Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the International Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Ministry of Finance on May 20, 2010, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

22 May 2010 · International Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Ministry of Finance · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the International Financial Markets Conference in Berlin on May 20, 2010, amid parliamentary debate on the eurozone rescue package.
Main themes
Eurozone debt crisis, euro stability, European solidarity, Stability and Growth Pact reform, G20 global economic governance, financial market regulation, state rescue packages, fiscal discipline, European monetary union, international coordination
Duration
~34 min
86th percentile
Words
4,042
86th percentile
Sentences
182
87th percentile
Readability
48
56th percentile
Grade
12.1
46th percentile
Syntax
3.04
53rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
23rd percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 80%78%
  • Institutional 9%9%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

182 sentences in 43 paragraphs

Dear Minister of Finance, dear Wolfgang Schäuble,

dear Commissioner, dear Michel Barnier,

ladies and gentlemen,

I am pleased to be here today at the Financial Market Conference organized by the Federal Ministry of Finance. Wolfgang Schäuble has already mentioned it: the timing is interesting. When we discussed that the Ministry of Finance would hold such a conference, we felt that the timing should be aligned with the G20 and G8 meetings in Canada.

You have indeed come to Germany at a very interesting time. Because this week we are discussing in Parliament the rescue package for the Euro. We are, so to speak, making a collective effort to stabilize our common currency, which is, of course, not an easy but an existential decision, in which we clearly see the weaknesses of our common economic and monetary union, from which we must draw conclusions for the future.

What we have experienced in the last three years is a consequence of crises: first, a collapse of banks that required state intervention; subsequently, a downturn in the global economy that again necessitated state intervention in the form of stimulus programs; finally, a debt crisis of states – this was not unforeseeable, but already evident when we rescued the banks and implemented the stimulus programs – and now a critical reaction from the markets to this weakness, because excessive deficits of states are, of course, also a vulnerability for a balanced development in the future.

It was evident that no single country could manage this alone, but that international, joint action was required – both within the framework of the European Union and globally. It is right and important that the G20 countries have taken the initiative and leadership in this regard, that the G20 has been institutionalized over the past years, and that it will continue to monitor global economic development in the future. Globalization is now clearly reflected in the institutionalization of the G20. We have long debated whether the G8 was still sufficient, and we had expanded it to include the G5. Ultimately, this financial and economic crisis has crystallized the fact that the G20 will be an important group for the future of global economic development.

When we talk about stabilizing our European currency, the Euro, it is based on the question posed by the markets: How long will this European Union and especially the Eurozone hold together despite internal tensions? We have answered this question politically in a clear manner: Yes, we stand together, because this common currency is of great importance to us, is characterized by many advantages for each individual member state, and is also the fundamental prerequisite for the continued cohesion of the European Union as a whole and for the functioning of the internal market, so we are ready to take the necessary political actions for it.

Secondly,

observers of the scene have noted that this is not proceeding smoothly, but that very difficult negotiations are necessary. Essentially, there is a competition or a dispute regarding the question: Can we exercise solidarity while simultaneously ensuring the solidity of the currency and the currency area? To understand this, one must know – this has also played a prominent role in recent days – that the decision for the Euro was a decision characterized by the firm commitment that each country must contribute to the functioning of the Euro. Therefore, the Stability and Growth Pact is not just any pact, but the fundamental prerequisite for its functioning.

In retrospect, it must be said: Failures and, in part, also relaxations of this pact were allowed. For years, it was concealed that this pact was not adhered to with the necessary consistency. Due to the crisis and possible speculations, the effects have now been intensified. We must tackle the problems at their root now. I believe we have succeeded in this through hard negotiations. We need a tightening of the Stability and Growth Pact. A group led by Council President Van Rompuy will begin its work this Friday. We also need a consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, especially in the countries that have particularly violated it, but ultimately – I want to state this explicitly – in all countries.

Now, we may be accused of having a certain fondness for low state deficits in Germany and of being relatively risk-averse regarding stability. I would like to say: When you have a currency like the Euro, where each country is responsible for its contribution to a stable currency, then you may need stricter rules than others who can decide this as individual governments.

Secondly,

the creation of the Euro has always been characterized by the independence of the European Central Bank and the firm will to prevent inflationary developments, which have left deep scars on our continent, especially in Germany, at all costs.

This means that at the G20 meetings we will hold in the future, where, in addition to financial market regulation, which I will address shortly, growth issues will play an increasingly important role, Germany and the Eurozone as a whole will always contribute significantly to sustainable growth – that is, growth that is not bought at the cost of excessive deficits. I can already predict that there will be exciting discussions, especially in connection with the Anglo-Saxon world. This is foreseeable; it has always happened this way, and it will continue to do so. But we feel confirmed in this assumption by what is currently happening within the Eurozone. You also find many supporters for this thesis in international discussions, especially in the Asian region. Otherwise, we would again become dependent on market developments that, in my view, are not right. This means that a solid fiscal policy must be the standard for the times when we shape politics after the crisis.

Therefore, questions of exit strategies also play a significant role for us. In this regard – I want to make this very clear – I have significant concerns about whether we will arrive at an internationally coordinated exit strategy as coordinated as we did with the stimulus packages. Because if some say that maintaining stable finances is the basis for achieving sustainable growth, and others say, "I can only come to an exit strategy when unemployment has fallen again and my political systems are stable," then that is an inherent contradiction that must be balanced through our negotiations. But we will insist on a consistent exit strategy in Europe.

Politicians tell us, for example, Swedish politicians who themselves experienced such crises in the early 90s, that this is quite normal: banking crisis, economic crisis, stimulus programs, debt, and then a focus on structures and the question of how competitive the structures are. The European Union – I say this again for all 27 member states – will have to face this discussion. Because our structures are not as efficient in global competition as we would actually wish them to be.

Yesterday, I said in the German Parliament: We may need to have somewhat fewer discussions about the naming of apple trees, the renaming of apple wine, or the salt content of bread, and perhaps a bit more discussion about the rapid provision of broadband technology, intelligent electrical grids, and the completion of the internal market in the area of research and innovation. We must do our homework. Therefore, a European Council will take place in June at the right time, which will deal with the growth strategy towards the year 2020. Only a narrowly defined fiscal policy without the willingness to undertake real reforms will not advance Europe.

Having said all this, I do so from a perspective that relies on market forces, which, however, has always been based on the principles of the Social Market Economy in Germany since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, that is, a market economy where the state is the guardian of order. States must ensure that, so to speak, extremes of the markets do not gain the upper hand, but that the primacy of politics prevails, so that there is a balance, for example, between capital and labor, but also between other opposing forces. This has led in the Federal Republic of Germany to the state repeatedly making very harsh interventions, for example, in competition law. This, in turn, has led to the fact that in Germany there are not only a few very large companies, but that the middle class has always had room for its existence, which we now understand as one of our great economic strengths.

With increasing globalization, where financial markets have of course also played an increasingly important role, we saw at the end of the 90s that the security that the Social Market Economy provided to people in earlier times – based on the motto "If my company is doing well, then I am doing well"; there was a close partnership – is no longer present in globally operating companies, but that people suddenly experience: My company can be doing wonderfully because it is making many good deals outside of Germany, but I, as an employee in Germany, am not doing well. This has led to a certain insecurity in society, which has been further intensified today by the financial markets. People are asking: What do you as politicians still have in your hands? Is globalization manageable, or are there independent forces at work, regarding which politics can only watch and do nothing? I say very clearly: I believe that we can succeed in working out an order in a globalized world together, in which market forces are, of course, the driving forces, but in which they are politically integrated in such a way that the claim to design by politics is not destroyed, but continues to exist.

The task is to no longer do this nationally, but to agree on it together. It must be said: In the crisis, this worked very well. But the anxious question is: When things get better again, will national egoisms not take over again? Therefore, my request also goes to the Canadian and – from both countries much will depend – to the South Korean G20 presidency: Even if your countries are not personally affected by certain phenomena, I believe that the task of advancing the process as a whole is one that must also be accomplished in countries that may currently be in a better situation.

If we want to come to a global order, then we must also have a global responsibility and cannot simply say: Because things are going well for me, I am not interested in this or that problem. Otherwise – at least in Germany – people will despair of us. If we decide that we actually need a bank levy – for example, we say this in Europe; and even the British and the United States say this – and then there are again three countries that say, "We are not affected by this," then that is extremely frustrating and ultimately cannot move us forward. So this is my request: Let us send a common signal of strength at the G20 summit.

Now, in our hour of need, we have committed to what is completely undisputed in the G20, namely that every financial product, every actor, and every financial center must be regulated in the future. We promised this to the people. After one and a half to two years, people are asking: What has become of that? Then we must honestly say: We are distributing wonderful technical papers that state this and that. I do not want to deny that much progress has been made. We tell the people: One thing is decided in Europe and the other is decided nationally. This must be implemented; and that takes a while. But at some point, we must provide proof and be able to say: Look, we have succeeded. This time frame should not take too long. Every product, every actor, and every place – at least the relevant ones in this world – are regulated in a reasonable manner. We still owe this to the citizens. Therefore, the conferences, which ultimately only account for what we have already implemented from the initiative, have a high political and communicative significance when we say: Yes, we are on the right track. We are somewhere "in the struggles of the plain," as one would say in Germany, but we will report to you at such and such a time that we have achieved this and that.

Of course, we must not beat around the bush. Let us take the example of Basel II, which includes a regulation of great importance and which, with concrete and stringent implementation, can prevent certain effects. We have implemented this cleanly in Europe after it was unanimously decided in the Basel Committee after years of negotiations. A directive was quickly adopted, which we have implemented into national law. Every German medium-sized business knows today that every loan application has been burdened with high assessment costs because the sustainable development of this medium-sized enterprise must be assessed. However, we have found that Basel II has not yet been applied in the United States of America. Now, we have agreed within the G20 that by the beginning of 2012, the United States of America will also introduce this regulation. That is good. But it is still burdened with the hope that they will indeed find a way through the respective chambers in Congress; and that is not trivial, as one knows.

At the same time, work is already underway on Basel III. You must understand that there is a certain skepticism in the European or German economy regarding the proper implementation of Basel III, and people say: We are not sure whether others elsewhere will not gain a competitive advantage from this, while we may again be the ones who have to help in times of crisis because we are all interconnected. It is easy to imagine that a heated discussion has erupted over this. Therefore, coordinated action in every direction is important; not only in the hour of need but also in the hour of regulation.

I believe we agree that we need intelligent control of systemic risks. One of the tasks we are addressing, which is also being considered elsewhere, is: How can I ensure that banks and financial institutions do not become so large that they ultimately always represent a potential for blackmail for states? How can I require enough self-provision from banks so that they can take care of themselves in the event of potential future crises?

That is why the bank levy, which we have developed together with France as a cornerstone, is an important point. We will implement it into law. I hope that this can be enforced worldwide in a similar manner. Countries that have not been affected by a crisis are, of course, not exempt from the possibility that they may be subject to a certain development in ten or twenty years. The political problem that people say, "With everything we have to endure in terms of austerity measures, we now also have to save people who have personally equipped themselves with good profits," is something we cannot face indefinitely. You can do that once and say that you did not foresee it exactly. But a second and third time will bring extreme risks that we, I and the entire federal government, do not want to take. This also unites us in the European Union.

Then the question arises: Do we need to involve financial participants even more in dealing with the damages and deficits? This is a discussion that is currently raging dramatically in Germany. I believe that this is not entirely unjustified, as it raises a fundamental question of justice. We always argue that certain taxes can only be levied internationally. Therefore, at the last G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, we asked the IMF to make proposals on what could be done to better involve financial actors, namely banks, in the costs. There are various proposals, such as the financial transaction tax and the financial activities tax.

We have said that we will advocate at the summit in Canada for the financial markets to be taxed in addition to a levy. One does not need to be far-sighted to say that one will probably not reach a consensus decision immediately on the first evening at dinner, but that there will again be many reservations. I would just like to point out that the problems in all countries are similar. In every G20 state, one is accountable to the people. In this respect, it could be an element of justice that does not ruin the financial markets if we could agree on an international tax. I, or we, will certainly advocate for that.

When we look at further areas of regulation – you will do this today in a much more skilled manner than I will – then certainly the area of hedge funds is one where I am very grateful that the European Commission with its proposal and the finance ministers with their resolution have taken a step further. It would, of course, be advantageous if there were comparable regulations in all G20 areas, as this would make such regulation easier to implement.

When one hears what is said about it, the echo is, of course, as always diverse. This is, by the way, one of the problems of politics. Since we are all not financial market experts – no matter what we studied – and most financial market actors are themselves participants with a comprehensible profit motive, it is not so easy to find selfless advisors in this area, which is still relatively young. Therefore, the question of whom to listen to is one of the most difficult questions. You meet people who tell you that hedge funds are the largest capital pools today that can exert significant effects with incredible activity and incredible possibilities when they act concertedly. You can meet people who say that their impact is actually to be rated as low, has nothing to do with the crisis, and that we are, of course, exaggerating again. Politics must always find the way in between. I can only advise the financial industry to be honest with us. If we do not receive honest advice, we may do things that are not so sophisticated but politically necessary. That will only cost us unnecessary energy. The space for honest advisors is still relatively unoccupied.

I have mentioned the question of hedge funds. The question of derivatives and short selling also plays a huge role in public discussion. As a physicist, I say: The financial market actor loves gradients. Days on which there are no differences and no gradients must be designed so that one invents a gradient. Therefore, one must look at how the gradient is used productively or to what extent one must tame the gradient so that it does not produce unnatural effects.

I could still say something about several other regulatory tasks. I believe you will go into detail on this today. For us, the topic of rating agencies still plays a role. For the supervision of rating agencies, we need the European financial market supervision. In the discussion about European financial market supervision, one recognizes the dispute that ultimately also exists within the G20 over the question: How much do we want to regulate intergovernmentally? To what extent do we accept multilateral structures – that is, structures in which we as member states relinquish a piece of our own responsibility?

I believe that all European member states find it relatively easy to cede sovereignty to a higher institution like the European Commission because we have been doing this for decades. But emerging countries like China or India, for example, do this much more hesitantly. I would also say that the United States is not exactly a pioneer when one is not sure that one still has an important influence in the respective supranational institution. In my opinion, institutions like the IMF and the Financial Stability Board must be strengthened in the overall process, because without such overarching institutions, we will not be able to manage.

When one returns to European financial market supervision, the question of how much we regulate intergovernmentally and how much we regulate through truly European institutions plays a role. We must reach an agreement here; otherwise, we cannot subject the rating agencies to any supervision and will not make any progress in this regard.

One topic that is much discussed among us is the question: Does the European continent need its own rating agency, which is of course not politically dependent but thinks and acts in the spirit of sustainable economic consideration and is not short-term oriented? To what extent should one even become dependent on the ratings of the rating agencies?

We could see a very interesting example of this. When the Greek aid package was passed, the European Central Bank decided to buy lower-quality bonds. This was actually supposed to signal: We believe in the Greek aid package; and therefore we do not necessarily believe in the rating of Greek bonds.

However, the effect on the markets was not entirely clear. Therefore, the relationship of politics to the rating agencies, which is connected with questions of how independent they are and on what information they operate, is one of the most interesting. I would – I say this quite clearly – advocate for there to be a rating agency within the European Union that competes with the others – of course in a fair competition. In this respect, we still have a lot of work to do.

When we meet in Canada for the G20 summit, I hope that this conference will contribute to achieving manageable results. The world has not yet returned to the point where people think we have already done our work in terms of regulation and commonality. In this respect, the Canadian presidency bears a high responsibility. We pledge that we will be supportive. We say this just as we do in the direction of the summit in South Korea.

As one of the major exporting nations in the world, we have a great interest in the world economy getting back on its feet. To be honest, we must say that we are currently benefiting from the fact that export markets are functioning well again. We are ready to discuss global imbalances. I am not willing to discuss that we put better competitiveness at the expense of higher deficits. We will advocate for the competitiveness of others to improve. We will advocate for free world trade to truly take hold.

My last point: The economic recovery after this global economic crisis will only work if it is not hindered by elements of protectionism. It is good that there is the World Trade Organization. It is bad that we have not made progress for years in the effort to conclude the Doha Round. In fact, everything in this crisis calls for submitting to this effort. There are a multitude of non-tariff trade barriers that can have similar effects as tariffs. Therefore, we must be very careful that a kind of protectionism does not spread under the international regulatory framework that will ultimately not benefit any of us. I know that this is not politically easy because, in an emergency situation, the shirt is always closer than the coat, as one says in Germany. But I consider it an indispensable prerequisite for the world economy to truly recover.

I believe one can already say today: We have done many things better than in the last global economic crisis in the 1930s. But one cannot yet say whether we have done everything optimally so that we can get on the fastest possible path to recovery. Unfortunately, one cannot yet say that precautions have been taken to ensure that such a thing does not happen again. Therefore, you still have a lot to do here. Even for us, there will still be a lot of work left in Canada and South Korea.

I thank you all for coming here and wish you a successful conference.