Indian Constitutional Reform.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

29 March 1933 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 29, 1933, in the debate on Indian constitutional reform, arguing that the Government's proposals would create inevitable conflict between the Viceroy and an Indian legislature.
Main themes
Powers of the Viceroy and Governor-General, Indian Parliament and constitutional claims, provincial legislatures as dictators, unitary government at the centre, composition of the central Senate, Hindu Princes and Congress pressure, Moslem representation and the national cause, protection of property rights, safeguards in the Instrument of Instructions, analogy with Crown and Parliament conflict, criticism of Government proposals
Duration
~7 min
22nd percentile
Words
793
22nd percentile
Sentences
35
21st percentile
Readability
49
61st percentile
Grade
12.2
47th percentile
Syntax
3.24
77th percentile
Vocabulary
2.16
40th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 80%80%
  • Ceremonial 9%9%
  • Geopolitical 6%6%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

35 sentences in 8 paragraphs

Yes, and that is very like the doctrine which the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) unfolded the other day. Proceed by constitutional measures until you get control of the police and the Army, and then go ahead with your revolution. But I am bound to bring these points to the House although they are by no means in harmony with the mellifluous language which is usually employed on these occasions. If this is the position of the Viceroy, with all the power and, as I say, without the executive machinery to exercise that power, look, on the other hand, at the position of the Indian Parliament. They would have all the constitutional title-deeds. There is no constitutional argument that will not be at their disposal. They will be able to claim that they are the elected representatives of the people. They will have control of the party machine, of the organisation of elections, and so forth. They will have the great bureaux in their hands. They are told that they are responsible for the well-being of the nation. Endless means of friction will arise between the responsible officials and the Government or the Governor-General and they will have a hundred means of making their pressure constant upon those harassed functionaries. I am amazed at the perverted ingenuity with which the Government have arranged a grievous and a certain struggle, very similar, as my Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) has said, to that which convulsed England in the struggles between Crown and Parliament during the whole of the 17th century.

I shall endeavour to curtail my remarks as much as possible, but I am anxious to conclude the argument which I am putting before the House. The case of the Governor-General will apply, on a smaller scale but more crudely and directly, to the Governors of the provinces. Eleven potential dictators—11 hopeful and aspiring Parliaments! And this warfare in the provinces will proceed simultaneously with the graver disturbances at the summit. Then, when

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this is occurring, you will perhaps learn the wisdom of the Statutory Commission's remark, that unitary government at the centre was most important during the development of the Provincial Legislatures.

I will examine only one other element in the Constitution—the Senate or upper Chamber at the centre. A great deal of fine filigree work has been put into that. There are Princes, Moslems, representatives of the landowners, certain official representatives and so forth. There is some provision, I believe, for a two-thirds majority and so on, and I am ready to admit that the character of that assembly will be such that it will have very stiff opinions about the rights of property. I have not the slightest doubt it will be very careful to protect the rights of property, the rights of the landlord, or of the moneylender, or of the Ahmedabad mill-owner, or, no doubt, of orthodox religion. In that respect it may be a highly Conservative chamber, but not in the best sense of the word. But when you come to the kind of question with which we are concerned here, issues which arise between Parliament and the Crown, issues which arise between India and Great Britain and which will be fought out, then it seems to me that you may very easily find that these forces, on which you are so trustfully relying at the present time, may be actuated by quite different motives from those which you attribute to them.

How can Hindu Princes—and are they not seven-eighths or nine-tenths of the whole—be expected to stand against the movement of Hinduism throughout the whole of India? How can they be expected to stand against that movement when Congress will have means of causing disorder in any one of their States? How can you expect Moslems to show themselves less forward in advocating what is called the national cause than their Hindu fellow-countrymen? No, Sir, it may well be that while you will have, for the purpose of the maintenance of Indian property rights, and Indian trading interests, a very strong, firm, oligarchy, there is not the slightest guarantee that the whole of them may not be ranged on nationalistic lines against the Viceroy and this country in any serious constitutional dispute.

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Evidently Ministers do not believe that this situation is one that can last, and it seems they have no doubt how it will eventually resolve itself. Hence all these safeguards arranged to satisfy British opinion. But they are all placed in the Instrument of Instructions and not in the Constitution and thus can be discarded by a simple resolution. Certainly, they can be discarded by simple resolution and not by the process of a Bill.