- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate on the Navy Estimates in London on March 16, 1939, opposing the scrapping of the Royal Sovereign battleships and setting out British naval strategy against Germany and in the Mediterranean.
- Main themes
- Scrapping of the Royal Sovereign class battleships, German 8-inch gun cruisers as super-Emdens, reinstitution of the convoy system, Royal Sovereigns as ocean convoy escorts, Anglo-German Naval Agreement and tonnage limits, German armament spending and the air programme, earlier reversed Admiralty decisions, German command of the Baltic, British command of the Mediterranean, Lord Chatfield's doctrine of seeking out the enemy fleet, Anglo-French naval cooperation
- Duration
- ~23 min
- Words
- 2,768
- Sentences
- 110
- Readability
- 55
- Grade
- 12.1
- Syntax
- 3.18
- Vocabulary
- 2.12
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other110 sentences in 24 paragraphs
I hope that the denunciation which I am now endeavouring to apply to what has been done, or proposed to be done, will, at any rate, have the effect of saving the others. The House would hardly gather from the euphemistic phrase the Parliamentary Secretary employed—"replacement"—that these two ships are to be destroyed. That does not tell us what one would expect, that until the new ships are in commission the old ones will be kept in reserve. In other days I used to say that when the ace is out the king is the best card. These old ships can play their part, although we must be careful not to bring them into contact with new ships in the event of war.
I will outline my argument against this course in this way. Old as they are the Royal Sovereigns have a vital and final service to render us. Under the Treaty of London, and various other agreements, we have been prevented from building any 8-inch gun cruisers for five or six years, and Germany will have at an early date in the future five 8-inch gun cruisers which will be definitely superior in speed, armour and gun power combined to any vessel in our Fleet except our battle-cruisers or our battleship-cruisers. That is a very serious matter. These German vessels in the event of war would be super-Emdens, let out upon our trade routes, and they would inflict very heavy losses. But whereas in the case of the "Emden" and her consorts the "Karlsruhe" and "Konigsberg" we had 100 cruisers with which to envelop, pursue and destroy them, we have now a far smaller number, and it makes the problem much more serious. That is only half the story. The "Emden" was a small ship of 3,000 tons with 4-inch guns, which have only to be caught to be killed. You are going to have in the near future five super-Emdens of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns, against which you have not only lost half the number of cruisers to bring them to book but nothing except battle-cruisers which can at once engage them and kill them in single ship action. All this arises out of treaty entanglements which in every single respect have hampered our naval construction, made it more difficult for us to get true value for
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the taxpayers' money and produce the best classes of fighting vessels with the money provided.
What is the conclusion I draw from all this? It is that we shall certainly be forced in any war that may occur in the next few years to re-institute the convoy system, not so much against the submarine as against enemy cruisers on the broad waters of the ocean. It might be a year of war before these raiding cruisers are extirpated, and meanwhile 45,000,000 people in this island have to be fed and we have to carry on our trade without which we cannot purchase the supplies we require not only for war but for keeping body and soul together. You will have to institute the convoy system on the broad waters of the ocean. After this preliminary and on this footing I come to the case of the five Royal Sovereigns. These are the very ships which would be the surest escorts of your ocean convoys. No raiding cruiser would dare to come within range of their 15-inch guns. Their speed is much greater than that of any convoy of merchant ships. They are the ideal vessels to bring in a three-monthly convoy of 60, 70 or 80 vessels from Australia or the Cape, or from South America, quite safely across the oceans until they come within the regions where other escorts would be needed to deal with the submarine. The range of their enormous heavy guns would afford complete protection from a raiding cruiser, even to a very large convoy. This, at any rate in the early stages of a war, would be an enormous convenience to us. Yet these are the very ships, whose function it would cost us so many millions to provide in other ways, which are to be taken out and scrapped and destroyed although they may play a vital part in the feeding of this island.
We have heard some reasons why such a monstrous decision has been made. Under the Anglo-German-Agreement no provision was made, as some of us suggested, that old ships should be counted at a lower tonnage than new ships in estimating the tonnage of German naval construction. If we keep the Royal Sovereigns Germany would be entitled under the Treaty to build two additional battleships in the four year period in question, and they have asked us to state, as they have a right to ask, in advance what we propose to do. We have
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promised to scrap or sink the first two Royal Sovereigns, and I presume, that there is no hope now of rescuing the others from that imprudent decision. I put it to the House that it would be far better to let them build their two additional battleships, if they want to do so. There are two arguments for this. The first is that it will take them four years from 1942 to build the first extra battleship, and for good or ill this hideous armaments race will stand in an entirely different position in 1946. But at the mere threat of an additional German battleship arriving on the seas seven years hence we are in 1942 to destroy these important Royal Sovereigns which may be of vital service to us in the intervening years. We are to go without a real and necessary prop during a most critical period to ward off a hypothetical danger—it may not be to Germany's interest to build the two battleships—which cannot mature until the critical period is over.
And can we be sure that after we have scrapped our Royal Sovereigns Germany will not say that the situation is changed and build her battleships none the less? Such things have happened. At any rate, we should be very chary of getting rid of something of value to us on the mere possibility that thereby we may deter Germany from building something which in my view is not of very great value to her. Why should we be disturbed if Germany chooses to build an additional battleship? I would rather see her build an additional battleship than that she should build these extra squadrons of commerce raiders. I say that quite frankly.
It must be remembered that Germany, like all countries, is now at full extension in armament production, groaning and straining in that tremendous effort. Already she is spending 26 per cent. of her national income on warlike preparations. All labour, skilled and unskilled, is employed to the utmost. The park railings and even iron crosses in the graveyards are being melted down for scrap. What is given to one service in these circumstances must be taken from another. This applies not only to money but especially to skilled labour and to high-quality war materials which have to be purchased across the Exchange. I say frankly I would much rather see Germany build two additional battleships than that
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the £20,000,000 which I suppose they would cost by then should be thrown into a further expansion of the German air programme. Whatever happens, whatever they do, we can keep an overwhelming lead in the line of battle. How very different is the picture in the air. There we are struggling to catch up; there we are on far more difficult ground. Why should we seek to deter Germany from consuming her substance and natural energy in a sphere where we have a sure means of keeping our supremacy, and perhaps transfer her activity into a sphere in which already, through past neglects, we are condemned to a far weaker position? Why, for the purposes of this in itself detrimental process, should we lead out to the slaughter yards these great vessels which have a most important and probably even a vital function to discharge?
I hope this matter may be reconsidered, as the question of the Immediate Reserve was reconsidered; as the omission of a flotilla last year was reconsidered; and as the scrapping of five small cruisers in 1936, about which so much argument had to be used, was reconsidered. They were absolutely useless before it was decided not to scrap them, and now they are most valuable and important units of the Fleet. All three mistakes were made, and defended with a wealth of argument and professional authority; and they have all been repaired after a loss of valuable time. Do not let us make a fourth mistake on a far more important scale, and deprive ourselves during some most dangerous years of our history of resources which we already have in being, and of which we have need. I hope this argument may be considered. I am grieved very much to hear that commitments have already been made, but let us at any rate save the rest from that fate. It gives me a certain feeling of anxiety, when I think of the enormous demands made on the taxpayers, that vessels of this kind are simply put out of existence without any attempt to discuss the matter openly—wiped out—and then at the same time we have to come forward, as we willingly do, and provide great funds for the creation of vast new construction.
I am going to imitate the example of the right hon. Gentleman who spoke for the Opposition, and confine myself to
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modest limits. I have only one more point which I shall venture to submit to the House. But I cannot conclude without making a reference to Naval strategy which I am sure is in the public interest. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that some of these matters must be discussed. The Government may have difficulty in discussing them, but they must be discussed in this House in order that a sound opinion may be formed on these matters. I shall merely place before the House the heads of the argument. The German Navy in the next few years will not be able to form a line of battle for a general engagement. One would expect that cruisers and submarines would be sent out to attack commerce, but I think you may take it as absolutely certain that the prime object of the German Navy will be to preserve command of the Baltic, which is of supreme consequence to Germany, not only because of the supplies she can obtain from the Scandinavian countries, and the influence she can exert over them, but because the loss of naval command in the Baltic would lay the whole of the Baltic shores of Germany open to attack or possible invasions from other Baltic Powers, of which the largest and most important is, of course, the Soviet Union. Thus, you may be sure that no use will be made of the German fleet which will compromise their loss of command of the Baltic. It was for this reason that they have been and are still quite content with a ratio of 35 per cent, to the British Fleet, because that fully occupies their building resources, or all the resources they think fit to assign at present to their naval development, and because it enables them to achieve the practical and necessary object which they have in view, namely, the maintenance of command of the Baltic.
On the other hand, for Britain in time of war, the command of the Mediterranean must be the prime objective. There should be no difficulty in securing this, even if we were engaged single-handed with any one of the Mediterranean Powers, and had at the same time to watch the debouches from the Baltic and the Elbe. Although great new British fleets which are now under construction are not yet ready, there is still an ample superiority of sea-power available to secure and hold command of the Mediterranean. The developments which have taken place, and which were described to
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us by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty this afternoon, in anti-submarine measures and in the anti-aircraft gunnery of our Fleet, and the structural alterations to our ships against overhead attack, are, I entirely agree with the Parliamentary Secretary, such that we may reasonably expect that our great preponderance of surface craft will make itself fully effective in future, as it has done in the past. I think it is a safe rule to treat the sailors of every country as equally brave and skilful, and I should, therefore, feel confidence in the very large British Naval superiority of numbers which would exist in a war against a Mediterranean Power. This superiority would become even more ample if the British and French Fleets were acting in combination. Presumably, they would be combined, as we shall never make war except as a result of unprovoked aggression upon us or upon our ally. Therefore, it seems that an overwhelming superiority will be available.
Now, there is a school of thought which favours what is called "sealing up both ends of the Mediterranean," and leaving it as a closed sea. This policy will, I hope, be rejected by the Admiralty—I hope particularly by the present First Lord of the Admiralty who, in a matter like this, as the Parliamentary Secretary reminded us, may hear the promptings of ancestral voices. To gain and hold command of the Mediterranean in case of war is a high duty of the Fleet. Once that is achieved, all European land forces on the shores of North Africa will be decisively affected. Those that have command of the Mediterranean behind them can be reinforced to any extent and supplied to any extent. Those that have no such command will be like cut flowers in a vase. A hostile Power which had commitments overseas in the Mediterranean could not afford to keep its fleet in harbour; it would have to come out to make sure that communications with its forces were not intercepted or their operations interfered with by operations from the sea, and consequently, there would be no means by which such a fleet could avoid the necessity of fighting a naval engagement, and possibly at very heavy odds.
No doubt for the first few months or weeks, while actual fighting for the command of the Mediterranean was proceed-
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ing, it would be prudent to deflect our Eastern merchant traffic round the Cape. But that in no way affects the general argument for immediate decisive operations to obtain full and unquestioned command of the inland sea. Therefore, I was very glad to hear Lord Chatfield yesterday lay down the sound doctrine that it is the duty of the Royal Navy to "seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet." There is the true note to strike. But it is not possible to be simultaneously strong everywhere. Sacrifices must be made and punishment must be taken in some theatres in order that speedy victory may be gained in the decisive theatre. After the victory has been won there are ample resources which will be available to restore the position in more distant theatres. If there is anything left over which is not restored, that could be settled at the peace conference. It should not be long before we were in a position to restore the position in the more distant theatres. Therefore, I submit that the first main effort should be to secure and keep command of the Mediterranean. Lord Chatfield's statement was no doubt of general application; he did not suggest it was given a particular application; but none the less, it was most timely, because such a doctrine, vigorously applied, will influence the foreign policy of every Mediterranean Power, both in deterring possible antagonists from attacking us or our allies, and in encouraging other States bordering on the Mediterranean, who are animated by the most friendly feelings towards us, to pursue their part in confidence.
It is refreshing in times like these for us to take an afternoon off from black care and dwell upon the great and growing strength of our Navy, and to feel confidence that the new inventions in the air and under the water, properly countered as they have been and are being, do not in any decisive degree deprive us of the measureless resources of sea-power with all that has so often followed in its train.
