Conduct Of The War.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · First Lord of the Admiralty of the United Kingdom

8 May 1940 · House of Commons debate on the Conduct of the War (Norway Debate) · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on May 8, 1940, during the debate on the conduct of the war, defending the decision to abandon the direct assault on Trondheim and withdraw British troops from Norway.
Main themes
Norwegian campaign of April 1940, abandoned direct attack on Trondheim, diversionary landings at Namsos and Andalsnes, Narvik as a decisive objective, Admiralty and Chiefs of Staff advice, danger of air bombing to warships, German thrust north of Oslo, withdrawal of 12,000 troops, ministerial responsibility for the decision
Duration
~7 min
24th percentile
Words
824
24th percentile
Sentences
33
20th percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
12.8
55th percentile
Syntax
3.43
91st percentile
Vocabulary
2.24
59th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 70%70%
  • Institutional 18%18%
  • Ceremonial 12%12%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

33 sentences in 9 paragraphs

I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend is always accurate in what he says, but that is not the point I am discussing now. The question was whether at the outset we should have sent these vessels in. I can see that this is a matter that might well have been done, but the cost would have been disproportionate to the particular advantage, and it could not have been foreseen that these two small craft would have played the part they did play in the subsequent operations.

I now come to the much more important question of Trondheim. There is no dispute that it was our duty to do our best to help the Norwegians and that the capture and defence of Trondheim was the best way to do it. My eye has always been fixed on Narvik; there, it seemed to me, is a port which may lead to some decisive achievement in the war. But when the German outrage occurred, there is no dispute that we were bound to go to the aid of the Norwegians and that Trondheim was the place. A plan was prepared by the joint staffs for two diversionary landings at Namsos and Andalsnes and for a direct landing in Trondheim Fiord of a force superior to that of the enemy which had seized that port. This was undoubtedly a hazardous operation. The forts at the entrance presented no serious difficulty, and the guns were not of a very formidable character; but the fact that a very large number of valuable ships would have to be continuously exposed for many hours to close bombing meant that grievous losses might be sustained. And although perhaps only one in two or three hundred bombs hit—we have had scores of ships under hours and hours of bombing—yet every now and again there is a hit, and the injury is disproportionate altogether to the power and value of the aircraft which inflicts it. Nevertheless, the Navy

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were perfectly ready to carry the troops in, and no doubt was entertained about their ability to do so.

Why, then, was this plan, which was timed for 25th April, abandoned? It was abandoned because, on the 17th, the two diversionary landings had made good progress, and it seemed much easier to capture Trondheim by this method than to incur the heavy cost of direct attack. I must make it perfectly clear that the Admiralty never withdrew their offer or considered the operation impracticable in the naval aspect. Grave doubts were, however, entertained by the military as to the possibility of making an opposed landing under heavy hostile air superiority, apart from the existence of machine guns, and in these circumstances the Chiefs of Staff, and not only the Chiefs of Staff but their Deputies, or Vice-chiefs, as they are now called, without the slightest difference of opinion, so far as I am aware, advised that it would be less costly and surer to convert the diversionary landings into the main attack. No one has the slightest right to suggest that the Navy withdrew from this undertaking or that the politicians overruled the Admirals. I take the fullest responsibility—and so do the Prime Minister and the other Ministers concerned—for having accepted the unanimous view of our expert advisers. I thought they were right at the time and on the information we then had, and I have seen no reason to alter my view by what I have learned since.

However, the situation rapidly became worse. In the first place, the German thrust North of Oslo developed enormous strength. The Norwegians were unable to hold the mountain passes, and they did not destroy the roads and railways. By the 25th or 26th the possibility of the arrival in the region South of Trondheim of very large German forces, thoroughly equipped and maintained, had to be foreseen. At the same time the intense and continuous bombing of the bases at Namsos and Andalsnes prevented the landing at these small fishing-ports of any large reinforcements, even of the artillery for the infantry we had already landed, and of the many supplies for the troops already landed. It was, therefore, necessary to withdraw the troops, or leave them to be destroyed by overwhelming force. The decision to withdraw was undoubtedly

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sound, and the extrication and the re-embarkation of those 12,000 men—for that is all there were, less than a division—was accomplished with very great skill and, I may also add, with very good luck.

Now, that is the story of what happened, and why. As I have said, all the responsible Naval and Military and Air authorities, together with the Ministers principally concerned, and the War Cabinet, were at every stage united; and I expect that if any dozen Members of this House had been brought into this matter day by day they would equally have been united. But that does not, of course, end the question.