- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on June 23, 1938, in a debate on the bombing of British ships in Spain, criticising the Government's inaction and proposing an appeal to Mussolini and, as a last resort, seizing a Franco warship.
- Main themes
- Bombing of British merchant ships in the Spanish Civil War, Non-Intervention Committee, protection of the British flag, Prime Minister's policy of inaction, Billmeir and ships transferred to the British flag, amendment of the Merchant Shipping Act, long-range gun argument and air bombing of neutral ships, vulnerability of British food supplies in wartime, appeal to Mussolini, seizure of a Franco warship as a last resort, neutrality between Franco and the Spanish Republic, appeasement and national humiliation
- Duration
- ~24 min
- Words
- 2,870
- Sentences
- 98
- Readability
- 54
- Grade
- 12.9
- Syntax
- 3.43
- Vocabulary
- 2.11
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other98 sentences in 28 paragraphs
I should always differ from my hon. Friend the Member for the neighbouring division of South-East Essex (Mr. Raikes) with much reluctance, because my hon. Friend and I have cooperated and collaborated in other Parliaments and on other topics, and it certainly could not be suggested of him that he does not form his own opinions irrespective of party pressure, or even of constituency pressure. He forms his own opinions, and he gives his counsel truly as he conceives it to be his duty to do. Therefore, I differ from him not only with personal reluctance but, on general grounds, with some anxiety. Nevertheless I do not think that my hon. Friend was well advised to point to the recent by-election as a sign that the people of this country were entirely upon the side of the foreign policy of which we are having another example to-day. If he would examine those by-elections carefully he would, I think, see that it would be better not to cite them as evidence of popular opinion, but in any case I do not think this matter, which is so very grave, should be settled by reference to the fortuitous incidents and accidents of by-election contests.
I listened with great attention to the very powerful speech which the Prime Minister delivered. Certainly no one could mistake the general basis from which his argument arises. I should be altogether unfair to the right hon. Gentleman if I did not fully admit that many of the considerations which he has advanced must appeal to all of us. It is not so much a question of the facts that causes the difference as the question of the emphasis which should be put upon particular facts, and I must say that I thought the Prime Minister did not sufficiently present to the House and to the country the gravity of the offence of which we are the victims. Sir, it is a very painful injury and assault to which we are being subjected. Over 50 British ships, I gather, have been molested, eight or nine have been actually sunk—12 have
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been actually sunk—many of them inside the three-miles limit but others outside. They have been sunk by a method of warfare which we have always regarded with great abhorrence. According to all the laws and customs of the sea the sinking of vessels by an agency which has not the means of taking on board the crews has always been regarded as an outrage upon the long traditions of the sea, and all our views in the past have been expressed in that sense.
These vessels were not carrying, in most cases, munitions of war—cannon or explosives; very frequently they were carrying food supplies. Of course, food supplies may be made contraband of war, but we have not recognised any process by which the supplies which these ships were carrying could be impugned in any way. Moreover, most of these ships were sailing under the seal and charter of the Non-Intervention Committee, and they had non-intervention officers on board, officers collected from all countries to see that the rules which the Non-Intervention Committee have laid down should not be broken. These agents and observers were on those ships, vouching for the innocence of those ships from any breach of the processes to be adopted—not upon the authority of His Majesty's Government only, but upon the authority of all the great nations which have been gathered together around the table of the Non-Intervention Committee.
If in these circumstances 50 or even more ships flying the British flag, engaged in a traffic not only lawful in the name of this country but lawful in the name of many countries, are to be assailed by a brutal, inhuman form of attack which leaves their crews, if the vessels founder, at the mercy of the elements, it constitutes a very grave offence, and I feel that there ought to be some spirit in His Majesty's Government and in this House to commend to the nation the wrong that is being done. The Prime Minister, in his speech two days ago, said that to have our ships sunk like this was not a very nice thing. There is always a certain latent power in understatement, and I think I can leave the remark at that. No, Sir, it is not a very nice thing, and it is not only a question of the incidents, of the examples, which confront us, but it is the general basis upon which these incidents proceed, and the consequences of our accepting them
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in general tolerance, as we are doing. Why, Sir, we are debasing, or we are acquiescing in the debasement of, a currency which we have defended for generations, and when we affect to ignore the fact that the British flag is not giving protection to persons proceeding about their lawful vocations under the authority of Parliament, we are debasing a symbol which has hitherto been regarded as of great practical consequence to the British realm and the British Empire, and one well worth making sacrifices and running risks to defend.
I say it with pain, but I believe it to be true—and I will await contradiction from any part of the House—that no other great naval Power would tolerate such treatment; Japan, Italy, Germany, the United States, no other great naval Power, would submit to this kind of treatment for long, month after month. More than that, I say that no agency or force in the world would dare to offer them such treatment. I feel that that is a most grave fact. I speak, I believe, without incurring any great difference of opinion when I say that no other Government that I have ever seen, and no other Parliament in which I have sat in nearly 40 years would, I am sure, have felt itself forced, or been willing, to cast these outrages all off as if it were a mere question of some profiteering Billmeir.
I have endeavoured to consider the various arguments which have been advanced by His Majesty's Government or advanced on their behalf from whatever quarter. Of course, Ministers might come to the House and say: "We have allowed our defences to fall so low that we are not able to give His Majesty's lieges protection, "but they have not said that yet. Perhaps that argument is to come. Then there is the argument, the one which figures most, of bogus ships, the Billmeir argument. That, of course, introduces a new element into the discussion. One thinks of the Union Jack and one is confronted and affronted when Mr. Billmeir is brought into it. I think that this special case might easily tend to divert the judgment of the House from the true course on which it should go. I have felt uncomfortable for some time about ships being transferred rapidly to the British flag, and have felt that it
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might conceivably involve us in very serious responsibilities on account of their action. In fact, I wrote privately to the late Foreign Secretary about it before the Nyon business occurred.
The remedy for ships being transferred to the British flag, all of a sudden and in a hurry, with just the limited number of persons necessary to qualify under the Board of Trade regulations, is to amend your Merchant Shipping Act and not to allow your flag to be insulted. The Government could amend the Merchant Shipping Act at any time, and in my opinion they should have done so, when they saw that difficulties were arising in this respect. They should have specified certain dates and conditions which had to be fulfilled. If they had done it, their position would be all the stronger because they would be able to insist upon effective protection to their traders who went forward under perfectly normal conditions. I could not follow the argument of the Prime Minister when he tried to suggest that there was no difference between volunteer combatants on either side, who go, as was pointed out by the Leader of the Liberal party, contrary to the express law of this country, and fight and try to slay an opponent in the field of war, and a ship, a peaceful ship, that goes on trade under the authority of the Non-Intervention Committee and the law of the land, to carry food to a Spanish harbour.
There could be no two cases, as a matter of fact, that you could bring forward for the purposes of more effective contrast. The right hon. Gentleman is so very keen a reasoner and is so very patient always, I must say, in dealing with the House, not only in Debate but at Question Time, always endeavouring to argue a matter out, that I must suggest to him that after the excitement of this Debate is over, if he will examine this particular argument in cold blood, he may find that it is one which his armoury should not have included.
There is another argument, which I will call the long-range gun argument, although it is not one that has been used to-night. It says that if a seaport town is under the bombardment of an enemy, and a gun is fired 10 or 15 miles away, or even more, it may hit ships in the harbour; and that an aeroplane is only another method of carrying the projectile that is fired from the gun. I hope that
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the House will not entertain such an argument. Nothing could be more detrimental to us than that we should seek to legitimise and confirm and, as it were approve —I agree not in words, but by our actions —this process of unregulated bombing from the air. Merchant ships of all kinds are involved. No country in the world has a greater interest in preventing the air blockade or the air bombing of neutral ships.
The Prime Minister said, quite truly, that the air raises many novel problems. Of course it does, but what solutions are we proposing publicly for those problems? What principles are we affirming and what precedents are we creating? Are we really creating and affirming the principle that if neutral ships go with food to a harbour of a country at war it is a legitimate act, or an act that we cannot resist, and has to be accepted, if those ships should be bombed from the air? What consequences might this principle not have to ourselves, when our small food supplies are absolutely dependent in a very large proportion, upon neutral ships as well as upon British ships seeking our food ports in time of war? As far as I can make out, on the reasoning which is now put before us, if we were at war with a European State and we had the command of the sea, and therefore the enemy could establish no blockade in any legal sense, and if the United States sent foodships to our country and those ships were bombed by long-range aircraft from the European State, our view, on this Debate and on the position which the Government have taken up at the present time, would be that those ships had got no more than they deserved for shoving their noses in. It is of the most extreme importance that the orientation of British policy in these matters should be carefully considered. We are legitimising, or at any rate acquiescing in, methods which not merely insult our flag—I suppose we must let that go in these days—but strike at the very life of our community.
One must refer to the suggestion which is made that the Opposition take a special interest in this matter because they wish to see the Spanish Government win. It is difficult for human beings to disentangle all the motives which lie in their minds, but I am bound to say I have found a counter-opinion among some of my own
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friends that we should go easy in this matter because it is thought that British interests will be served by General Franco winning. I think we might leave those arguments to cancel out on both sides. For my part, I have tried studiously throughout this Spanish business to be neutral as between the two parties. It seems to me that it would be a very great misfortune if the British Government were to adopt a policy which could be recognised by all the democracies of the world as having perhaps struck a finishing blow at the resistance of the Spanish Republic, which resistance is inspired, not only by their zeal for their cause, but by the probability of very cruel punishment if they are defeated.
I must address myself to the question which is asked, "What would you do?" I am sure my hon. Friend does not suppose that I should shirk that question, but that is just what His Majesty's Government are doing. They are asked what is to be done, and they say "Nothing." They say that there is no remedy, and there is no limit to the number of ships that will be sunk, as far as I can gather from anything that my right hon. Friend said to-night. There is no remedy; we have to lump it; we have to put up with it; we have to go off and believe it never happened; we have to shut our eyes and hope that something will turn up to divert our minds from this most painful topic. It is not for the Government to ask what should be done, they should come forward with a clear policy. But it certainly is not a possible conclusion that nothing should be done, no matter how far or how long the provocation may go on. Here it is only 50 ships—only 50; but at any moment a vessel may be sunk with really heavy loss of life, and all the arguments which have been used to-night could presumably be deployed in that case.
The Government ought not to ask what should be done: they ought to provide a solution which would enable them to carry out their duty, namely, to give reasonable protection to His Majesty's ships and lieges and to the British flag when these are acting under the full sanction and protection of the law. But if we are asked to assist the Government by offering suggestions, I would hazard a very simple suggestion. I suggest that my right hon. Friend the
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Prime Minister should use his personal influence with Signor Mussolini. I have never under-rated the force and importance of the policy for which my right hon. Friend has worked so long and has undertaken so much exertion, but he largely based his commendation of it to the House upon the faith he had in Signor Mussolini's sincere desire for the friendship of the British people. I suggest that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister should, through whatever channels are available—and we know, that when there is need for them, all sorts of channels are available—ask Signor Mussolini to leave no stone unturned to prevent a recurrence of this air bombing outrage, and to make it quite clear that he has done his utmost to stop it. I am sure that, if he does that, a very great obstacle will be removed to friendly relations between Great Britain and Italy.
One has to apprehend, however, that, after my right hon. Friend and his gallant confrere have done their best, General Franco may still remain obdurate, that he may refuse to mitigate his wrath in any way, and that, consequently, we may be. thrown back upon the final resource. I see no difficulty in that at all. If everything else has been tried, I think it could be perfectly safely said to General Franco "If there is any more of this, we shall arrest one of your warships on the open sea." If they like to resist, that is a question for them, but that, I believe, could be done with perfect safety if everything else had been tried, and I cannot believe it would bring Europe into a general war at the present time. I can quite understand undergoing humiliation for the sake of peace. A great country like ours, with its long history, so very splendid in past periods, could submit to a succession of humiliations, perhaps rightly, in order to create an atmosphere favourable for peace, and I do not agree with those who say that a spark should be allowed to set alight the passions of great nations. Therefore, I would have supported the Government in bearing some humiliation, and asking us to undergo it, if I felt that we were making towards greater security for peace. But I fear that this abjection is woefully misunderstood abroad. I fear it will weaken our influence and power to avert war, and that, so far from making for greater security for peace, it will actually bring
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nearer to us all those dangers which in all parts of the House we desire above all things to withhold from our people.
