Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

5 March 1949 · Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Context
Mao addressed the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on March 5, 1949, shifting the Party's focus from countryside to cities and setting out economic, military and diplomatic policy for nationwide victory.
Main themes
Shift of the Party's work from village to city, Tientsin, Peiping and Suiyuan ways of dealing with Kuomintang troops, People's Liberation Army as fighting and working force, restoration of urban production, seven points on the new-democratic economy, regulation of capital and control of foreign trade, cooperatives for agriculture and handicrafts, destruction of imperialist control and recognition policy, negotiations with the Nanking government, Political Consultative Conference and coalition government, cooperation with democrats outside the Party, guarding against sugar-coated bullets
Duration
~44 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,279
92nd percentile
Sentences
200
89th percentile
Readability
36
26th percentile
Grade
15.2
77th percentile
Syntax
3.22
75th percentile
Vocabulary
2.27
67th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 43%42%
  • Economic 33%32%
  • Institutional 12%12%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

200 sentences in 27 paragraphs

I

After the Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, the main forces of the Kuomintang army have been destroyed. Only a little over one million Kuomintang combat troops remain, scattered over a vast area from Sinkiang to Taiwan and along very long fronts. From now on there are three ways of dealing with these one million and more Kuomintang troops: the Tientsin way, the Peiping way and the Suiyuan way. To deal with the enemy by fighting, as was done in Tientsin, must still be the first thing we pay attention to and prepare for. All commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army must never in the slightest relax their will to fight; any thinking that relaxes the will to fight or that underestimates the enemy is wrong. The possibility of settling problems in the Peiping way has increased, that is, compelling the enemy troops, by peaceful means, to reorganize quickly and thoroughly into the People's Liberation Army in accordance with the system of the People's Liberation Army. Settling problems in this way is somewhat less effective than settling them by war for the rapid sweeping away of counter-revolutionary remnants and the rapid elimination of counter-revolutionary political influence. But this way inevitably appears after the main forces of the enemy have been destroyed; it is unavoidable; and it is also to the advantage of our army and the people, that is, it can avoid casualties and destruction. Therefore, the leading comrades of all field armies should pay attention to this form of struggle and learn it. It is a form of struggle, a bloodless form of struggle; it does not mean that problems can be solved without struggle. The Suiyuan way is deliberately to keep a part of the Kuomintang troops intact, or largely intact, that is, to make a temporary concession to these troops in order to help win them over politically to our side or keep them neutral, so that we can concentrate our forces on first dealing with the main part of the remaining Kuomintang forces, and then, after a fairly long time (for example, after a few months, half a year or a year), go on to reorganize these troops into the People's Liberation Army in accordance with the system of the People's Liberation Army. This is another form of struggle. This form of struggle will preserve more of the counter-revolutionary remnants and counter-revolutionary political influence than the Peiping way, and preserve them for a longer time. But there is not the slightest doubt that these counter-revolutionary remnants and this counter-revolutionary political influence will in the end be eliminated. We must never think that once the counter-revolutionary forces submit to us, they become revolutionaries and their counter-revolutionary ideas and designs cease to exist. Certainly not. Many of them will be remoulded, some of them will be weeded out, and certain resolute counter-revolutionaries will be suppressed.

II

The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after nationwide victory, during the historical period in which classes have not been abolished in our country and the imperialist system still exists in the world, our army will remain a fighting force. There must be no misunderstanding or wavering on this point. The People's Liberation Army is also a working force, especially when problems are being settled in the Peiping way or the Suiyuan way in the various parts of the south. As fighting gradually decreases, its role as a working force increases. There is a possible situation in which, before very long, the People's Liberation Army will be entirely transformed into a working force, and we must take this situation into account. The 53,000 cadres now ready to go south with the army are very inadequate for the immense new areas we shall soon occupy, and we must prepare to turn all of our 2,100,000 field troops into a working force. Then there will be enough cadres, and work can be developed in the vast areas. We must look upon our 2,100,000 field troops as a gigantic school for cadres.

III

From 1927 to the present, the centre of gravity of our work has been in the villages, gathering strength in the villages, using the villages to encircle the cities and then taking the cities. The period for this method of work has now ended. From now on, the period has begun of going from the city to the village and of the city leading the village. The centre of gravity of the Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. In the various parts of the south, the People's Liberation Army will occupy the cities first and the countryside afterwards. Attention must be given to both city and countryside, and urban work and rural work, workers and peasants, industry and agriculture, must be closely linked. On no account may the countryside be neglected and attention be paid only to the city; such thinking is entirely wrong. Nevertheless, the centre of gravity of the work of the Party and the army must be in the cities; we must exert the utmost effort to learn how to administer and build the cities. We must learn how to wage political, economic and cultural struggles against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bourgeoisie in the cities, and also how to wage diplomatic struggles against the imperialists. We must learn how to carry on open struggles against them, and we must also learn how to carry on covert struggles against them. If we do not pay attention to these problems, if we do not learn how to wage these struggles against these people and win victory in the struggles, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail. After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to wage a life-and-death struggle against us, and we must never underestimate these enemies. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit the gravest mistakes.

IV

On whom shall we rely in our struggles in the cities? Some muddle-headed comrades think we should rely not on the working class but on the masses of the poor. Some comrades who are even more muddle-headed think we should rely on the bourgeoisie. As for the direction of industrial development, some muddle-headed comrades maintain that we should mainly help the development of private enterprise and not state enterprise; or, conversely, that it is enough to pay attention to state enterprise and that private enterprise is of little importance. We must criticize these muddled views. We must rely wholeheartedly on the working class, unite with the rest of the labouring masses, win over the intellectuals, and win over to our side, or keep neutral, as many as possible of the national bourgeois elements and their representatives who can cooperate with us, so that we can wage a determined struggle against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie and defeat these enemies step by step. At the same time we shall begin our work of construction and learn, step by step, how to administer the cities and restore and develop production in them. Regarding the restoration and development of production, it must be established: first, the production of state industry; second, the production of private industry; third, handicraft production. From the very first day we take over a city, our eyes must be turned towards the restoration and development of its production. We must on no account grab at things and blunder about blindly, forgetting the central task, with the result that several months after occupying a city its production and construction still have not got on the right track, and many industries have even come to a standstill, causing unemployment among the workers, lowering their standard of living and making them dissatisfied with the Communist Party. Such a state of affairs is absolutely impermissible. To this end, our comrades must do their utmost to learn the techniques of production and the methods of managing production, and must learn commerce, banking and other work closely related to production. Only when production in the cities has been restored and developed, when consumer cities have been transformed into producer cities, can the people's political power be consolidated. Other work in the cities, for example, Party organizational work, the work of the organs of political power, trade union work, the work of the various other people's organizations, work in culture and education, the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and the work of news agencies, newspapers and broadcasting stations, all revolves around and serves the central task of production and construction. If we are ignorant in production work, cannot quickly learn production work, cannot restore and develop production as speedily as possible and achieve solid results, first improving the lives of the workers and then improving the lives of the people in general, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail.

V

Conditions in the south differ from those in the north, and so the Party's tasks must also differ. The south is still under Kuomintang rule at present. There, the tasks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army are to wipe out the reactionary Kuomintang armed forces in city and countryside, set up Party organizations, set up organs of political power, arouse the masses, set up trade unions, peasant associations and other people's organizations, build people's armed forces, eliminate the Kuomintang remnant forces, and restore and develop production. In the countryside, the first thing is to launch, step by step, struggles to clean up bandits and to oppose the local despots, that is, the faction of the landlord class in power, and to complete preparations for the reduction of rent and interest, so that the task of rent and interest reduction can be accomplished about one or two years after the arrival of the People's Liberation Army in a given area, creating the prerequisites for the distribution of land; at the same time care must be taken to maintain the present level of agricultural production as far as possible and prevent it from falling. In the north, apart from a few newly liberated areas, the situation is entirely different. Here Kuomintang rule has been overthrown, the people's rule has been established, and the land problem has been fundamentally solved. The Party's central task here is to mobilize all forces to restore and develop production; this is the centre of gravity of all work. At the same time it is necessary to restore and develop cultural and educational work, eliminate the remnant reactionary forces, consolidate the whole north and support the People's Liberation Army.

VI

We have already carried out extensive economic construction, and the Party's economic policy has been put into effect in practical work and has achieved marked success. However, on the question of why this economic policy and not some other should be adopted, on questions of theory and principle, there are many muddled ideas within the Party. How should this question be answered? We think it should be answered as follows. As to the proportions of industry and agriculture in China's national economy, for the country as a whole, before the War of Resistance Against Japan, modern industry accounted for about 10 per cent and agriculture and handicrafts for about 90 per cent. This was the result of oppression of China by the imperialist system and the feudal system, the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of old China's society, and also the basic point of departure for all questions in the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution. From this point of departure arise a whole series of questions of strategy, tactics and policy for our Party. A further clear understanding and solution of these questions is an important task for our Party at present. That is to say:

First, China already has a modern industrial economy of about 10 per cent; this is progressive, this is different from ancient times. Because of this, China already has new classes and new political parties — the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, proletarian and bourgeois political parties. The proletariat and its party, having been oppressed by several kinds of enemies, have been steeled and have become qualified to lead the Chinese people's revolution. Whoever overlooks or underestimates this point will commit the error of Right opportunism.

Second, China still has about 90 per cent of its economy in scattered, individual agriculture and handicrafts; this is backward, this is not very different from ancient times — about 90 per cent of our economic life remains in ancient times. In ancient times there was feudal ownership of land, which we have abolished or are about to abolish; in this respect we have become, or soon will become, different from ancient times, and we have gained, or soon will gain, the possibility of gradually developing our agriculture and handicrafts in the direction of modernization. But today, and for a fairly long time to come, our agriculture and handicrafts, in their basic form, are and will remain scattered and individual, that is to say, similar to those of ancient times. Whoever overlooks or underestimates this point will commit the error of "Left" opportunism.

Third, although the output value of China's modern industry still accounts for only about 10 per cent of the total output value of the national economy, it is extremely concentrated; the largest and most important part of the capital is concentrated in the hands of the imperialists and their lackeys, the Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists. The confiscation of this capital and its transfer to the people's republic led by the proletariat will enable the people's republic to control the economic lifelines of the country and will make the state-owned economy the leading component of the entire national economy. This part of the economy is socialist in character, not capitalist. Whoever overlooks or underestimates this point will commit the error of Right opportunism.

Fourth, China's private capitalist industry occupies second place in modern industry and is a force that must not be ignored. Because they have been oppressed or restricted by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, China's national bourgeoisie and its representatives have often taken part in the people's democratic revolutionary struggle or maintained a neutral stand. For these reasons, and because China's economy is still backward, there will be a need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy. In this period, all components of urban and rural capitalism that are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and develop. This is not only unavoidable but also economically necessary. But the existence and development of capitalism in China will not be unrestricted and uncurbed as in the capitalist countries. It will be restricted from several directions — in the scope of its operations, in tax policy, in market prices and in labour conditions. We shall adopt well-measured and flexible policies for restricting capitalism from various directions, according to the specific conditions in each place, each line of business and each period. Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "regulation of capital" we must still use and can still use. But for the sake of the whole national economy and the present and future interests of the working class and the labouring people, we must never restrict private capitalist economy too much or too rigidly; we must allow it room to exist and develop within the orbit of the economic policy and economic planning of the people's republic. The policy of restricting private capitalism is bound to meet with resistance in varying degrees and forms from the bourgeoisie, especially from the big owners of private enterprises, that is, the big capitalists. Restriction versus opposition to restriction will be the main form of class struggle within the new-democratic state. It is entirely wrong to think that we need not restrict capitalism now and can discard the slogan of "regulation of capital"; that is the viewpoint of Right opportunism. But conversely, it is also entirely wrong to think that private capital should be restricted too much or too rigidly, or that private capital can simply be eliminated very quickly; that is the viewpoint of "Left" opportunism or adventurism.

Fifth, the scattered, individual agriculture and handicrafts, which make up 90 per cent of the total output value of the national economy, can and must be led prudently, step by step and yet actively, to develop towards modernization and collectivization; the view that they may be left to take their own course is wrong. It is necessary to organize producers', consumers' and credit cooperatives and leading bodies of cooperatives at the central, provincial, municipal, county and district levels. Such cooperatives are collective economic organizations of the labouring masses, based on private ownership and under the direction of the state power led by the proletariat. The cultural backwardness of the Chinese people and their lack of a tradition of cooperatives may cause us difficulties; but cooperatives can be organized, must be organized, must be popularized and developed. With only a state-owned economy and no cooperative economy, it would be impossible for us to lead the individual economy of the labouring people step by step towards collectivization, impossible to develop from a new-democratic society into the future socialist society, and impossible to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in the state power. Whoever overlooks or underestimates this point will likewise commit the gravest of errors. The state-owned economy is socialist in character, and the cooperative economy is semi-socialist; these, plus private capitalism, plus the individual economy, plus the state-capitalist economy in which the state and private capital cooperate, are the main components of the economy of the people's republic; these constitute the new-democratic economic formation.

Sixth, the restoration and development of the national economy of the people's republic would be impossible without a policy of control of foreign trade. When imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the rule of the Kuomintang (which is the concentrated expression of these three) have been eliminated from China, the problem of establishing an independent and integrated industrial system will still not have been solved; it will be finally solved only when our economy has been greatly developed and China has been transformed from a backward agricultural country into an advanced industrial country. And to achieve this end, control of foreign trade is indispensable. After the countrywide victory of the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is, the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second is external, that is, the contradiction between China and the imperialist countries. Because of this, after the victory of the people's democratic revolution, the state power of the people's republic led by the working class must not be weakened but must be strengthened. Regulation of capital at home and control of foreign trade abroad are the two basic policies of this state in its economic struggle. Whoever overlooks or underestimates this point will commit the gravest of errors.

Seventh, China's economic heritage is backward, but the Chinese people are brave and industrious; with the victory of the Chinese people's revolution and the founding of the people's republic, the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and in addition the assistance of the working class of the countries of the world, chiefly the assistance of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's economic construction will not be very slow but may be fairly fast, and the prosperity of China can be counted on day by day. There is no ground whatever for pessimism about China's economic revival.

VII

Old China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist control. The thoroughly anti-imperialist character of the Chinese people's democratic revolution has made the imperialists bitterly hostile to this revolution and led them to help the Kuomintang with all their might. This has aroused the deep indignation of the Chinese people against the imperialists even more and has caused the imperialists to lose their last shred of prestige among the Chinese people. At the same time, the whole imperialist system has been greatly weakened since the Second World War, while the strength of the world anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union has grown as never before. All these circumstances make it possible for us, and require us, to adopt the policy of systematically and thoroughly destroying imperialist control in China. This imperialist control is manifested in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres. In every city and every place where the Kuomintang troops are wiped out and the Kuomintang government is overthrown, imperialist political control is overthrown with it, and so is imperialist economic and cultural control. But the economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists are still there, and so are the diplomatic personnel and the journalists recognized by the Kuomintang. We must deal with all these properly, in order of priority and urgency. Refusing to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refusing to recognize the continued existence of any of the treacherous treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolishing all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, immediately taking control of foreign trade and reforming the customs system — these are the first steps we must take upon entering the big cities. When we have done these things, the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism. As for the remaining imperialist economic and cultural establishments, they can be allowed to exist for the time being, subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with after our countrywide victory. As for ordinary foreign nationals, their legitimate interests will be protected and not infringed upon. As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now, and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be quick to treat us as equals, and so long as they do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not for a single day grant the imperialist countries legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question about that; wherever there is business to be done, we shall do it, and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are competing with one another. So far as possible, we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries.

VIII

All the conditions are ripe for convening the Political Consultative Conference and forming a democratic coalition government. All the democratic parties, people's organizations and democrats without party affiliation are on our side. The bourgeoisie of Shanghai and the Yangtze valley is trying to establish ties with us. Shipping and postal services between north and south have already begun. The Kuomintang, which has fallen apart, has become divorced from all the masses. We are preparing to negotiate with the reactionary Nanking government. The forces pushing for these negotiations on the side of the reactionary Nanking government are the Kwangsi warlords, the peace faction of the Kuomintang and the Shanghai bourgeoisie. Their aim is to get a share for themselves in the coalition government, to keep as many troops as possible, to preserve the interests of the bourgeoisie of Shanghai and the south, and to do their utmost to give the revolution a moderate colouring. These people accept our eight terms as the basis for negotiations, but they hope to bargain so that their losses will not be too great. Those who are trying to wreck these negotiations are Chiang Kai-shek and his diehards. Chiang Kai-shek still has sixty divisions south of the Yangtze, and they are still preparing to fight. Our policy is not to refuse negotiations but to demand that the other side accept the eight terms in their entirety, with no bargaining allowed. In exchange, we will not fight the Kwangsi clique and the other members of the Kuomintang peace faction; we will postpone the reorganization of their troops for about a year; some of the personnel of the Nanking government will be allowed to take part in the Political Consultative Conference and the coalition government; and certain interests of the bourgeoisie of Shanghai and the south will be allowed protection. These negotiations are comprehensive in nature; if they succeed, they will remove many obstacles to our advance into the south and our occupation of the big cities of the south, and this will be of great benefit. If they fail, local negotiations will be carried on separately after our advance. The negotiations are planned for the latter part of March. We hope to occupy Nanking in April or May, then convene the Political Consultative Conference in Peiping, form a coalition government and make Peiping the capital. Since we have agreed to negotiate, we must be prepared for the many troublesome things that will come after the negotiations succeed, and we must be prepared, with a clear head, to deal with the policy the other side will adopt of acting like Monkey, who got into the belly of the Princess of the Iron Fan to play havoc there. So long as we are fully prepared mentally, we can defeat any Monkey who plays havoc. Whether the peace negotiations are general or local, we should prepare for them in this way. We should not refuse these negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want peace and quiet, nor should we accept these negotiations in a muddle-headed way. We must be firm in principle; we must also have all the flexibility that is permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles.

IX

The people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance requires that our Party conscientiously unite the entire working class, the entire peasantry and the broad masses of revolutionary intellectuals; these are the leading force and the basic force of this dictatorship. Without this unity, this dictatorship cannot be consolidated. It also requires that our Party unite with as many as possible of the representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie who can cooperate with us, and with their intellectuals and political groups, so that, during the revolution, the counter-revolutionary forces may be isolated and the domestic counter-revolutionary forces and imperialist forces thoroughly overthrown, and so that, after the victory of the revolution, production may be speedily restored and developed, foreign imperialism dealt with, China steadily transformed from an agricultural into an industrial country and built into a great socialist country. Therefore, the policy of our Party of long-term cooperation with democrats outside the Party must be firmly established in the thinking and work of the whole Party. We must regard the majority of democrats outside the Party as we do our own cadres, consult and settle with them sincerely and frankly those problems that require consultation and settlement, give them work to do, give them real authority in their posts and help them make a success of their work. Proceeding from the desire to unite with them, we should carry on serious and appropriate criticism or struggle against their errors and shortcomings, so as to achieve the aim of uniting with them. It would be wrong to adopt an accommodating attitude towards their errors or shortcomings. It would also be wrong to adopt a closed-door or perfunctory attitude towards them. In every big and medium city, in every strategic region and in every province, we should cultivate a group of democrats outside the Party who have prestige and can cooperate with us. The incorrect attitude towards democrats outside the Party, fostered within our Party by the closed-door style of work during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, was not completely overcome during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and it appeared again in 1947 during the high tide of land reform in the base areas. This attitude would only isolate our Party, prevent the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship and provide the enemy with allies. Now that, for the first time in China, a Political Consultative Conference under the leadership of our Party is about to be convened, a democratic coalition government is about to be established and the revolution is about to win victory throughout the country, the whole Party must seriously examine this question and gain a correct understanding of it, must oppose both tendencies — the Rightist tendency of accommodationism and the "Left" tendency of closed-doorism or perfunctoriness — and adopt an entirely correct attitude.

X

Very soon we shall be victorious throughout the country. This victory will break through the eastern front of imperialism and will have great international significance. To win this victory will not require much more time or much more effort; to consolidate it will require a great deal of time and a great deal of effort. The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to construct. The imperialists reckon that eventually we will have to beg alms from them in order to live. Because of victory, certain moods may grow within the Party — arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwillingness to make progress, love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. Because of victory, the people are grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may be some Communists who were never conquered by enemies with guns and who deserved the name of heroes in face of these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation. To win countrywide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is comparatively tiny; what will be more worthy of pride is yet to come. When we look back on the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution after several decades, it will seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama. A drama must begin with a prologue, but the prologue is not the climax. The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution is longer, the work greater and more arduous. This must be made clear in the Party now. The comrades must be helped to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work. The comrades must be helped to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle. We have the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of a bad style and keep a good one. We can learn what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we shall also be good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without begging alms from the imperialists, they will live a better life than that in the imperialist countries.