Debate On The Address.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

5 November 1936 · House of Commons debate on the Address in reply to the King's Speech · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on November 5, 1936, in the debate on the Address, urging a firm League of Nations collective security policy, rearmament and a consistent plan in foreign affairs.
Main themes
Collective security under the League of Nations Covenant, need for a consistent British foreign policy plan, rearmament as deterrence, Anglo-French common defence, Germany and alleged encirclement, redress of grievances of the vanquished, Italy and the Abyssinian conflict, naval command of the Mediterranean, Soviet Russia and Communist intrigue, Spanish Civil War
Duration
~27 min
78th percentile
Words
3,236
78th percentile
Sentences
143
79th percentile
Readability
57
82nd percentile
Grade
11.0
33rd percentile
Syntax
3.17
69th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
37th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 85%81%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

143 sentences in 30 paragraphs

I am bound to say that I think that at this juncture we should be wasting our breath and wasting our influence if we passed by the League of Nations, the existing machinery which has been erected with so much pain and trouble in the world, which has enlisted behind it an enormous body of support. If we went out vaguely with some appeal of that character, which really would amount to very little more than that Great Britain was prepared to give away a large number of colonies, if that would satisfy the hunger of certain nations, it appears to me that the right hon. Gentleman might easily find that he had led his countrymen up a path which would lead to nothing but vexation and disappointment on all sides, and that he had meanwhile discarded a high road,

311

upon which an enormous amount of human effort, and benevolent effort, has been expended. The most important thing, it seems to me, in regard to British policy is for us to have a plan and to stick to it. The repeated chops and changes, hot fits and cold fits, with which even the last melancholy 12 months have acquainted us, these have sensibly diminished our influence and augmented the dangers which menace us and others. No one can look out upon the surface of the world without profound anxiety, not only because of the causes of unrest, but because of the unfavourable regards which are turned in our direction from many countries. No one can do that without feeling that at every stage events have darkened and turned against us. You can hardly think of anything that has happened in the last year that has not made our position one of greater anxiety. One has to note every week something happening which seems to tell against our view and against our influence in the world which we rightly cherish.

That is why I plead for a plan, and I think there is a plan which is open to us. It is the same plan that nearly all the Members who were elected talked about at the General Election and gained votes for urging, namely, the plan of standing by the Covenant of the League of Nations and trying to gather together, under the authority of the Covenant, the largest possible number of well-armed, peace-seeking Powers in order to overawe, and if necessary to restrain, a potential aggressor, whoever he may be. Why, Sir, a very great number of our people have given their faith to this conception of the reign of law in Europe, and if possible in the world. But when we speak of the reign of law we must mean a reign of law supported by adequate and, if possible, by overwhelming force. The days of saving money on armaments have gone by. They may well return in happier conditions, but in this grim year 1936, and still more in its ominous successor, our aim, our task, is not to reduce armaments. It is something even more intense, even more vital, namely, to prevent war, if war can be staved off. Horrible war, blasting in its devastation the prosperity of the world, can only be—I submit it with all respect to the House—prevented by the mar-

312

shalling of preponderant forces, sustained by world opinion, as a deterrent to any aggressor who breaks the peace.

I welcome the speech of the Foreign Secretary. I think we ought to play, not only because it is our duty, but also because it is for our safety, a manly and a resolute part in this. I believe we should run more risks by standing out of what is called collective security than by coming in and trying to make a reality of what has hitherto proved only a sham. I do not see what we lose by making a new and vehement effort, and I interpret the speech of the Foreign Secretary in that sense, that -he intended to make a new and resolute effort. I do not see what we lose. If we succeed, then we shall have borne our part in preventing a renewal of Armageddon. If our exertions are not supported in proportionate measure by others, if we are not backed up by a very large number of countries, great and small, then, of course, collective security will be shown to be a fraud, and the League of Nations will be proved to be nothing but an idle dream.

Even if that happens, I do not see how our affairs will be worsened from the bad position in which they now stand. There will still remain the two Parliamentary democracies of the Western world, the two great nations whose thought and action have shaped its destiny and cleared the path of progress. These two nations, Great Britain and the French Republic, will still, if everything else fail, remain possessed of very considerable means of common defence. Together they will be very dangerous to attack. Together they will be very hard to destroy. It seems highly probable, therefore, that even if we fail in re-establishing a decent tolerable life for the whole European family, which is our first endeavour, we shall nevertheless he so much considered that the fury of an aggressor will not fall upon us or, if it should we shall be able to survive and ride out the storm as we have ridden out others in the past. There is no greater mistake than to suppose that platitudes, smooth words, timid policies offer to-day a path to safety. Only by a firm adherence to righteous principles sustained by all the necessary instrumentalities, to use a famous American expression, can the dangers which close in so steadily upon us and upon the peace of Europe be

313

warded off and overcome. That they can be overcome must be our hope and our faith.

It will be said, of course, that these words lead in one direction. "What you really mean," it will be said, "is the gathering together under the aegis of the League of Nations of what amounts to a grand defensive alliance against Germany." Germany, we are assured, is a most peace-loving country. It is true they are scraping together a few weapons, but that, we are told, is only because of the terror in which they dwell of a Russian Bolshevik invasion. Night and day the fear, we are told, of the aggression of Soviet Russia rests upon Germany. If that be their trouble it can easily be healed. Let them come into the system of collective security, and if Russia is the aggressor and the invader, then all Europe will give to Germany guarantees that they will not go down unaided. They have only to ask for guarantees for the defence of the soil of Germany, and they will find them forthcoming in the fullest measure from many nations, both powerful and small alike.

What, then, is this talk about encirclement? It is all nonsense. There is nothing that we ask for ourselves under collective security that we will not willingly concede, nay, earnestly proffer, to Germany. Let her join the club, and make her great contribution and share its amenities and immunities. Let me make it clear that those who are devoted and sincere supporters of the Covenant of the League of Nations do not confine their position to an armed and combined defence of the status quo. We contemplate machinery for the redress of legitimate grievances between nations, and we must contemplate that if a grievance is shown to be justified it shall be corrected even in the despite of nations who would be unwilling to make the sacrifice. Four years ago—I do not know whether the House can go back so far, for nowadays memories are so happily short—I ventured to submit to the House the doctrine that the redress of the grievances of the vanquished should precede the disarmament of the victors. Those days are gone. We have fooled them all away.

Now under infinitely harder circumstances the same issue presents itself in a somewhat different form. One desires

314

to see among the nations who were the victors a certain association of strength in order that they may reach a position where they can discuss on even terms the redress of grievances. It is said that there must not be a front against any nation, or against Germany. All I can say is that unless there is a front there will be no settlement. Unless there is a front against potential aggression there will be no settlement. All the nations of Europe will just be driven helter-skelter across the diplomatic chess board until the limits of retreat are exhausted, and then out of desperation, perhaps in some most unlikely quarter, the explosion of war will take place, probably under conditions not very favourable to those who have been engaged in this long retreat. I believe that the next 12 months may be our last chance of averting a European conflict and of preventing that conflict from darkening into a world war.

I rejoice that the Foreign Secretary has this afternoon told us in unmistakable terms that he will make one more effort at Geneva to establish the reign of law backed by adequate force. Because these efforts have failed in the past, as he says himself, there is no reason why they should fail in the end. That is why I say that we must have a plan, a theme. We must have a cause and all necessary subordinations of pique, prejudice or pride must be made to that general theme. If this policy is openly proclaimed and frankly avowed, the people in this island will not be the last to understand it or the least willing to take measures to sustain it. We shall be no longer drifting about, hither and thither. Now, as the evils of the time unfold and one sinister event after another crops up, every section of public opinion represented in the nation, every section of public opinion represented, I have no doubt, in the Cabinet has its day, has its expedient. Something happens here to favour the Nazi regime, and those who are its opponents then raise their voices. Something happens on the other side, and another set of gentlemen find their ideas apparently receiving some confirmation from the course of events. To be governed in your foreign policy by the ups and downs of events in times like these causes the greatest misfortune.

315

Without a theme boldly proclaimed on which the great majority of the nation is united, which commands the assent of many classes and parties—without that there will be no means of finding our way through these extraordinary dangers. Look back on the past 12 months and see the varieties of policy to which not only the Government but this House has given vehement expression. It is not only for ourselves that it is a serious peril. It baffles friends; it fans the wrath of foes. It makes the remaining authority and influence of Britain a positive embarrassment to Europe instead of being the main anchor, as it should be, of honesty, courage and stability. With a plan, with a theme and with a cause to which we adhere, even though circumstances run counter to it for a time, you will bring other people to conform to your movement. You have no chance of doing it while we are drifting this way and that.

With such a plan minor difficulties cease to count. We could with combined strength speak with a united voice, and these minor daily affairs and distractions could no longer disturb us. The principles would be proclaimed of submission to international law, of resolve to enforce international law, of determination to secure the means to enforce it and of appealing to other similarly minded to join hands with us. Such a policy may well inspire the conscience of the British Empire, and may yet command the action of the world. That is why I am most grateful to the Foreign Secretary. I think that he has acted in the only way in which he could possibly act in proclaiming his intention not to cast aside the Covenant of the League, not to lose heart at this critical moment, but to make a renewed effort adequate to the seriousness of the time in order to establish, in defiance of past experience, in spite of disappointments, the principle of collective security against aggression without which we cannot see how a future conflict is to be prevented.

There are some practical points, however, to which I would crave the permission of the House to refer because they are difficult points, and it is no use talking about a subject if you avoid the difficult points. Take this question of collective security. The phrase has come to be derided now. People point to what happened in Abyssinia, and so forth, and

316

then they say, "Are we not in Great Britain likely to commit ourselves to an enormous extension of our liabilities and dangers?" I hold that the doctrine of collective security must mean that no one is in until enough are in. It seems to me good sense. If other Powers and small Powers are not going to do their part, they must take their fate. Some of the small countries have enormous colonial possessions, great empires almost. If there is to be a stampede among them to join the martial dictators, the Western democracies can do nothing to save them, still less to save their possessions.

So, when I suggest we ought to pledge our faith to collective security, I mean in these troublous times such as we are enduring that the nations adhering to the Covenant should have by far the greater force and make all preparations to make that force effective. The idea that Great Britain should multiply her risks indefinitely without receiving in return accessions of combined strength which will be capable of holding an aggressor to parley, or, if all fail, to form a solid defensive front, that is certainly not a policy of sense or reason. We have not yet got this security. Let us labour to get it, and do not let us despair too early or repent too soon. I cannot see how the practice of this policy during the present year and in the future can deprive us in the slightest degree of any security we enjoy at the present moment. On the contrary, it may invest the action of Britain with a unity and a harmony which will go far to add to our strength abroad and go far to facilitate our task of putting our defences in order at home.

My right hon. Friend found it impossible to avoid speaking of particular countries. He spoke about Italy. What ought to be our policy towards Italy? At any rate we can see what it ought not to be. It ought not to be a policy of nagging. Very serious antagonism existed betwen Great Britain, doing her part as a member of the League of Nations, and Italy, over the conquest of Abyssinia. In that antagonism we have not succeeded. We have been humiliated, but we have not been dishonoured. However we may have been guided we are not regarded either as knaves or cowards. That would be a very grave mistake. Friends of mine tell me that the Italian dictator has repeatedly said that he both

317

understands and respects the British point of view. He has also made public a statement of certain submissions which Italy will make to the League of Nations about the character of Italian rule in Abyssinia. I do not know whether those have been departed from or not, or whether they still apply. It seems to me that any statements of that kind are of value and importance.

The relations between Great Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean have always been those of special amity. For more than 200 years we have held naval command of the Mediterranean. I cannot conceive that the time has come when we should abandon it. Therefore, we could never enter into any convention which limited the naval or air forces we found it necessary to place in the Mediterranean, and, as a matter of fact, the attempt to make such a limitation is physically impossible. Nothing can possibly prevent the stronger navy from, in a few days, placing any force it may desire and which it can spare from home waters in the Mediterranean. My right hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong, but I gathered from his statement that he had no idea of making any convention limiting our right to defend our interests in the Mediterranean as we may think fit. But surely the corollary of that is that the naval Powers in the Mediterranean should reciprocally bind themselves not to molest each other's sea communications, to give each other reassurances about their respective communications. The molestation of communications is, of course, as great an onslaught upon a country—in these circumstances, in the Mediterranean—as an invasion across her land frontier would be. It seems to me that if it were possible to have relations with all the Mediterranean Powers which gave a greater feeling of the freedom and security of the Mediterranean, a feeling that it was, as it were, an area which was not to be disturbed by the storms of war, there would be another very great and essential step forward to the securing of world peace and also, it might well be, to the reinforced action of the League of Nations.

There was one country which my right hon. Friend did not mention in his survey. I think he was wise, in his position, not to mention it on this occasion,

318

but private Members cannot close their eyes to the fact that there is such a thing in the modern world as Soviet Russia. There never was any question so baffling as the attitude which the Liberal democracies of the West should adopt towards Soviet Russia at the present time. I certainly agree with what has been said, I think by the right hon. Gentleman, that certainly Britain and France are not going to be lined up in a Nazi crusade against Communism. We shall show ourselves capable of dealing with our own Communists in our own way. We have, it is true, no fewer than one representative of the Communists in the House of Commons, and I really do not feel that we require the mobilised strength of the mighty, armed dictatorships in order to establish tolerable working relations with him. But Russia is in very great peril. She has to consider dangers from the East as well as from the West. Mighty military nations glare at Soviet Russia, and it is most surprising that a State thus threatened should act with such insensate folly. Why, but for Russia and but for the Russian Communist propaganda and intrigues which for more than six months racked Spain before the outbreak, the Spanish horror need never have occurred. Spain might be a constitutional republic, adjusting its internal stresses by ordinary Parliamentary processes, but the importation of the most skilled agitators, Bela Kun and others—