Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the measures to stabilize the Euro before the German Bundestag on May 19, 2010, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

19 May 2010 · Government statement on measures to stabilize the Euro before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on May 19, 2010, presenting a government statement on the 750-billion-euro package to stabilize the Euro amid the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
Main themes
Eurozone stability crisis, European financial rescue package, German budgetary responsibility, prevention of transfer union, financial market regulation, European integration, stability culture, Greece bailout, G20 cooperation, structural reforms in EU
Duration
~34 min
86th percentile
Words
4,083
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Sentences
222
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Readability
49
59th percentile
Grade
11.1
34th percentile
Syntax
2.88
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Vocabulary
2.13
33rd percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 69%68%
  • Institutional 18%18%
  • Geopolitical 10%9%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

222 sentences in 67 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

It was not even two weeks ago that the German Bundestag, with a large majority, approved the stabilization measures for Greece. With the package adopted on May 7, we have made it clear both economically and politically-legally: We are helping Greece because we are thereby helping the stability of our common currency as a whole. We are protecting the money of the citizens of our country – nothing more and nothing less is the mandate of the Federal Government as well as of this esteemed House here.

Today we have come together to make a decision that is even more significant for the future of Germany and Europe; for each of us feels: The current crisis of the Euro is the greatest test that Europe has faced in decades, indeed since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This test is existential, and I add: It must be passed.

Let us get to the point. The Euro, which along with the internal market represents the foundation for growth and prosperity even in Germany, is in danger. If we do not avert this danger, the consequences for Europe are incalculable, and then the consequences beyond Europe are also incalculable. We got a glimpse of what could happen on Thursday evening before our debate on Greece with the almost hysterical turbulence in the international markets.

What became visible there – you all followed it – was dramatic. Therefore, just a few days later, there was no reasonable alternative to securing the stability of the entire Euro financial system. The Ultima Ratio had been reached; this means nothing other than that the Euro as a whole was in danger. But what unfolded in those days was only the economic foreboding of what would come to Germany, Europe, and the world if action were not taken or if it were taken incorrectly. The political consequences, on the other hand, are not even imaginable in thought.

Let us therefore set aside for a moment the technical key data of the present bill: the loans amounting to 750 billion euros that are available if necessary, of which 60 billion euros are covered by the European Union, for which the Euro states guarantee proportionally for up to 440 billion euros, and Germany in turn for 123 billion euros, possibly 20 percent more. The International Monetary Fund wants to contribute an amount of at least half of the European share. That would be up to 250 billion euros. Those are the figures and key data. But let us set them aside for a moment; for we know: It is about much more than these numbers; it is about much more than a currency. The monetary union is a community of fate. Therefore, it is about nothing more and nothing less than the preservation and validation of the European idea. That is our historical task; for if the Euro fails, then Europe fails. If we avert this danger, then the Euro and Europe will be stronger than before.

We must achieve two things:

first

the management of the acute crisis situation and second the precaution for the future.

To this end, I want us to first ensure together with our partners that all of Europe commits to a new culture of stability, a culture of stability that ensures the consolidation of state budgets and the long-term stability of our common currency.

I want

second

that we, together with all G20 countries, take precautions through the regulation of financial markets to protect the world economy from a renewed crisis.

I want

third

that the European Union ruthlessly uncovers its own structural weaknesses and then focuses on the great tasks to shape our common future.

In the discussions of the heads of state and government on May 7 and the finance ministers of the European Union on May 9, there was – to put it mildly – not immediate agreement in Europe on what the rescue path out of the current crisis could look like. Proposals were discussed that I, as German Chancellor, and the Federal Government as a whole were not willing to support. Specifically, the path to a transfer union was threatened, in which a direct and binding liability of all for the self-responsible decisions of individual member states would have been introduced. That had to be prevented.

Had that not succeeded, Europe would have made a fatal misjudgment. The consequences would have been obvious: In such a model, the incentives for necessary self-efforts for budget consolidation and structural reforms would have been extremely low. Economically more successful member states would have been weakened without the weaker ones truly becoming stronger. That, however, would have been neither legally tenable nor economically sensible. From that perspective, it would have been politically irresponsible. Therefore, such a path was at no time feasible with Germany, neither in the case of Greece nor now.

The price for our stance was to be criticized as hesitant or slow. But the Federal Government is happy to pay this price if, in the end, the right decisions are made. Another decision could never have been rectified. I honestly cannot imagine that you, if you had been in such a situation, would have knowingly done something that is legally unacceptable and at the same time would not have advanced us all economically.

In this respect, Germany only gave its approval to the comprehensive package for the preservation of financial stability in Europe in the night from May 9 to 10 when the package was structured in such a way that it corresponds to our economic and legal principles, and not because we had become arrogant, but because we are convinced that these are principles that serve the matter.

The

first

principle is: We help on the condition that the affected state commits to comprehensive self-efforts. With this, we provide assistance to stabilize our common currency and not to relieve deficit sinners of their obligations. By involving the International Monetary Fund, it is ensured that the countries applying for loans implement an effective restructuring program. This gives us the best assurance that they will be effectively monitored in their implementation.

The

second

principle. We help on the condition that we decide for ourselves about every use of the funds, as far as it concerns bilateral funds from the states. There is no automatism of European loans. For the larger part of the rescue package, the Euro states guarantee proportionally. They retain full control. The loans from the Euro states will be technically processed through a special purpose vehicle. You know the key points of this special purpose vehicle: unanimous decisions, time limitation, a foundation under Luxembourg law.

The contract – you know this; we have informed you about it – is being worked on. It has not yet been completed. But if desired, we will find means and ways to ensure that no money flows before the contract for the special purpose vehicle is known.

Parliament will be involved in the decisions. The mechanism for the loans of the Euro states is thus designed in such a way that the budget sovereignty of the Bundestag is fully taken into account. The basis and prerequisite for a decision to be made unanimously in Brussels on the granting of a loan is an assessment by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission. The granting is therefore tied to strict conditions. However, these loans from the Euro states will only come into play when the new community instrument is no longer sufficient; for loans amounting to a total of 60 billion euros, the European Union itself guarantees. It acts on the basis of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Union action on this legal basis is now possible because some member states are seriously threatened by a spreading chain reaction and thus by exceptional events that are beyond their control.

The

third

principle. We help on the condition that the measures adopted ensure long-term stability. Germany advocates for permanent stability in Europe. That was the case at the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union, and it is the case today and will be in the future. We will not spare anyone in Europe from this. I say: At the core of the dispute that we have over every detail is precisely this culture of stability. I believe it is important and right that we fight for the ideas that were laid down at the founding of the Euro to prevail in the long term.

This also includes defending the independence of the European Central Bank. It was created after the model of the Deutsche Bundesbank and has successfully guaranteed price stability in the Euro area since then. The safeguarding of price stability is and remains the highest mandate of the European Central Bank. This constitutes the core of its credibility. I therefore have no doubt that it will continue to fulfill this task with the same consistency as before.

With our package for the stabilization of the Euro and with the agreement to decisively consolidate state finances, we facilitate the European Central Bank's role in making an important contribution to the long-term stability of the Euro area. Long-term stability is unthinkable without healthy public finances. It is that simple. At the same time, it is so difficult; for we all know the reality of our countries. – It is really funny how quickly one can forget in a few months.

Too many competitively weak members of the Euro zone have lived beyond their means and have thus fallen into the debt trap. That is the real cause of the problem. Therefore, we must tackle the problem at its roots. At my suggestion, the heads of state and government committed on May 7, 2010, to accelerate the consolidation of their budgets within the framework of the Stability Pact. Spain and Portugal have already presented additional measures last week. I welcome that, and I add, first:

That was indispensable.

And

second:

The measures must now also be implemented and monitored consistently.

It is my firm conviction: All member states must accelerate the consolidation of their national budgets. Only then can the rescue attempts be effective. For the continuation of the concealment of the true cause of the crisis would not help Europe in the long term. It would only harm all member states. That must come to an end. I do not want to beat around the bush: We Germans have also – by the way, not just since yesterday, but for over 40 years – incurred more debt than is good for us. We too live on credit. But we have found the strength to break this cycle. We have enshrined the debt brake in the constitution. Exactly that will be reflected in the presentation of the budget for 2011. You know that the budget discussions in Parliament take place annually in September. The budget will be presented in June, early July. We will take that into account. We will then, when the debt brake takes full effect, only spend what we also have. This means: From 2011 onwards, we must save, and in a way that we have solid finances while at the same time shaping the future of our country and generating growth. That will be the principle by which we conduct our budget discussions.

All of this will not yet be enough to actually ensure long-term stability. Without measures that we take to prepare for the future, we will not succeed. With such measures, however, the Euro will be stronger after the crisis than before.

Europe needs a new culture of stability. However, we will only achieve it if we improve economic and financial policy coordination and mutual monitoring for all member states. I want to remind you once again that the Stability and Growth Pact applies not only to the Euro states but to all member states. Therefore, the adoption of the growth strategy EU 2020 in June of this year is of significant importance. It will be about making it clear at this point where we want to develop this Europe. It goes without saying that we will, of course, ensure that the principle of stability is first adhered to. Therefore, I find the Commission's proposals, which foresee an early submission of budget drafts also in Brussels, to be correct; for this does not restrict the budget sovereignty of national parliaments but gives the European Commission the opportunity to comment.

It remains imperative: We must finally catch up on what has been neglected so far, what was neither achieved with the Maastricht Treaty nor with the Lisbon Treaty: the necessary economic integration of the European Union. It must follow the monetary union. Without it, the monetary union will not be able to exist in the long term.

When I state this, I also add unequivocally: Such a stronger interlinking will only be successful if the conditions for this interlinking are right. Specifically: The rules must not be tailored to the weakest, but they must be oriented towards the strong. I know that this is a tough message. Economically, however, it is an absolute necessity. Otherwise, we would be going from bad to worse. This will also have implications for the tasks of the European Union as a whole. I believe we will have fewer directives on the salt content in bread, the renaming of apple wine, or the distribution of fruit in schools, and we will focus more on sensible infrastructure, research policy, and the future viability of the European continent as a whole.

I predict to you that, once again, there will initially be few supporters for this issue, and we will have to fight hard again. But neither can nor will that be the criterion for the federal government when it comes to deciding whether we will follow our principles or not. Too much is at stake, as we can see from today’s debate.

It is, not least, the culture of stability of the currency as well as of public finances that has always been part of the self-understanding of the Federal Republic of Germany since its founding. However, that alone would not be a sufficient argument. Much more important is: Our culture of stability has proven itself more than adequately, and because it has proven itself, I will not deviate one iota from it, no matter how tough, arduous, lengthy, and time-consuming the debates in Brussels may be.

Therefore, we also need a comprehensive reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. The tightening of the rules must primarily serve one goal: The member states must fulfill their own responsibility for sound budget management. This is the crux of all efforts and cannot be emphasized often enough. Since we are already discussing this somewhat controversially, I want to point out: The change and weakening of the Stability Pact in 2004 was a major mistake. Today, it is important to say that once again.

I therefore attach great importance to the group of finance ministers chaired by President Van Rompuy. Federal Minister Schäuble will present extensive German proposals at the first meeting of the group on Friday. From the perspective of the federal government, the following measures are necessary, among others: a faster and stricter application of sanctions against Euro member states that do not meet their obligations to reduce the deficit. These sanctions include, for example, withholding structural funds from the EU budget. Additional consolidation efforts are also necessary from member states with high debt levels; because these pose particular risks for crisis susceptibility. A temporary withdrawal of voting rights from notorious deficit offenders is necessary, and above all, the development of a procedure for an orderly state insolvency is essential. This would create an important incentive for Euro member states to keep their budgets in order.

When I say this, I am of course aware: Real reforms towards a new culture of stability across Europe require treaty changes. The path to this will, as always in Europe, not be short; but that cannot be an argument for refraining from doing what is right. Therefore, the federal government will continue to advocate for treaty changes.

In all the measures and principles that we must apply, it is fundamentally about something else, something much more important. Banking crisis, economic downturn, stimulus programs, and now the currency crisis, all of this fundamentally revolves around the question: How can we enforce the primacy of politics? We see after the banking crisis of 2008 once again how the absence of boundaries and rules can lead to behavior driven solely by profit-seeking on the financial markets being destructive, how it can become an existential threat to financial stability in Europe, indeed worldwide. The market alone – to be very clear – will not correct these misdevelopments. It is therefore the task of politics – of parliaments and governments – to intervene, to regulate, and, if necessary, to prohibit, in order to keep the risks manageable.

Once again: The causes of the financing crisis are truly not only due to the financial markets; however, the financial markets have acted like an accelerant. To prevent worse, to ensure the functioning of our division of labor economy, the countries of the Euro area had to act. The beneficiaries of this action are not only the citizens but all participants in economic life, including those financial market actors who contributed to exacerbating the crisis in the first place.

This may all be explained economically, but for the citizens, it is hardly comprehensible. They simply want one thing – I think they are right in this –: They want fairness. That is exactly what we must achieve. That embodies the spirit and essence of the social market economy: In the social market economy, the state has always been the guardian of order, and as such, it intervenes.

Therefore, we pursue two goals:

first

a sharper regulation and supervision and second a fair distribution of burdens that involves the financial sector in the costs of crisis management.

Words on financial market regulation must be followed by actions, more actions, and more decisive actions than before.

It is true: We have already achieved quite a bit – since representatives of yours, who are now in the opposition, were involved, I would not discredit that if I were you –: Compensation in the financial sector will in the future be more aligned with the long-term success of the company. In Germany, corresponding regulations have been in place since last year, initially mandated by the financial supervisory authority.

The Bundestag and Bundesrat are expected to complete their deliberations on the federal government’s draft law from February in September. Rating agencies will in the future be subject to financial supervision in Europe. Work is underway on a European financial supervision. The debates are currently taking place in the European Parliament. Unfortunately, the statements of the European Parliament contradict in some respects the statements of the national parliaments. Therefore, we are called upon to quickly find a common regulation here; because rating agencies cannot be subjected to any supervision unless a European financial market supervision is established. This is now the main task in this area.

But of course, not enough has been achieved yet. Therefore, the most important next step is the presentation of a directive that will achieve increased transparency and supervision of the derivatives markets and through which the role of ratings and rating agencies will be defined. At yesterday’s meeting of the finance ministers' council, the timetable for this was presented by the Commission.

In areas where a national solo effort by Germany does not cause harm, we will also act unilaterally. You have seen this in that BaFin has prohibited certain transactions by general decree since midnight: uncovered short sales in shares of the ten largest German financial companies, uncovered short sales of government bonds of the Eurozone, the purchase of credit default swaps on government bonds of the Euro area, provided the buyer has no justified hedging interest. – All of this will remain in effect until alternative regulations have been found at the European level.

Where we cannot act nationally, we naturally need European or international regulations. It was achieved yesterday through a decision of the Ecofin Council to establish stricter control and more transparency for hedge funds. The Council of EU finance ministers has achieved a breakthrough and cleared the way for a rapid agreement with the European Parliament. Fund managers – not only from hedge funds but also from private equity firms – will in the future be subject to supervision and certain codes of conduct. Above all, they must disclose their investment strategies, which is a very important step.

In addition, we must ensure – initial considerations are also being made for this – that a resolution and restructuring of banks becomes possible. This excludes the possibility that the state can be blackmailed by large banks and that taxpayers will be asked to pay again in the future. In addition, we naturally need a contribution to the costs. Therefore, the industry must in the future fund a fund through its own risk-based levies, which can finance such restructurings of banks. In March, we adopted key points on both issues in the cabinet in the presence of the French finance minister. The draft law will follow, and then we can debate it here.

Furthermore, we believe that financial institutions should contribute to the costs of crisis management. We have – as I have already stated – asked the International Monetary Fund for proposals on this by the next summit in June.

I do not want to revisit, as in the last debate, the advantages and disadvantages of the financial activity tax and the financial market transaction tax; they are well known to all of us. However, I have certainly taken note of the mandate from the coalition factions, which say: We need a taxation of the financial markets, whether through a financial market transaction tax or a financial activity tax. We will advocate for such taxation of the financial markets at the European and international levels. I say this to the coalition factions and regarding the financial market transaction tax also to the opposition factions.

We know that the discussion about the financial market transaction tax has long ceased to be just about the technical details of the tax. Rather, it is about the question of how justice can be achieved regarding those who have made large profits from all these excesses in the markets. When people fear for their jobs, when they have concerns about the stability of the currency, and when they also have to endure austerity measures, they ask themselves what we are doing to achieve at least a piece of justice in this burden-sharing.

But it is of no use that they rightly ask this. Rather, we must also do something to make it happen. Therefore, I and the entire federal government will advocate at the G20 meeting that we present a common European stance on financial market taxation. Therefore, the financial market transaction tax was already discussed among the finance ministers yesterday. If we do not reach an agreement on an international tax there – it will not be due to Germany – then we will have this discussion in Europe: How can we shape the contribution of the financial sector so that people can feel this piece of justice?

I said here not quite two weeks ago: Europe stands at a crossroads. – That remains unchanged. Europe stands at a crossroads, and it is now up to us to choose the right path to pass the existential test that Europe is facing. We know that we need Europe to successfully tackle the major future challenges that we as member states cannot manage alone. A path back from Europe is not a path in times of globalization. European unification was, is, and remains the most compelling, the greatest, and the most promising idea that Europe has ever seen. It is the legacy of the political generations before us. The task of our political generation today is to protect this legacy and to make the 21st century Europe’s century.

Our decision today is another indispensable step on this path, on the way to a long-term stable European Union that can guarantee not only a secure currency but also prosperity and peace for the people.