Indian Constitutional Reform.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

29 March 1933 · House of Commons debate on Indian constitutional reform · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 29, 1933, in the debate on Indian constitutional reform, attacking the White Paper's safeguards and the Viceroy's powers as an incoherent scheme.
Main themes
Safeguards in the India White Paper, powers of the Viceroy and Governor-General, responsible government versus autocracy, Indian commercial classes' despair, control of police and Army, British officials of the Indian Civil Service, transfer of welfare functions to provincial legislatures, comparison of the Viceroy to the Tsar of Russia, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's remarks on capturing the legislatures, Dominion status for India
Duration
~14 min
49th percentile
Words
1,688
49th percentile
Sentences
78
51st percentile
Readability
59
86th percentile
Grade
10.4
25th percentile
Syntax
2.82
24th percentile
Vocabulary
2.11
29th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 71%68%
  • Ceremonial 15%14%
  • Geopolitical 8%8%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

78 sentences in 20 paragraphs

I will never withdraw a statement which I am certain is founded on fact. Then the Secretary of State claimed all the commercial classes. Of course, when the Conservative party

1049

of this country is known to have thrown its weight behind a scheme of this kind—this has been going on for the last three years—the commercial classes in India have despaired, and their despair is now quoted as if it was their approval. When the Prime Minister emphasises the safeguards, when the White Paper emphasises the safeguards, they are, of course, magnified for British consumption, and when it comes to India the opera glasses are turned round the other way. There are two audiences and two voices. We heard that the Government was confronted with the dilemma—either the safeguards are real, in which case responsible government is a sham; or responsible government is real, in which case the safeguards are a fraud. There is another dilemma into which we must ourselves be careful not to fall. That is, are we opposing this scheme for what it concedes or for what it withholds? Let me say that I think we ought to condemn it both for what it concedes and for what it withholds. The greatest objection to the scheme is that it neither gives nor withholds on any coherent or workable plan. On the one hand it offers autonomy in the most sweeping terms; on the other it sets up autocracy in an extreme form. It leaves these two opposite principles to struggle together within the heart and brain of the government of India.

It is a perfect plan for inaugurating an era of ceaseless strife, and the contending forces are evenly balanced. Both are armed with great power and great facilities, so that their warfare will be long, exciting, equal and calamatous; but I cannot conceive a scheme of which it could more properly be said that it comes "not to bring peace but a sword." The Viceroy or Governor-General is armed with all the powers of a Hitler or a Mussolini. There is practically nothing that he cannot do in the sphere of the Army and foreign affairs. He has the power to tax apart from the Legislature; he has the right to safeguard minorities; he has the right to safeguard the interests of the Civil Service; he has the right to safeguard the interests of the native States; he is authorised to prevent commercial discrimination. All these great powers are confided to him. By a stroke of the pen he can scatter the Constitution and decree any law he pleases, or

1050

martial law, which is no law at all. Of all these he is the sole judge.

Such a functionary is a dictator, and he has behind him a very powerful Army. Yet at the same time he is instructed to work a democratic Constitution tactfully, and to govern by consent, when consent is not forthcoming. I pause to ask, have such opposite qualities ever been united in the breast of a single human being The phlegm of Bismarck, the energy of Mussolini, the special knowledge of Colonel Lawrence, the high ideals of Mr. Gladstone, the deft persuasiveness of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George)—all would seem to be needed in the functionary who has to discharge these opposite tasks and with so much thoroughness. The Secretary of State said yesterday that the Viceroy would have less to do than he had to do now. I should have thought that that was an absolutely absurd contention.

Let me look at the constitutional aspect. All these safeguards which are placed in the hands of the Viceroy are not new; they are not new creations of the Government. They all reside at the present moment in the structure of the Government of India, in the Viceroy and his Council, in the Secretary of State and his Council, in the great Indian Departments, and in this House. They are all there. But what we are doing now, and I think it singularly unfortunate, is to pick out all these essential safeguards and to set them out in a row, in a category, to be the target of every kind of criticism, and to place the Viceroy in a position where he, the representative of the King-Emperor, is responsible and can be made responsible and blamed for almost everything that takes place in this vast Empire.

But there is one notable omission from the Viceroy's powers. He is removed from the people he has to govern. The only functions of Government, practically, that are outside his jurisdiction, are those which concern the daily welfare of the masses, their education, justice, hospitals, their railways, their engineering works, the care of their forests and natural resources, the weight of taxation. He can, I gather, increase taxation, but not diminish it. All these things are beyond his sphere. We have a superman, not yet found, who has everything laid upon him except to mitigate the lot of the common

1051

people. That is judged unworthy of his attention; that can be safely transferred and handed over. I even heard the Secretary of State boast, glory in the fact that the affairs of 230,000,000 people were handed over freely, lock, stock and barrel, to these new legislatures, untrained and untried, which in all other respects are to be carefully controlled by safeguards.

I hope the House was stirred by the very powerful speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood). He certainly struck a new note in this controversy. The powers of the Viceroy and the Governor-General, immense as they are, are counter-worked, to make things equal, by other provisions of this Constitution. The holder of these great powers is rendered virtually impotent. For his information he has to depend upon responsible Ministers; he has to work through them and the departments which they control. The police, 180,000 of them, in five years are possibly not even to be recruited by him. Even the Army is spoken of as a force which is to be transferred some day to Indian hands. All the great services which make the life of the Indian superior to the life of the Chinese have been taken from the purview of the Viceroy. The British officials are provided with an emergency exit so that they can throw up their jobs, should their condition become intolerable. The lonely Satrap has all the power, but it is blind power. He has no means of acting upon the hundreds of millions of people he controls, except by troops. His position is very similar to that occupied by the Tsar of Russia before the Revolution, with immense power, immense ceremony, mighty military forces, but no real contact with his people.

Where, I should like to know, would a general be without his staff? Where would a Member be without his local organisation Where would a Minister be without his Department? Where would a Government be in times of distress if the police were withdrawn from the control of the Executive? Such is the position of the Governor-General. He can tax, but who is to collect the taxes? He can overrule an Act of commercial discrimination, but if there is a boycott to effect the same purpose as the Act would have done, he must go to the very

1052

Ministers he has overruled and ask for their support in controlling the boycott. He can protect the rights of the Civil Service, but their appointment, their treatment, all their daily affairs, will be in the hands of responsible Ministers, who, I cannot help feeling, will increasingly wish to get a very large reduction in the number of white officials. Why should they wish these officials gone? My right hon. Friend has made it abundantly plain. These British officials are to be the cadre, the steel framework upon which this country has to rely to enforce all the safeguards.

Of course, the position of these officials will be very invidious. You cannot consider the state of the Indian Services as they are to-day; you have to consider the state in which they will be in four or five years' time, when they have been under responsible native administration. They will be an organism of Indian life, and it is by no means to be taken for granted, indeed it is even improbable, that these great departments can be taken over at a moment's notice by the Viceroy or by the Governor-General simply by an act of power at a time when probably there is a great Nationalist movement in progress in India, and when he is overruling and dismissing the responsible Government which has been set up. Why should Indian officials risk their livelihood and their careers against their own fellow-countrymen in an emergency of this kind, for the sake of an Imperial Power—an alien Power I think the Foreign Secretary said they called it—which has declared itself in process of liquidation and is actually in train to hand over its authority to a new regime? My right hon. Friend the Member for Hillhead quoted a statement from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru yesterday, but he left out, by accident, a very important passage which I must read to the House:

The Constitution, however, places such a powerful weapon in your hands that if you can send into your legislatures the right sort of men, I have not the least doubt you can achieve all you want probably much quicker than you imagine, because the cumulative weight and effect of these changes will be such that they dare not resist your demand for the further expansion of the Constitution, its natural and logical evolution being Dominion status.

A little further on he said to his colleagues:

1053

I would advise you all to grasp power, for it is far better that you should send those who oppose you to gaol than suffer yourself to be shut up. I therefore say it is the duty of every one of you to capture the machinery.