Defence (Government Policy)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

15 February 1951 · House of Commons debate on defence · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, as Leader of the Opposition, addressed the House of Commons in London on February 15, 1951, in a defence debate, attacking the Labour Government's record on National Service, the Army, Korea and atomic weapons.
Main themes
Criticism of Labour defence policy, wasted wartime stores, National Service terms, Defence Estimates and manpower control, slow Korea force deployment, failure to produce British atomic bombs, Anglo-American atomic cooperation, American atomic base in East Anglia, Soviet nuclear threat, Churchill-Roosevelt wartime agreement
Duration
~7 min
26th percentile
Words
897
26th percentile
Sentences
38
24th percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
10.9
31st percentile
Syntax
3.33
84th percentile
Vocabulary
1.93
4th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 49%45%
  • Institutional 37%34%
  • Economic 9%8%
  • Ceremonial 6%5%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

38 sentences in 13 paragraphs

They would have been a great deal better equipped if a wiser process had been followed. The squandering and destruction of what might have been carefully put away in care and maintenance, and thus preserved for use should other trouble come, was a lack of foresight. I never said anything about the Lord President of the Council, although I have no doubt that he had as much to do with it as anybody else, and much more than his right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence on his right flank. I shall not be hurried at all; I shall take my time in dealing with every interruption, because I feel I have a perfectly legitimate right to unfold this case in my own way.

In the United States, in spite of many temptations, less improvidence was shown, especially in respect to warships. I may remind the House again that the figure for the Services which I mentioned of 1,550,000 is double that to which the Forces were later reduced. And even now, according to the Defence Minister's speech of yesterday, it will not be until 1952 that an overall figure of 900,000 can be reached. I say this because this has been made an accusation against me. I think it was the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who made that attack the other day. I sent him some

629

figures correcting it, which he had not the courtesy to acknowledge. I agree that the mistakes made at the beginning put us on the wrong line, but no British Government in time of peace has ever had the powers that Socialist Ministers have wielded, or the resources they have consumed.

In 1946, they took the step, with our full support, of introducing National Service in peace-time. First, 18 months was the term, then 12 months, and then 18 months again according to the changing winds. Now it is two years. Before the late General Election, I said to the House that the principle which might help us in economising our money and our manpower, and in getting better value from the sacrifices demanded, would be to take fewer men and to hold them longer. We all know how that was used at the election. Nevertheless, we have supported the Government in their further steps. Undoubtedly, the two years' service was far more suited to our dangers and to our special problems than anything else they proposed before. If it had been introduced in 1947 or 1948, when the skies began to darken—and we should certainly have supported the Government—how much better off we should be in effective military formations today?

One has the feeling that if the position had been studied by the Minister of Defence and other Ministers responsible —and they have changed often, not always for the better—very good solutions might have been reached. But the Government deal in words, in declarations, in projects and in schemes which seem to indicate impressive action. Alas, it is mainly on paper—committee to committee, declaration to declaration, one edition after another of their proposals for National Defence.

But with the control they have demanded over our manpower, and with the vast sums of money voted so constantly by the House, it ought to have been possible to produce a substantial and efficient Army. I do not say an adequate army, but a substantial and efficient army. But what has happened? With Defence Estimates of nearly £1,000 million a year for five or six years, and with their unprecedented control of manpower, they have produced so few effective tactical units that when the Korean trouble broke out and it was necessary

630

for us to send a token force—I have never advocated sending more than a token force—to Korea under the authority of the United Nations, it took over three months to produce even a brigade group of good quality. But talk and waste and muddle have robbed the nation of the results of resources which, whether adequate or not, Parliament at their request conferred upon the Government on a very large scale.

Another subject of grave complaint is the inability of the Government to produce any atomic bombs of our own in the five and a half years which have passed since the war. When we remember how far we were ahead, and how we were able to deal on equal terms with the United States, it is indeed depressing to feel that we have been outstripped by the Soviets in this field. I take the opportunity of repeating now my request that the document I signed with President Roosevelt in the war should be made public at an early date.

We must not forget that by creating the American atomic base in East Anglia we have made ourselves the target, and perhaps the bull's eye of a Soviet attack. On 28th March, last year, I said in Parliament:

If, for instance, the United States had a stock-pile' of 1,000 atomic bombs—I take the figure as an illustration merely; I have no knowledge of any sort of kind of what they have—and Russia had 50, and we got those 50, fearful experiences, far beyond anything we have ever endured, would be our lot."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th March, 1950; Vol. 473, c. 201.]

I say the total failure of the Government to hold its own and to keep up development—