartime comrades. I admit I was nettled by it. I am quite sure that France would never have acted in this manner towards any British Government but the present one. But there is an explanation which I will give. It is an explanation, even if it is not an excuse, and it should be stated. As for the suddenness; the French Ministers no doubt felt that after we had upset the whole of their economy and finance by devaluation without even a word of warning, they were under no special obligations to study our convenience where other large issues were concerned. I do not say they were entitled to retaliate in this way. It is a feature of friendship to rise above and overlook such treatment on both sides.

There is also an explanation which the French may offer upon the merits of the question itself. They evidently wished the British Socialist Government to give a general affirmation in principle to the policy of a merger of the European heavy

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industries, and of British goodwill towards the ending of the quarrel of the centuries between France and Germany, which in our lifetime has cost us all so dear. Why did they do this? I will tell the House. It is because they suspected that the British Socialist Government were no friends to the process of the unification of Western Europe, or to what we call the European Movement, and they had good ground for their apprehensions.

We have the record in our minds. We all remember, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) reminded us yesterday, how the Socialist Executive and Government used all their influence to prevent any members of their party attending the Conference of the European Movement at The Hague in the summer of 1948, and how many of their pledge-bound supporters went there in spite of them. Everyone will recall the attitude of the Lord President of the Council and his colleague, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, at Strasbourg last year. These matters are public.

What has not been made public, though it is well known and many of us have been continually informed upon it, has been the constant efforts to hamper, obstruct, restrict and diminish the powers and development of the European Assembly by the Foreign Secretary and his representatives in the meetings of the Council of Europe which they had been forced by public opinion and their own party to accept. I have been told from time to time by some who were present at these meetings that the British were consistently using their influence to delay progress and to minimise decisions. Our Foreign Secretary was on almost every occasion regarded, rightly or wrongly, as the obstacle which must be overcome. I am not concerned today with his personal motives. We all regret his illness, but the prolonged illness of a Minister and his unfortunate absence from our Debates cannot arrest the march of events or relieve us from our duty to deal with them. I am sorry that this should be so, but none of us can help it.

So I say, without hesitation, that the French Government had the feeling rooted in them by long or hard experience that the British Socialist Government and the British Socialist Foreign

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Secretary were hostile to the movement towards European unity and might, therefore, attend a meeting on the Schuman Plan only for the purpose of bringing it to naught. It was on these grounds that they were led to dwell, I think unduly and with a pedantic insistence, upon agreement in a broad and general expression of accord with the great international objectives which were in view and are now before us.

But this was no excuse for the British Government piling their own prejudices on the top of French pedantry. If we had had an effective Foreign Secretary able to get through his work and a reasonable measure of goodwill between friends, comrades and allies exposed to common and increasing dangers, this curious deadlock on matters not so much of principle as of procedure and etiquette would never have occurred, and if it had occurred could easily have been smoothed away.

When the House compares the words and the sentiments of the Conservative and Liberal Motion with those of the Government Amendment, upon both of which we shall vote tonight—because we certainly cannot accept the terms of the Government Amendment even if we are not able to establish our own point of view—hon. Members will find it hard to understand, when they compare these two, how the present breakdown and deadlock have occurred. We are, however, confronted with the situation as it now lies and with the larger issues which have now been raised. These have, of course, been carefully considered on both sides and the results are embodied in the Motion and the Amendment which, I agree with the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, are the main direct topics before us. It is upon these that we have to pronounce this evening.

If the French needed proof that the British Socialist Party and Government are hostile to the idea of a united Europe and would try to restrict and retard any international conference of which they were members, they could not find more conclusive evidence than the extraordinary pamphlet—and I have it here—issued by the National Executive of the British Labour Party and timed in such a curious manner with, I can only call it, the soiled fingers of coincidence. In this document it is stated that the British Socialists are

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opposed to joining any European system which is not dominated by people of their own kidney, by other Socialists. This is what I may call the Dalton theme, plainly declared to the Labour Party Conference three years ago. The right hon. Gentleman then said:

If the United States of Europe is indeed to succeed and is to benefit its peoples, it can only fully succeed if all the countries of Western Europe commit themselves, as our electors committed themselves in 1945, to the belief that Socialism is the hope of us all.

It is this idea which the document expresses and reiterates. It amounts to a declaration that if Europe is to unite and Britain is to play any part in such a union, it can only be on a one-party basis—and that party the Socialists.

This is a squalid attitude at a time of present stress and I should like to remind the House that this attitude is adopted at a time when Socialism is losing ground all over the free world outside the Iron Curtain, at a time when one cannot find any other Socialist Government in the British Commonwealth or in the English-speaking world or in Western Europe, apart from Scandinavia, which has a tale of its own to tell and is subject to many special factors. For instance, the first thing the Socialist Prime Minister of Norway did, on being returned to power with a majority—with an effective majority—was to say that there would be no more nationalisation. We have had something like the same language used here, but there is the great difference that an effective majority does not lie behind the Government.

We are invited by the Government to bind ourselves to what the "Manchester Guardian" has well called "insular Socialism" and to make a party distinction between us and the countries which do not take our view. There is, of course, one exception—the outstanding, mighty, capitalist, free enterprise United States. That is the exception. But then, of course, they are paying us the heavy subsidies upon which the Socialists' claim that they are able to maintain full employment is founded. But, apart from this important exception, it would be a lonely pilgrimage upon which we are to be led. The Socialist Party, which assumes this self-opinionated position—I might almost say this arrogant position—has just been shown to be in a minority in Great Britain. It has had to modify

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or suspend its whole policy of nationalisation and is now looking about for a new version of the Socialist theme—I see the Lord President is out of the House, perhaps even engaged in this very task—upon which to found their class warfare. At home the Socialists are in full retreat. Abroad they claim to impose their ideology on nations and societies whom, after bitter experience, have cast it off.

What plainer proof could the Government give of their hostility to European union than the appointment of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer—I like to keep the former Chancellor and the present both in view at once: both have rendered their contributions to the state of our national finances; both aspire now to lay their skilful hands upon our foreign affairs—but what plainer proof could the Government give than to appoint the right hon. Gentleman to lead their half of the delegation to Strasbourg, in full view of the declaration which he has made, and to send him as their representative? I say that that is a grimace. I had thought of using the word "outrage," but, on subsequent consideration, I thought that the more moderate word would cover the point in its correct proportions. I ask even now that this step should not be taken. If the Government persist, it is they who will suffer in the decline of their influence in Europe; but we shall all suffer, too.

In this Debate we have had the usual jargon about "the infra-structure of a supra-national authority." The original authorship is obscure; but it may well be that these words "infra" and "supra" have been introduced into our current political parlance by the band of intellectual highbrows who are naturally anxious to impress British labour with the fact that they learned Latin at Winchester. Although we may not relish the words, no one will wish to deny this old-school-tie contingent their modest indulgence in class self-consciousness.

As I listened to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday, I could not help feeling very sorry that our relations with France have been reduced to this long legalistic argument, taking point after point with professional skill in order to reach and justify a deadlock. I reject the Chancellor's claim that at no time in our history the understanding

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between this country and France has been greater than it is today. It would hardly be possible to state that reverse of the truth with more precision.

But what was really astonishing was the manner in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman based the breakdown upon the Documents 12, 13 and 14 of the White Paper, and omitted all similar mention of Document 10. The brilliant rejoinder of the hon. Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay), exposed this glaring oversight—as we must hope it was—for in their Memorandum of 30th May (that is, Document 10) the French Government stated specifically the words which have been read out to the House, but which are so important that I must read them again.

The special position"—

say the French—

in these negotiations which the British Government wishes to preserve is justified in their Memorandum by the intention, said to be held by the French Government, of asking, as a prior condition, for full participation in the discussions, for an undertakng to pool coal and steel resources, and to set up an authority with certain sovereign powers.

4. As their representatives have informed the British representatives orally, the French Govrnment wish particularly to confirm once more that these are not their intentions. As has already been made clear in the French Memorandum of 9th May, there will be no commitment except by the signature of a treaty between the States concerned and its parliamentary ratification.

Here certainly was the point when the British Government might have safely agreed to enter the conference.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Chancellor has put to us the question. What would you have done? We reply that once we had the assurance conveyed in Document 10, that there would be no commitment except by the signature of a treaty between the States concerned and its parliamentary ratification we should not have hesitated to attend the conference, and we should have replied in the same sort of manner as the Dutch, and in terms similar to those which are embodied in the Motion on which we are going to vote tonight.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman later proceeded to draw an alarming picture of what might happen to us if we accepted the principle of a supra-national high authority which

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… could cause a whole coalfield or steel centre to go out of production without any social or political responsibility for their action. …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT: 26th June, 1950; Vol. 476, c. 1942.]

Surely, this is one of the points we could have raised at the conference in a decisive manner? To win the war we agreed to put our armies under S.H.A.E.F., a great Anglo-American organisation that was for the tactical and limited purposes prescribed. No one would ever have suggested that General Eisenhower should have had the power to say what units of the British Army should be suppressed or disbanded, or how they should be raised or remodelled, or anything like it. All these remained questions within the control of the autonomous sovereign States which were willing to agree to a larger unity for certain well defined functional—I use the "functional" because it is coming into use—functional purposes. Surely, this is one of the points we could have urged, and even have made conditional upon our agreement to any final scheme.

It is simply darkening counsel to pretend, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman did, that by participating in the discussion, under the safeguards and reservations I have read, we could have been committed against our will to anything of this nature. I would add, to make my answer quite clear to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, that if he asked me, "Would you agree to a supranational authority which has the power to tell Great Britain not to cut any more coal or make any more steel, but to grow tomatoes instead?" I should say, without hesitation, the answer is "No." But why not be there to give the answer?

Nothing is said about the method of voting. We know nothing about the method by which voting power will be allotted to the different members of any supra-national authority which may be set up. But it is quite certain we should not agree to become members of it—and that we should have every right to disagree—if our great preponderance in coal and steel production did not receive full recognition. Then there is the question of the right to terminate such an agreement. That is surely a matter we could have looked at after discussion. Finally, there is the question of whether there could be two grades of members of such a body—full members and associate

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members. That is a matter also which should be borne in mind. I cannot conceive how such issues would not have benefited by any conference if we were there to shape and guide it. If they did not, if we did not succeed, our safeguards are overwhelming; we should not be bound in honour or good faith to accept adverse decisions on matters which we regarded as impracticable, but we would be the judges.

But that is not all. Even if the Ministers or representatives taking part in the conference were too weak or too facile to stand up for our vital interests and rights, even if they reached agreement round a conference table nothing would be settled until Parliament had ratified the resultant conclusions. This is what the French say in their Document 10 of 30th May. By becoming a member of this conference on the conditions imposed by the French Government we should in no way abrogate the full rights of power of the House of Commons to judge the final result—to judge as a whole and not as a party or as supporters or opponents of a Government. The power of this House would be absolutely undiminished.

If we attend the conference we can use all our influence and all our arguments, and if these are not accepted we are not committed in any way to agreement, and there would be no agreement so far as we are concerned. If, however, our delegates agree, as I have said, Parliament has still the full power to judge and to decide when the case is laid before it after it has all been thrashed out. There is the question: "To be there or not to be there," that is the question on which we shall vote tonight. It seems to me that we run no risk by being there, but let me examine some of the risks of our not being there.

The Prime Minister is soon to reply, when his own political creed and record are, if I may say so, in a sad plight. We all remember how before the war he said that national patriotism and national armaments were wrong. His words are upon record, but I will not trouble the House with them unless he wishes me to do so. In this faith, however misguided, in the years before the war the Prime Minister led the Socialist Party into the Lobby against every Estimate to strengthen, or even maintain our Armed

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Forces; and only four months before the explosion he urged his followers to oppose National Service. When in later years—a year ago in fact—the Prime Minister was taxed with this, be offered the defence that he would gladly have voted for armaments and conscription on an international basis, a collective basis, under the League of Nations, but he would not associate himself with any form of national armaments or re-armament in any way. This is what he said on 16th March last in this House:

This party"—

that is, his party—

never opposed the proper re-armament of this country. No, my speeches are on record in this matter. We were always prepared to support a system of collective security."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1391.]

But no system of collective security existed, as he knew well, and as we learned only too soon.

This is the same leader of the Socialist Party who now, as Prime Minister, comes forward, or is persuaded to come forward, as the champion of the extreme insular view, which is inconsistent with the trend of what is going on, and also inconsistent with much that he himself has done. He seeks to win for himself and his party popular applause by strutting around as a Palmerstonian jingo. This diversity, in relation to the same story and the same issues, will not win for him or those who follow him any measure of public esteem.

Let me ask him a specific question, and I direct his attention to this document which I hold in my hand. He may have seen it. Has he read what may be called the "Dalton Brown Paper"? It was issued before he made his first statement in the House on the Schuman Plan. Had he read it, or had he not? I quite understand his embarrassment. If he says he had read it, his first statement in Parliament was inconsistent with it. If he says he had not read it, he might well be accused of throwing an unfair burden upon his colleague. There is also a third aspect which I am sure he will not consider irrelevant, namely: What is the truth? What is the fact?

It is no use for the right hon. Gentleman to tell us that these are purely domestic party matters, and that the House of Commons has no right to ask questions about a declaration by the Labour Party Executive, or the Prime Minister's attitude

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towards it. So powerful a body as the Labour Party Executive, of which the Prime Minister and all his principal colleagues are active members, a body which has a recognised part in the constitution of the Labour Party, cannot be held to be outside the purview of the House of Commons; it is a living part of the way we are governed, and of the means by which we are governed. The Prime Minister cannot dissociate himself from it. We do not know now what his position is, but I ask him this simple question: Did he read this document before he made his statement on the Schuman Plan to the House of Commons, or did he not? If the right hon. Gentleman does not answer, or dare not answer, then he will be the sufferer in reputation. Apart from being a Prime Minister he is a public man, and I doubt if there is any Member in this House who, if asked a question of this kind, would shrink from giving a plain and simple answer.

I venture, from long experience, to offer some advice to the House, which is naturally perturbed by the far-reaching issues which have been aroused in our minds, and which we have to discuss in the inevitably unpleasant atmosphere surrounding or between two fierce General Elections. It is not within our power, nor is it our task this evening, to settle all those vast questions of world destiny and Britain's part in it. We must keep them in our minds so far as we can perceive them, but we have not got to pronounce judgment upon them all. We have to deal with the definite practical issues put before us in the Motion on the Order Paper. This can only be a step, and a carefully-guarded step, forward in what the great majority on both sides of the House believe to be the right direction.

We ought under all effective safeguards to take our part and use our influence in this forthcoming discussion, provided, first, that we wish it good success, and secondly, though no less important, that we reserve our full freedom to judge the final results. We cannot do that now. We do not know any of the details, or how they will emerge from a careful examination. We have only a general outline of what is proposed as a basis for discussion. Every Member should ask himself two simple practical questions: "Do I wish to see the unity of Western

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Europe advanced?" and anyhow, apart from that, "Had we not better take part in the conference subject to the reservations which the Dutch have made?" These are the issues before us tonight.

More than a month ago when I addressed the Scottish Unionist Conference at Edinburgh we knew even less than we do now. Nevertheless, the course I should advise the Conservative Party to follow seemed clear. I will venture to read to the House what I said, because at that time I had no idea that this would become a controversial party issue. I hope that the House will forgive me reading this, but I think that it is relevant:

While the Schuman proposal is right in principle, we must nevertheless consider carefully the way in which Great Britain can participate most effectively in such a larger grouping of European industry. We must be careful that it does not carry with it a lowering of British wages and standards of life and labour. We must, I feel, assert the principle of levelling up and not of levelling down. We are all surely proud of the British steel industry which plays so large a part in our export trade. The terms on which we could combine with Continental nations must be carefully studied. If we were to destroy or even impair the efficiency of our steel industry by nationalisation, we might find ourselves at a serious disadvantage compared with Continental countries which are free from Socialist abuses. We must be reassured on these and other points while welcoming cordially the whole principle and spirit of what is proposed.

That is what I said, and that is what, broadly speaking, I stand by now, and it is what I ask that we shall vote unitedly upon this evening.

We are asked: How can the Conservative Party reconcile its opposition to the nationalisation of steel and yet give any countenance to the principle of internationalisation in a European system? It is a fair question. The answer is that we oppose the nationalisation of British steel because we wish to see it remain in the competent hands of those who under free enterprise have raised it to its present magnificent position among our industries. In our opposition to nationalisation we have never objected to a proper degree of Government supervision; indeed we have always insisted upon it. What we have opposed, and shall continue to oppose, is State ownership and management—or mismanagement as it has proved so far—of the industry.

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Under the Schuman proposals, ownership remains unaffected. We cannot see any objection in principle to a wider measure of international co-ordination if that proves practicable and in accordance with our essential interests. We see no reason why the problems of the British steel industry should not be discussed in common with the problems of the other European steel industries, and we have good hope that if this is done, an association mutually advantageous and acceptable may be created. But at any rate it will be far better for us to take part in the disussions than to stand outside and let events drift without us. That is the view of the present leaders of the British steel industry, and I am sure that it is a sensible and practical one.

The Socialist Government, as their Amendment sets forth, speak of their desire to follow closely the conversations from outside and they welcome the proposal which M. Schuman has made. The French Government have promised to keep us fully informed. But what is that compared with taking part in the discussions and influencing them in the powerful way which we could have done having regard to our preponderating individual stake. There is a great difference between being outside a conference and being perhaps a leading member of one. There may well be a certain resentment against the Government which is thought by the others to have wilfully refused under all safeguards even to sit at the table.

Here are the six Powers talking all these matters over among themselves with the United States beckoning encouragement to them from across the ocean— Nothing has done more harm in the United States than the publication in this country of this document—and Britain, although absolutely safe from being committed, finding excuses, elaborate excuses, to keep out of the conference altogether and thus perhaps spoil the hopes of a general settlement. The French have a saying "Les absents ont toujours tort." I do not know whether they learn French at Winchester.

There is certainly a risk of all these matters of great consequence being discussed in our absence. We have no means of intervening from moment to moment. New difficulties may be springing up in

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our absence, as we sit here. All kinds of draft conclusions or draft proposals may be presented which would never have seen the light of day had we been able to use our influence on the spot beforehand. Perhaps resentment is too strong an expression. Let me call it "a fellow feeling" among those who are there against the one who is out.

Continental wages are lower than our own. If they were averaged out on the basis of those who were in, it might well increase in a marked degree the competitive undercutting power in the exports of all these countries. Whereas our influence at the table might well have been sufficient to turn the balance in favour of the British standard, it seems to me contrary to the interests of the British coalminers and steel workers that they should never have been allowed to put their case for a levelling-up on the Continent instead of a levelling-down.

There is another reason why the boycotting of the conference is to be regretted. The absence of Britain deranges the balance of Europe. I am all for a reconciliation between France and Germany, and for receiving Germany back into the European family, but this implies, as I have always insisted, that Britain and France should in the main act together so as to be able to deal on even terms with Germany, which is so much stronger than France alone. Without Britain, the coal and steel pool in Western Europe must naturally tend to be dominated by Germany, who will be the most powerful member. This point was made by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) last night.

I ask both sides of the House to consider whether it is really a wise policy for us to pursue at this particular moment of European recovery. It is difficult to imagine any course more inconsiderate to European interests in general, and to British interests in particular, than that into which the Government are forcing, not only the House as a whole, but their own party.

I have spoken of this document—this Brown Paper. There was, however, in the Socialist pamphlet one declaration with which I wholeheartedly agree. I mean the declaration against Europe becoming a Third Force between America

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and Russia and creating a "neutral geographical bloc." This was formerly the view of many of the Socialists in the days when they condemned my Fulton speech in 1946. I am glad to read this recantation. I trust the educational process may continue.

I should myself regard the neutralisation of Germany or Western Germany, still more of France and the rest of the six Powers now meeting together in Paris, as a disaster second only to actual war. It would simply mean that not only Western Germany but the European States in the neutral zone would be undermined and overcome one by one and bit by bit exactly as we have seen Czechoslovakia devoured before our eyes. The question which both the pamphleteers and we should ask ourselves tonight is whether British reluctance to assert herself within a movement towards European unity will not bring about just this very danger of a neutral geographical bloc, and whether we, by standing out, may not become responsible for bringing about the very situation the Socialist Executive in their pamphlet so rightly fear.

I was deeply moved by the decisive gesture which France made in the Schuman Plan for an effective reconciliation with Germany on the basis of such a measure of pooling heavy industries, which would, if developed, make impossible a renewal of war between these two nations. When I asked four years ago at Zurich that France should take Germany by the hand and lead her back into the European family, I could not hope that such an historic event would have come to pass so soon.

It would be quite fair to ask me whether I should have welcomed this event even if there were no such thing as this Russian menace, or the Soviet Government or the Communist movement in many lands. I should say, "Yes, certainly." The unity of France and Germany, whether direct or in a larger continental grouping is a merciful and glorious forward step towards the revival of Europe and the peace of the world. The fact that there is a grave Soviet and Communist menace only adds to its value and urgency. Here surely we can find agreement on all sides of the House.

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No one can say with justice that we are acting and feeling in this way in prejudice to the interests of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Everyone knows that that stands first in all our thoughts. First, there is the Empire and Commonwealth; secondly, the fraternal association of the English-speaking world; and thirdly, not in rank or status but in order, the revival of united Europe as a vast factor in the preserving of what is left of the civilisation and culture of the free world. When one hears Socialist orators claim that they are the champions of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations and remembers that they did not even take the trouble to tell the Commonwealth what was going on, it is impossible not to repress a feeling of scorn.