Grundtvig and Kierkegaard - some of my important sources. Lecture by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Vartov, Wednesday, November 30, 2005.

Denmark Anders Fogh Rasmussen · Prime Minister of Denmark

30 November 2005 · Lecture on Grundtvig and Kierkegaard · Vartov, Denmark

Context
Rasmussen delivered a lecture at Vartov on November 30, 2005, reflecting on Grundtvig and Kierkegaard as formative influences on his political and philosophical worldview.
Main themes
Grundtvig and Kierkegaard as intellectual influences, personal worldview formation, freedom and liberalism, Danish national identity, folk high school tradition, socialist misappropriation of Grundtvig, economic liberalism, Danish philosophical heritage, religious and cultural upbringing
Duration
~48 min
93rd percentile
Words
5,717
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Sentences
379
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Readability
55
77th percentile
Grade
9.0
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Syntax
2.69
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Vocabulary
2.31
75th percentile

Translated from Danish

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Social 85%56%
  • Ceremonial 7%4%
  • Institutional 4%2%
  • Geopolitical 2%1%
  • Economic 2%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 34%

379 sentences in 143 paragraphs

First and foremost, I would like to express my appreciation for the great work that the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center has done and continues to do. Both in connection with the unique publication of Søren Kierkegaard's works. And as an internationally oriented research center that attracts researchers from all over the world to study the great Danish philosopher.

The research center has now moved in here at Vartov. This has provided a unique opportunity to continue the posthumous conversation or dialogue between Kierkegaard and Grundtvig, which was initiated in 2002 when the Grundtvig Society and the Søren Kierkegaard Center organized the Grundtvig-Kierkegaard week.

I do not know what the two gentlemen would say to the fact that we are now forcing them into the dialogue that they themselves were unable to establish. But let them deal with it. They cannot protest. And they have both contributed so much to the development of Danish society that it is entirely relevant for us today to illuminate their possible agreements and disagreements.

Therefore, I am also pleased to be invited to talk about my inspiration from Grundtvig and Kierkegaard as sources for the formation of my worldview, human perspective, and understanding of society.

Let me start by saying that I have had a problematic relationship with both. But I have come to terms with them. And they have both meant quite a lot for the formation of my views.

I came to Grundtvig in a somewhat skewed way because my source was skewed. And I came to Kierkegaard late because he was difficult to digest.

I grew up in a Grundtvigian home and environment. Not in the sense that there was talk of Grundtvig at the dinner table. But my parents were influenced by agricultural school, household school, and folk high school, and their views were passed on to us children – without Grundtvig or Kristen Kold being mentioned in every sentence. One could say that the Grundtvigian spirit hung in the living room.

I had an intuitive sense of Grundtvig, without being particularly aware of the precise content of his thinking. And in school and high school, I learned not the least about Grundtvig.

My entry to him was somewhat peculiar. For it was Ebbe Kløvedal Reich. He published in 1972 the so-called folk book, "Frederik," about Grundtvig's time and life. I read it. And here I saw Grundtvig appropriated for the most peculiar views. For communism and Mao. Against capitalism and the USA.

It was the year we voted on Denmark's membership in the EEC. Kløvedal mobilized Grundtvig to fight against the EEC: "It is necessary that Grundtvig's way of being Danish, and his opinion on what it means to be responsible for precisely this language, precisely this land, and precisely this people's history, is remembered before our sales-crazy politicians squander the last remnants of us."

And he continued: "The Common Market and the entire northwestern capitalist conspiracy aim to poison the peoples with a stereotypical internationalism, a worldwide network of pseudo-power roles, based on an absurd belief in money and blind growth, secretly controlled by the technological and economic priesthood."

Yes, we have almost forgotten the socialist rhetoric of the time.

So I not only set aside the book, "Frederik," but also Grundtvig. For there was, in general, a romantic Grundtvigianism in those years that took Grundtvig to account for all sorts of viewpoints that were completely contrary to my fundamental beliefs. It was as if Grundtvig was being used as a driving force for socialist projects.

I did not engage in the discussion about the interpretation of Grundtvig. I simply set him aside. I concentrated on other aspects of the political debate.

But I returned to Grundtvig. He was, in my eyes, rehabilitated. Fortunately, Grundtvig was born in 1783. Fortunately, because it meant that the 200th anniversary of his birth was marked in 1983, when the spirit of the times had changed significantly. The socialist side of the spirit from '68 was already fading. And perhaps that is why the celebration of Grundtvig's birthday that year took place in a completely new atmosphere.

What truly rekindled my positive interest in Grundtvig was Kaj Thaning's anniversary book from 1983, "Grundtvig." For the first time, I really grasped Grundtvig and his thinking. And by reading Thaning's book, I found the sides of Grundtvig that I had intuitively sensed during my upbringing on the farm at home.

Grundtvig had a sharp eye for the necessity of freedom. Thus, he wrote, among other things: '(.....) if one denies freedom, voluntariness, courage, and happiness the opportunity to show themselves and act with power, then one prevents the only thing that can save Denmark.'

And about economic liberalism, he wrote enthusiastically: 'The means of production must therefore be made and kept free to a high degree, so that they are neither bound by guild coercion, licensing constraints, and customs prohibitions, nor burdened with production tax and poor tax, nor undermined by large factories, but one must not at all attempt to secure the producers their residence, as that only feeds laziness and all evil, encroaches on property, and halts the free circulation, which, like the free circulation of blood in our body, is the condition for the healthy state of civil society' (Danskeren, June 28, 1848, p. 237).

But at the same time, Grundtvig had an eye for the duty to help those who need help. He formulated it this way: 'Any wise and humane authority will (.....) seriously strive, with the greatest possible freedom of enterprise and property security, to promote common prosperity and desirable equilibrium, while as far as possible, through charitable arrangements, providing for the children and the elderly, sick and disabled, who are found helpless in their immediate circle.'

In other words: It is not laws and paragraphs that can ensure social security. Ultimately, it is only production and prosperity in society that can provide the opportunity for help to the weakest.

What Grundtvig advocated was the genuine community of helping the weakest. In the song, 'Now it shall be revealed,' he writes, among other things:

Yes, the chain of dear memories one can easily dare to praise, the stronger it binds, the freer it makes.

No one is born homeless, but we all enter into family structures and local trust relationships. It was Grundtvig's vision that freedom does not mean hunger and social distress, but on the contrary develops a strong society linked together by dear memories.

In other words: Freedom and community are not opposites. On the contrary. The community becomes stronger and more genuine when it is formed by people who each feel a personal responsibility to contribute to the community.

There is something good about marking round anniversaries for deceased personalities, as their lives, works, and thoughts are placed in a contemporary light. And for my part, the 200th anniversary of Grundtvig's birth was at least an eye-opener that reinstated Grundtvig in the place in my universe where I felt he belonged. I recognized, so to speak, the old Grundtvig – he had returned home after the forced guest visit with the socialist ideologues of '68.

* * *

It was not until about 10 years later that I truly began to take an interest in Søren Kierkegaard. Of course, I was generally aware of a few main features of Kierkegaard's thinking. But I had not been properly introduced to Kierkegaard, and I had not set out to study him more closely. He was not a thinker I explicitly referred to in my political work.

Looking back today, I am strongly critical of the fact that I did not learn more about Kierkegaard during my high school years. High school was, after all – and still is – intended as a general youth education. But in the years immediately after '68, it was certainly not a general education.

And at the university, the exciting subject, "philosophy," was replaced with a dry discipline called "social science theory and method." The basic book was titled, "Positivism, Marxism, and Critical Theory."

So it has been quite a laborious task to catch up on some of the neglected material afterward.

It was during the preparation for my much-discussed book, "From Welfare State to Minimal State," that I truly began to take an interest in Søren Kierkegaard.

When the book was published in 1993, it was immediately used as ammunition in a general party-political trench war over the politics of the day and the road ahead.

I believe that Søren Kierkegaard would have shaken his head at all the commotion that followed the publication of my book.

I drew sharp lines in the book. To provoke a debate about the status quo. That method is entirely in Kierkegaard's spirit.

Søren Kierkegaard once wrote about the necessity of what he called "the corrective to the established":

"The one who is to provide the 'Corrective' must now accurately and thoroughly study the weak sides of the Established – and then one-sidedly present the opposite; skillfully one-sidedly. Just therein lies the Corrective, and therein again the resignation in the one who is to do it. The Corrective is indeed spent in a certain sense on the Established.

When this relationship is correct, then again a formally sharp-witted head can come and make the objection against the 'Corrective' that it is one-sided – and he can get the whole audience to believe there is something to it. You mild God. Nothing is easier for the one who provides the Corrective than to set the other side aside; but then it ceases to be the Corrective and becomes an Established itself.

Such an objection therefore comes from one who completely lacks the resignation to provide the 'Corrective' and does not even have the patience to grasp it." (Journal NB12:97, from 1849, SKS 20, 194-95).

In the party-political barrage that my "corrective" was subjected to, it completely got lost in the smoke of gunpowder that the book also contained some substantial sections on what I would call "applied political philosophy."

In that context, I drew quite a bit on Kierkegaard. Not to appropriate Kierkegaard for a specific political viewpoint. For one cannot do that. All the more so as Kierkegaard was very skeptical of, yes, perhaps even felt disgust for politics and politicians.

Søren Kierkegaard once compared politicians to demons. Of these, he said: "...... they lived off sacrificial smoke and incense, they were very mobile and could quickly traverse the whole world."

It is hardly meant as a recognition of politicians.......

But serious politics is precisely something other than sacrificial smoke and incense. And in the work on the book, I needed to get closer to the concepts of "freedom" and "responsibility." And that simply cannot be done without also drawing on Søren Kierkegaard's thinking.

Kierkegaard's original writings can be difficult to access. So therefore, I used Aarhus professor Johannes Sløk as an entry point to gain a good overview.

Sløk was, as is well known, a provocative and skilled storyteller. His book, "Kierkegaard's Universe – a New Guide to the Genius" from 1983, is well-written and pedagogical. I followed it up with the somewhat heavier book from the same year, "Existentialism" – finally rounding off Sløk with the rather entertaining and debate-provoking book from 1993, "The Morality That Went Missing."

Since then, I have read much more about and by Søren Kierkegaard. But my first real entry was Sløk. And Sløk's version harmonized well with my immediate reflections and fundamental beliefs. So I openly acknowledge that my use of and interpretation of Kierkegaard is heavily influenced by Johannes Sløk's presentation.

When I had to engage with Kierkegaard, it was to resolve a dilemma that everyone dealing with political philosophy inevitably encounters sooner or later.

I would call it the confrontation between absolutism and relativism. For a liberal, it is easy enough to distance oneself from any form of absolutism. My problem arose when I had to relate to relativism.

Absolutism means that the individual must obey ethical rules that are given from the outside. This can be in a religious variant or a non-religious variant.

In the religious variant, the norm system is a creation of God – or humans have interpreted what they believe is God-given. It rests in its own unshakeable validity. Humans cannot intervene in it, change it, or abolish it. The human task is to blindly obey the divine commandments. Violations of these commandments are severely punished – in the worst case, with death. We see this, among other things, in religious dictatorships, such as Iran.

Then we have the secular variant. Here, the norm system is produced by a higher, secular authority, for example, a dictator. The individual must obey orders from the powers that be. Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot are just some of the most prominent tyrants who have killed millions and millions of people for the ideological cause.

We can easily conclude that both a religious and a secular dictatorship are completely incompatible with freedom for the individual. For the individual must blindly obey orders in the form of ethical or other rules set by an authority outside of the individual itself.

Well then, it must be true freedom that the individual shapes its own moral stance in accordance with ethical rules established by the individual itself?

A juhuu-freedom, where no values are given and absolute. Where the individual has total freedom to create its own set of norms.

That is relativism. There are no orientation markers. The individual can and must make free choices – without any guidance for what is good and what is evil. Even doing nothing is a free choice. All values and all choices are equally valid.

One or another may perceive it as truly real and unlimited freedom. But the reality is that it is a freedom in emptiness. And from this freedom in emptiness follows a far-reaching ethical consequence: We must constantly make exemplary actions.

Since there are no valid norms, it is impossible to choose an action without thereby choosing it as the right one. Every choice is made, so to speak, on behalf of humanity.

Thus, as I act, so should everyone in a similar situation act. Immanuel Kant calls this unconditional demand, "the categorical imperative." And Jean Paul Sartre precisely speaks of "the unbearable necessity of making exemplary actions."

Søren Kierkegaard has provided a thorough depiction of the despair that grips the individual who discovers that no values hold absolute validity. Existence loses all values, purposes, and norms. Nothing in existence becomes important. All efforts become futile, and life itself ends in utter indifference.

Consequently, it is ridiculous to take anything seriously, let alone to engage in it. Since everything is equally valid, one cannot choose one thing over another. And when one can just as well choose one thing as another, it becomes pointless to choose at all.

No human can bear this emptiness of values. At some point, we will embark on a quest for absolute values, anchors that can serve as a guide in existence.

Value relativism leaves a void that we wish to fill. The question is, who will fill the void – and with what.

It is a dilemma between ethical subjectivism and ethical objectivism: Subjective ethics leads to value emptiness – because it is created by humans who have simultaneously abolished all absolute values. All moral values are, in principle, equal. Thus, they also become equally valid – and indifferent. Existence becomes meaningless, and the way out of despair becomes to seek refuge in authoritarian systems that can fill the void left by value relativism.

Conversely, the ultimate ethical objectivism means that the ethical code is established by a higher power, divine or secular. The moral norms are given and absolute. Humanity's task is to blindly obey the ethical commandments. Humans are reduced to will-less beings, held captive by a religious or secular dictatorship.

Apparently, we are faced with a knot that we cannot untie.

Ethical subjectivism gives humans unlimited freedom, but no anchors to orient themselves by. Freedom thus leads to its own contradiction.

Ethical objectivism provides humans with some absolute anchors, but no freedom.

In my view, there is a way out of the dilemma. The solution lies in recognizing that there are certain objective ethical values. That is to say, there exists a higher ethical principle that is not determined by the individual human itself. There is "an instance" outside of and above the individual human, which provides the basis for ethics.

But human moral actions are not thereby governed from the outside. The objective ethical values only gain concrete content through human lives. There is a demand placed on humanity. But we have our own task, a responsibility.

It was Søren Kierkegaard who opened my eyes to this solution. For Kierkegaard operates with both an absolute instance outside of the human and at the same time a personal responsibility and personal freedom.

As I understand Kierkegaard, the absolute instance is what we could call "the eternal in humanity." For Kierkegaard, it is religious. This instance – or middle determination – as Kierkegaard says, is God. God is the ahistorical, that which is independent of history and society, the eternal.

From a Christian perspective, the absolute value lies in the commandment of love: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Indeed, Kierkegaard even goes so far as to say that love for one's neighbor is synonymous with helping one's neighbor to love God. It is almost a double commandment of love.

Well, I will not delve further into that. To understand Kierkegaard, one must use the religious approach. But I will return later to the idea that one can also argue a bit more secularly or worldly.

Kierkegaard is clearly a deontologist. But that does not mean that humans are exempt from living their own lives and taking responsibility for their own lives. On the contrary, Kierkegaard says that humans must choose themselves, take responsibility for themselves.

It is not a traditional choice. It is not a matter of choosing the outer role of whether we want to be farmers, writers, merchants, or politicians. It is also not a matter of choosing traits, such as whether we want to be diligent or amiable or virtuous.

No, we must choose ourselves, as we are. We can also say: Take responsibility for ourselves, as we are.

We must take responsibility for ourselves simply because there is no one else to do it. Take, for example, an alcoholic. It does not help to excuse oneself by saying that it is an innate tendency, or that his father was a drunkard, or that he had a sad childhood and early fell into bad company.

All of this may be objectively true. But it does not help to present it. For the first prerequisite for doing something about the problem is that he himself is willing to make an effort. He must therefore take responsibility for himself, just as if he were the cause of it all.

This does not mean that he stands alone with his problem. He can decide to seek help from others to rid himself of his burden. We others can decide to help him. But without his own will and effort, no help can succeed. It starts with the personal responsibility for one's own life.

To choose oneself is a far-reaching choice. For we choose ourselves with all our faults and shortcomings. If I am lazy or irritable or a tobacco addict, I choose myself as lazy or irritable or a tobacco addict and do not seek refuge in an ideal image that represents something else.

This does not mean that I passively accept myself as I am and let five and seven be equal. But it means that I take responsibility for myself with skin and hair and faults and shortcomings and thus also the responsibility to correct the flaws.

But responsibility presupposes freedom. For if we do not have freedom, then we cannot reasonably be held accountable.

This is where I am captivated by Kierkegaard. The personal responsibility and personal freedom combined with some overarching ethical anchors.

It is my fundamental position that we humans have a basic right to freedom. And that we not only have a right but also a duty to take responsibility. But at the same time, we need some firm anchors in existence so that it does not merely become a freedom in emptiness.

If there is to be seriousness in responsibility, there must also be something firm and enduring to be responsible to.

It was Søren Kierkegaard who opened my eyes to the solution. Kierkegaard saw the solution in faith in God. And for many people, that will indeed be the solution.

But I believe that there can be advantages in expanding the solution so that it extends beyond Christianity. So that it is universal and general. So that it does not distinguish between God and Allah and other metaphysical instances. So that it does not depend on one prophet or another. So that it addresses all people solely by virtue of their humanity.

It would contribute to creating a more peaceful world if we could universally agree on a common set of fundamental ethical principles, independent of societies and religions. So to speak, a cross-religious set of norms.

* * *

The question is, then: Can we find an overarching ethical norm set without reference to Christianity, Islam, or any other religion? An ethical norm set that expresses the eternal, which is independent of time, place, history, society, and religion, which springs from something objective, something inherent in humanity or nature?

The late Professor K. E. Løgstrup spoke of "the sovereign expressions of life." He mentions as examples "mercy," "trust," and "the openness of speech." According to Løgstrup, these phenomena are elementary. They are fundamental traits of human existence before our cultural shaping of this existence.

Let us look at mercy.

The parable of "The Good Samaritan" is part of our childhood lessons.

Most would say that, of course, we should help another person in need. Nevertheless, Jesus included in his story two priests who simply leave the distressed person lying there.

Most feel a genuine outrage that the priest and the Levite just walk by the assaulted person. In contrast, the Samaritan did the right and necessary thing.

Now, it is easy to be outraged at the priest and the Levite who just pass by. But take an example from our own everyday life. If one day you see two bikers in the process of mutilating an innocent person on the open street, will you intervene to stop the assault – or will you hurry past to avoid getting your head smashed?

There is hardly a clear answer. Some will try to stop the assault – and there are indeed several tragic examples of those who try to stop a fight ending up being beaten down themselves and even mutilated to death. For the same reason, the police can report examples of many people deliberately looking the other way and not even wanting to testify in cases of violence and terror. But deep down, we know that it is base and wrong to react so passively and indifferently.

The very fact that we think this way shows that we feel a responsibility towards a person in need. If we see someone drowning or burning, will we not try to save them? Yes, and there are even many examples of people putting their own lives at risk to save others.

Why do we feel this obligation to help other people? Yes, it is one of life's fundamental questions, and so far it remains unanswered. Let me just state that no matter how selfish one may perceive humanity, there are certain principles in our nature that make us interested in the well-being of others, and make others' happiness and misfortune, joy and sorrow a part of our own existence.

To make a large topic short and concrete, I will assert that it has to do with conscience. Conscience binds us into a community with other people. Conscience urges us to help our fellow humans when they are in need. Conscience imposes a responsibility on us.

Perhaps conscience is precisely the eternal in humanity. Perhaps conscience is the objective ethical norm set, which is the instance above humanity. In that case, I believe one can argue for the existence of an objective ethical norm set without taking a religious starting point. For conscience, I believe, is something inherent in humanity. I do not believe that we help a person in need merely because it is stated in a religious commandment. I believe that the urge to help another person in need lies in our nature.

Conscience is universal. But the voices of conscience are not necessarily the same from person to person.

In other words: Conscience expresses an ethical norm set. How we actually live up to our own conscience requires personal choices and personal responsibility.

* * *

The eternal could also be the very fundamental principle that every human has the right to life. If we do not have the right to our own life, existence, yes, being human, becomes absurd.

From the very fundamental right to life follows the right to freedom. For the individual must be guaranteed the freedom to undertake the actions and choices that make it possible to sustain life, yes, to strive for the good life for the individual. This also implies property rights to the fruits of one's own labor. For that is the prerequisite for the individual to support themselves and thus sustain life.

The right to life and freedom is such a fundamental prerequisite for humanity to live as humans that I will call these rights natural rights. They are natural rights because they follow from human nature. The natural rights apply to every human solely by virtue of being human. They exist independently of conventions and agreements and religions. They are absolute and inviolable.

But again, the point is that they do not constitute an ethical answer key. We can only fill them out through personal choices and through personal responsibility.

We have the right to life, yes. But this right gives rise to a concrete stance on several questions and dilemmas in everyday life. What about access to abortion? What about assisted dying? What about the death penalty?

We have the right to freedom, yes. But the freedom of the individual must, however, be limited by the fact that it must not hinder others' right to the same freedom. Otherwise, freedom ends in its own contradiction. So where do we draw the line in practical life for the individual's freedom in relation to others?

I will call these natural rights the rights to human freedom. For me, they are the ethical anchors. But precisely not an ethical answer key. The answer we humans can only achieve by making an effort with the intermediate calculations.

* * *

The rights to freedom are fundamentally cross-religious. This ethical norm set can be reconciled with the existence of multiple religions. Yes, it is even the case that the rights to freedom demand respect for personal religious beliefs.

On the other hand, it is clear that the rights to freedom are not compatible with a legal religion that demands to be superior to the nation and the state. The rights to freedom are not compatible with a legal religion that seeks to dictate the believer's existence from cradle to grave.

But the rights to freedom are fully compatible with having a personal religious belief. Yes, the rights to freedom are based on the premise that the individual has the right to have their personal religious conviction – without interference from either the state or other people.

This also leads me to say a few words about the significance of religion in society. I have great respect for other people's faith. And it is my clear opinion that one should always behave tactfully and respectfully towards the religious beliefs that the individual may hold.

But I also must emphasize that religion is and remains a personal matter between the individual and the God that the individual may believe in. It is dangerous when personal faith is replaced by a legal religion, where society must conform to religious mandates – which may even be based on millennia-old prescriptions.

With all due respect for the Bible of us Christians, the Koran of Muslims, and the Torah of Jews, these are indeed ancient texts, written in a distant past. They were authored by people who have subjectively interpreted what they consider to be divine commandments. But they were written in a time and in a society that is fundamentally different from our own.

No enlightened society can live with the notion that such ancient texts must be taken literally and translated directly into our modern times.

It is the fundamentalists who create unrest with their insistence on their God, their prophets, and their religious texts. And with their insistence that millennia-old writings must be taken completely literally even in our modern times.

We see this when fanatical Muslims become suicide bombers in the name of Allah. We see it in Israel, where Orthodox Jews refuse to evacuate settlements. We saw it in Northern Ireland in the conflict between Catholics and Protestants.

I therefore must warn against fundamentalists in all camps. We must respect each individual's personal religious beliefs. But we must combat religious fundamentalism.

Denmark has so far been spared from religious fundamentalism. The Danish people have a good tradition of approachability and peacefulness. We talk things through. Opinions clash and decisions are made over the table and a cup of coffee. We could call it a conversation democracy.

Religion has found its place within this framework. The majority of Danes are members of the Church of Denmark. The Church of Denmark is therefore widely popular. Rooted in the local congregations. And no one goes to extremes. While there are different directions within the Church of Denmark. While there can be differences in the intensity of religious belief.

There is, however, a consensus and a community around some fundamental principles. Among other things, about not mixing politics and religion. And it is always possible to have a sensible conversation and to talk things through.

It is not quite as self-evident anymore. In the wake of a couple of decades of immigration of many people with a Muslim background, some groups have emerged that practice a very aggressive form of Islam.

These are minority groups. But they occupy a significant space in the public debate.

They come from a background where Islam is not just a religion, but a societal order. Religion is not a private matter. Islam is a total worldview that guides the believer's existence, from birth through death to life beyond.

On that point, we must clearly state our position. That form of Islam is not compatible with the societal order we have in Denmark.

In my view, Danish society can accommodate multiple religions. We already do. But there is a clear condition that must be met for it to be combined with a strong cohesion in Danish society. And that is that Islam and any other religion find their place within the jovial Danish conversation democracy. That all Muslims practice Islam in a way that is in accordance with Danish traditions of down-to-earthness, pragmatism, peaceful dialogue, and respect for others' opinions.

I believe that a significant majority of the Muslims living in Denmark share exactly the same wish. To be free from aggressive religious practice. To be free from being imposed upon by some fundamentalist and medieval religious mandates. To be allowed to live in peace with their personal relationship to Allah and Muhammad.

* * *

If we take our starting point in Kierkegaard, there is a radical effect in asserting the equality of all people before God. The radical effect is that no human being can make themselves into the Lord. No human being can elevate themselves to the judge who decides between good and evil. No human being can appoint themselves as the manufacturer of ethics who determines the rule set by which all others must live.

In my view, Christianity is a worldview that turns against all that is authoritarian and oppressive, thereby emphasizing the individual's freedom and responsibility.

Even those who do not believe in God should feel completely secure with the Lord. For without the Lord, humanity would be inclined to take God's place, indeed, to elevate themselves to the creator and savior of the world. And that role is too fragile for the human mind to fulfill.

When people take it upon themselves to play the creator and savior of humanity, the result is unfathomable cruelty, evil, and oppression.

The belief that in the end we alone must answer to God, and not to humans, is precisely the strongest protection of each individual's freedom against oppression from other humans.

But something similar could be said if we perceive the instance above humanity as something inherent to humanity, something fundamentally natural, which provides a basis for an ethical norm set, some ethical reference points.

The crucial point is simply to establish that each individual has a personal freedom and a personal responsibility to take the right actions to fulfill these norms.

Each individual has a responsibility to make an effort in life here and now. To give God a helping hand, so to speak.

I can best summarize my fundamental position in the story of the priest who visited the farmer, Hans Pedersen. Hans had cleared the harsh piece of land of trees, weeds, and stones. In the sweat of his brow, he had cultivated the land and could now enjoy the fruits of his labor with a fine grain harvest.

The priest stopped to talk with Hans Pedersen. "Hans," he said, "you have indeed produced a blessed and beautiful grain field. Let us thank the Lord for His gift to you."

"Yes, thank you," said Hans Pedersen, "I am also very grateful to the Lord. But the pastor should have seen how the land looked when the Lord was alone in taking care of it!"