Supply.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

20 July 1936 · House of Commons debate on Defence Supplementary Estimates · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on July 20, 1936, in a defence debate, criticising the Government's co-ordination of defence and rearmament and urging a Minister of Supply, citing German spending of £800,000,000.
Main themes
Co-ordination of national defence, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence's remit, proposed Ministry of Supply, Royal Air Force expansion, German rearmament spending of £800,000,000, British defence estimates compared with German, miscalculation of German air strength, delays in machine tool provision, food supply and granaries, destroyer construction reversal, government complacency over rearmament
Duration
~43 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,100
92nd percentile
Sentences
211
90th percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
11.0
32nd percentile
Syntax
3.03
52nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.05
18th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 42%38%
  • Geopolitical 27%25%
  • Economic 22%20%
  • Ceremonial 6%5%
  • Social 3%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

211 sentences in 51 paragraphs

By all means let us be strictly accurate in our quotation of my right hon. Friend, who judged the speech so important that he occupied upon it time which otherwise would have enabled him to bring to the complete stage the Report upon the Fleet Air Arm. I do not want to quarrel with him at all; I only want to agree with him. So we are all right about that. Of course, a Minister in charge of matters of high importance, making a statement of this kind which is expected on all sides and for which everyone is waiting, can easily supply a large number of instances and give a very interesting account of some of the matters with which he has been concerned; and certainly there were many points in my right

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hon. Friend's speech which were of the greatest importance and interest. Still I must confess, if my right hon. Friend will permit me to do so, that when he concluded his remarks I could not feel that I had received any very large volume of new information; I could not feel that we have been, as it were, taken into the confidence of the Government, even so far as that would be possible without endangering the public interest. I have never doubted at all the ability of my right hon. Friend to put up an excellent defence for the Government, especially when, as was said by a speaker from the Front Opposition Bench, the "knock-about" element is required; and he certainly carried us all with him in the rebukes which he administered to the Opposition for advocating strong policies on the part of this country in foreign affairs and yet at the some time not throwing their whole heart into the business of recruiting our small Army and of facilitating the production of munitions.

I am not going to follow my right hon. Friend, except on one point, into the account which he gave of the progress of Royal Air Force expansion, but I must say that the picture which he drew—or suggested rather than drew, for I admit that he covered himself with a good many clouds of vagueness—the general picture which he presented of streams of new machines of the very latest quality pouring out of the factories to the squadrons of the Royal Air Force is one which I feel is based on a larger measure of anticipation than of actual realisation. I am sure than some of the statements which he made will be received, not only with interest, but with some surprise, in the ranks of the Royal Air Force. I could, I think, draw a very different picture, but I am not going to do so, because, frankly, I do not feel that here to-day, in open debate in this Chamber, I should like the case which I feel capable of stating to be stated; nor do I think it would be right for the Government to give all the information that they have at their disposal, either reassuring or not reassuring, on all the aspects of the development of a force so complicated and so difficult to measure as the Air Force of this or any other country.

There is, however, one point to which I must refer. My right hon. Friend used

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an extraordinary argument. He said that, if we had begun to expand our Air Force three years ago, or words to that effect, we should be worse off than we are now—we should be cumbered with a mass of inferior machines. This is an altogether new defence for the miscalculation which the Government have admitted in respect of the relative strength of the British and German Air Forces. In fact I do not know why, on this basis, the Prime Minister ever needed at all to stand in the most handsome way in a white sheet, because apparently this was not an oversight; it was not an accident; this was some deep design, a truly Machiavellian stroke of policy, which enabled us to pretend that a miscalculation had been made while all the time we were holding back in order to steal a march on other countries by the production of great numbers of machines of the latest type. I think that that is a most remarkable defence. I must say that, if it be true, I think Lord Londonderry has been rather hardly treated, and I trust that, now that the Government are able to avow clearly the methods they have been pursuing in the matter, some steps will be taken to re-establish the most cordial and happy relations between that former Air Minister and all his old colleagues who were combining with him in this innocent and, for us, so highly beneficial fraud.

Alas, I fear there is not much truth in this suggestion. If our aircraft factories had been set to work three years ago, albeit on the old type of machines that would not have prevented the substitution of the new type for the old at the same date which is now operative. On the contrary, the effect would have been exactly the reverse. If the factories had been thrown into activity, if apprentices had been engaged, if plant and staff had been extended and developed, they would have been all the more capable of taking the new types, and the transference would have been made with far greater facilities and the deliveries would have flowed out in far greater volume at an earlier date. I was a little sorry that my right hon. Friend should have suggested that the young pilots who are now joining the new Air Force would have had little cause to thank me if my advice on this matter had been accepted, as they would have been condemned to fly in inferior machines. I have, and have had

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for many years, a good many friends in the Air Force, and I am sure they do not think so badly of me as that. As a matter of fact, if you had a large stock of new machines, albeit of old pattern, you would find it a very great facility at this moment, and you would not have to draw away reserve machines from squadrons in order to assist in the business of training your rapidly expanding force. I really think my right hon. Friend lapsed into an argument there which was not quite worthy of him, and still less worthy of the gravity of the subject we are debating this afternoon.

But I have no quarrel with my right hon. Friend. Indeed, he has my sincere sympathy. It is not with his speech that I am going to deal so much as with the position in which he finds himself. He has an office so absurdly constructed that the very conditions of his commission reveal a confusion of mind and a lack of comprehension in those who have defined it. He has allowed himself to become the innocent victim of responsibiliies so strangely, so inharmoniously, so perversely grouped, endowed with powers so cribbed and restricted, that no one, not even Napoleon himself, would be able to discharge them with satisfaction. My right hon. Friend has three separate tasks. The first is the co-ordination of high strategic thought on all our affairs by land, sea and air; with which, apparently, is included also the enormous question of the food supply of this island in time of war. That is his first task. His second is to secure the punctual execution of the existing very large programme—another terrific task; and his third task is to plan and organise British industry and British labour so that if need be it could spring quickly into wartime conditions. Was there ever such an impossible jumble cast upon a single man, and a man, as has been pointed out in this Debate, who is without a staff under his control, without what I should call a composite brain? Other Ministers with great Departments have composite brains. Even any one leading a party must have a brain larger than his own, must have numbers of people through whom he can operate. Without a composite brain, without any necessary handling machinery, without power to give orders which will be obeyed, without the knowledge, indeed,

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in many cases, upon which those orders can be framed. We have all heard the saying,

They made a solitude and called it peace.

The Government have created a labyrinthine tangle of committees, with an able and unfortunate Minister flitting about between them, and they call it the Co-ordination of National Defence,

Once I went into a large signal-box on one of our great railways. Scores of trains of all kinds were passing to and fro and arriving from various branch lines. There was great press of traffic. But in the signal-box quite a few men, signalmen, were able to regulate the whole of this vast traffic. Why were they sufficient? They were sufficient because they had this long row of shining levers, all of which actuated signals; because, when they pulled the levers, the signals were worked and were obeyed; and because they were working according to a precisely drawn up time-table. That is how they were able to do their marvellous work. What would have happened if, instead of this row of shining levers and these men doing their task in this systematised method, there had only been a harassed stationmaster rushing about with red and green flags or lamps, endeavouring to arrange the traffic by hand? That would have been bad enough, but how much worse—and this is the real case in point—would the position not have been if, besides this unfortunate station-master, there had been three separate signal boxes labelled Navy, Army and Air, each with a certain number of levers which could be pulled, and a certain number of signals which, if the levers were pulled, would be obeyed, and if they were working separately, each with only a partial knowledge of the problem, in an endeavour to arrange the traffic on the line. I am bound to say that if that were the situation I personally should not be able to travel by that railway without a very considerable measure of misgiving.

That is why I ask that the function of co-ordinating high strategic thought between the Services, and of deciding the main priorities in all classes of munition production, should be separated from all functions connected with the problem of material supply and of the

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detailed preparation of factories in case we had to turn over from peace to war. I asked that many months ago, and I ask it now. I have not the slightest doubt that it is going to be done. The new appointment of an Admiral to the Army Council as Director-General of Munitions Supply, and the regrouping under him of certain important supply departments, is, of course, a tentative and in some ways necessary preliminary step to that end. I have no doubt whatever that, after further prolonged, costly, vexatious, purposeless and insensate delays, a Minister of Supply will be appointed, and that then there will be another equally injurious set of delays in clothing him with adequate powers.

Let us see to what classes of supplies this particular appointment of a Minister would be applied. It will, no doubt, be said that the Navy in the main have had their own establishment to a very large extent and that the Air arm are using all the existing facilities as well as they can, so it is only the Army. But that would be a very inadequate view to take. The War Office makes not only for the Army but a great number of essential articles for all three Services, and it is the Army which, under the present arrangement, would make not only for the Army but for the nation as well if we were called upon to face a great danger. The Prime Minister, in winding up an important Debate, I think on the last occasion he spoke in the House, said that if we were attacked by any Power or combination of Powers all would spring to arms. But what would happen if there were no arms when they sprang to them when they arrived ready to fight to the death, as he said only on Saturday. But then we had a supreme Navy and no Air. I saw with my own eyes how, when a million volunteers arrived, they had to drill for a year or a year and a half with wooden rifles. At any rate, then we had a supreme Navy and there was no Air to cause us serious embarrassment. But now what will be the case when the millions of volunteers come to spring to arms, and when all the time their women and children are being killed day by day by bombing in the air and hideous destruction is going on all round us and there is nothing to put in their hands because these preparations have not achieved their conclusion?

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The supplies that I have in mind are rifles and ammunition, cannon of all kinds, except the largest, shells, bombs, projectiles of all kinds, explosives, propellants, except for the Navy, machine guns, which affect the Air Force as well as the Army, trench mortars, medical stores, gas masks, tanks, mechanical transport of all kinds, and equipment of every description. This is an enormous sphere. How is it possible for the right hon. Gentleman to proceed with the complicated and responsible task that he has accepted? It is always possible for a Minister to tell a good tale, but one has to consider the proportion of the statements that we have made to us to the general events and facts of the world around us. Last autumn I made a statement about Germany spending at the rate of the equivalent of £800,000,000 directly and indirectly upon warlike purposes, including strategic roads. I have often repeated the statement, and it has often been challenged. I gave a very full account of the methods of calculation that I had employed. Now the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Question Time has given an answer which not only in no way contradicts what I said but, with the full knowledge of the Government, as far as it is proper for them to form conclusions about the expenditure of foreign Powers, anyone who reads the answer carefully will see that it is a complete acceptance of what I said:

The Government have no official figures but, from such information as they have, I see no reason to think that the figure mentioned in my right hon. Friend's question is necessarily excessive as applied to the half year, although he himself will agree that there are elements of conjecture.

I think, therefore, the Committee may take it that that is correct and that £800,000,000 was the equivalent of German expenditure in 1935 and, as that rate is continuing, perhaps it may be £900,000,000 in the current year. I have been challenged about the rate of exchange. I have taken the official rate of 12½ Reichmarks to the pound. I have taken the greatest pains to inquire whether that is a fair rate—whether £800,000,000 of British expenditure would actually represent the same productive result as would be achieved by the number of milliards of Reichmarks which we know have been spent. I am informed that 12½ Reichmarks buys the same amount of average munitions labour in

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Germany as £1 does in Great Britain. As a matter of fact we calculated, at 1s. 4d. an hour, that £1 would buy 15 hours' labour in this country and 12½ Reichmarks would buy 15 hours' labour in Germany. It is true that the German figure bears some charges which find no place in our Estimates, especially those for training youths in the camps on a great scale but, on the other hand, our Estimates are cumbered with pensions and non-effective charges and with the very much higher pay that we offer to all ranks of our three Services than are included in the Estimates of foreign countries.

Then, it is said, ought you to include the roads? I have not seen them, but I am told that these great concrete causeways, stretching for hundreds of miles to all strategic points and enabling troops and wagons and mechanical transport to move along them—five roads abreast—constitute a feature which will very likely play a larger strategic part in another war, should one occur, than fortresses or fortified lines. I think it perfectly right to include these roads. They are certainly not commercial in their purpose. The Government owns all the railways in Germany and they already impose a deficit on the German Budget. It is hardly likely that they would go on constructing these enormous causeways for commercial purposes. Therefore, I declare that these figures that I have given are correct, and I also say that they were easily accessible for nearly a year past. £800,000,000 or £900,000,000 a year! It is a prodigy. Nothing like it has ever been dreamed of before and nothing like it, as far as I am aware, is approached now. I am obliged to my right hon. Friend for answering my criticism but I do not think it should have been left to a private Member to bring to the notice of Parliament a fact of such gravity and pregnant significance. It would have been far better if the country had been advised of the scale on which armament was proceeding on the Continent a year ago. If there is difficulty, if the Opposition do not take the course one would wish, and which so many of them in their hearts would like to take, of whole-heartedly supporting our defence, it is largely because the case has not been made in its integrity. When the position dawns upon the people of the country, when they realise where they

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stand and what are the circumstances around them, I am confident that the only danger the Government will run is not of being accused of asking for too much but of being found woefully behindhand in asking for what they really require.

Now there are the figures by which we can judge the scale of our own efforts. In January there was some talk of spending £300,000,000, apart from normal upkeep. Of course, it was absurd to suggest that any such sum could be spent this year. The Government were quite right not to tie themselves to spending any particular figure. I remember that I warned the House that I doubted if they could spend more than £50,000,000 additional to the regular Estimates. Now Supplementary Estimates have been presented of £30,000,000, but that does not do justice to the Government's effort. There is a good deal of abnormal expenditure in the ordinary Services this year and, to state the case fairly, one ought to look back to 1934, when £113,000,000 was the total of Army, Navy and Air Force expenditure. That has now risen to £158,000,000 in 1936 or, with the £30,000,000 Supplementary Estimates, £188,000,000 odd. It is fairer to compare with 1934 and, therefore, I take it that there is an increase of £75,000,000 towards making up deficiencies and towards expansion, above the 1934 expenditure.

But when the Opposition complain of the size of these Estimates we must ask them to compare them with the German expenditure. I make full allowance for the fact that we do not need to keep a great Continental Army in this country. That makes the comparison between the two countries not at all exact. Nevertheless, it is of value to compare them from the point of view of seeing the scale on which events are proceeding. If you want to compare them, you should first deduct from the £800,000,000 at least £300,000,000 for the upkeep in 1936 of the German Forces. That leaves £500,000,000 for extraordinary expenditure and expansion—for something very serious which may happen quite soon. This £500,000,000 compares with our £75,000,000. That gives us the scale.

My anxieties are not at all diminished by anything I have heard to-day. On the contrary, I feel that they are deepened and aggravated. Everyone is going away on holiday and, when we

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come back, we shall all be looking forward to the Coronation, but do not forget that all the time those remorseless hammers of which General Goering spoke are descending night and day in Germany and that the most warlike and, in many ways, the most efficient people in Europe are becoming welded into a tremendous fighting machine equipped with the most fearful agencies of modern science. That is a spectacle which I cannot say is one that has never before existed, because it would be meaningless; it would fall utterly short of the facts. All I can say is that it is a machine upon which £800,000,000 or £900,000,000 are being spent for the second year in succession. We are going away on our holidays. Jaded Ministers, anxious but impotent Members of Parliament, a public whose opinion is more bewildered and more expressionless than anything I can recall in my life—all will seek the illusion of rest and peace. We are told, "Trust the National Government. Have confidence in the Prime Minister, with the Lord President of the Council at his side. Do not worry. Do not get alarmed. A great deal is being done. No one could do more." All the influence of the Conservative Party machine is being used through a thousand channels to spread this soporific upon Parliament and the nation. But I am bound to ask, has not confidence been shaken by various things that have happened, and are still happening?

I have already referred to the melancholy story of the miscalculations about German air power. Let me come to one or two more recent instances. When we met in January we asked for more destroyers, and the demand was voiced from all quarters of the House—more destroyers. We were assured that there was no need for more destroyers. All the highest authorities were convinced that more destroyers would be a superfluity. The number had been provided, and the highest expert opinions were available to justify that position. Now after six months in which new naval facts have come to light we are to have more destroyers. The escalator Clause has been used and a new flotilla is asked for in these Estimates, and I believe that further destroyer construction is in contemplation. Of course, it is very satisfactory to the House of Commons, and

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it ought to give us confidence in our own opinion on these matters. It ought to give the House more confidence in its own opinion in some respects than in the opinion of these very high authorities, which in January will say one thing, and in July will present an equally cast-iron, hide-bound conclusion, backed by the same solid consensus of expert authority.

Take another instance—the question of food supply. When the House became very anxious a few months ago about our existing granaries being only about half full, and some hon. Members had the audacity to suggest that perhaps it might be just as well to fill them right up and keep them almost filled instead of half empty, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence came forward with a plan. It was the kind of plan which is always popular, always acceptable and always most effective in allaying agitation and staving off Parliamentary questions. His plan was to have an inquiry. There would be an inquiry over which he himself would preside. Of course, once that has been announced, obviously all other questions whenever they are raised can be answered most effectively by saying "Hush, the inquiry is still proceeding, the case is sub judice. We must not interrupt these most searching toils and studies which are being undertaken. We must wait with patience until the whole matter can be presented." That inquiry is still proceeding.

But what happened the week before last? At the beginning of the week Lord Hailsham in another place unfolded an argument obviously based on the fullest official information, the effect of which was to deprecate even the filling up of our existing granaries at the ports on the ground that they might become targets—this indicates very high skill—of an air attack. He also at the same time deprecated building small granaries in different parts of the country on the ground of the expense and inconvenience that might arise, and on Monday of that week he assured us that we had three months' supply of the essential foodstuffs in the country. So much for the view of one of the highest officials in the Government. But at the end of the same week, on Saturday, the First Lord of the Admiralty made a speech at Southampton in which he declared that if our sea-borne supplies were interrupted, we

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should all be dead of starvation in six weeks. Here you have two Ministers, both in the most powerful situations, absolutely at variance upon the actual facts. You have your granaries still only partly filled, and you have my right hon. Friend the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence still inquiring into the general question. I beg his pardon. I took down the actual words. I must not say that the question is being inquired into, but is "being examined with a view to action." The first task of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence is to co-ordinate the contradictory utterances of his high colleagues, both of whom have already prejudged the result of his inquiry in opposite directions.

I will give one final instance which leads me to think that great diligence is required from Parliament. Tucked away in the Supplementary Estimates for the Army on page 8—perhaps that is an invidious thing to say—at any rate, let me say that on page 8 of the Supplementary Estimates of the Army occurs this sentence:

The provision made under the first of these heads (Deficiencies programme) includes a sum of £1,000,000 under Vote 9 DD in respect of machine tools for the manufacture of warlike stores elsewhere than at the Royal Ordnance Factories.

That is a very telltale and disquieting item—£1,000,000 for machine tools. Every manufacturer knows what that means, and every General Staff in Europe knows what it means. We all know how many months it takes to make machine tools in large quantities, and how long it takes after they are made before mass production of munitions can begin. My right hon. Friend told us that there are some 50 firms with which he has made, no doubt, the best arrangement which can be made, but surely we are entitled to ask; Why was this essential preliminary to rearmament not put in hand before? Why is it only now, in these Supplementary Estimates being presented to us in the Summer of 1936, that this preliminary provision has been made? The Prime Minister, speaking near Cardiff on Saturday, uttered the following words:

For years we neglected our defences in the hope of general disarmament. We did our best to bring disarmament about. Our hopes were disappointed.

I think we live in strange times when the head of the Government, who through

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all this period has been the most powerful politician in the country and who, all the time, has been in control of enormous majorities in both Houses, ready to vote any demand for defence which the Government might put forward, should be able to declare so suavely that we neglected our defences in the vain hope that others would do the same. But they did not do the same. They did exactly the opposite. Now we have the leeway of these fatal years to make up. But what I do not understand, even from the point of view of the right hon. Gentleman, is why when, in the well-meaning and good and sincere hopes of disarmament, we were neglecting our defences, he did not at the same time, as a measure of moderate prudence, make this comparatively small expenditure upon machine tools, which, at any rate, if the hopes of disarmament were frustrated, would have enabled him very rapidly to make up for lost time? In those days the Home Secretary used to boast that the country was being carried "to the edge of risk"—that was the expression—in disarmament, and surely it was not too much to ask, when we were running this frightful risk for whatever worthy and noble purpose, that at least some provision for a speedy recovery should have been made, if our hopes were blighted, as obviously ever since 1934 they were going to be blighted. Surely during the critical years when Germany was rearming and we were still neglecting our defences, someone should have prompted His Majesty's Government at all costs to put themselves into a position to repair the neglect as fast as possible.

I do not blame this upon the Prime Minister. It is not the business of the Prime Minister to think of things like that, but in the State, somewhere in your organism of State, there ought to be machinery, some power, some force to bring this matter to the notice of responsible authority. That is the point. Surely in 1934, when the warnings were so plain and so plainly given in this House, one should have said, "If we are running this risk and going so far, at least get these other matters attended to behind the scenes." It would have been perfectly worthy and legitimate expenditure and would not have astonished anyone. You could have gone ahead. What was the reason why the order for machine tools was not put in hand after the

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General Election? Was there no one in the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, no one in the Committee of Imperial Defence, no one on these innumerable committees whose frequent meetings we hear so much about, capable of pointing out to high authority this supine inadvertence? What confidence can we have in the efficiency? Is it not going too far to ask us to have blind confidence in the vigilance and foresight of our defence machinery when there was no one to come forward and say the word and ask for this comparatively small expenditure?