European Situation.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

23 March 1933 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 23, 1933, during a debate on the European situation, opposing pressure on France to disarm, doubting the four-Power pact's timing, and criticising MacDonald's foreign policy.
Main themes
MacDonald's Geneva disarmament plan, pressing France to disarm, German rearmament and persecution of minorities, Britain's obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, French army as shield of Europe, four-Power pact proposed by Mussolini, treaty revision before disarmament, 56 disarmament plans at Geneva, failures of MacDonald's foreign policy, Lausanne war debts and reparations, arms embargo and relations with Japan, MacDonald's visit to Rome
Duration
~35 min
87th percentile
Words
4,146
87th percentile
Sentences
165
84th percentile
Readability
50
63rd percentile
Grade
12.6
52nd percentile
Syntax
3.10
60th percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
32nd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 68%55%
  • Ceremonial 13%11%
  • Institutional 10%8%
  • Economic 7%5%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 19%

165 sentences in 39 paragraphs

It has frequently been said in this House that matters have been carefully considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, of course, by the naval and military experts. I do not say that Ministers cannot act apart from them. All I say is that they confer a very much greater degree of responsibility if they take measures of this kind, which are highly complicated and technical, without 'having gone through all the careful processes that are necessary.

Taking a layman's view of these facts and figures, I cannot say that they are injurious to our defensive interests, but I doubt very much indeed the wisdom of pressing this plan upon France at the present time. I do not think it is at all likely that the French will agree. They must be greatly concerned at what is taking place in Germany, as well as at the attitude of some others of their neighbours. I daresay that during this anxious month—we seem to have passed through a, very anxious month—there are a good many people who have said to themselves, as I have been saying for several years: "Thank God for the French army." When we read about Germany, when we watch with surprise and distress the tumultuous insurgence of ferocity and war spirit, the pitiless ill-treatment of minorities, the denial of the normal protections of civilised society to large numbers of individuals solely on the ground of race—when we see that occurring in one of the most gifted,

543

learned, scientific and formidable nations in the world, one cannot help feeling glad that the fierce passions that are raging in Germany have not found, as yet, any other outlet but upon themselves. It seems to me that, at a moment like this, to ask France to halve her army while Germany doubles hers—that is the scale of figures—to ask France to halve her air force while the German air force remains whatever it is—I am aware that there is no military air force permitted to remain —such a proposal, it seems to me, is likely to be considered by the French Government at present, at any rate, as somewhat unseasonable. The figures that are given in the plan of the strength of armies and aeroplanes secure to France only as many aeroplanes as would be possessed by Italy, leaving any air power possessed by Germany entirely out of consideration.

We must look at facts in this matter. Others are looking at them. Do not let the House be alarmed that we are doing any harm by looking at the facts. We may as well face realities. Germany and Italy, if united, would immediately have actually larger armies than France, 450,000 to 400,000, even if the whole of the French Colonial force were safely brought back across the Mediterranean, and this disposition of force, it must be remembered, corresponds to populations of 100,000,000 in the two countries I have mentioned as compared with less than 40,000,000 in France. I do not say for a moment that this contingency of a combination of Italy and Germany against France is likely to occur. No one has a right to think such a thing. I absolutely disclaim any such intention of making such a declaration. But there is very great anxiety in Switzerland, as the Prime Minister knows. They fear that some day or other it might be marched through by armies in a state of war, and certainly it seems to me that the French Government would be bound in self-preservation to bear these possibilities in mind when they are examining the figures which the Prime Minister never had time to look through himself, but which he has presented and for which he has made himself responsible to the great Powers of Europe—to all the Powers of Europe, great and small.

It seems to me unlikely, therefore, taking a general view, that these figures will be found acceptable not only to

544

France, but to various other countries concerned. I do not mean for a moment that they will be rejected out of hand. On the contrary, all the nations at Geneva have developed a very elaborate technique in dealing with disarmament proposals which do not suit their needs or which they think are dangerous or inconvenient. They have learned very well to talk the language which is agreeable to the League of Nations Union, which would warm their hearts and wing the eloquence of my right hon. Friend. They think they do it very well there. They have had a lot of practice at it. They never refuse at first sight any proposal, however injurious, visionary or foolish they may think it. On the contrary, they make praiseworthy speeches. They interchange agreeable compliments —"How interesting!" "How hopeful!" "What a meeting of our point of view is embodied in this." "It is the first time we have really had a helping hand in this difficult situation." "What noble sentiments have inspired this theme for which we are indebted to the genius of England." And then, having read it a second time, to use our Parliamentary form, amid prolonged enthusiasm, they adjourn to the banqueting hall and leave it to be killed in committee by a lot of minor objections to detail, or by putting forward counter-proposals which only make confusion worse confounded.

I understand that already—here again I am basing myself only on the newspapers—there are 56 Disarmament plans. Perhaps the Prime Minister has the right figure. It may be more now, because he has been two or three days away from Geneva. Fifty-six well-meaning plans, which certainly suited very well indeed the interests of the country which proposed them, have Already been disposed of by this machinery, and it seems not unlikely that the 57th will share the common fate. But although the plan of the Prime Minister may not be accepted, it cannot, I fear, fail to arouse distrust in the breasts of those from whom it asks the most hazardous sacrifices at the most inopportune time. Here, I say very little of the Prime Minister's oratorical style. We are familiar with it here. We know that he has, more than any other man, the gift of compressing the largest number of words into the smallest amount of thought. We have heard him on so many topics, from India to unemployment and

545

many other matters, providing us, apparently, with an inexhaustible flow of vague, well-sounding exhortation, the precise purpose of which is largely wrapped in mystery and which, as far as it can be discerned, can be understood differently in different quarters, according to taste. The only comment I would make upon his eloquent speech at Geneva is that when he said to the assembled nations that if they would not adopt the proposals they would be mannequins—not manikins—the functionaries who, I believe, are employed by French milliners to exhibit their wares to the best advantage. They would be mannequins, and not men. I cannot help thinking that he lapsed a little from those standards of international decorum which we expect in a representative of the British Empire in such circumstances. When I think of the figures which I have just been mentioning— —I am afraid that I was dealing with statistics, and not with fashions—when I think of the statistics which I have been mentioning to the House, I am not at all sure that the French will find such remarks even amusing.

All these considerations lead us ton very grave matter. I think that it is undoubtedly dangerous to press France at the present juncture to disarm because of the effect which that must necessarily have upon our obligations and our liabilities under the Treaty of Locarno. We have serious obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, but they are provided with various important safeguards which ensure our having a wide discretion whether we should or should not engage, on one side or the other, in a European war. I am going to mention those safeguards because they are of the utmost consequence to all of us in this country who wish to be assured that we shall never see our men dragged into another tremendous Continental struggle. The Council of the League of Nations must be unanimous. It would probably not be unanimous. In fact, in the grouping of the Powers, it could hardly be unanimous, apart from the fact that we ourselves would be an indispensable factor in that unanimity.

There is the emergency obligation under Clause IV. This operates in the case of what is called a

546

flagrant violation of peace constituting an unprovoked act of aggression, which by reason of crossing the frontier, or the outbreak of hostilities, or the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone requires immediate action.

"Immediate action" means, before the Council of the League of Nations can be invoked. I know that that is often mentioned, but here, again, I think that a considerable latitude of judgment rests in the conditions of the Treaty. The word "flagrant" in this case embodies not only the idea of a grave breach of law, but it also involves the elements of magnitude, danger and urgency. It is of the utmost importance that those elements should be read into the meaning of the word "flagrant." We should be entitled to consider all these aspects before we felt ourselves bound to join in a European war without even having the opportunity to discuss the matter upon the Council of the League of Nations.

It must always be assumed, of course, that Great Britain will stand by her obligations. Probably she will be better than her legal word, but I do not admit that the Treaty of Locarno deprives us of the right to judge the facts and circumstances, even in an emergency, according to what we think right in our interests and for our duty. All these refinements, which may be of vital consequence to the people of this Island and of the British Empire, will be swept away—I warn the Government—if we press France to disarm and encourage Germany to re-arm to a point where dangerous conditions are created. If you press a country to reduce its defences beyond its better judgment, and it takes your advice, every obligation you have contracted, however carefully it has been expressed, will be multiplied in force, and you will find your position complicated by fresh obligations of comradeship, honour and compassion which will be brought very prominently to the front when a country which has taken your advice falls into grave jeopardy perhaps as a result of what you have pressed upon it.

I remember what happened before the Great War. The growth of the German Navy obliged us to concentrate all our battleships in the North Sea, and we withdrew our squadron of battleships from the Mediterranean. The French moved all their battleships into the

547

Mediterranean. There was no bargain. The two operations took place independently. But although there was no bargain, when the peril of war came and all Europe was seen to be rushing towards catastrophe, the Ministers of the British Government who were the most resolved against participation in the War admitted the force of the argument, that, since the north coasts of France were undefended in consequence of their having moved their battleships, we should be bound to make sure that she did not suffer in that respect, and long before any agreement was reached as to whether we should participate in the War, a united agreement was reached in the Government, as my right hon. Friend well knows, forbidding the Germans from sending any warships into the Channel. That shows the enormous danger of pressing people to disarm beyond their better judgment, or becoming too closely intermingled in their defensive arrangements. What terrible consequences they may have upon your freedom of choice at some future time! I am profoundly anxious that we should preserve and enjoy the full freedom to judge of our obligations under Locarno without any additional complications. Therefore, I urge the very greatest caution upon His Majesty's Government at the present time in pressing the French Government to weaken their strength relatively towards Germany.

There is another and more obvious argument against our trying to weaken the armed power of France at the present juncture. As long as France is strong and Germany is but inadequately armed, there is no chance of France being attacked with success, and, therefore, no obligation under Locarno will arise for us to go to the aid of France. I am sure, on the other hand, that France, which is the most pacific nation in Europe at the present time, as she is, fortunately, the most efficiently armed nation in Europe, would never attempt any violation of the Treaty which exists or commit an overt act against Germany without the sanctions of the Treaty, without reference to the Treaty, and, least of all, in opposition to the country with which she is on such amicable relations—Great Britain.

The Prime Minister spoke of what he has put up to-day as the greatest effort

548

for peace since the Great War, doing, I think, little less than justice to the author of the Locarno Treaty, because certainly on the morrow of that we reached a position of far greater tranquility and security than we have ever been able to obtain since. How glad we should be to go back to that shining morrow of Locarno, and the hopes that were expressed there. It seemed to me at that time that as long as France was armed and Germany was disarmed, we ran no great risks under the Treaty of Locarno. We had an opportunity of bringing these two countries together in friendly intercourse—bringing France and Germany together in friendly intercourse.

Although bringing France and Italy together in friendly intercourse is a most important work, yet the master key of Europe is some understanding and relationship between its two greatest nations, Germany and France. If we are now going to try to establish conditions of equality—the Prime Minister used the word "equality" in a very loose way this afternoon, and I had to press him and make him add the enormously important words "equality of status"—if we are now going to try to create conditions of equality between France and Germany in armaments, or even an approach thereto, because the potential alliances of Germany must be considered, we shall invest the whole situation under Locarno with a far graver, far more imminent and more practical character than it possesses today. If you are going to take this step to reduce the Armies to the levels set out in the White Paper, then I say, that before that result is achieved Parliament ought to review the whole position of our responsibilities under the Treaty of Locarno. It is my sincere belief that if the armies of Europe had been measured during the last month or the last six months, especially the last month, as they are set forth in this White Paper, those very horrors that it is our whole aim to avert from us would have leapt out upon us already. If Europe has enjoyed peace this year, it has been under the shield of France. Be careful not to break that shield. It is perhaps not a broad basis on which we should like to see the harmony of Christendom stand, but it is a shield. Beware that you do not lower it or weaken it by any action in your power before you have, at least, something

549

which gives as good practical security erected behind it to put in its place.

Now I come to the proposals which the Prime Minister laid before us of a pact between the four great Powers—no doubt, technically within the League of Nations—to preserve the peace and to plan a revision of the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. I have always been attracted by this idea which Signor Mussolini has made so prominent. I have spoken for years of a pyramid of peace, which might be triangular or quadrangular, three or four great Powers shaking hands together and endeavouring to procure a rectification of some of the evils arising from the treaties made in Vile passion of war, which if left unredressed will bring upon us consequences we cannot name. The Prime Minister is, I think, a new convert to this idea. I have not had time to examine all his past utterances, but I had an impression that he had always condemned anything in the nature of a four-Power or a three-Power agreement and had considered that that was, as it were, inconsistent with the general authority of the League of Nations, on which so many Powers are represented. However, let that pass. Whether he was converted by the eloquence of Signor Mussolini, or by the strong personality of Signor Mussolini, or whether he had it in his mind before he went to Rome, are mysteries which are naturally hidden from us.

Although I have always been in favour of something of this character and have thought it the best line of approach to solid peace and to getting rid of the war peril, I am bound to say that the situation has deteriorated to such a point in the last year that such a plan is not nearly so hopeful now as it would have been some years ago or as it might be perhaps at no distant date in the future. I am very doubtful whether the Prime Minister has been wise to launch it in the way in which he has done at the present moment. I should have thought that it was indispensable before this plan of a four-Power pact could have a fair chance, to have got the Disarmament Conference laid to rest, and not to be assailing the nations involved with doubts as to their military strength and anxieties about their security at the same time that you are going to ask them to undertake the appallingly dangerous and difficult duty of endeavouring to get some

550

revision of the peace treaties. I have always tried to urge upon the House that to redress the grievances of the vanquished should precede the disarmament of the victors. This is a new idea and you must revise your other procedure in relation to the new idea, if you are to give it a chance. It is just like when we quitted the Gold Standard and we went on with ideas appropriate to our continued adherence to that standard. So in this field, when the Disarmament Conference has reached a point when it will absolutely conflict with treaty revision, through the desire of the four great Powers, the Prime Minister is still endeavouring to drive both these teams forward at the same moment.

To sum up, I trust that the Government will not press the disarmament proposals upon France unduly at the present time, for certainly the satisfaction of reaching an imposing conclusion of the Disarmament Conference would be far too dearly purchased at the cost of any aggravation of the danger of our being drawn into war, and even if it became an impediment to the progress of this larger and more dynamic idea of the four-power pact. I thank the House for allowing me to unfold a view which is not, I daresay, widely shared, but on which for a good many years I have been poring, as a result of some experience and study of these matters. In conclusion, to end where I began; I must say that the Prime Minister's interventions in Foreign Affairs have been—not through any fault or desire on his part—remarkably unsuccessful. His repeated excursions have not led to any solid, good result. Where anything has been achieved it has nearly always been at British expense and to British disadvantage. On the whole, his four years of control of our Foreign relations have brought us nearer to war and have made us weaker, poorer and more defenceless. Hon. Members say "No." You have only to study what is the position of Europe to-day. You have only to listen to what has been said from that Bench to know that we have been brought much nearer to war. I do not wish to place upon one man the responsibility for that, but at the same time when any one man has for four years held the whole power of this country in foreign affairs in his hands, and when he has pursued the lines of policy which I have indicated, you are

551

making a profound mistake if you think the efficiency of our public service will be enhanced by pretending that there is no responsibility to be affixed anywhere. Certainly not.

I withdraw nothing. I repeat what I have said, that, with the best of endear yours, with the most praiseworthy exertions, the right hon. Gentleman's efforts have not been attended at any point with a measure of success. Lausanne. All right. Under Lausanne we have now accumulated the gold to pay an additional instalment to the United States. Under Lausanne we have already told the French and the Germans that they need not pay us anything. Is that a great success? If eventually you reach good results and all War Debts and Reparations are forgiven and forgotten, then will be the time for these perfervid tributes to the Prime Minister. Then will be the time for hon. Gentlemen to range themselves up on the platforms of railway stations, but that is not the position now. The position now is that we have let everybody off, and we are going to pay everything ourselves.

Then there was the Naval Treaty of London, which I am glad to think the Conservative party voted against. It is cramping and fettering our Naval development, not merely the scale but the actual form and shape of our naval expenditure, in a manner which is certainly detrimental. Then there is the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, a solemn and prolonged farce, which, has undoubtedly lowered the prestige of the League of Nations and irritated many of the countries affected. Then there is the arms embargo, to come to more recent times. So little am I prejudiced that I welcomed it in all the innocence of my heart, carried away by the excellent speech of the Foreign Secretary. I said that I thought it was the best thing to do. What happened to me? I had hardly had time to turn round when the Government themselves had abandoned this policy, which they had put forward not only on the grounds of a policy and expediency but on those higher considerations of honour and avoidance of blood-guiltiness which made such a very great appeal to their audience. Let me say that this treatment of the arms embargo has seriously affected our relations with

552

Japan. We have abandoned the arms embargo now. We have not the advantage of the high morality which the Foreign Secretary preached to us, and we shall have to pay for it very considerably in after years if, as may well be the case, some special intimacy should grow up in trade matters in that part of the world between Japan and Germany. An hon. Member mentioned Lausanne. I have supplied him with other instances and illustrations of my theme.

Lastly, there is the visit to Rome. I do not wish to treat it too seriously. No doubt it was a pleasant expedition. No doubt it gave the right hon. Gentleman a great deal of pleasure to see Mr. Mussolini; the same sort of pleasure that 1,000 years ago was given to a Pope when an Emperor paid a visit to Canossa. It was certainly a striking spectacle to see these two heads of Governments, the master of sentimental word and the greatest master of grim and rugged action, meeting together in such friendly intercourse. I associate myself with my right hon. Friend in welcoming the Prime Minister back. We have got our modern Don Quixote home again, with Sancho Panza at his tail, bearing with them these somewhat dubious trophies which they have collected amid the nervous titterings of Europe. Let us hope that now that the right hon. Gentleman is safely back among us he will, first of all, take a good rest, of which I have no doubt he stands in need, and that afterwards he will devote himself to the urgent domestic tasks which await him here, in this island, and which concern the well-being of millions of his poorer fellow-subjects, and leave the conduct of foreign affairs, at any rate for a little while, to be transacted by competent ambassadors through the normal and regular diplomatic channels.