The War At Sea.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · First Lord of the Admiralty

6 December 1939 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, reviewed the first three months of the naval war for the House of Commons in London on December 6, 1939, announcing a retaliatory embargo on German exports.
Main themes
First three months of the naval war, U-boat destruction rates, magnetic mines, convoy system, armament of merchant ships, neutral shipping losses, retaliatory embargo on German exports, British merchant tonnage losses and gains, Royal Navy warship losses, trawler crews and mine-sweeping, German propaganda on mines, Rawalpindi and Royal Oak
Duration
~25 min
75th percentile
Words
2,989
75th percentile
Sentences
115
69th percentile
Readability
51
66th percentile
Grade
13.0
56th percentile
Syntax
3.23
75th percentile
Vocabulary
2.30
74th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 62%46%
  • Economic 29%22%
  • Institutional 5%3%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 25%

115 sentences in 31 paragraphs

I dare say the House will find it convenient if I review the course of the naval war during the first three months of its course and try to give some outline of the present position.

The main attack of the enemy has been concentrated upon the Royal Navy and the sea-borne commerce upon which the British Islands and British Empire depend. We have always, as I reminded the House the other day, considerably more than 2,000 ships at sea, and between too and 150 ships move every day in and out of our harbours in the United Kingdom alone. This immense traffic has to be maintained in the teeth of a constant U-boat attack, which never hesitates to break the conventions of civilised warfare to which Germany has so recently subscribed. We have also been frequently attacked from the air. Mining on a large scale has been practised against us; and latterly magnetic mines have been dropped from aeroplanes or laid by submarines on the approaches to our harbours, with the intention of destroying British, and still more, apparently, neutral commerce. These mines have been laid contrary to the accepted rules of sea-warfare and of specific German engagements in regard to them. Besides this, two of the so-called "pocket" battleships, and certainly one other cruiser, have been loose for many weeks past in the North and South Atlantic, or near Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.

The Admiralty task has been to bring in our immense world-wide traffic in spite of this opposition. Besides this, we have to cleanse the seas of all German commerce, and to arrest every German vessel and every scrap of cargo in which Germany is interested. Broadly speaking, as I shall presently show, these considerable duties have, up to the present, been successfully discharged. The destruction of the U-boats is proceeding normally, and in accordance with the estimate I gave to the House of between two and four a week, that is to say, at a rate superior to what we believe to be the German power of replac-

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ing the competently trained U-boat captains and crews. When I see statements, as I have done lately, that the Germans during 1940 will have as many as 400 U-boats in commission, and that they are producing these vessels by what is called "the chainbelt system," I wonder if they are producing the U-boat captains and crews by a similar method. If so, it seems likely that our rate of destruction might well undergo a similar expansion.

Enterprise and daring have been shown by U-boat commanders, who seek to emulate the exploit of Scapa Flow by penetrating into our defended harbours, and several graves of U-boats lie upon their approaches. The rate of destruction varies, of course, with the numbers of U-boats which are actively hunting. This fluctuates from time to time, and we have noticed three periods of maximum activity, interspersed with periods of minimum activity, when, presumably, the bulk of the raiders return home for rest and refreshment. In the last week they have been active, and we are inclined to think that five certainly have met their fate, either from our flotillas or from the ardent, skilful and invaluable cooperation of the Royal Air Force and particularly of the Coastal Command. These figures are, of course, independent of any results achieved by the French Navy.

Nevertheless, this struggle proceeds upon a margin which, though adequate, is not extravagant, and when we consider the possibility, as we always must, of some unexpected development of numbers by the enemy, it is a comfort to feel that very great reinforcements to our hunting-craft in home waters, which have already been tripled since the beginning of the war, will come into service during 194o. I must again repeat the warning which I gave to the House in September, that a steady flow of losses must be expected, that occasional disasters will occur, and that any failure upon our part to act up to the level of circumstances would immediately be attended by grave dangers. It is, however, my sure belief that we are getting the better of this menace to our life. We are buffeted by the waves, but the ocean tides flow steady and strong in our favour.

In the course of this war the U-boats have tended to turn from using the gun

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to using the torpedo, and from summoning ships on the surface to sinking them at sight without warning or provision for the crews. This carries them into a form of warfare at once more ruthless and at the same time far less effective. The under-water attack by torpedo can only be delivered at a quarter of the speed that it is possible for a U-boat to move on the surface, and the chances of their intercepting ships or convoys are, therefore, greatly reduced. In addition to our armed merchant cruisers we have armed already more than 1,000 merchant ships for self-defensive purposes, and this process is continuing with all possible speed. It will not be long before we shall have 2,000 vessels so armed. These merchant ships, in accordance with the oldest rights of the sea, fire back when they are attacked. The merchant captains and seamen show a resolute disposition to defend themselves, and many duels are fought in which the U-boat, fearing to be damaged, and thus to be unable to dive, gives up the attack and is beaten off. The efficacy of the asdic method of detection is increasingly proved, and as our margin in hunting craft increases, as it has done and will do rapidly, the ordeal to which the U-boat is subjected will become ever more severe.

The convoy system is now in full operation. Very few ships have been attacked in convoy; less than one in 750 has been sunk. Nevertheless we must remember that convoy involves a certain definite loss of carrying power, since the ships have to wait during the assembly of the convoy, and the convoy must travel at the speed of the slowest ship. This loss is being steadily reduced by the institution of slow and fast convoys, and by other appropriate measures; but a certain delay must always remain, a certain diminution, that is to say, in the actual fertility of our convoys.

In consequence of our defence and the defence of our merchant ships, the U-boats have found it easier to attack neutral shipping than to attack the vessels of Britain and France. They prefer increasingly to attack the ships of countries with whom they are at peace, rather than those of the countries with whom they are at war. The figures are remarkable. The losses of British merchant ships in

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October were half what they were in September, and in November they were only two-thirds of what they were in October. There has been a strong and steady diminution of loss among all ships obeying Admiralty directions or joining our convoys. Quite the contrary has been the case with the neutrals. They lost half as much again in the second month as they did in the first, and double as much in the third month of the war as they did in the second. It is indeed, as the Prime Minister said the other day, a strange war—it is a strange kind of warfare for the German Navy to engage in, when, driven off the shipping of their declared enemy, they console themselves by running amok among the shipping of neutral nations. This fact ought to encourage neutrals to charter their ships to Great Britain for the duration of the war, when they can be sure of making larger profits than they have ever made in peace, and have a complete guarantee against loss. The Ministry of Shipping have already arranged the charter of several millions of tonnage, and it seems probable that this healthy process will continue to mutual and even to general advantage.

In the last few weeks the German U-boats, having largely abandoned the gun for the torpedo, have descended from the torpedo to the mine. This is about the lowest form of warfare that can be imagined. It is the warfare of the I.R.A., leaving the bomb in the parcels office at the railway station. The magnetic mine, deposited secretly by the U-boat under the cloak of darkness in the approaches to our harbours, or dropped by parachutes from aircraft, may perhaps be Herr Hitler s much vaunted secret weapon. It is certainly a characteristic weapon, and one that will no doubt be for ever associated with his name. More than half our losses in the last month have been due to the magnetic mine, but two-thirds of the total losses from the use of this mine have fallen not upon belligerents but upon neutrals. In fact, in the third month of the war, neutral losses by mine have been twice as great as British losses, and neutral losses of all kinds have been one-third greater than belligerent losses. These losses have fallen upon Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Belgian, Finnish, Yugoslav, Dutch, Greek, Italian and Japanese

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vessels, who have had to pay a heavy toll for remaining in friendly relations with. Germany. So far as the sea war is concerned, German friendship has proved far more poisonous than German enmity.

The magnetic mine is neither new nor mysterious. As the Prime Minister announced in his broadcast, its secrets are known to us. Indeed the preparation of counter-measures was already far advanced before the first magnetic mine was laid in British waters. I do not wish, however, in any way to underrate the magnitude or intensity of the effort which will be required and is now forthcoming to cope with this latest manifestation of Nazi culture. Many variants are being developed and applied, and as an interim measure, before the full scientific treatment can be given to this procedure, we have found it necessary to call upon a large number of trawlers to assist in the dredging of our harbours. The service of mine-sweeping is one of peculiar danger and one calculated to try the strongest nerves because of the silence and constant uncertainty of destruction in which those who engage in it must dwell. The fact of this serious danger was sufficient to bring forward an overwhelming response from the fishermen, the trawler crews, when called upon to come to their country's assistance, though I imagine in this case for only a comparatively short time. Offices when they opened on the Saturday night at some of the fishing ports were crowded and thronged and had to be kept open all night and on the Sunday, and in a very short time a full complement was made up of these fisher folk, eager to serve their country in a manner which they felt would be really effective.

I do not say more about this at the moment. Events must tell their tale, and at the Admiralty we shall be content to be judged by the results of our exertions. Perhaps when we come together after Christmas, I shall be able to give more information upon the subject.

The recklessness of this latest attack upon neutrals, and the breach of international agreements which it involves, have led us to place a retaliatory embargo upon the export of all goods of German ownership or origin. This measure was taken in the late war, when it worked with surprising smoothness and efficiency.

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German oversea exporting power was rapidly destroyed, and with it perished all power of building up new credits abroad. No serious inconvenience need be caused to neutrals. They have only to avoid carrying tainted goods in their ships, and they can easily obtain a certificate from the British Consular officers in neutral countries, which will enable them to proceed upon their outward voyages without interference or delay from us. It is satisfactory to learn that goods for export are already piling up on the German quays and in their warehouses to such an extent that, we are told, they hamper the handling of incoming merchandise. This latter congestion will, however, be relieved as our blockade tightens through the growing strength of our patrolling and blockading squadrons.

A strident effort has been made by German propaganda to persuade the world that we have laid these magnetic mines ourselves in the fairways of our own harbours, in order, apparently, to starve ourselves out. When this inanity expired amid general derision, the alternative claim was made that the sinking of the neutrals by mine was another triumph of German science and seamanship, and should convince all nations that the German mastery of the seas was complete. This claim may be tested by a general survey of the results of the first three months of war. We began the war with 21 million tons of merchant shipping. This figure, of course, includes ships on the Great Lakes of North America, and a number of very small coastal vessels. Out of this total we have lost during the three months in which we have been subject to severe and concentrated attack by all kinds of methods, fair and foul, by U-boat, by mine, by surface raider, and by the hazards of the sea, about 340,000 tons. Against this we have gained by transfer from foreign flags, independent of the large chartering operations to which I have referred, by prizes taken from the enemy, and by the new vessels we are building on a very large scale, about 280,000 tons, leaving a nett loss of about 60,000 tons.

We should have to go back to the Hundred Years War in order to provide sufficient time and scope for inroads of this degree to make any serious impression upon the scale of our mercantile

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marine. For every 1,000 tons of British shipping sunk 110,000 tons have entered or left the ports of this threatened island, which we are told, upon the enemy's authority, is beleaguered and beset on all sides, in the first three months of war. In the month of November, nearly a quarter of a million tons of our shipping entered or cleared from our harbours for every 1,000 tons lost, a proportion of 250 to one. When from day to day we read in the papers of the losses, which are always advertised and often placarded, and one notices "another ship sunk," "four ships reported sunk" and items like that, it is necessary to correct our passing impressions by reference to the broad, underlying facts which govern the situation.

If the House feels that these facts are reassuring and worthy of acknowledgment, their debt is due to the officers and men of the Royal Navy and of the Merchant Service, and also, in increasing measure, to their comrades of the Royal Air Force, as well as to our Allies, the French, about whom I spoke on the last occasion, and to the small though highly efficient Polish flotillas which have lent us their aid.

The losses which have fallen upon the protecting warships of the Royal Navy are necessarily heavier in proportion than those which affect the Mercantile Marine. His Majesty's warships run greater risks as, unlike merchant ships, they have to seek the enemy wherever he may be. The Navy has never been so many days at sea each month as in this war plying in the most dangerous waters. The price for sea control must be paid. It is often heavy. We make a rule to publish all losses of British warships by enemy action, at the earliest moment when it is possible to inform the relatives of the survivors. There has, been no exception to this rule. We do not publish damage to His Majesty's ships unless this becomes widely known, or is certainly known to the enemy. These ships can be repaired very often within a few weeks, and there is not the slightest reason why we should be at pains to inform the enemy of matters which he cannot find out for himself, but greatly desires to know. We have lost, in these three months of war, two great ships, the "Courageous" and the "Royal Oak," two destroyers, and the submarine which

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was blown up by accident, in all, about 50,000 tons. We have at present building, much of it in an advanced stage, nearly 1,000,000 tons of warships of all classes. We have also lost one of our 50 armed merchant cruisers, the "Rawalpindi," whose glorious fight against overwhelming odds deserves the respect and honour of the House and of the nation.

However, our losses in warships during the first three months of war of 1914 were more than double those we have now suffered. Of course, war is full of ugly and unpleasant surprises. No one must indulge in easy habits of mind, or relax for one moment the vigilant attention to the fortunes of the State, and that fearless desire to measure the real facts and understand them and master them which are incumbent upon all citizens, and still more upon their Parliamentary representatives. If I have given this afternoon facts and figures of reassurance, it is only because the House and the nation have a right to know them, and because the House and the nation can alike be trusted to use these good tidings only as a stimulus and fortification to the much greater efforts which will be certainly required from us as this fierce and obstinate conflict rises to its full height. We have the means, and we have the opportunity, of marshalling the whole vast strength of the British Empire, and of the Mother Country, and directing these steadfastly and unswervingly to the fulfilment of our purpose, and the vindication of our cause, and for each and for all, as for the Royal Navy, the watchword should be "Carry on, and dread nought."