- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 21, 1951, opposing a motion on a complaint of privilege and arguing that Mr. Speaker's ruling of no prima facie case was correct.
- Main themes
- Complaint of privilege, Speaker's ruling on prima facie case, scope of Parliamentary Privilege, distinction from common law privilege, Member's correspondence with constituents, Rex v. Rule (1937), law of libel and blackmail, electors' rights under ordinary law, Member for Nelson and Colne's motion, Member for Sevenoaks's correspondent
- Duration
- ~6 min
- Words
- 743
- Sentences
- 36
- Readability
- 63
- Grade
- 8.8
- Syntax
- 2.88
- Vocabulary
- 2.14
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other36 sentences in 8 paragraphs
He said that there was not a prima facie case. I cannot be interrupted. The House has a perfect right to reverse Mr. Speaker's Ruling, but the step is a serious one, and I do not remember it happening in my time—an immense period, far longer even than that of the Father of the House. It is quite open to a Member to put down a Motion on the Order Paper such as we have tonight, but I contend that it could not be carried without implying stultification of Mr. Speaker's Ruling. I do not mean it is any censure on Mr. Speaker, but it implies a different view taken by the House from the view taken by Mr. Speaker in the very brief time accorded to him when a Motion of this kind is made. My submission to the House is that Mr. Speaker's Ruling was right. There was no prima facie case then, there is not now a prima facie case; still less is there a case, not prima facie but, as it were, to a certain extent, pre-judged by the decision of the House.
Let us look into this question of Privilege. Privilege means Parliamentary Privilege. It is a privilege which protects Parliament, its Members, its officers, its witnesses, counsel, people who appear before it or its Committees, and also petitioners. It is a Parliamentary Privilege protecting this House and those who take part in it. It does not protect or refer to the electors or the general public. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne may shake his head. He had better be careful not to shake it too much. That is a fact. Privilege is not instituted to protect the universal suffrage electorate. They can protect themselves if they get a chance. It is to protect the House and Members of Parliament.
The electorate and the general public have their rights under the ordinary law, and they have their votes—quite an important thing. The Motion by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne is based upon the assumption that the House should use its Privilege to protect a corre-
2504
spondent, who wrote to my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Mr. John Rodgers), from some real or supposed injury. I say that Privilege was never instituted- or intended for such a purpose. It is to protect us and those who have to deal with us, and not to protect the vast mass of the nation outside.
The correspondence of a Member with his constituents or other persons is regulated by the existing law of libel, blackmail and that sort of thing. That is the law. The correspondence of a Member is also governed by good taste, good faith, and respect for private and confidential matters. If these aspects come before the public or the electors in any constituency it is for them to judge, and unless the conduct of some Member of the House, in the course of his Parliamentary duties, or the conduct of the Chair, or other matters directly connected with Parliamentary proceedings, are involved, no question of Privilege arises. It is no good not liking it, because I am quite certain that it is a solid, established fact, upon which this matter rests and stands.
It is true that the Court of Criminal Appeal, in the case of Rex v. Rule, in 1937, held that a Member of Parliament—I use this case because it is a good illustration of how the matter stands— to whom a written communication was addressed by one of his constituents, asking for his assistance in bringing to the notice of the appropriate Minister a complaint of improper conduct on the part of some public official acting in that constituency in relation to his office, had sufficient interest in the subject matter of the complaint to render the occasion of such a publication a privileged occasion. But, here, the word "Privilege" refers to privilege under the common law. It has nothing whatever to do with Parliamentary Privilege, which is the only thing with which we are concerned on this Motion. How could the Court of Criminal Appeal pronounce on a question of Parliamentary Privilege?
There is, therefore, I submit, no case, prima facie or otherwise, on this issue that is before us. It is ordinary privilege and does not come under Parliamentary Privilege at all. Nor is any ruling by any court relevant in the slightest degree to our affairs.
