Eire (Confirmation Of Agree Ments) Bill.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

5 May 1938 · House of Commons debate on the Eire (Confirmation of Agreements) Bill · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on May 5, 1938, during debate on the Eire (Confirmation of Agreements) Bill, opposing the unconditional handover of the Treaty ports and the financial concessions to de Valera's government.
Main themes
Handover of the Treaty ports Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough Swilly, Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1938, land annuities and financial settlement, Irish neutrality in wartime, defence of the western approaches, respect for treaties, Mr. de Valera's claims and partition, Admiralty advice and the Chiefs of Staff, Irish Free State Treaty of 1921-22, Cosgrave and the Irish Treaty signatories, use of the name Eire
Duration
~22 min
71st percentile
Words
2,675
71st percentile
Sentences
105
65th percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
11.2
34th percentile
Syntax
3.15
66th percentile
Vocabulary
2.16
40th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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Other
  • Geopolitical 65%64%
  • Ceremonial 18%18%
  • Economic 9%9%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

105 sentences in 27 paragraphs

His Majesty's Government, supported by the Conservative party and the Opposition party have now accepted Mr. de Valera's claim practically without challenge, except for the fact that they are not prepared to put pressure upon Ulster to make her leave the United Kingdom. No doubt they would defend Ulster with all their strength if she were violently attacked. All the rest of the contentions of Mr. de Valera are by this Agreement, it seems to me—I hope I may be corrected on the legal view—tacitly or directly accepted. I think that is a fair statement of the position.

I have for a great many years walked in step and in agreement with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the Irish question. I remember when I was conducting the Irish Free State Bill through this House the resolute support which he gave to that Government as a Private Member, speaking from below the Gangway, at the most painful and the most difficult part of that process, immediately after Sir Henry Wilson had been murdered close by this House, in Eaton Square. In 1925 we were both Members of the same Government, when Mr. Justice Feetham's Boundary Commission gave an award which deeply disappointed the Irish Ministers. On that occasion I made, as the hon. Member for County Down (Sir D. Reid) has mentioned, a substantial modification of the financial provisions, but I was not aware that it amounted to such a high figure as that he quoted, in order to make the position easier for the men with whom we had signed the Treaty, and who were so faithfully endeavouring to give effect to the Treaty.

Respect for treaties is a very important factor, and it cannot be treated as if it were a matter of no consequence. I remember very well that the Irish Government of those days described the arrangement which resulted from that concession not only as just but generous. When Mr. de Valera came to power against these men, in 1931, the National Government, of which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was the mainspring—he did much the hardest part of the work —he did not hesitate, when Mr. de Valera

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repudiated the financial provisions, to impose retaliatory duties, which were so well conceived from this particular point of view that they had the effect of recovering for us practically the whole of what was our due, forcing Mr. de Valera to pay a large proportion of his obligations to this country by the roundabout but costly method of bounties upon exports. I was in agreement with my right hon. Friend on that matter.

The British Government, in the fairest manner, offered to submit the whole question of land purchase annuities and the general financial question to arbitration. Mr. de Valera was willing to agree to arbitration, but he insisted that there should be a foreigner upon the tribunal. But the British Government, to all intents and purposes the same Government as to-day, would not agree to anyone being on the tribunal who was not a subject of the King Emperor. I thought, and I still think, that the position taken up by my right hon. Friend and the Government was right, and it was steadfastly approved by this House. Now, all the difficulty about the tribunal has been removed, and removed by the simple process of complete surrender on our part of the whole case. We have given away our whole case in regard to the financial position, which was just and sound, and on which we relied; and we have given away our whole position on land annuities without arbitration of any kind, on account of a payment of £100,000,000, a derisory payment if it is to be regarded as a settlement of the sum in question. Practically, we have given away £,000,000, to which we had a valid claim. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer reminded us in his Budget speech, that action has imposed upon this country in this year of hard, onerous taxation, with great needs and burdens, over £4,000,000, which we shall have to meet this year and in the future.

What were these land annuities? They were not a tribute wrung by England from Ireland. They were the purchase price by which a peasant proprietor—a luxury which we have never been able to achieve in England—was established on Irish soil. Moreover, a large part of this £4,000,000 or £5,000, 000 which we received on this account went back to Ireland, and will go back for many years to come, in the shape of pensions which are paid by the British Exchequer, and are

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spent in Ireland. Therefore, I must say that I am puzzled, and I regret that the Government have abandoned our rights wholesale in this matter, and have departed entirely, without warning to Parliament, from the position which they had deliberately taken up with full assent both before the General Election and afterwards.

I confess that I was wholly unprepared to read in the newspapers that we have abandoned all our contentions about the repudiation of the Treaty, about the annuities, and, above all—and this is the subject which makes me feel compelled to speak—our contentions about the strategic ports. It is this issue of the strategic ports which makes me undertake the thankless task of bringing some of these matters very respectfully to the attention of the House. The ports in question, Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough Swilly, are to be handed over unconditionally, with no guarantees of any kind, as a gesture of our trust and good will, as the Prime Minister said, to the Government of the Irish Republic. When the Irish Treaty was being shaped in 1922 I was instructed by the Cabinet to prepare that part of the Agreement which dealt with strategic reservations. I negotiated' with Mr. Michael Collins, and I was advised by Admiral Beatty, who had behind him the whole staff of the Admiralty, which had just come out of the successful conduct of the Great War. Therefore, we had high authority in prescribing the indispensable minimum of reservations for strategic security.

The Admiralty of those days assured me that without the use of these ports it would be very difficult, perhaps almost impossible, to feed this Island in time of war. Queenstown and Berehaven shelter the flotillas which keep clear the approaches to the Bristol and English Channels, and Lough Swilly is the base from which the access to the Mersey and the Clyde is covered. In a war against an enemy possessing a numerous and powerful fleet of submarines these are the essential bases from which the whole operation of hunting submarines and protecting incoming convoys is conducted. I am very sorry to have to strike a jarring note this afternoon, but all opinions should be heard and put on record. If we are denied the use of Lough Swilly and have to work from Lamlash, we

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should strike 200 miles from the effective radius of our flotillas, out and home; and if we are denied Berehaven and Queenstown, and have to work from Pembroke Dock, we should strike 400 miles from their effective radius out and home. These ports are, in fact, the sentinel towers of the western approaches, by which the 45,000,000 people in this Island so enormously depend on foreign food for their daily bread, and by which they can carry on their trade, which is equally important to their existence.

In 1922 the Irish delegates made no difficulty about this. They saw that it was vital to our safety that we should be able to use these ports and, therefore, the matter passed into the structure of the Treaty without any serious controversy‥Now we are to give them up, unconditionally, to an Irish Government led by men—I do not want to use hard words—whose rise to power has been proportionate to the animosity with which they have acted against this country, no doubt in pursuance of their own patriotic impulses, and whose present position in power is based upon the violation of solemn Treaty engagements. I read in the "Times" that:.

The Agreement on defence…releases the Government of the United Kingdom from the articles of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 by which they assumed the onerous and delicate task of defending the fortified harbours of Cork, Berehaven and Lough Swilly in the event of war.

That is the way it is put—we are released from these burdens. I dare say you could make arrangements with many countries to release us from a great many burdens of a similar kind. I am not going to trespass on controversial grounds by reciting some of the countries who would be willing to release you from some of your difficult and delicate obligations of defending ports of the British Empire in time of war. We are to sacrifice £4,000,000 revenue because this tiresome business of defence is taken out of our hands; we are released from the necessity of defending these ports. It is quite true that the Prime Minister has read out the clauses which are to be repealed in the Irish Free State Act. It is quite true that we spoke in those clauses of the coastal defence of Ireland. That was polite. It was felt by both sides that it was better to put it that way. But

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these are not ports which are part of the coastal defences of Ireland; they are the life defences of the crowded population of England. Incidentally, the possession of these ports by a superior British Navy enables us to give protection to Ireland against invasion from overseas, protection to their shipping and trade, and general protection except from the air. But the primary purpose of holding these ports is the defence of Britain.

In all my experience nothing has surprised more than that I should have to stand here to-day and plead this argument against a National Government and the Conservative party. Well was it said that "the vicissitudes of politics are inexhaustible." We have been told that this was settled after consultation with the Chiefs of Staff. If it is true that they have recommended this course as being free from danger, that they have raised no serious objection, then I must say that they are advising contrary to the whole weight of the expert opinion placed before the Government which made the Irish Free State Treaty. We do not know, of course, how the questions were put to these experts, and it is evident that in these matters politics and Defence are inextricably mingled together. Of course, if we accept the basis that we are to have a friendly Ireland and that the ports will be in trustworthy and competent hands, then the argument falls to the ground, but to say that is to beg the whole question in dispute. What grounds have we of experience for assuming that all will be well in the future? We are conceding rights, and we have no guarantees at all except the hope and assertion that they will be replaced by good-will. Obviously, if these ports, or any part of Ireland, fell into the hands of an enemy Power, or if Southern Ireland became herself an enemy Power, then the matter would pass into the region of force, and if we possessed superior forces we should be able to rectify the situation.

I am not going to argue, although it should not be excluded, that these ports will fall into the hands of an enemy Power. There is a great deal of substance in Mr. de Valera's declaration that the Irish would resent the landing of any foreign Power upon their shores, and that their main desire would be to rid their country from such an intrusion. But it seems to me that the danger which has to be considered, and which ought not

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to be excluded, is that Ireland might be neutral. I have not been able to form a clear opinion of the exact juridical position of the Government of that portion of Ireland called Southern Ireland, which is now called Eire. That is a word which really has no application at the present time, and I must say, even from the point of view of the ordinary uses of English, that it is not customary to quote a term in a foreign language, a capital town, a geographical place, when there exists a perfectly well-known English equivalent. It is usual to say "Paris" —not "Paree."

But what guarantee have you that Southern Ireland, or the Irish Republic as they claim to be—and you do not contradict them—will not declare neutrality if we are engaged in war with some powerful nation? The first step certainly which such an enemy might take would be to offer complete immunity of every kind to Southern Ireland if she would remain neutral. What answer will Mr. de Valera or his successors—the world does not end with the life of any man—what answer will Mr. de Valera give? He may say, of course, "I will stand by your side." That is what we all hope. But he may also say, "I will be neutral." There is a third course, and this is one to which I want to draw the attention of the House. He might say, "Restore the integrity of our country, give me the whole of Ireland, and then I will throw in my lot with you, and make common cause with you." That is a serious contingency ahead in the future. We can see it, because there it is, and it may be that is what he meant when he said that this Agreement would ultimately further the ending of Partition.

The Ministers of the Crown have established pleasant relations with Mr. de Valera. I understand that his view—a characteristically Irish view—stripped of its substratum of truth, is that the only way to unite the two islands is to dissolve every possible connection between them. Ministers have certainly formed the impression, and, after all, they have had the advantage of close contact with him, that if they trust him he will see them through. But he has made no promise of this kind; he has given no guarantees, and every act of his life points in the contrary direction. Under this Agreement, it seems to me more than

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probable—at any rate it is a contingency which we cannot exclude—that Mr. de Valera's Government will at some supreme moment of emergency demand the surrender of Ulster as an alternative to declaring neutrality. He has made no promises, and even if he had I do not think we should have conceded our rights without some protection.

You may say that he is a man of his word. You could certainly say that of Mr. Michael Collins, who died for it. You could say it of Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, who died for his word, and of Mr. Arthur Griffiths. I do not know whether he died in consequence of the Treaty, but he died because of his exertions to carry out what he had promised. And then there is Mr. Cosgrave and his colleagues. They have lost all their power in their own country in an effort to make good their undertakings to Great Britain, and they are now utterly stultified by the fact that we have abandoned every point which they regarded as in honour bound to maintain unless we released them from them. That was the time, if you were going to make these concessions. If they were possible and agreeable to our safety, then we had the men who had actually signed the Treaty, and who were out vehemently to sustain the Treaty. This would have made their part easy. As it is, it has only set a premium on all those who come forward in Ireland to break engagements with the British Government and to overturn the men who are faithfully adhering to solemnly-contracted pledges.