Indian Constitutional Reform.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

12 December 1934 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on December 12, 1934, in the debate on Indian constitutional reform, attacking the Government's scheme and urging that it would neither govern better nor win Indian consent.
Main themes
Parentage of the India constitutional scheme, Malcolm MacDonald's account of the 1931 Round Table Conference drafting, Socialist Opposition's rejection of the scheme, Irish analogy and risk of playing parties against each other, lessons of the South Africa Constitution Act, lessons of the Irish Treaty, Joint Select Committee advice, Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, absence of safeguards for the Indian masses, grants-in-aid and inspectors for provincial government, loss of British authority in India within ten years, Government's middle way lacking a theme
Duration
~33 min
85th percentile
Words
3,907
85th percentile
Sentences
193
88th percentile
Readability
63
91st percentile
Grade
9.5
15th percentile
Syntax
2.90
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.01
11th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 62%58%
  • Geopolitical 24%22%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

193 sentences in 41 paragraphs

I am glad to hear that remark, because there is a certain amount of controversy as to the parentage of the interesting progeny before us. The hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot) laid claim to it for Lord Reading, and he was rather controverted from the Socialist benches. Now there is another competitor for this dubious honour. As there is some difference on the subject, I will read the perfectly plain statement which was made by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. M. Macdonald), whom we know as the most popular, agreeable, and competent Under-Secretary of State for

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Dominion Affairs. This is what he wrote in a newspaper in his constituency. It is very important that we should know these facts, because there is a dispute. This is what he wrote three years ago:

How accurate was the Government's calculation of what would be the ultimate conclusions of the Conference, and of what policy it would finally be able to announce with the approval of all delegations, is illustrated by an interesting fact. The drafting of the Prime Minister's concluding statement of the Government's policy, actually delivered on the 19th January"— that is, January, 1931— was already in hand before Christmas. The text of the statement was completed during two all-day conferences between the Prime Minister and his principal Government advisers which I attended at Chequers on 27th and 28th December. This was several days before the Conference itself began to consider the all-important question of Indian responsibility in the Central Government. It was before the Indians themselves had stated their ideas in detail,

Here I must disappoint the hon. Member for Bodmin—

before Lord Reading had made his famous speech announcing the Liberal party's support of the Indian claims, and before the Conservatives' definition of their policy. Yet only minor alterations had to be made in the Government's statement as a result of these events following its original drafting. So much for the tactics of the Government.

So much for the statement of the hon. Member for Bassetlaw. There can be no dispute about the origin and the genesis of this scheme which we have before us, on the part of anyone who will consider that frank and open avowal. It may be asked: Why bring this up? I bring it up because it is challenged in some quarters. I also bring it up to show hon. Members opposite what obligations they have towards this scheme. Their paternity is proved without any doubt, and they are not going to escape the consequences by merely abusing the wretched brat which has been foisted on the guileless Conservatives. What did we then see? No sooner had the compliance of the Conservatives been achieved, no sooner had they agreed—no doubt they agreed of their own free will, and no doubt they agreed with the scheme on its merits; I do not argue that it was done under any duress—but no sooner had the matter been pushed forward to this stage than hon. Members opposite started moving on another downward march along the slope.

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I must really warn His Majesty's Government that they will never be able to reach an agreement with the Socialist Opposition. The more they go forward the more they will be led on. Even now, if they were to meet all the suggested amendments which were made by the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) in the Joint Select Committee, it would only be the starting point for a new departure. The Socialists are ready for that. The right hon. Gentleman who leads the Opposition is much ahead of the hon. Member for Limehouse, and is careering along on the path towards the abyss, with a policy all of his own. I am told that the highest caste in India boasts of the distinction of being twice born. The party opposite—if they will allow me to say so in no offensive way—have been twice brought in regard to this matter. What is the result? The result is the formal opposition of the whole of the Socialist party and extreme denunciation by that party of the whole of this scheme, after the Government have done so much to meet them, and which they have carried on so far at such great risk. That is a very formidable fact.

We hear a lot about national unity and the importance of acting as a nation and not as parties in this matter. Where is the national unity if a party which represents a very large proportion of the country and is advancing confidently, as it believes—there may be more to be said about that before they reach that point—to power, definitely dissociates itself from such a scheme, and denounces it and opposes it formally in the House of Commons? My hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made a very thoughtful speech the other day. He does sometimes make very thoughtful speeches. He referred to the Irish parable. Let me say, as I am going to quote his words, that I do not intend to shirk my responsibility for any concern in that. The hon. Member, with great force and great cogency, said:

We allowed the Irish question to become a party question, and from that moment we were lost. Once the Irish realised that they had two opposing parties to contend with their success was assured, for they could, and did, play one party off against the other until Great Britain was reduced to the most shameful surrender in her history. The Indians are not lees astute than the Irish. They are more numerous and more powerful.

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Once allow them to believe that they can get more from one party than from another and there will be no end until we retreat from India with the same ignominy that attended our retreat from Ireland.

There you have the analogy. Here you have the alternative party, the only party which can replace this Government, and it has definitely come forward in direct opposition to and denunciation of your policy. The Government are entitled to review the situation in the light of the fact that what they have to offer now to the Indian people is not any more the gift of the nation. It cannot be pretended to be so. It is only the gift of a number of gentlemen who at the present time are able to marshal a Parliamentary majority in the House of Commons.

Many false analogies are drawn from past events, and we have had in these Debates continuous references to Ireland and South Africa. Of course, we all try to learn lessons from the past, but in extracting those lessons we naturally draw and extract the ones which are the most agreeable to our mood at the moment. I had something to do with most of those decisions. It fell to my lot to carry the South Africa Constitution Act and the Irish Free State Act through this House. I will tell hon. Members the particular lessons which have remained in my mind from them First as to the South Africa Constitution Act. The lesson there was that it is not enough to be right and well meaning, but that you must find big men with whom you can make a bargain which will be faithfully observed. In General Botha and General Smuts we found two great men, two great warriors, and fathers of their country, who, for a quarter of a century, have used their extraordinary gifts in order to preserve the solemn compact which was signed between the two belligerents in the Treaty of Vereeniging, and subsequently in the South Africa Constitution Act. It is no use comparing the South Africa Constitution with what we are now asked to do for India. It is only to darken counsel to bring that in. I am sorry that General Smuts, for whom I have such admiration and a long friendship, seemed to make some comparison the other day. I wonder what the distinguished General would say if a proposal was put forward to give seats in the Union Legislature

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to Indian immigrants to South Africa, or to the native inhabitants of South Africa? I think the fine and expansive phrases of his Liberalism would shrink to a very much more narrow and effective practical demonstration of his will.

In Ireland also, I shared in that sombre decision, and I am not going to attempt to elaborate it to the House now except to say that there, again, we tried to make a bargain with the men who really controlled the opposite forces, and, if that has failed, it is largely because those men, Michael Collins, Kevin O'Higgins and Arthur Griffiths, gave their lives quite soon in an effort to maintain the honour, as I believe it to be, of the Irish people in the faithful execution of Treaties entered into with good faith on both sides. We have had great disappointment and disillusion in Ireland. I wonder whether the then leader of the Conservative party, the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir. A. Chamberlain), feels that disappointment. I certainly do, poignantly, and every reproach which naturally attaches to it; to the prophecies which were made, the hopes which were aroused, but which the passage of time and the march of events have falsified. I feel it very much indeed. Although one must act according to the circumstances of the moment, and grave indeed were the circumstances of that moment, I cannot feel that one ought not to accept to some extent the hard teachings of experience.

But how much worse lies the Indian situation? There you have no one to deal with, nobody that can execute their side of the contract or agreement. There you have no one who can answer you; you have only vague noises coming back to us across the ocean, incoherent noises, as the result of all we say and do. The House must ask itself: How shall we stand on this Indian matter, not in a year or two, but 10 years hence? After all, the lesson that you may learn from Ireland is that at the beginning things may go fairly well, that the first lot of men you deal with will keep their word. There are in India men trained under your system, their minds habituated to a certain course. But the second lot of men, who come along and get into office by attacking the first lot, cars nothing for the contracts which have been entered into or the agreements which have

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been made; they brush them all aside; they are nothing to them. And thus we have been insulted, derided, defrauded and mocked in our Irish policy.

Where shall we be 10 years hence in our Indian policy? Ten years is a very short time. I have been twice engaged in big matters in my experience as a Minister in which 10 years was the limit when they were to be reconsidered—the Washington Treaty and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. It seemed to be all right and that we need not worry about them any more. They are both here. Where shall we be 10 years hence in this Indian matter? That is the question we must ask before the House votes to-night. In 10 years time the foundations and pivots of British authority will have simultaneously weakened in every part of India. You will have shifted the axis of India. You will have altered the focus of Indian loyalty. Everywhere the waves of so-called popular government and democratic movements will be lapping against the foundations of your institutions and pressing upon the structure of your power. Where will hon. Members in this House find themselves in 10 years time? If you resolve to proceed upon this path, to take this step now, it will be absolutely no use afterwards complaining of the consequences. We were criticised, the Lord President of the Council, the right hon. Member for West Birmingham, and I, for what we did in regard to Ireland, sometimes very harshly. Believe me, what you are going to do now is far more risky and ten times as large and lasting.

But we are told by the Secretary of State for India that the case of India is different, that we are keeping an Army in India and kept none in Ireland. I do not believe that that really affects the issue. At this stage of the difficulties in front of us it is not a question of the Army. If it comes to that the British Army is not so far away from Ireland. If the Irish trouble could have been settled by the use of military forces, we should not have put up with the treatment which we have received. No one dreams of using military forces against Ireland, great and grievous as are our complaints against the Irish Free State; nor would anyone. Once you engage yourself in this constitutional process

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and deliberately hand over power, set up a responsible Government with Ministers and Cabinets, who may present to the Governor-General their minutes according to the Constitution, you are upon a path where you may suffer mortal injury before any situation arose, and without any situation arising where military power had to be employed.

One other lesson I learned from the Irish Treaty proceedings, and I am sure that the Lord President of the Council learned it too, and a great deal better than I did. It was this. On a great Imperial issue the votes which are given by Conservative Members in the Lobby or at the National Union of Conservative Associations are no true measure of the feelings of the party on the subject at stake. They are naturally influenced by their trusted and honoured leader. I well remember when we were both engaged in the Irish matter that everything seemed to be going very well—I think there were only 30 or 40 who voted against us in the Lobby on the decisive Division—we had the great advantage of Lord Derby's assistance in bringing Lancashire along quietly and in turning the opinion of the National Union, and at the Liverpool conference only 70 delegates voted against the Irish decision out of 1,800 delegates. The "Times" newspaper recorded this with lively satisfaction. But the right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that underneath the surface passions and feelings were boiling and that deep injury was done to the structure of unity and harmony within the party. So well did he judge this that within less than a year he went off to the Carlton Club and blew the Government sky high.

I venture to draw a lesson also from the Montagu-Chelmsford Commission, and it is this. It is not the slightest use the House of Commons depending on a Joint Select Committee to give them good advice about India. We had a very fine Joint Select Committee, not quite so loaded, arranged and marshalled as the one over which the Secretary of State for India has reigned, but it was a very authoritive Committee and contained many men of intelligence, experience and authority. We took its advice. Many people think the advice given by that Committee has been the seed of the difficulties and evils we are

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suffering from to-day. For a long time I felt some reproach when hon. Members came along and said: "Mr. Churchill, it is all very well your coming forward now, but what were you doing when the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were passed." There, we took the advice of a Joint Select Committee, and the lesson I draw is that the House of Commons should not allow itself to be too easily gulled by an array of complacent notabilities and dignatories, but should address itself with earnestness to the topics which come before it and form an opinion of its own. That is what we shall endeavour to do in the months before us.

I will not linger longer upon the past, although I have, I hope, extracted some gleams of guidance from it. The past is over, the long process of examination has come to an end, and with it many hot controversies which were associated with it. When the House has approved of the report of the Committee, which no doubt it soon will do, the Constitution Bill will be brought before us, and then we shall have to take a new view of that piece of work as a whole. We shall have to try it, as I ventured to say out of doors the other day, by the test of a few simple questions. Will it work? Will it last? Will it satisfy the people for whom it is designed? Will it make a better government in India and a more assured and permanent connection between India and the Crown? These are the questions we shall have to determine next year, and we must go into them fully in the time allowed, which is enough to make it possible for us to do so. It is by the results of its work that the House will be judged. It is no good saying that we were at it for seven years, that we had a Joint Select Committee, and that we took enormous pains, the test by which our work will be judged will be: Is it good? Is it vital?

The great Napoleon said that a Constitution should be short and obscure. Although we have not yet seen the text of the Bill, we know enough about it to know that this particular Constitution will never fulfil one of those desiderata. But you may ask of any Constitution two questions: First, will it make a better Government; and, secondly, will it be acceptable to those for whom it is intended? Justification is, I think, possible on either of those

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counts. You may say that it will be unpopular in the country, that they will not like it, but that it will be a much better Government for the great mass of the people; or you may say that the people will have to put up with a lower level of administration, that the conditions will not be so good, but that it will gratify their ideals and that that is what they really want. Either of those defences can be made. But can His Majesty's Government make either of them upon this proposal? I believe it is possible to demonstrate that your policy fulfils neither of those conditions in any way. I know what we are going to hear. We are going to be told: "Here are the extremists of the Labour party; here are the Die-hards; and in the middle this great central phalanx of the sober-minded, steady, prudent, patriotic, matter-of-fact, common-sense, British Members of Parliament moving forward along the middle way." But it does not always follow that the middle way is the best way, as the man found who fell between two stools.

That is the difficulty of the Government. However large may be the number of people with them, they are still confronted with that difficulty. I do not agree with the party opposite; I disagree violently with the proposal they put forward. But at any rate they have a theme. Their theme is to do what the Indians wish. We also have a theme; it is to discharge the mission of Britain in the East. But what is your theme? That is what we want to find out in the months that lie before us. This scheme offers neither efficiency nor consent. We are launched upon a project which political India rejects. We parade it as grand and magnanimous; they reject it as a hollow sham. We consider that it is an immense relinquishment on our part of vital control; they accept it, if they accept it at all, only as the means of wresting further controls from us. We have deserted our duty to the Indian masses. Well I know that. But we have not gained the consent or gratitude of the Indian intelligentsia. We have wrested, wrenched, plucked the roof-beam from our house in the hope of building a bridge across a gulf, and when we have torn it down we have found that the beam is much too short. That is the answer which I give to those who say: "Go along in the middle with

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the moderate people." It is not the least use doing so unless they have a policy which somewhere or other achieves a definite purpose.

I was very glad to see that the report of the Joint Select Committee does not in any way under-rate the importance of provincial government. It speaks of it as a fundamental departure from the present system, and indeed Indian Ministers who have had so little experience can really not consider themselves slighted when they are asked to take over the government of countries as great as France or Germany, or Spain, or Italy, and when they have the whole of these vast populations and their affairs submitted to them. No one can complain at all that these tasks are unworthy. On the contrary, they constitute, I believe—provincial Governments alone, whether the police is fully transferred or not—a rulership as great and as august as is being exercised by any body of men in the world.

But there is this objection to the provincial scheme. I should have acquiesced in it and supported it and submitted to it, although from many points of view I do not like it, but there is this objection to it: Absolutely no provision is made for ensuring that we discharge our responsibility to the mass of the Indian people—none whatever. It is quite callous and disgusting the way in which the whole of their services are transferred without any desire to follow up and see what happens and to make sure that efficiency is maintained. I ventured to submit to the Joint Select Committee a proposal to have a system of grants-in-aid similar to those which we have in this country, which ensure the efficiency of our education system, and inspectors from the centre who would get in touch and make the conditions of the people between one province and another attain a certain standard. This could be done without the slightest derogation from the dignity of those whom it affected. There is not the slightest derogation. It is only what the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Ministers here, who are giving money to local bodies, are continually doing.

There is no reason why something should not have been done. But the right hon. Gentleman yesterday boasted in a very pointed way that there would

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be no question of grants-in-aid or inspectors following up or anything of that kind. He can do that, and no doubt his Indian friends, as he rightly called them, will be pleased. Of course they will be pleased. But where does he stand himself? He stands himself in the position of one who has announced that the British Government completely disinterests itself in the welfare of this great mass, handing them over without caring even to inquire whether or not their hospitals, their schools, and all their different social services undergo a great deterioration. I call that a lamentable thing.