- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on September 28, 1949, in the debate on the devaluation of the pound, criticising the Government's handling of finances and arguing for a free pound under safeguards.
- Main themes
- Devaluation of the pound from 4.03 to 2.80 dollars, criticism of the Socialist Government, sterling balances and unrequited exports, American and Commonwealth aid, sterling area and European tariff barrier, case for a free pound, free trade and Imperial Preference, American protective tariffs, the 1931 exchange precedent, timing and mismanagement of national finances
- Duration
- ~22 min
- Words
- 2,600
- Sentences
- 118
- Readability
- 60
- Grade
- 10.3
- Syntax
- 2.97
- Vocabulary
- 2.09
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other118 sentences in 33 paragraphs
I could sell him fur a great deal more than I bought him for
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but I am trying to rise above the profit motive.
But let us see how great is the help we have received from the productive efforts and generosity of countries outside this small crowded island which has been led so far astray. We have been given or loaned—and have spent—about £1,750 million sterling by the United States. We have been helped to the extent of over £300 million by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, at the end of the war, Australia owed us £220 million and we now owe them £10 million, a turnover of about £230 million; and there are other very considerable items which could be mentioned.
In all history no community has ever been helped and kept by gratuitous overseas aid, that is to say, by the labour of other hard-working peoples, to anything approaching the degree which we have been under the present Socialist Government. And where are we at the end of it all? That is the emergency which we have been called together here to face.
After these preliminary observations I come to the actual Motion and Amendment which are before us, and the measure which has given rise to them, namely, the devaluation of the pound sterling from 4.03 down to 2.80 of the American dollar. The Government declare that this was all they could do in the extremity to which we have come or to which we have been brought by them. Nay more—they even try to represent it as a benefit and a fine shrewd stroke of timely policy. Here again in this matter I will venture to recur to first principles and seek for realities. One must be careful not to be baffled and bewildered by technical jargon. There is no sphere of human thought in which it is easier for a man to show superficial cleverness and the appearance of superior wisdom than in discussing questions of currency and exchange. I saw a very good cartoon in a newspaper the other day of a hospital ward filled with patients who had become demented through trying to explain the devaluation problem to their wives
But I will submit to the House some simple propositions which they may deem worthy of consideration and which are at any rate easy to understand. The reduction of the rate of dollar exchange from 4.03 to 2.80 means, subject to certain minor abatements, that we may have to
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pay up to nearly half as much again, some say 35 per cent., some 40 per cent., for what we buy—much of it necessaries without which we cannot live—from the dollar area. We may have to pay up to nearly half as much again over an area of almost one-fifth of our imports—actually 17 per cent.
That cannot be good for us. It can only mean that we are forced to give much more of our life energy, that is to say toil, sweat, physical fatigue, craftsmanship, ingenuity, enterprise and good management, to buy the same quantity of indispensable products outside this country as we had before. We have to do more work and draw more upon our spirits and our carcases to win back the same amount of food, raw materials and other goods without which we cannot carry on. That is bad for us; it is a new blow to our economic health and a new burden which we have to bear.
Now, the life thrust of the British nation, if not impeded, is magnificent, but we have been, as I said at the beginning, exhausted by our glorious efforts in the war. Great exertions are made by the people, but we can ill afford to make a new drain upon our latent strength and remaining motive power. We are not in a state of health to become a blood donor on a large scale at the present time. We are already a blood donor on a tremendous scale through our unrequited exports to India, Egypt and other countries to whom we became indebted for local supplies while we were defending them from being conquered by the Italians, the Germans or the Japanese. The "Manchester Guardian," perhaps at this moment a better guide on economics than on ethics, has estimated these unrequited exports at nearly one-fifth of our total exports. That is a lot.
Many hundreds of thousands of our skilled or semi-skilled wage earners are toiling today to make desirable things for those countries which are paid for simply by somebody scratching something off with his pen from what is described by the misleading term "sterling balances," which really means British debts. Nothing comes back in return to nourish the productive energies of the island. Trade is exchange, but here is neither trade nor exchange. An intense effort goes out and nothing comes back. I am not at this moment arguing
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the rights and wrongs, though I am quite willing to do so on a suitable occasion. I think that an amount for our expenses for the defence of those countries should have been set against the local supplies, but it would be a long argument and much could be said. I am not arguing it at the moment; I am only setting forth the brutal fact.
On the top of all this, the devaluation of the pound sterling draws a further draft in life blood and initial energy not only from the wage-earning masses but from all that constitutes the productive fertility of Britain. We are to give anything up to 45 per cent. more products of our own toil for the same amount of dollar imports. That cannot be a good thing, it cannot be something to rejoice about, it cannot be something to parade as a triumph or to boast over as some new benefit bestowed by the Socialist Government upon our struggling community. It is a hard and heavy blow. However necessary it may be at the point to which we have been led, even if it be the best step open to us to take in the plight into which we have fallen—and all that is arguable—the hard, blunt, simple conclusion remains; it cannot be a good thing. We have suffered a serious disaster. In all this my mind would have marched step by step with that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer until a fortnight ago. Now, he probably finds these notions revolting and reactionary. So much for the first of the realities of devaluation. I must not again make the joke about revaluation. The delicacy of the point will I am sure be fully respected.
Now I come to the second reality which is more complicated. Anybody can understand that it is not good for a man in a weak state of health with an overstrained vitality to be tapped month by month for his life blood for the good of others across the oceans, be they stronger or weaker, in order to win his daily bread and that of his wife and children. But this second point concerns the whole sterling area of which the British Empire and Commonwealth is the foundation; and also it concerns all the mighty regions of Europe outside the iron Curtain.
I see it said that the effect of our devaluation of the pound and its consequences on European and on sterling currencies is to erect something like a 40 per cent. tariff wall against the United
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States. I am myself a supporter of Imperial Preference, of European Unity and of the sterling area and I am glad to see all these vast regions and forces becoming conscious of a common identity. I cannot regret in itself the drawing of a girdle or zollverein around themselves. But here it is a question of degree. Up to a certain point it would be a help. It would help world recovery. But beyond that point it may well be a hindrance.
I think of course as a free trader. I may have adopted some variations and modifications, as we all have in the course of years, but still that is the basis on which my thought was formed many years ago. If we pierce down to the economic roots of world production and human material and creative power, the erection of a new barrier in addition to the political and economic barrier of the Iron Curtain in the modern world of today cannot be deemed a stimulus. Restriction is never a stimulus in itself. It may in a crisis make for order, but it is not a stimulus. It may on a longterm view promote a wider harmony and more equal bargaining power, but in so far as world trade is restricted this is a contrary force to the ideal of plenty. Abundance or plenty is the aim of mankind. Plenty is within its power. Plenty should be its inheritance. Plenty is hope for all. Restriction is inevitably the enemy of plenty.
It has been stated that the United States Government have pressed us to devaluate the pound. The Chancellor need not even shake his head. I was not going to omit the point. The Chancellor told us yesterday that he did it of his own free will when the time came. I do not suppose that the United States, this gigantic capitalist organisation, with its vast and super-abundant productive power—millions of people animated by the profit motive—I do not suppose that it will be seriously injured by a moderate wire fence being placed around the British Empire, the sterling area and United Europe. But I cannot believe that American manufacturers will see in such a development any immediate inducement to reduce their own highly protective tariff behind which they have built up their unrivalled economic power and which tariff is backed—as all tariffs are—by potent political interests.
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I should be very glad to be contradicted by events. I have always hoped for a large reduction in American tariffs, but this is no time to nurse illusions or delusions. We must seek the truth even if we cannot give full effect to it at this particular moment, and we must face it when found however ugly it may be. I cannot feel that what has taken place—namely, the erection of a 40 per cent. tariff round the European area and the sterling area is likely to promote in itself the probability of an important United States change from her present protective policy. I hope, however, that they will rise above the considerations which obviously present themselves at this stage.
I come to my third point, my third reality, upon this issue of devaluation and it centres upon the word, "truth." Whatever the currency experts may say—and they say all sorts of things and with learned grimaces change their views very frequently—but whatever they may say, the true exchange value between pound and dollar, or between all other currencies and the dollar or the pound, the true one is the right one; and the one at which we ought to aim. In the present circumstances if the Chancellor of the Exchequer felt it necessary to devaluate the pound to a fixed figure, I think it was right to go the whole hog; and that it was better to cut down the rate of exchange to this level in the hopes of a later revival than to take half measures which would soon have been overtaken and overwhelmed by the true and real forces which are relentlessly at work.
Now the matter is done, and when we have had to give up our exchange position which we had maintained so long, I feel entitled to take a fresh view. I am all for a free market and a true market. As I told the House two or three years ago, it is only a false and untrue market officially supported that breeds a black market. A sham market can no more escape a black market than a man can escape from his own shadow. Therefore I should myself have been more inclined, had I been in any way responsible, to set the pound free under regular and necessary safeguards and control— —certainly, and accept the results, than to the present rigid method of pegging the exchange at the very
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lowest rate which anyone could possibly conceive.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer argued at some length against this yesterday, and it is obvious that anything that is free or largely unregulated is obnoxious to the Socialist mentality. But this was what we did in 1931—the last time we had to clear up the Socialist financial mess——Oh, I remember it well. Quite soon we had a natural exchange rate of 3.30 which through the actions of both countries rested fairly stable until the war came. I do not think that the idea of the liberation of the pound should be ruled out by any Government which can command confidence abroad. That may be the decisive reason for the Chancellor of the Exchequer rejecting it at the present time.
I believe that great strength still resides in the sterling area of which Britain is the centre. That has to some extent been proved by the many countries which, roughly as they were used, and little though they were consulted, have had to conform to our action. I believe that this strength, working freely and backed by the intense productive effort of all the communities concerned, would in a short while achieve, a far better rate of exchange against the dollar than the present figure of 2.80 to which we have been condemned. I believe further that in its intrinsic strength under favourable circumstances a free pound might establish itself at a rate which, while far more beneficial for us than the present position, would nevertheless promote and express a natural but conscious affinity throughout the sterling and associated currencies of the world.
To sum up this part of my argument which I am submitting to the House, the devaluation of the pound sterling is a new and serious drain upon the life strength of Britain. We always supported, my right hon. Friend in particular, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in resisting it. It might have been better in my view, and may still be better when confidence is restored, to let the pound go free under proper safeguards——control of the sending of large sums of money from this country—all this applied in 1931— —what are hon. Members laughing at? They had very little to laugh at in 1931. It might have been
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better, I say, and may well be better when confidence is restored to let the pound go free under proper safeguards and reach its natural level. A free pound would impose a less severe drain upon our conditions of life and labour, and nevertheless, in reaching its true level would afford a girdle to the European and sterling area which, without being unduly restrictive, would afford an effective means of economic as well as political association.
Now I turn from discussing the policy of devaluation to the timing of the act and the sequence of events in which it lies. Judged by the results, the management of our finances has been deplorable. If as a result of that mismanagement the devaluation or liberation of the pound sterling had become inevitable, ought it not to have been taken as part of a general policy of setting our finances in order? A reduction in expenditure—
