- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on May 25, 1938, in the air defences debate following Lord Swinton's removal as Air Minister, urging the creation of a ministry of supply and a declared emergency.
- Main themes
- Resignation of Lord Swinton as Air Minister, call for a ministry of supply, delays in air rearmament programme, overlapping supply committees under the Committee of Imperial Defence, anti-aircraft gun shortages compared with Germany, equipment deficiencies in the Army and Territorial Army, conversion of factories to war production, negotiations with skilled labour unions, case for proclaiming a state of emergency, aircraft industry output compared with Germany
- Duration
- ~38 min
- Words
- 4,531
- Sentences
- 217
- Readability
- 55
- Grade
- 10.8
- Syntax
- 3.02
- Vocabulary
- 2.13
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other217 sentences in 46 paragraphs
I think that makes it worse. It is one of those statements which, apart from the purport, you can just claim to be literally true, but when it is presented to Parliament it has just the effect complained of in the statement of the Secretary of State for War yesterday, of having a thoroughly soothing, reassuring effect on the general public, while, at the same time, it in no way represents the actuality of the position. Everybody listening to that would have thought that the trouble was over, and that the great flow of new machines was coming forward 22 months ago. Yet it is not until 31st March, 1939, that we are to have even 1,750 first-line aeroplanes. I have dealt with the interruption made by my right hon. Friend.
I hope the new Air Minister will imitate the example of Lord Baldwin, and when he makes a mistake plump it out in the most appalling manner, so that, at any rate, whatever we may complain about, we cannot complain that we have been misled. I have often warned the House that the air programmes were falling into arrear. But I have never attacked Lord Swinton. I have never thought that he was the one to blame—certainly not the only one to blame. It is very usual for the critics of the Government—I have been a consistent critic in this matter—to
1284
discover hitherto unnoticed virtues in any Minister who is forced to resign. But perhaps I may quote—because it is directly relevant—what I said three months ago:
It would be unfair to throw the blame on any one Minister, or upon Lord Swinton, for our deficiency. Anyone who was put in his place in July, 1935. would have made a great many mistakes, and would certainly not have been able to discharge the programmes which were proclaimed within the limits assigned; but he certainly does represent—and I say this with a great feeling of sympathy for him in his task— an extremely able and wholehearted effort to do the best he possibly could to expand our air power, and the results which he has achieved would be bright if they were not darkened by the time table, and if they were not outshone by other relative facts occurring elsewhere. Every country admires what it is doing itself, but what is not always seen is what is being done by others. I say that the hard responsibility for the failure to fulfil the promises made to us rests upon those who have governed and guided this Island for the last five years, that is to say, from the date when German rearmament in real earnest became apparent and known.
I certainly did not attempt to join in a man-hunt of Lord Swinton. I was very glad to-day to hear the Prime Minister's tribute to him. Certainly he deserves our sympathy. He had the confidence and friendship of the Prime Minister, he had the confidence and support of an enormous Parliamentary majority; yet he has been taken from his post at what, I think, is the worst moment in the story of air expansion. It may be that in a few months there will be a considerable flow of aircraft arriving, yet he has had to answer for his record at this particularly dark moment for him. I was reading the other day a letter of the great Duke of Marlborough, in which he said:
To remove a General in the midst of a campaign—that is the mortal stroke.
Why was he removed? Certainly not because of the inconvenience to the House of Commons. Because the Prime Minister had given conclusive arguments against that on former occasions. When we asked for an inquiry we were told at the beginning of the Session and, later, "You cannot have an inquiry; that would be a court-martial on Lord Swinton." So there has been no court-martial. What has happened has been a private execution. Now there is, apparently, not even to be the usual post-mortem; or, shall I say, coroner-s inquest? This is a strange episode, I
1285
must say, in Parliamentary history. I have not seen the like in my time. It almost seemed to me that occult forces were at work. Have votes of confidence no longer the virtue to sustain a Minister? Are they to be taken so much as a matter of course, a mere formality, that they no longer affect the Government? Can the earnest desire of hundreds of Members, acting in a particular way, no longer convey that sense of strength to the administration? Are the facts more powerful than the votes that are given in the Lobby? Is our business in the House of Commons to be settled outside and around here? If so, it is a new development, and I must say that I prefer the older system when Members voted with greater independence and Governments practised a more virile candour.
But there is another reason why I am far from being reassured, and why I do not think the Prime Minister has taken the best course in the circumstances. It will be many months before my right hon. Friend knows half what Lord Swinton knew about the Air Force. The departure of this Minister is a very serious event. Was it necessary? Would it not have been a more reasonable and practical plan to leave Lord Swinton at the Air Ministry, and to free him and that Department from the whole business of supply? If, for instance, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air had been appointed Minister of Supply, Lord Swinton could have continued to discharge the immense task of organising and perfecting the Royal Air Force as a fighting service, in which he has made great progress, I agree with the Prime Minister, and which is a task of infinite complexity, a whole-time task, and one requiring, if ever one did, experience and knowledge, which can be gained only by seeing things on the spot, and, further, can only be slowly acquired.
If that course had been adopted, a great shock to public confidence would have been avoided, and I believe we should have had more efficient service than we can possibly have for the Air Force in the next few months. Each of these Ministers, the Air Minister, and the Minister of Supply, would have had a harmonious and integral task to which they could have devoted their whole energy, and the Secretary of State would
1286
not have had to be summoned from his salubrious employment and forced to don the panoply of Mars, or, to put it in more homely language, we should not have been putting a round peg in a square hole.
I am very anxious to press the point of a ministry of supply. Let us see what is the present organisation, as far as I have been able to make out, that is employed in producing armaments from British industry. It is an extraordinarily cumbrous and complex organisation. First of all there is the Admiralty, with all its establishments and activities. Secondly, there is Admiral Brown's Department of the War Office. Admiral Brown is Director-General of Munitions production for the War Office, and he is a member of the Army Council. He makes for the War Office and he makes certain things for other Departments as well. Included in his sphere is the old Department of Master-General of the Ordnance, which we were told was working so splendidly a year ago, but which, when the new Secretary of State for War came along, was found to be in such a condition that it had to be transferred en bloc to the control of Admiral Brown. Thirdly, there is the enormous system of committees working under the Committee of Imperial Defence.
I was glad to read Lord Zetland's very full account of this in another place, and the Prime Minister has referred to some of these committees to-day. He mentioned particularly the Principal Supply Officers' Committee. He said it was in continuous session, which I am bound to say I heard with some surprise. I notice that there is Sir Arthur Robinson's Supply Board, which I have no doubt is in very constant function. Parallel with Sir Arthur Robinson's Supply Board, to quote the words of Lord Zetland, is a body controlled by the Board of Trade, known as the Board of Trade Supply Organisation. Beneath Sir Arthur Robinson's Supply Board, we were told by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence nearly two years ago, there are no fewer than seven main committees and no one knows how many subordinate and subsidiary committees. None of these organisations under the Committee of Imperial Defence, nor under Sir Arthur Robinson's Board, has any executive power. All these committees of the Imperial Defence Committee are delibera-
1287
tive and advisory. They deliberate and they advise, and the ball is flung from one to the other at weekly or fortnightly intervals.
These are not secret matters, but it is difficult to see clearly what happens. Nowhere in these committees is there power to give a series of executive orders. That is reserved, as I understand it, to the Service Departments. Consideration, yes; things considered, innumerable; done, very few. That is why, when questions are asked on all sorts of topics, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence is able to say, "That is being considered." "We have given our attention to this." "We are fully alive to that." "We are exploring the other." No doubt it is perfectly true. I do not suppose there is any question on the subject of National Defence which is not being considered, ventilated, explored, illuminated by these innumerable committees.
I have dealt with three branches, the Admiralty, Admiral Brown's War Office Committee and this cluster of committees under the Committee of Imperial Defence. Now I come to the last one, the most relevant immediately to our topic, which is the organisation for ordering aircraft supplies. This again is dual. There are two quite separate aspects. In the first place there is the Director of Production of the Air Ministry, who is the opposite number of Admiral Brown at the War Office. Besides this there is this new committee which we heard so much about the other day from the Chancellor of the Duchy, a committee of manufacturers, who have gathered together with my Noble Friend at their head, and they were going to put everything right in this sphere. However, owing to some oratorical fireworks, the whole of this part of the organisation is to be remodelled. Moving around in this jungle, without executive power and burdened with a whole sphere of other and even more important duties, is my right hon., learned and unfortunate friend, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, specially charged not merely with co-ordination, but with the preparation of the industry of the country for transition into a state of war. That is the machinery that is working at the present time.
1288
I was surprised at my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He treated the matter, when he was describing the reasons against a ministry of supply, as if everything that had happened so far was satisfactory. That apparently is his point of view. I say this machinery has failed; I say it has not delivered the goods. And this is the machinery which some people think should be replaced forthwith by an effectual ministry of supply under a responsible Parliamentary head and with all necessary executive powers. The Prime Minister obdurately resists this ministry of supply. He made difficulties to-day about powers, and seemed to be willing to excite a prejudice, which I do not think exists, upon the other side of the House against reasonable powers. Who has ever suggested that this ministry should be equipped with power to prevent strikes in time of peace? I am not prepared in the course of these remarks to unfold to the House the exact category of powers, but it can easily be done. There are powers that are necessary and appropriate, not to a state of war, but to an intermediate state of emergency preparation.
Why does my right hon. Friend resist this plan so obdurately? It is true that I have pressed it upon him and his predecessor for two years or more, but that was not in itself a sufficient reason. I will avail myself of the avuncular relationship which I hope I may still possess in respect of the Government to put it to the Prime Minister personally and even intimately. Has he ever heard of St. Anthony the Hermit? St. Anthony the Hermit was much condemned by the Fathers of the Church because he refused to do right when the Devil told him to. I hope my right hon. Friend will free himself from this irrational inhibition for we are only at the beginning of our anxieties. I warn the Prime Minister of the troubles that lie ahead in this administrative sphere. He is not the only one on that bench who requires warning. Three able, industrious, loyal Ministers of the Crown have been, or are being, deeply prejudiced by being given ill-conceived and ill-assorted tasks. The Secretary of State for War, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence and the Air Minister have all been prejudiced in their work and will be smitten in their reputation by the fact that they have been given ill-conceived and ill-assorted tasks to discharge.
1289
The Air Minister has gone and we have another in his place, who at present has not been able fully to survey the extremely difficult ground upon which he is called to enter. When shall I be able to convince the Government that a service department and a service Minister are incapable of dealing with large-scale industrial production? In time of prolonged peace, when the annual requirement of the Air Ministry or the War Office is very small, when the War Office has only to deal with Vickers, Enfield and Woolwich, when the Air Ministry can work with its small group of selected firms, there is no question, but from the moment when you require to throw yourselves for the purpose of rearmament upon the industry and labour of the nation and upon the good will of the whole mass of skilled labour and the skilled labour unions, you have created a task which requires the whole-time attention of a Minister of the Crown equipped with the full force of a great Department.
It would have been easy for the Prime Minister to have saved Lord Swinton last week. All he had to to was to relieve him of a task which ought not to be combined and which cannot effectively be combined with the direction of the Royal Air Force. He had only to relieve him of the task of the production of aeroplanes and aviation material, which can be done only by civil industry on a gigantic scale. In the same way, my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence has been throughout confronted with an unnatural task, which he has faced with his usual sturdy courage and patience, but which no man, however able, could fully discharge. I predict that there lie ahead of him, and I fear ahead of all of us, many painful realisations of the results of the discharge of this task. I take the Secretary of State for War, who sails proudly and buoyantly over calmer waters than have been vouchsafed to his colleague at the Air Ministry. There is a Minister who should welcome most earnestly the creation of a ministry of supply.
The hon. Member who opened the Debate for the Opposition made a formidable case about the present condition of our air defences. I cannot challenge any substantial part of the statement which he made. It should be read with profound
1290
attention by all persons who are awake to the dangers which surround our country at the present time. I consider that that alone should give the House the reason for making a decisive change in the methods of wholesale manufacture of war materials. But if ever there were to be an inquiry, certainly other aspects would come into view. I am prepared to say that the military programmes are lagging equally. It is true that the Secretary of State for War has an easier method of escaping from his difficulties than the Air Minister. When deliveries of munitions and equipment fall into arrear, all he has to do is to reduce the number of divisions that he considers necessary to meet the war need. Thus, all we are able to say, as he said the other day, is that "All is proceeding according to schedule." He has the advantage, perhaps, of what we might call a double sliding-scale. The schedule is unknown, and so also are the standards towards which it is working. After all, these are grim times, and it is no time for the kind of rigmarole responses we had at Question Time yesterday in answer to vital questions.
We are now in the third year of openly avowed rearmament. Why is it, if all is going well, there are so many deficiencies? Why, for instance, are the Guards drilling with flags instead of machine guns and anti-tank rifles? Why is it that our small Territorial Army is in a rudimentary condition of equipment? Is that all according to schedule? When you consider how small are our forces, why should it be impossible to equip the Territorial Army—I have asked this for years— simultaneously with the Regular Army? It would have been a paltry task for British industry, which is more flexible and more fertile than German industry in every sphere except munitions. We have for generations competed successfully on even terms, and even adverse terms, in the markets of the world. If Germany is able to produce in these three years equipment and armament of every kind for its Air Force and for 60 or 70 divisions of the Regular Army, how is it that we have been unable to furnish our humble, modest military forces with what is necessary? If you had given the contract to Selfridge or to the Army and Navy Stores, or to Harrods I believe that you would have had the stuff to-day.
These deficiencies of every kind, which are patent, and clearly can be seen by
1291
anyone, and are certainly known abroad, touch a more crucial point when we come to the subject which has been touched upon by all speakers to-day, namely, that of anti-aircraft defence. The other day the Secretary of State for War was asked about the anti-aircraft artillery. He seemed entirely contented with the position. The old 3-inch guns of the Great War, he said, had been modernised, and deliveries of the newer guns—and there are more than one type of newer gun—were proceeding "in advance of schedule." But what is the schedule? If your schedule prescribes a delivery of half-a-dozen, 10, a dozen, 20, or whatever it may be, guns per month, no doubt they may easily be up to schedule and easily be in advance of it. But what is the adequacy of such a schedule to our needs? A year ago I reminded the House of the published progress of Germany in anti-aircraft artillery—30 regiments of 12 batteries each of mobile artillery alone, aggregating something between 1,200 and 1,300 guns, in addition to over 3,000 guns in fixed positions. They are all modern guns, not guns of 1915, but all guns made since the year 1933.
Does not that give the House an idea of the tremendous scale of these transactions? We do not need to have a gigantic army like continental countries, but in the matter of anti-aircraft defence we are on equal terms. We are just as vulnerable, and perhaps more vulnerable. Here is the Government thinking of antiaircraft artillery in terms of hundreds while the Germans have it to-day in terms of thousands. Yet we are told that "All is proceeding according to schedule. Everything is satisfactory. We are in advance of the schedule." The Prime Minister considers the organisation, as it has grown up at the present time under the Committee of Imperial Defence, as the last word. He does not see how it can be improved. The Secretary of State for War, acclaiming his achievement of being in advance of schedule, almost invites us to place a chaplet of wild olives upon his brow. I assert that the Air Ministry and the War Office are absolutely incompetent to produce the great flow of weapons now required from British industry. I assert, secondly, that British industry is entirely capable of producing an overwhelming response both in respect
1292
of the air and of military material of all kinds both in quality and in quantity. But you have to organise it, and, to organise it, you must have the best brains that British industry can produce, directed by the most powerful organisation that the State can supply. Without that you will not get the response.
If this is true of present peace time rearmament, how much more is it true of the immense expansion which will be necessary on the outbreak of war. We are told that "All is ready for a Ministry of Munitions on outbreak of war." Lord Zetland tells us that all that happens is that he or some other noble personage has to press a button. I hope that it is not a button like the last gaiter button which was talked of before the war of 1870. He has only to press this button and a Ministry of Munitions will leap into being fully armed like Minerva from the head of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. Do not let the House believe that.
You may conceivably bring together a number of functionaries of State in their varying relations. You may bring together advisory committees of business men, but what we should need if war should come would be a running concern in full activity, and from the first moment an organisation which is actually shaped and moulded, and an industry which is planned in every detail to take the upward leap. Otherwise, your pressing the button would result merely in producing a paper organisation which would require months to understand its job and really get its hands upon the levers, and still more months—tragic months—of agony before industry would respond to this greatly expanded scheme.
You ought now—I said this two years ago, but still it is as true to-day—to have every factory in the country planned out, not only on paper, but with the necessary jigs, gauges and appliances handy, hung up on the spot, so that they could turn over at once in time of war to some form of war production. The exact routine change for every suitable factory should be foreseen now and elaborated, so that when you press your button you do not merely bring functionaries into being, but you have a living control of British industry which immediately enters into the production of munitions upon a war scale. That is only what is organised already
1293
in foreign countries, and in no country is it organised in this way so much as it is in Germany. I cannot see that there could be any objection to the view that everything ought to be prepared. It is not a very expensive job, and it is a matter of the utmost consequence.
The more you are prepared and the better you are known to be prepared, the greater is the chance of staving off war and of saving Europe from the catastrophe which menaces it. Every time we are seen to make a big new move forward there is a wave of confidence which goes through all the small countries and the peace-loving countries of the world. Supposing it were said to-morrow that we have set up a ministry of supply and are making provision for turning industry over to munitions, do you not think that that would at once create a feeling of confidence and security? An hon. Member doubts it, but as the Prime Minister said, confidence was spread through the world by the improvement of our armaments, so do not let us differ about any matter upon which we can agree.
Let me give one or two other reasons for the immediate creation of a ministry of supply. We are thinking at the present time in terms of production for three separate armed forces. In fact and in truth, the supply of arms for all fighting forces resolves itself into a common problem of the provision and distribution of skilled labour, raw materials, plant, machinery and technical appliances. That problem can only be dealt with comprehensively, harmoniously and economically through one central dominating control. At the present time there is inefficiency and overlapping, and there is certainly waste. Why is it that this skilful aircraft industry of Britain requires 90,000 men, and that it produces only one-half to one-third of what is being produced by about 110,000 men in Germany? Is that not an extraordinary fact? It is incredible that we have not been able to produce a greater supply of aeroplanes at this time. Given a plain office table, an empty field, money and labour, we should receive a flow of aeroplanes by the 18th month, yet this is the thirty-fourth month since Lord Baldwin decided that the Air Force must be tripled.
How much longer will the obvious remedies be denied? No mere change of Ministers will meet this occasion. We
1294
must have a change of system. Without a change of system you will find yourselves involved ever more deeply in vexations and Ministers in undeserved misfortune, or in misfortune which, if it is deserved, is only because they allow these ill-assorted duties to be imposed upon them. Just consider that up to this moment we have not reached any agreement with the skilled unions, after the whole of these two years. It is only now that negotiations are beginning. If you wish to ask these skilled unions to make the sacrifices which undoubtedly are necessary, you must convince them of the emergency. Every time a ministry of supply is refused, the emergency is discounted and denied. At the present time the attitude of the Government is clearly that all may be carried on safely upon the existing methods, with a minimum of disturbance of the general life of the country. Surely, it is time now to proclaim the emergency. During last week-end many of us thought of those furnace fires of which the Prime Minister spoke a year or two ago, and almost felt a gust of scorching air upon our faces; and then there is no emergency! Surely, this is the time when Ministers should rise to the level of events and give more effective defence protection and service to the nation which has trusted them so long.
