- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on May 8, 1940, in the debate on the conduct of the war, defending the decision to abandon the attack on Trondheim and reporting on fighting at Narvik.
- Main themes
- Abandonment of the attack on Trondheim, advice of the Chiefs of Staff, ministerial responsibility for expert advice, German air superiority, German base at Oslo and lines of communication, risk of a forlorn operation, strain on the Air Force and Fleet flotillas, Swedish neutrality and criticism, fighting for Narvik and Northern Norway
- Duration
- ~8 min
- Words
- 908
- Sentences
- 30
- Readability
- 48
- Grade
- 14.1
- Syntax
- 3.53
- Vocabulary
- 2.21
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other30 sentences in 8 paragraphs
I am not only denying that, but I am making a much stronger denial. There were no naval authorities on the spot at Trondheim. We had not got our naval authorities on the spot at Trondheim; but no authority that we consulted or were advised by, differed, so far as I am aware—and I deal with the responsible officers—for the advice tendered by the Chiefs of Staff, supported by their officers. I do not think that settles the question. Ministers are not sheltered by the fact that they accept their experts' advice; on the other hand, they are very unsheltered if they over-ride that advice. But whether they were sheltered or unsheltered, the results were very bad and very disappointing, and the question arose whether, if we persisted in the direct naval attack, events would have turned out better. Personally, I have always believed that the Navy would have carried troops into Trondheim Fiord, and that the troops would have been able to make their lodgment in the Fiord and come to grips with the enemy. I would have been very glad to take all possible responsibility for the step, provided that it was properly supported by expert opinion.
Even if we assume that that view is right and that we could have been masters
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of Trondheim, or its ruins for such it would have speedily become, by 25th April, the question immediately arose: Could be have brought to bear a sufficient Army South of Trondheim to hold the invader or drive him off? It is true that we should have had, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, one good aerodrome together with proper quays for landing larger forces, and artillery, and that we might by this time, perhaps, have been building up a front on a line, South of Trondheim, between the sea and the Swedish border, but even if we had, at the present time, got 25,000 or 30,000 Allied troops into action on this front, which, in view of the enemy's air superiority is highly questionable, such a force would not have been able to arrive in time or be equipped with the necessary artillery in time, or to get anything like equal air support in time. I do not believe that it would have been able to withstand the immense weight of the attack which was being delivered by the Germans from their magnificent base at Oslo and up the two lines of railway and road from Oslo to the North. There can be no doubt whatever that the German base at Oslo and the German communications northward were incomparably superior to anything that we could have obtained at Trondheim, and at the various small ancillary landing places which we used. It would have been a very unsatisfactory struggle, at a great disadvantage and at disproportionate cost to the Allies. There are already over 120,000 German troops operating in South and Central Norway and although we could have thrown in continual reinforcements, I cannot believe that there was the slightest chance of ultimate success, and it would have been a struggle between an army based on Trondheim and a German army based on Oslo. That aspect of the matter had to be considered by the military experts as to whether the Germans could reinforce more quickly than we could. There was no means by which their air superiority could have been overcome. We should therefore have been committed to a forlorn operation on an ever-increasing scale.
Therefore, whatever view we may take of the chances of the attack on Trondheim, the decision to abandon it, although it was taken for different reasons from those I have just mentioned, was not only reasonable at the time, but has,
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I believe, saved us in the upshot from a most disastrous entanglement. It often happens in war that an operation which is successful on a small scale becomes vicious if it is multiplied by three, four or five times. We must be careful not to exhaust our Air Force, in view of the much graver dangers which might come upon us at any time, and also not to throw such a strain on our flotillas and anti-aircraft cruisers as might hamper the general mobility of the Fleet. There are other waters of which we have to think besides the Norwegian waters, and I can think of nothing more likely to bring new adversaries down upon us in other waters than the spectacle of our being too largely absorbed under the most unfavourable conditions in a protracted struggle around Trondheim. Of course, if Sweden had come to the rescue of Norway, if her troops had entered, as they could easily have done, and if her air bases had been at the disposal of the Royal Air Force, very different positions might have been established. There has, unhappily, never been any chance of that. The Swedish Government, like many other people, have been confined to adverse criticism of His Majesty's Government.
We are now fighting hard for Northern Norway, and in particular for Narvik, and I will not attempt to predict how the struggle will go, nor will I give any information about it at all. I will content myself with saying that the conditions in that area are much more equal so far as ability to reinforce it is concerned—much more equal and much more favourable than those which would have developed in Central Norway.
