Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the Journalists' Symposium of the "Convention for Germany" on December 5, 2007, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

5 December 2007 · Journalists' Symposium of the Convention for Germany · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 'Convention for Germany' journalists' symposium in Berlin on December 5, 2007, reflecting on Germany's EU Council Presidency and the imminent signing of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Main themes
EU Reform Treaty and Treaty of Lisbon, Germany's EU Council Presidency, European federalism and subsidiarity, distribution of competencies between EU and member states, Charter of Fundamental Rights, European institutional reform, democracy and citizen proximity, German constitutional principles in European context, role of the European Commission, nation-states within the EU
Duration
~42 min
91st percentile
Words
5,083
91st percentile
Sentences
251
93rd percentile
Readability
45
48th percentile
Grade
11.9
44th percentile
Syntax
3.02
50th percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
22nd percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 71%71%
  • Geopolitical 15%15%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Not in focus 0%

251 sentences in 56 paragraphs

Dear Mr. Federal President,

esteemed members of the Convention and participants of today's symposium,

I would like to extend a warm welcome to Erwin Teufel as someone with whom we have already worked very closely; this, of course, is only representative of all the distinguished members of the "Convention for Germany."

You have addressed many topics, and today, thankfully, once again the topic of Germany's capacity for action in Europe. In this context, a multitude of individual questions arises. I believe that by the end of this year we can say: Germany had the opportunity, with the EU Council Presidency, to make a special contribution to the questions: How do we envision this Europe? What is feasible? How can we make Europe more capable of action, and how can we also articulate the situation of the nation-states in the European Union more clearly?

The goals we set for ourselves have largely been achieved. In politics, it is not always the case that one can time moments when something is moving. Anyone who has been politically active knows phases of prolonged failure. However, what happened in connection with the Constitutional Treaty was already depressing enough. But after that, things had to move forward again.

Next week, we will sign the Treaty of Lisbon. This is a treaty into which – one can also say – many German demands and ideas have flowed. For this, special thanks are due to some of the individuals present here.

I will address the Charter of Fundamental Rights shortly. Before I speak about the developer of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, I would like to sincerely thank former Minister-President Erwin Teufel. Erwin Teufel has repeatedly made certain principles very clear in his work in the Convention for the Constitutional Treaty. Germany has always advocated – he was one of the Minister-Presidents who articulated this very clearly – a federal structure for Europe, a clear distribution of competencies between the Union and its member states, and for more democracy and closeness to citizens based on its own experiences. We need clarity about who – as it is often said – the masters of the treaties are, and an understanding of what the principle of subsidiarity means.

Much of this has been achieved, although I must say that in these negotiations one has repeatedly felt – many of you will have experienced this – how different the ideas are about what a federal entity is. Those who have never lived in such a system cannot imagine the questions of the distribution of competencies between the federal government, states, and municipalities, which we have absorbed almost with our mother's milk in Germany. Those who have not established a federal structure in their own constitution do not even know that different responsibilities can be regulated. In this respect, it was quite an interesting experiential process. No matter how many definitions of the principle of subsidiarity one could hear from Scandinavia to Southern Europe, at least great demands were placed on the breadth of tolerance. It is indeed the case that particularly on such questions, very different thoughts prevail.

I personally would never have suspected how different the ideas are in Europe alone about what the Commission should be. For us in Germany – I believe we were even in agreement with Giscard d'Estaing on this – it is relatively clear: Here a Parliament, there a Commission. At least one can see certain forms of government and parliamentary control. And the member states form, with the Council, something like a very significant second chamber. But such an obvious and logically appearing perspective is found in Europe only extraordinarily rarely. One must engage with other ideas, where nearly unsolvable questions arise about whom we give which responsibilities and how we should organize all of this. Therefore, based on my current experiences, I tend to understand the whole thing as a process in which Germany does well to have a clear idea of the allocation of responsibilities.

With the Reform Treaty, much has certainly been achieved regarding the allocation of competencies, although we are, for example, still far from the clarity of our Basic Law regarding how competencies are to be clearly delineated. I believe that particularly the question of coordination represents a certain gray area from which competencies can develop, but from which, with the help of the principle of subsidiarity, it can also be claimed that a barrier should be put in place. In any case, one can say that the number of instruments available to us as member states has increased rather than decreased through this Reform Treaty.

It is therefore not easy to make progress with 27 member states. There has been a significant controversy in connection with the referendums when the question was raised: What is this Europe now? Therefore, major disputes have erupted over things that are actually quite natural to all of us – flags or anthems or other symbols – as even those who could no longer show themselves at home with a treaty mentioning the European flag could still quite naturally let the Europe flag fly. Such examples have shown that what constitutes a constitution obviously has not only a rational core but also an emotional part. This emotional part has been rejected by some peoples due to many uncertainties about the future and the reality of Europe.

We would have wished that these parts were included in the treaty. If that is not the case now, one does not need to redefine it and ultimately say that it is actually good that it is not so. It was not enforceable. For the capacity for action of Europe, it has been and is good to display a certain rational negotiation approach.

The institutional package of the Reform Treaty is a historic advance. The institutional reforms already laid out in the Constitutional Treaty have been decided in essential parts. In some respects, however, it is not as unique as it would have been as stipulated in the former Constitutional Treaty. What strikes me and is fundamentally regrettable about the entire discussion is that those who said no to the Constitutional Treaty in the referendums actually said no to something that was better than the current state of the European Union. The Constitutional Treaty had incorporated several points of criticism that were repeatedly raised by the citizens. Nevertheless, the comprehensibility and the discussion about the Constitutional Treaty were not such that the citizens had the impression that all of this was being taken into account. Rather, they had the impression that it was becoming even more complicated, more opaque, and more difficult.

I am not a historian. But looking back, one must also say that just at the moment a Constitutional Treaty was being discussed, the citizens had to cope with the enlargement and the confrontation with the question of how we deal with globalization. In this respect, the Services Directive has become a beacon or symbol of the confrontation with the role of Europe in globalization. To close off or to open up? The discussion about this has overshadowed much. With the no in the referendums, fears have essentially been articulated. This has shown us: We must first reorder the statics of the European Union. From my perspective, this has been achieved with the institutional package.

Nevertheless, it was important to us that we retain the Charter of Fundamental Rights and also in a form that at least has binding effect for the majority of the member states of the European Union. Printed, it now comes across somewhat shyly, but it will be recited again next week by the European Parliament. Dear Mr. President Herzog, I believe that this gives a piece of your post-presidential work its proper and important recognition.

When one looks at the Charter of Fundamental Rights, one recognizes that it is partly shaped by German influences. However, one also sees that a high degree of willingness to compromise was necessary. I have never concealed that I would have wished for an even stronger return to the spiritual roots of Europe. This also shows that the treatment of questions of the secular and laicism and the relationship between state and church in the member states of the European Union are indeed very different. All the more remarkable is that we have a church article in the treaty itself. I believe this is of great significance.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights gains legal binding force. I believe that a value-conscious Europe truly deserves this. Because if we want to engage in intercultural and interreligious dialogue, it would not be bad for us as Europeans to have a shared understanding of what is important to us, from which roots our thoughts are nourished. Great Britain and Poland have chosen a different path. We must respect that and will see how history develops further.

We now have the European Citizens' Initiative. This introduces an element of direct democracy at the European level for the first time. I am curious to see when we will first reach a million signatures to call on the Commission to submit proposals for European legal acts. Personally, I am very cautious about plebiscitary elements.

If a European public were to emerge through the Citizens' Initiative, it would indeed be a very interesting experience. Because if one looks at the press reviews of the European member states today, one must find that among 27 member states, at least 20 very different priority perceptions prevail. If there were occasionally a topic that occupied all of Europe at the same time to the same extent, it would also be an interesting and community-building experience for the citizens of Europe.

It is undisputed that the Reform Treaty strengthens the rights of the European Parliament and the national parliaments and thus also democracy in Europe. The European Parliament will now be a co-legislator alongside the Council. The European Parliament will elect the President of the Commission. This means that the office of the President of the Commission will be democratically legitimized. This is something I welcome extraordinarily. Because I find it rather strange to ask the European citizens to participate in a European election, to form the composition of the Parliament from it, and then to say: The election of the Commission and its composition take place at the same time, but have nothing to do with the outcome of the election; rather, they are a reflection of the national elections that have taken place at some point in the individual member states.

That the European Parliament elects the President of the Commission is actually already a small movement towards my vision of the role of the Commission and not towards the view of those who believe that the Commission is, so to speak, a conglomerate of national representatives who are to assist the Council in an official capacity. For me, the Commission is rather that group that proposes legal acts for the parts of European reality for which Europe has a competence, and to which the European Parliament, through parliamentary deliberations, naturally grants legitimacy just as the Council does.

The national parliaments are significantly strengthened. They gain more rights to participate in the legislative processes. A simple majority of the national parliaments can ultimately ensure that a Commission initiative must be withdrawn. This will have the salutary effect that the parliaments and thus the parliamentarians of the European member states will work more closely together and get to know each other better.

This also means that national parliaments must be informed early and comprehensively about upcoming legislative initiatives before they can express their opinions. This means, of course, that the Bundestag and Bundesrat will deal with European projects earlier and more intensively, which is good when I think of a whole series of European legislations, for example, the much-discussed Flora-Fauna-Habitat Directive.

How has it been so far? At some point, something was passed. The parliamentarians in the national parliaments could not even follow that. The period until the entry into force in Europe often takes many years. Then suddenly, like a phoenix from the ashes or like Zieten from the bush, some legal act comes into force and surprises everyone in Germany because no one has ever dealt with it. We cannot afford for such things to practically filter down to local politics, and then we have to explain for years what actually happened seven, eight, nine, ten years ago.

The national parliaments will certainly and gladly take the opportunity to examine whether the European Union is adhering to its original competences or whether it is acting beyond its original competences. This can put a stop to so-called creeping competence expansion. I know that this was a very important objective for many of you who are here today. Now we will see how the national parliaments will exercise their rights.

We come to a point that we have also negotiated very intensively: What is the relationship between the governments and the Council with its leeway and the parliamentary mandates? There are some member states that are very rigid through their parliaments regarding the mandates and the existing leeway of their government. If all 27 display a maximum of rigidity, then we can no longer negotiate in Europe and cannot reach common decisions. This means: A piece of mutual trust between national parliaments and the Council is necessary.

Certainly, there will also be very exciting discussions between the European Parliament and the national parliaments. Because I often experience that it is not party affiliation that is the decisive momentum for whether one is for or against a European measure, but rather the question of which parliamentary level one is currently working at, whether one is sitting in the European Parliament or in a national parliament. It is particularly interesting to see when someone moves from the European Parliament to a national parliament and then their entire perspective and argumentation chains turn around.

Keyword: distribution of tasks and competences. In this regard, some things will be clarified. Competences that are not expressly assigned to the European Union remain with the member states. We must, as I see it, be very careful now at the beginning or even in anticipation of the legal force of the future treaty and proceed straightforwardly with some examples. At the moment, for example, there is a dispute over the Soil Protection Directive. It is not at all clear whether there is a European competence for this. Germany has its own Soil Protection Act. Currently, negotiations are taking place again about how the federal government should position itself here. As in any negotiation process, on one side there are those who say: Let us first participate so that we can still express our concerns, because otherwise it will be very bad. On the other side, there are those who say: We will put a stop to this right away; we will not participate in this discussion at all because, according to the principle of subsidiarity, this is not a matter for the European Union at all.

Germany often finds itself in a very special role because so much is decided by majority vote today. Gathering blocking minorities is not entirely easy on many issues. There are a number of small European member states – this must be acknowledged – that work very consensus-oriented and rarely use the means of a blockade or a strict no. In this respect, finding blocking minorities to enforce national interests will certainly be more difficult in the future and will not become easier with the upcoming and conceivable expansions – see Western Balkans.

The reform treaty also makes it clear – this was important to us, and it was also important to other member states – that the allocation of competences is not a one-way street. If one comes to the realization that certain competences can be better exercised at the level of the nation-states, it must, in principle, also be possible to return them after a certain time.

An example of this: The Common Agricultural Policy was certainly one of the constitutive elements to bring this Europe together at the beginning. I have often discussed this with Jacques Chirac. Here the Coal and Steel Community, there the Common Agricultural Policy. However, in Europe, coal and steel are no longer quite what they once were. Therefore, the pressure also exists that the European Union is no longer legitimized solely by the Coal and Steel Community and the Agricultural Policy. This means, why can I not give nation-states more responsibility for agriculture, so that, for example, they do not simply grow olives because there is still money for olives in the Union, but so that the respective country where olives grow can also ask itself whether it really still needs olives?

We should not relinquish the question of the return of competences. That is why I am glad that discussions in the area of agricultural subsidies are generally possible. Whether they will actually take place remains to be seen. But the treaty allows for that. It may therefore be that the European Union does not always gain new competences, but that some are also relinquished.

Fortunately, we have now reached the point with the topic of "better regulation" that directives can also be abolished or simplified again. This means that the European Union is not a construct where, by definition, the mountain of laws and regulations can only increase. It can also decrease. Nevertheless, this can be good for Europe.

In many ways, precautions have been taken to ensure that Europe does not simply become a superstate, but that European action only takes place where it is in our common interest. However, not all loopholes are closed. Therefore, one must observe the learning process of dealing with the new treaty with eagle eyes.

I know that Federal President Herzog has made further proposals regarding a "subsidiarity court," which would not, so to speak, be under the spell of European competences as a European Court of Justice – by virtue of office – rather favoring the Commission and its competencies, but which would only have the task of neutrally observing who is claiming too many competences. I initially completely rejected this, but I have since gained at least some theoretical appreciation for the idea and will therefore also observe how the jurisprudence in the area of subsidiarity develops.

Transparency and comprehensibility. The treaty, as it is now signed, represents a maximum of obscurity. It now has to be combined with the existing treaties, so to speak, to become a readable work. We, especially my staff, have developed a high level of theoretical imagination in the meantime. Because first we had to turn the constitutional treaty into a mandate and, based on the existing treaties, define the changes. These have now been written down. Now we have to turn the whole thing upside down like a cake mold, and then a proper, readable treaty will emerge.

The Union is now granted a unified legal personality. This means it can also conclude contracts in its own name. I have already spoken about the qualified majority. An incredible battle – you have all been able to follow this – has developed over the voting modalities. The "double majority" means: the majority of member states and the majority of the citizens of the Union. Now, this is a very nice, very logical procedure. I have, of course, also dealt with the sociological theory of the square root. But this seems to me to be more of a theory suited for the maximum enforcement of individual interests and not for the most effective voting procedures. The number of states and citizens, on the other hand, is something that can be very well represented.

Regarding the number of parliamentarians in the European Parliament, we had the bizarre discussion about who is an Italian. Is every person with an Italian passport an Italian, or are all those Italians who live somewhere in the world and have some Italian roots but no longer have an Italian passport? I had to point out that we are getting into a web that is hardly untangleable. In this context, I always cited my quarter Polish ancestry. Otherwise, we would probably have to look quite far back into history and would have to set at least a historical end date by which we would stop researching respective affiliations. But we were clever. Italy received one more seat, and that settled the issue.

The size of the parliament will be limited, and the Commission will be reduced by one third in 2014. What this means has fortunately not yet been fully thought through by everyone, so that the battles over it have not yet flared up. Germans generally behave very internationally abroad, so the loss may not hurt us as much as others. But I just say: There will still be a big discussion about who will not be represented in the Commission. I would say: We are already making friends with as many member states as possible so that we can use their commissioners to enforce our interests.

Now something very interesting is happening, and faster than some think. If the ratification process goes well, that is, is completed by the end of next year, the treaty would come into force on January 1, 2009. Then there will suddenly be a President of the Council and a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. Both are very exciting developments because they will shift the dynamics between the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament.

The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy will, so to speak, mean the merging of the offices of Ms. Ferrero-Waldner and Mr. Solana. He will be able to rely on a European diplomatic service, which will be fed from what Mr. Solana and Ms. Ferrero-Waldner have today, and from all the representations of the European Union in the respective countries of this earth. I am very curious to see how this structure works, what need the member states have to send additional diplomats to this service to better represent their interests.

This is an exciting process, especially in relation to the Parliament. Because the High Representative is appointed by the Council and is Vice-President of the Commission. The Commission, in turn, must be confirmed by the Parliament. This means that the High Representative is actually a person whom the Parliament does not have to determine. However, it will, of course, try to exert some influence on this office indirectly, which the Council will probably not always appreciate. We have come to terms with the fact that it wants to have a lot of influence over the Commission, but not with the fact that it wants to have indirect influence over the Council.

The term of office of the Council President will last two and a half years. Now the member states are asking themselves: What does this mean for the presidency? I will keep a close eye on what the Council President does when he is not preparing a Council meeting. There are only two, three, or four Councils a year. Does he align himself with the Commission President, do they have lunch and dinner together every day and forge secret plans against the member states, or does he really remain a good representative of the Council? In this context, we must also see and will look at: What expectations do we have of the personalities we choose?

A lot will depend on the first appointments of the offices for the interplay of the European institutions. My feeling is that we should rather have persons of compromise so that everything continues to function reasonably and – to put it humorously – so that our expressive characters as heads of government can still come to the fore. This means that a whole series of institutional reform demands will be met. I used to be very skeptical about the office of the Council President. But when one considers that the effort alone to call all member states once and coordinate something with them is so high that it is almost unmanageable alongside the government work in a member state, I can now also see the positive side of it.

Sometimes it is now said that not much is changing. However, a lot will change in the European Union.

The ratification procedures can now hopefully take place in the individual member states. If everything goes according to plan, we will be able to bring this treaty into force on January 1, 2009. At that time – we have checked this; it is essential – we will also have to have appointed the Council President and the High Representative. There was the idea that this could perhaps be combined with the European election taking place in June 2009 and with the appointment of the President of the new Commission. However, the treaty cannot be implemented if the respective representatives, namely the Council President and the High Representative, are not appointed.

I hope that we will have a swift ratification process. In some countries, this goes very quickly; in the Federal Republic of Germany, it takes a bit longer. We will address the treaty in the Cabinet before the Christmas break, and then we will go into the parliamentary process – Bundestag and Bundesrat. We could be finished with the respective work before the summer break of 2008. There will be a variety of other ways of ratification. Ireland will be the only country that must hold a referendum according to its constitution. All other countries do not need to do this now and have a good chance of carrying out the ratification through parliamentary discussions.

Once we have completed this treaty process, we can finally turn our attention back to other work that requires urgent attention. After we completed the final work on the treaty in Lisbon, we already began to discuss what I would like to call the external dimension of the Lisbon process, for example, the questions: How does Europe respond to globalization, how do we engage in greater transparency in international finance, how do we conduct WTO negotiations, and much more?

We have a lot to accomplish in foreign policy, particularly in the coming weeks regarding the future of Kosovo. We need to make the cooperation between European Security and Defense Policy and NATO practically feasible. Personally, I do not believe that we need great new security strategies. However, we have the situation that the cooperation between European Security and Defense Policy and NATO is not functioning well because there are simply difficult constellations regarding the respective memberships.

Cyprus is a member of the European Union, while Turkey is a member of NATO. If we now want to have a European security and defense mission in Kosovo in the sense of building a police force, while at the same time the KFOR troops are provided by NATO, then it is very difficult to achieve cooperation, as there are unresolved conflicts between Cyprus and Turkey. I only mention the Ankara Protocol in this context. We are facing similar issues in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

European security policy is very slow in establishing certain structures. For example, think about how long it takes in Afghanistan to make the respective forces available for building the Afghan police. Everything has to be coordinated again and again through the member states. This means that we will still have an important and necessary learning process here. The appointment of a person as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy is of utmost importance.

We will certainly continue to talk about deepening cooperation. We already have some examples of this: the Euro, the Schengen Agreement, and much more. Now there are tendencies, for example, towards the formation of a Mediterranean Union, which I view very skeptically. I say openly: The cooperation of some member states of the European Union must be such that it is open to everyone. It must be approved by all that such cooperation takes place between some member states.

However, if we now build a Mediterranean Union that only includes the Mediterranean neighboring countries, which, for example, makes use of financial instruments of the European Union, then I predict that others will say: Then we also need to establish an Eastern Europe Union, for example, with Ukraine. This will also make use of these instruments. Then something will happen that I consider very dangerous. It could be that Germany feels more affected from the Central and Eastern European side and France feels more affected from the Mediterranean side. This would awaken tensions within Europe that I do not want. Therefore, it must be clear: The responsibility for the Mediterranean is also present for a Northerner, just as the future of the borders with Russia and Ukraine is also the concern of those who are based in the Mediterranean. If we can no longer muster this strength, then in my view, the European Union will decline in its core area. The formation of a Mediterranean Union would only be a very short-term progress, which I believe would not prove itself in the long term.

I have now laid out my thoughts on what we have worked on and also my ideas about what lies ahead of us. I believe that in a world where between seven and nine billion people will be present in the coming years, there are all the reasons for the 500 million Europeans to concentrate on certain issues and formulate their interests together. Then we are stronger, even if still not super strong. That is why I have also advocated very strongly for transatlantic economic cooperation, to achieve more harmonization here as well.

We will have to focus again very strongly on our competitiveness in terms of our innovative strength, in terms of reducing bureaucracy, and similar matters. We have agreed in a second attempt on how we want to build our "Galileo" system. I hope that this will work now. Behind this lies an innovation claim of the European Union, which I consider to be right.

If we do this in community and do not overestimate Europe where it should not be overestimated, and do not use overestimation to legitimize too much bureaucracy, but rather define it relatively soberly as a good community of interests based on common values, then it can still be enjoyable to work for Europe.