- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on February 15, 1951, in a debate on defence policy, attacking the Government's small mobilisation as a sham and disputing the claim that the danger of war had grown.
- Main themes
- Criticism of the Labour Government's defence policy, short period of national service training, danger of shams and pretences in rearmament, Soviet Kremlin leadership and its designs, American rearmament and General Eisenhower's appointment, European front as deterrent to Soviet aggression, American atomic superiority versus Russian stockpile, defence expenditure of £4,700 million over three years, Minister of Defence's claim of increased danger of war, request for facts in secret Session, Government delay in telling the country the truth, prevention of a third world war
- Duration
- ~8 min
- Words
- 988
- Sentences
- 29
- Readability
- 46
- Grade
- 15.5
- Syntax
- 3.45
- Vocabulary
- 2.00
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other29 sentences in 12 paragraphs
I certainly do not feel called upon to propose an alternative time so that hon. Members opposite may go round from door to door trying to make political capital out of it, but if the Government had proposed a longer period of training we would certainly have supported them, and if we were responsible we would face our obligations, as is our duty.
In the situation in which we now are there is a danger in dealing in shams and pretences, not only because they mislead us here at home but because they will be used as justification for additional real measures taken in cool calculation and in design by our potential opponents on the Continent. The Government produce this small mobilisation, but they do not know what other measures will be balanced against it: measures which will be real measures and not measures that have to be subjected to the tests of public opinion or free elections; measures taken with all that design and purpose with which we feel ourselves confronted, and the more we are confronted with which, the more we are deeply impressed with the formidable character of the dangers which lie before us.
I have had the opportunity several times of seeing in conditions of grave business some of these commissars who form the oligarchy in the Kremlin and their chiefs, and I can tell you that these men are apt to form designs and to carry them out, and that when confronted with farces and shams they very often retaliate by strong and real measures. We are playing with fire when we pretend that we are taking very large steps, and we may only bring the very evils which we all hate nearer by this pretence. This is, in fact, another instance of getting the worst of both worlds. How can we approve—and "approve" is the word we stick at—and thus accept a certain amount of responsibility for a measure of this kind, which seems designed to thread its way through political difficulties rather than add appreciably to our security?
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The Minister of Defence said yesterday that the danger of war had become more acute in the last few months. I follow these matters as closely as I can, and I am not aware of any facts which justify this assertion. On the contrary, I think that the gigantic measures for re-armament adopted by the United States—the declaration of a state of emergency, 10,000 million dollars additional taxation, 27 months' military service and the appointment of General Eisenhower—have all improved the chances of the rearmament of the free democracies, and the formation of a European front which will be a real deterrent upon Soviet Communist aggression in Europe; they have all improved the chances of this being achieved before the vast American superiority in the atomic weapon has been overtaken by the Russian stockpile.
If any important facts have occurred justifying the statement made by the Minister of Defence about the increased danger of war they should be imparted to the House, if necessary in secret Session. To make a statement of that kind is to give, I think, a wrong view, apart from causing alarm.
I return, in conclusion, I am glad to say—as no doubt hon. Members opposite are also glad, or they ought to feel glad that I am nearly at the end of my remarks—to the direct issue that is before us. The figure of expenditure, about which we shall presently hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has been raised to £4,700 million over three years without, as I have said, any new changes or reasons of a fundamental character being adduced.
Last year, in March, July and September, I stated the full story, so far as it was possible in public, and I do not know of any decisive facts which have occurred to alter it. The fundamental issues were not created by the United Nations intervention in Korea. They have only been brought more violently and more vividly before the masses here and in every country by these exciting and varied events which fill the newspapers from day to day.
Still less have the basic facts of the European peril been altered in the interval, after the third or fourth versions, if we take in the March White Paper. If the proposals now submitted to us are right, they would have been more right,
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in the sense of being more timely—and here is where time is vital—six or eight months ago, or, better still, much earlier. The Government have been in full control; they have had all the national resources at their disposal for nearly six years; their responsibilities for telling the truth to the country and giving the necessary leadership and guidance are grave, and it is by their whole conduct of our military and foreign affairs that they must be judged. Although most people feel that things are getting worse, it is not true that the basic situation has changed. All that has happened is that the Government have felt themselves forced into making a further interim scheme. They are not dealing with the realities of the situation now any more than on former occasions.
We are witnessing a process of gradual education of those who ought to know best and have all the power, but who have to reach agreement by an endless series of compromises among themselves and with their military advisers. All we are dealing with here today is a new state of mind in those who have so long held our fortunes in their hands. It is hard to imagine a situation which gives fewer chances for the British nation to make the best of its resources and authority, and thus play the great part which might be open to us of preventing the drift into a third world war with all its indescribable, immeasurable, unimaginable horrors and perils.
