Speech By Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister At The Europe / East Asian Economic Summit At Shangri-La Hotel On Thursday, 13 October 1994 At 5.00 Pm

Singapore Lee Kuan Yew · Senior Minister of Singapore

13 October 1994 · Europe / East Asian Economic Summit · Shangri-La Hotel

Context
Lee addressed the Europe / East Asian Economic Summit at the Shangri-La Hotel on October 13, 1994, urging the US and EU to integrate China into multilateral frameworks such as GATT rather than isolate it.
Main themes
East Asian economic growth projections, China's rise as a global player, Western strategy towards China, integrating China in a multilateral framework, China's accession to GATT, intellectual property piracy in China, Western opportunities in Chinese demand, myth of Asian exports causing Western unemployment, US trade deficits with Japan and China, Japan's need to relocate production, costs of isolating China, risk of a new Cold War
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,419
80th percentile
Sentences
199
89th percentile
Readability
52
67th percentile
Grade
9.6
16th percentile
Syntax
2.85
27th percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
70th percentile

Source: National Archives of Singapore ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 72%64%
  • Geopolitical 23%20%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 2%2%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Institutional 0%0%
  • Not in focus 11%

199 sentences in 92 paragraphs

Introduction

East Asia is projected to grow by five to six per cent on average over the next three decades, or seven per cent excluding Japan. By the year 2025, its combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be twice as large as North

America’s, or almost equal to the GDP of North America and Europe combined.

(See Table 1.)

The policies of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU)

towards East Asia will have long-term strategic consequences for the future.

However, neither has yet formulated a coherent, long-term strategy towards East

Asia. The challenge of East Asia springs primarily from the colossal transformation that is taking place in China, a continent of 1,200 million people, able to do 50 times over what Hong Kong (six million) and Taiwan (20 million)

together can do.

The other major and continuing challenge in East Asia is Japan. Japan already contributes 12.5 per cent of the United Nations (UN) budget - second to the US. It cannot indefinitely be denied a permanent seat on the UN Security

Council. But it is China’s giant size that poses the real challenge for Western strategy in the post-Cold War era.

As the nature of the challenge from Japan is well known, I will deal mainly with China. This is not because the rest of East Asia is unimportant. Korea.

Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Association of the South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN) are significant players in East Asia. But they cannot alter the balance of power in the world. China can.

China’s GDP will be equal to that of North America in three decades. It will become a global player. How the West deals with China as it struggles to overcome its many economic, political and administrative weaknesses will determine whether China will be a constructive or a negative player.

The West can join in China’s development and benefit from it. Or it can try to slow down China’s growth through restricting its access to markets, capital and technology and so minimise its own restructuring which will become necessary as a result of China’s enormous supply of skilled and unskilled workers.

Over the next three decades, China will need huge amounts of Western capital, technology and know-how. If the West engages in constructive collaboration with China, China will be more likely to become a cooperative global player.

Integrating East Asia or Isolating It: The West’s Strategic Choice

The World Bank estimates that between one-third and one-half of the global increase in imports from now until the year 2000 will be accounted for by

East Asia. Its rising incomes have increased demand for sophisticated consumer goods and infrastructure development, which Western firms are well-placed to provide.

Is East Asia a Threat or an Opportunity?

These opportunities have not been favourably articulated in the West. The

Western media, with a few exceptions, have portrayed East Asia’s rapid growth, especially China’s rapid growth as being at the expense of the West, displacing lower-skilled Western workers from their jobs.

The conventional wisdom is that exports from East Asia displace domestic production in the West, thus increasing domestic unemployment and contributing to economic stagnation. Some Western politicians and media claim that East

Asian exports are competitive because they rely on “exploited, underpaid”

labour, and on labour practices which could not be tolerated in the West.

In reality, exports from developing Asian countries form only a tiny fraction (less than 4 per cent) of total consumption of manufactured goods in the developed countries1. Technological change, not competition from poorer countries, is the basic cause of US and EU unemployment. Because European wages and social costs are high, managements avoid hiring more workers by increasing automation, computerisation and robotics. So, their demand for highly educated labour is increasing, but their demand for unskilled labour is falling.

The western media portrays investments in the emerging economies as being at the expense of investments in the industrial countries. The flow of capital from all advanced nations to newly industrialising countries reached a new peak of US$100 billion in 1993. But this represents only three per cent of investment in developed nations2.

Imports from developing countries as a percentage of manufactured consumption in the developed economies were 3.36 per cent for 1989-90 (Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1992, UN Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, pp. 534). In 1992, the US and European Community (EC) 12 countries spent 3.0 per cent of their combined GDPs on imports of manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8) from East Asia (including Japan), or 1.3 per cent if Japan is excluded. It would have reduced growth in their capital stock by less than 0.2 per cent (Paul Krugman, “Does Third World Growth Hurt First World Prosperity?” in Harvard Business Review, July-August 1994, pp. 113- 121).

Far from diverting investments from the West, the increase in demand for goods and services created by East Asia’s emergence will stimulate investments in the West to meet this demand.

In the US, advocates of managed trade say that East Asia’s bilateral surpluses are proof of unfair competition. America’s largest deficit is with

Japan3. It is caused by macroeconomic fundamentals. As long as Americans save too little of their income, they will be running deficits, with Japan or with other countries.

The increase in the US trade deficit with China is because Hong Kong and

Taiwanese industries have moved to China. America’s trade deficit with China increased while its deficits with Hong Kong and Taiwan have declined. But the overall American trade balance with China, Taiwan and Hong Kong together has not changed.

In 1993, the US calculated its trade deficit with Japan at US$72.5 billion, and that with China at US$23.7 billion (as reported in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, June 1994.) The OECD Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, August 1994, gives the US - Japan bilateral trade deficit in 1993 as US$59.3 billion.

The combined current account deficit of East Asia (excluding Japan) will get larger in the next decade, as massive infrastructural investments flow into

China and the rest of East Asia4. The West has huge opportunities to export its goods and services to the region, and build infrastructure needed for its growth.

How the West can Benefit

East Asia has already helped to spur economic recovery in certain sectors in the West. For example, the aviation industry, airlines in US and Europe face severe financial problems due to the economic recession and airfare wars.

Western airlines have drastically cut orders for new aircraft. On the other hand,

Asian demand for aircraft has remained strong. Airbus Industry expects air traffic to grow at an average of eight per cent in Asia though to the year 2006, compared to five per cent in Europe and four per cent in the US. China will lead this demand with a 14 per cent per annum growth in passenger traffic5.

Estimates of China’s demand in energy, information technology (IT) and telecommunications are overwhelming. Western firms are strong in these sectors. China’s electricity consumption will more than triple over the next two

East Asia excluding Japan should have a combined current account deficit of about US$50 billion (in 1993 dollars) by the year 2000. “Asia likely to lead growth in air travel industry, says Airbus” in Business Times 25/2/94, pg. 2.

decades. China’s IT market is expected to more than double to US$48 billion by

19976. China aims to increase the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants from two at present to 10 by the year 2000. If they reach even half of this target (five lines per 100 inhabitants), it will be 20 per cent of the world demand for telecommunications equipment in the year 20007.

Annual per capita income for the top 10 per cent of Chinese households, at market exchange rates, is about US$10008. That’s more than 100 million consumers. Higher income households have fuelled much of the consumption boom over the last few years. The demand for big-ticket items is especially strong. Private consumption tripled between 1978 and 1992: Sales of refrigerators rose 24 times. The Chinese people have purchased about 13 million television sets in 1990 - about 11.5 per 1000 population.

Another example is biotechnology. Many biotechnology firms are setting up new offices in China. Amgen Inc., for example, has opened offices in Beijing and Guangzhou. American Biogenetic Sciences has established a cooperative

Report by San Jose based market research firm Dataquest Inc., quoted in “Demand will double size of IT market in China, says report” in Business Times 30/3/94, pg. 4. “Hanging on a China line” in The Economist 27/8/94, pg. 50 and “Alcatel in China: The biggest prize” in The Economist 16/1/93, pp. 68-69. Data in this paragraph from “China’s consumer market”, DRI/McGraw-Hill and the China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service Centre, Fourth Quarter 1993.

agreement with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences in Beijing, while

United Biomedical Inc. has received approval from the Chinese government to test its new AIDS vaccine in Yunnan9.

In the past, western firms invested in East Asia to take advantage of lower production costs. Some western firms now produce the bulk of their global output in Asia. Texas Instruments hires more than 15,000 workers in Asia, including production operators, software engineers and even research and development (R & D) specialists10.

Now they can take advantage of East Asia’s growing consumer market.

General Motors is entering the automobile market in Southeast Asia. But the

Japanese had earlier set up a network of local assembly plants in the region11, and they are overwhelmingly dominant.

“Genes for the masses” in China Trade Report, March 1994, pg. 5. “A new frontier: US electronics firm expands in Asia” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 17/9/92, pp. 62-63. “GM Finally Discovers Asia” in Business Week, 24/8/92, pp. 42-43.

The growth in Asia’s demand for goods is matched by its greater need for services from the West. Asia already runs large trade deficits in services, from

US$17.6 billion in 1987 to US$57.1 billion in 199212. By 1992, Asia had overtaken Europe as the biggest buyer of US services13.

China will not import simple manufactures goods like television sets and radios which they can easily manufacture. But it needs sophisticated equipment for production. It needs expertise and technology in financial services, telecommunications, transportation, health care and education. The US and

Europe have the comparative advantage in these service sectors.

The US and Europe will benefit from these developments in East Asia.

But they have to tackle their own problems of low savings, high budget deficits due to extensive welfare provisions, and structural rigidities in the labour markets.

Japan also will have to adjust. Its comparative advantage is shifting. If it does not relocate the production of goods to East Asia, it will become uncompetitive and unable to free resources for higher value-added sectors.

Compared to German or American firms, the Japanese still produce a much

“Invisible imbalance: Asia’s services trade deficit” in Business Asia 11/4/94, pp. 12.

smaller fraction of their output in subsidiaries outside of Japan (six per cent).

Over the next decade, they have to relocate many lower value-added industries.

US Department of Commerce, as cited in Business Times 20-21/11/93, pg. 1.

Integrating China in a Multilateral Framework

Integrating China in a multilateral framework is really the first item on the agenda of developed countries. President Clinton’s renewal of China’s most favoured nation (MFN) status and his commerce secretary’s recent China visit show that Americans recognise what is at stake. Lobbying by human rights interest groups could not overcome the need to get US industries into China. In

1993, the US had over 2000 investments worth US$6 billion in China. But more important than the economic are the strategic interests. The US needs to encourage China to be a cooperative and constructive global player.

China’s relations with the industrial world should be multilateral, not bilateral. Closer ties between China and the US should be matched by similar ties between China and Japan, China and EU, in a multilateral framework of cooperation -- in trade, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and also international security.

China’s early accession to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT) is important for the world. GATT membership will push China to move more rapidly in removing its import barriers. All GATT members can hold China to the terms of the agreement. It would have to play by the rules and abide by its promises14. China has already gained from the Uruguay Round, but through separately negotiated bilateral agreements15. As a GATT member, China’s concessions will be multilateral, not confined to the stronger countries that can extract concessions by bilateral agreements.

China should also be integrated into a multilateral regime for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). American software makers estimate that 94 per cent of software in use in China is pirated, causing them estimated losses of

US$322 million per annum16.

China has already signalled its willingness to join GATT, by instituting reductions in tariffs and quotas and making certain concessions to the West. For example, the US and EU wants safeguards written in to the protocol governing China’s accession, so as to protect their economies against surges of Chinese imports. After initial opposition, China has indicated its willingness to make concessions on the safeguards issue (Far Eastern Economic Review 17/3/94, pp. 42-43). GATT reforms are expected to boost China’s exports by 38 per cent over the next 10 years - double the average benefit for developing countries - and to increase its GDP by 1.8 per cent - 2.5 per cent by the year 2002 (Business China 7/3/94, pg. 4, quoting World Bank and OECD estimates). China enjoys large gains because its main exports are now manufactures goods, which are subject to relatively high tariffs, rather than primary products, which face lower tariffs. Moreover, the Uruguay Round agreement to phase out the Multi - Fibre Agreement in 10 years would also boost Chinese textiles exports significantly. Estimates by Business Software Alliance, which represents eight US software makers. These losses may be underestimated, because China cannot be hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world. The International Federation of Phonographic Industry estimates that China has 26 plants producing 75 million compact discs (CDs) annually, while its annual domestic demand is only 5 million per annum. Therefore, the pirated CDs are actually being made for export. If China is not integrated into the world IPR regime, such illegal exports have the potential to undermine IPRs in other countries. (“Fakes under Fire” in China Trade Report July, 1994, pp. 2-3.)

For the world’s stability and security, integrating China into an international framework is not a question of choice, but of necessity. The world does not need another Cold War. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)17, which involved all five Security Council members of the United Nations, is a good example of multinational cooperation to ensure stability in the region.

The Costs of Isolating China

China’s emergence as a major global economic player over the next two to three decades can be slowed, but not stopped. If the West seeks to block

China’s development by imposing trade restrictions and withholding technology,

China’s growth will undoubtedly slow down. China may take at least twice as long to become industrialised. At slower growth of about 4 per cent per annum from 2000 onwards, China will reach a GDP level in 50 years (2045). That is equal to what it can reach in 30 years (2025) if it grows at seven per cent per annum. But it will eventually get there, and what is more troubling, it will have to build up its own sphere of influence as part of the process.

I believe that the US and EU will lose in strategic terms if China operates outside GATT and goes it alone. For it will mean that China need not pay

Eighteen countries: ASEAN, US, Japan, Canada, the EC, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, copyright royalties or observe patent rights and that the US and EU will give up exports and investments in the largest growing economy in the post-Cold War world.

Blocking China only encourage China to go for DIY (do-it-yourself)

solutions. China will pirate copyrights, ignore patents, do reverse engineering and make the grade as Japan did before World War II. Whatever relief the West will gain from China’s, and as a result East Asia’s, slower growth, will have to be paid for in terms of heightened world tensions and increased military spending. The price will be a world poisoned by enmity and suspicions.

Finally, what happens in East Asia, which means in the main, what happens in China and Japan and how their relationship develops, will decide the kind of world we live in year 2020. It will be short-sighted to repeat the errors of protectionism, imperial preferences, and currency devaluations that led to World

War II. The world has become too integrated by science and technology to be kept apart by policies based on ideology, religion, culture or race. For better or for worse, we have become one interdependent and mutually destructible world.

China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea.

Table 1 GDP Projections at Purchasing Power Parity Real Growth (% pa) GDP at PPP’s and Price Levels of 1990 (US$8m) 1956-90 1991- 1991- 2001- 2011- 1990* 2000 2010 2015 2020 2025 2025 2000 2010 2025 North America 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 8560 8642 11069 12601 14420 16800 US 2.8 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.0 5522 7069 8617 9513 10504 11597 Canada 3.9 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.0 523 650 832 918 1014 1119 Mexico 4.4 5.9 4.8 7.0 6.0 516 824 1621 2169 2902 3884 LA & Caribbean (ex Mexico) 3.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 811 1321 2152 2746 3505 4473

Europe 2.2 2.9 2.3 3.1 3.1 6354 7997 10859 12506 14563 17162 FC-12 3.1 1.9 2.3 2.2 1.5 4626 5307 7219 7777 8378 9026 FFTA 2.7 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 653 648 790 872 963 1063 East Germany 2.3 7.4 8.0 7.5 7.0 151 @ 326 672 943 1323 1853 Eastern Europe 1.5 5.1 3.0 6.0 6.0 512 688 1231 1648 2205 2951 FSU 1.3 4.3 0.3 6.0 6.0 513 @ 528 946 1268 1694 2287 East Asia= NE Asia + SE Asia 7.3 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.4 4982 8697 14882 19237 25086 32978 East Asia (ex. jpn) 6.7 7.5 6.8 6.2 2889 5927 11485 15487 20946 28407 North East Asia 6.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 3975 6639 11206 14338 18547 24239 Japan 5.6 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.0 2093 2680 3397 3750 4141 4572 China 7.5 7.6 8.5 7.5 7.0 1268 2843 6861 8220 11528 18189 China & HK 7.4 8.3 7.3 6.9 1350 2894 6079 8473 11823 18510 NIEs - 3 8.8 5.1 8.6 5.3 4.0 603 1139 1910 2321 2820 3428 Hong Kong 8.1 3.8 5.0 3.8 3.0 93 151 219 264 294 341 South Korea 9.1 5.4 6.9 5.8 4.2 309 63 1041 1277 1567 1923 Taiwan 9.0 5.1 6.7 5.4 4.0 202 386 651 790 959 1181 North Korea na 3.4 2. 4.0 4.0 22 26 39 47 57 70 South East Asia 6.2 6.4 6.7 6.7 5.9 1007 1918 3676 4899 6539 8730 ASEAN-5 6.4 6.7 6.7 5.9 981 1871 3577 4782 6347 8470 Singapore 9.0 4.6 6.8 4.5 3.0 40 78 121 140 163 180 ASEAN-4 6.3 6.4 6.7 6.8 6.0 941 1793 3456 4622 6185 8282 Indonesia 6.5 6.2 6.5 8.5 5.6 429 806 1619 2005 2658 3524 Malaysia 6.8 6.5 8.0 7.1 5.2 105 228 452 582 750 967 Philippines 4.1 5.7 2.9 6.0 7.4 143 190 340 486 694 982 Thailand 7.6 7.0 8.0 7.3 6.1 264 569 1152 1549 2082 2789 Vietnam na 7.9 8.0 8.5 7.5 8 @ 17 39 56 30 115 Myanmar na 7.0 6.0 7.8 7.1 8 @ 14 30 42 60 84 Others # 2.2 5.9 6.5 6.0 6.0 10 @ 16 29 39 52 70 Australia & NZ 3.5 2.9 3.5 3.1 2.5 319 450 610 690 779 881

South Asia 4.3 5.9 5.5 6.0 6.0 338 @ 577 1034 1384 1852 2478

Others 4.3 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.9 1211 @ 1859 2983 3781 4793 6078 Africa 3.0 3.3 1.7 4.0 4.0 255 @ 302 302 544 681 805 Middle East 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 956 @ 1557 1557 3237 4132 5273 World 3.1 4.0 3.6 4.0 4.2 20575 29353 43589 52944 64998 80651 Brunei, Cambodia and Laos International Financial Statistics. World Bank World Development Report 1992: Asia Yearbook, 1992; National Publications.