Korea

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

5 July 1950 · House of Commons debate on Korea · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on 5 July 1950, supporting the Government's action over Korea, urging negotiation with the Soviet Union from strength and renewing his request for a Secret Session on defence.
Main themes
Communist aggression in Korea, support for the Government's action in Korea, request for a Secret Session on defence, American atomic deterrent, Soviet atomic bomb programme, settlement with the Soviet Union from strength, Secretary of State for War and the Schuman Plan, Crossman's Sunday Pictorial article, opposition responsibility for military preparedness, Western Europe's security
Duration
~17 min
58th percentile
Words
2,042
58th percentile
Sentences
70
46th percentile
Readability
45
47th percentile
Grade
14.4
71st percentile
Syntax
3.42
90th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
26th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 54%49%
  • Institutional 32%29%
  • Ceremonial 14%13%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

70 sentences in 30 paragraphs

I am not at all sure that we should have received from all the Ministers opposite and from all their followers the same measure of good will and support that we are giving them on this occasion. We shall not, however, allow our action to be deflected in great matters by behaviour of this kind. We believe that the electorate, in judging these matters for themselves, will be influenced by the ordinary British standards of fair play, and it is on that that we rest ourselves.

I must say one word here about the Secretary of State for War, whose speech at the weekend was the subject of question and answer just now. As to the merits of his comments on the Schuman Plan, I shall not attempt to pronounce, except to say that they are very different from the formal Amendment placed on the Order Paper by the Government that they welcomed the French Plan. But I really wonder that the right hon. Gentleman cannot a little cast his past behind him and rise to the occasion of the great responsibilities which he has the honour to bear as the head of a Fighting Service at this critical time. I really wonder that he should find it necessary to hamper his work in a great Service and reduce his influence in the country by plunging into these bitter political controversies. Surely he has enough responsibilities to bear and enough work to do, and surely he has been treated with a great deal of forbearance by the House of Commons?

I was commenting on the article of the hon. Member for Maldon just now, but I must confess that in some ways I prefer his outspoken diatribes to the comments of the hon. Member for Coventry who really has laid down a principle— The hon. Member for

Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man). Certainly I would not like to saddle any other constituency with the responsibility of the hon. Member. But this is to my mind one of those little sayings which should always be placed

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on record. This is what the hon. Member wrote in the "Sunday Pictorial":

But there is one lesson we can and must learn from recent history—the time to start thinking about peace is the beginning and not the end of the fighting.

All I can say is that it has usually been thought, and I hope will not be overlooked on the present occasion, that between the beginning of fighting and the end of fighting, between the beginning of a war or a military operation and peace, there is an intervening stage called victory. It seems that the hon. Member for Coventry, East in trying—curiously and even characteristically—to have it both ways, has really excelled himself in this particular statement, which has only to be followed by any Government carrying on military operations to lead to certain military disaster.

We naturally cannot accept the responsibility for creating the present situation, nor do I suggest that this falls primarily upon Great Britain. Still less, as I have already stated to the House, can we accept any responsibility for the military position of our country or of Europe, or for the use that has been made of the unprecedented sums of money which have been voted by the House for the Defence Services, or for the resources of manpower placed with our full support on this side at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.

Some time in May, before this crisis occurred, I asked the Prime Minister for a Secret Session of Debate on our military position in order that this new Parliament might have some idea of where we stood in Europe and of the state of our own defences. The Prime Minister did not grant my request and we had therefore intended on this side of the House to have a public Debate on Defence before we separated for the Recess. Now that this crisis has arisen I do not feel that it would be helpful at this stage if we had a general Debate on Defence in public, even though all responsible Members taking part in it were to confine themselves strictly to facts which they were sure the Soviet Government already knew. But even within this limitation, there is a vast amount of matter which is public knowledge, which has appeared in British newspapers and, far more, which has appeared in the United

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States either in the Press or in the continuous proceedings of the Congress and its varied committees.

There never has been a period that I can remember covering the present century, in which the British public and the British Parliament were so totally ignorant of the conditions which exist. I must, therefore, renew my request here and now across the Floor of the House for a Debate in Secret Session upon this matter before we separate. I do not ask that even in Secret Session we should be told any secrets of a special or technical character. On the contrary, I should be quite content if the Government limited themselves in their statements to what they are sure is already known abroad.

I do not pretend myself to have anything like the detailed and precise information on which I based my warnings before the last war. Nevertheless, I am sure I could tell the House a lot of things which they ought to bear in mind, and these the Government could amplify or correct at their discretion, and other hon. Members would make their fruitful contributions.

If a Secret Session is refused and we do not ourselves, even within the limits I have prescribed, have a public Debate, the House will go forward into this deepening crisis with less information about it than any previous Parliament at any similar time. It seems to me that the Prime Minister and his colleagues will be taking an invidious and unprecedented responsibility upon themselves if they refuse us the Secret Session for which we ask. It is a responsibility which we on this side can in no wise share. Our responsibility is limited to supporting them in what they are doing in the international sphere since last Tuesday week, and does not extend to the military field or to what has happened since 1945 or to the methods which have been adopted or to the Ministers chosen to deal with our defences.

I will, therefore, confine myself today to a few general observations which are necessary to justify the support we are giving to His Majesty's Government. It might be asked of us, "How can you judge without the fullest information whether the United Nations, the United States, and Great Britain are strong enough to resist Communist aggression in the Far East when that resistance may

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conceivably bring about a major crisis in Europe? Might it not be that the rulers in the Kremlin are drawing us all into the Far East as a preliminary to striking in the West?"

I answer these questions to myself, as one's mind asks questions at these times, as follows. The forces required for the defence of South Korea, or even its recapture should that become necessary, would not make any decisive or even appreciable difference to the situation in Europe. The immunity of Western Europe from attack depends overwhelmingly on the vastly superior stock pile of atomic bombs possessed by the United States. There is the deterrent, and the sole decisive deterrent, which exists or can be brought into being in the near future. Therefore I do not feel that a major issue of security is raised by the necessary measures which have to be taken in Korea.

Secondly, I have for a long time felt deeply concerned at the discovery by the Soviet Government of the secret of the atomic bomb, and the probability that it is already in production. I saw that General Omar Bradley, who occupies one of the most responsible executive positions in the United States defence system, said recently that in three or four years the Soviets will have a sufficient supply of these bombs to cause a major catastrophe at any time they so decided, or words to that effect.

It is for this reason that I think it very much better that we should make a resolute effort to come to a settlement with them by peaceful means, but on the basis of strength and not of weakness, on the basis of success and not on fatuous incapacity of resistance to aggression. We should endeavour to come to a settlement with them before they become possessed of this devastating power in addition to all the military and air superiority and armour superiority which they undoubtedly possess at this present time in Europe and Asia.

I can quite understand the Communist propaganda about banning the atomic bomb, for such a decision would leave the civilisation of the world entirely at their mercy even before they had accumulated the necessary stockpile themselves. Since this new aggression in Korea and the spirited reaction of the United States, I feel that we ought to bring the policy of drift to an end, and I believe that no

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better prelude to the opening of major discussions with the Soviet Government could be found than the successful repulse of the Communist forces that are now invading Korea.

I believe that if this is achieved, conditions may be created less unfavourable to a general settlement than any others I can conceive before the Soviet power is freed from the deterrent of the immense American superiority in atomic resources. That hope may fail, but it is the best hope that now exists of averting from Europe and America perils and sufferings utterly beyond anything we have hitherto experienced. It is' my belief that the American superiority in atomic warfare is, for the time being, an effective deterrent against a general Communist onslaught. Of course, I may be wrong—no one can tell; no one can give a guarantee.

Still, if it be true that there are at present no signs of exceptional preparations or concentrations behind the Iron Curtain in Europe, it would at least give a temporary indication that the supreme events of misfortune are not immediately imminent. Indeed, it may well be that the Soviet Government have been taken aback by the resolute action of President Truman, supported as it has been by His Majesty's Government and by so many other States and members of the United Nations.

This is no time to despair of world peace being achieved upon tolerable foundations. Certainly, we must not despair. To do so is almost to despair of the life of the world. But one thing is essential now, and I cannot think that the Government will differ from me when I say that it is of vital consequence alike to our hopes of world peace and to our own safety here at home, namely, that what the Communists have begun in Korea should not end in their triumph. If that were to happen, as I said last night to an American gathering, a third World War under conditions more deadly than now exist might be forced upon us—would be forced upon us—before long.

There could be no more certain way of bringing about the destruction of civilisation than that we should drift on helplessly until the Soviets are fully equipped with the atomic bomb. Neither, meanwhile, must we accept defeat and humiliations in one place after another wherever the Communists thrust and

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gnaw their way forward, and in this process of continued misfortune lose the faith in us of everyone else in the world, and lose our own confidence in ourselves. There could be no greater disaster than that; there could be no more certain road to what it is our first duty to avoid than that; and it is because of my confidence that those men in His Majesty's Government with whom I worked so long and with whom I have gone through so much, are resolved to prevent by every means in their power anything like that, that I shall follow the Prime Minister tonight should the need come to give him a vote.