- Context
- Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, presented the Navy Estimates to the House of Commons in London on February 27, 1940, asking for token votes and reviewing the U-boat, mine and battleship situation.
- Main themes
- Navy Estimates and token votes, U-boat losses and German building rates, magnetic mine countermeasures, fishermen volunteers for mine-sweeping, merchant shipbuilding under the Admiralty, arming of fishing and merchant vessels, German atrocities and neutral reaction, Altmark episode, role of battleships and capital ship superiority, ageing battleships and new King George V class, parliamentary committees on war expenditure, waste and extravagance in wartime
- Duration
- ~29 min
- Words
- 3,464
- Sentences
- 130
- Readability
- 55
- Grade
- 12.3
- Syntax
- 3.32
- Vocabulary
- 2.09
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other130 sentences in 34 paragraphs
I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
I come before the House, on behalf of the Navy, to ask for a few men, some ships, and a little money, to enable them to carry on their work, which has become important to us all at the present time. In making this request, I am emboldened by the remarkable consideration with which naval affairs have been treated during this war by all parties in the House. It seems to me that since I last presented Navy Estimates in war-time—25 years ago, almost to a day—there has grown up a very much wider comprehension of the conditions under which the Navy and the Admiralty do their duty; of their difficulties, and of the certainty that mistakes will be made both at Whitehall and on salt water, and that, however hard we try, a painful drain of losses will be sustained.
I am grateful to the House—not only to my hon. Friends on this side, but to the right hon. Member who speaks for the Opposition and to the Leader of the Liberal party, for this spirit of tolerance, of understanding, and even indulgence with which we have been and are being treated; and I can assure the House that it will only make us more zealous in the discharge of our task, in order to give satisfaction and win approval by producing good results. The earnestness and vigour with which Parliament is supporting the Crown in waging this very grievous war, and the unstinted money contribution which the House of Commons has made for that purpose, imposes the highest obligation upon the armed Forces, and upon the Parliamentary Ministers entrusted with their superintendence and direction.
I regret that it is not expedient to lay precise facts and figures of the proposed strength and cost of the Navy in the coming year before the House, as we
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should naturally desire to do. In the first place, it is physically impossible to make exact estimates for contingencies which are constantly changing; and, in the second place, there is no need to tell the enemy more than is good for him about what we are doing. We, therefore, ask the House to show us a special mark of confidence by allowing us to present only token votes. But this must not in the slightest degree relax or baffle the vigilance of Parliament in preventing waste and exposing errors, should such be detected.
The Parliamentary Committees which the House desired, and which the Chancellor of the Exchequer instituted, are now at work in all three Services. I have given particular directions at the Admiralty that all officials and officers required shall attend before them, and assist them in their work. Many have already been examined, but they can be recalled at any time, and there are many others who have not yet been seen; and all those have full liberty to disclose all matters bearing on the subject except those which, being of a specially secret nature, the Committee themselves would not desire to know. Should any difficulty arise, I hold myself entirely at the disposal of the Committee examining Admiralty expenditure. I hope they will not confine themselves to taking evidence in London, but will go to the naval ports and establishments and see things on the spot for themselves.
Of course, there is bound to be both extravagance and waste in time of war. In our country, accustomed to strict Parliamentary supervision, this waste arises very rarely from fraud or corruption. It arises sometimes from inefficiency, and is capable of correction. It arises most of all, I think, from excessive zeal in preparing against dangers which often change, and sometimes fade as soon as they are faced; and still more from the well-intentioned desire of every branch and section to reach 100 percent. standard of safety, which, of course, is never attainable in war. An officer, in any station, serves his country best by asking for no more than he needs for his task. It is not patriotic to ask for the moon—and you do not get it, either. The Navy has borne, and is bearing, the main weight of the war up to the present, and many vexatious and dangerous forms of attack are directed upon us; but if at
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any time in the future it becomes apparent that we have got the upper hand in an even more marked and decisive form than at present, I shall be the first to propose a review of our resources and requirements—and we have quite a lot—in order to aid the national war-effort in other directions.
That time has not yet come. We must clearly expect that attacks will be delivered upon the sea-power by which we live, on which all depends, on a far greater scale than anything we have so far beaten back and beaten down. We have been making, from the outset of the war, immense additional preparations to meet these reinforced attacks, whether they come from U-boats, or from the mine-laying of various kinds, or from the air.
Let me first say a word about the U-boat warfare. I have "opined"—if I may find an opportunity to give such a sorry word a job—and it seems to fit the case—that our killings of U-boats may be estimated at between two and four a week; but I qualified this by pointing out that it only applies to periods of U-boat activity; because, of course, when very few come out we could not achieve these figures. I believe it is safe to say that, by the end of 1939, the Germans had lost, from all causes, at least half the U-boat fleet with which they began the war. If we put that fleet at 70, this would leave them 35. On the other hand, I was in error when some months ago I told the House that the rate of German new building of U-boats must be counted at two per week. This and even more may be true in the future; but it was not true up to the end of 1939. I doubt very much whether even 10 fresh U-boats came into action in that period. Thus the enemy may have ended the year with about 45 U-boats, of which, of course, 20 would be required for training, leaving perhaps 25 for active operations. As these would work in two or three reliefs, the number at any one time cannot be very large. Indeed, our calculations show that it has probably not exceeded 10 operating at any one time. This figure must be compared with the figure of 60 all operating together which on three occasions marked the high peak of the great U-boat campaign which we wore down and broke in 1917.
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We are getting an increasing number of U-boats. Since the New Year things have sharpened up on both sides, and we have had some quite exceptional weeks of proved results. I see it is said in the papers that another U-boat was sunk yesterday. We do not make announcements of U-boat sinkings unless there are some features of special interest. We leave them wrapped in mystery, but as this case has been mentioned I do not mind saying that it is an under-statement, because actually in the last two days there were one certain and two almost certain U-boat sinkings. This may be satisfactory so far as it goes, but when we remember the substantial losses we have suffered from just these few U-boats operating up to the present, the House will see how vast must be the preparations which we ought to make and which we have made to cope with the full scale of attack which may come upon us later on.
Hitherto we have been fighting with the very modest number of destroyers we had ready at the beginning of the war, supplemented by several hundreds of other small craft, the bulk converted from civilian use, but all armed with the Asdics, with the depth charge, and the gun. But with the passage of the summer the new building of U-boats will increasingly come into play, and we expect to meet these with our very large new buildings of craft specially adapted to their destruction. The token Estimates provide for an immense programme; in fact, we shall be building all this summer at our extreme capacity, subject only to one condition.
I have also undertaken, as the House will remember, at the request of the Cabinet, to try to make a large increase in the rate of merchant shipbuilding in order to replace inevitable losses. Obviously we have to balance one form of building against the other, and that is best done by making the Admiralty responsible for both. I told the House some days ago about this new responsibility which we have accepted. I hope to get, not only leading employers, but also leading trade unionists, into the new Department, so that both sides will be represented, will have a place in the honour of success, and will, I trust, pull together as they have never pulled before, which is very necessary.
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The U-boat has been steadily driven from using the gun, with all its great advantages of speed, upon the surface into the more ruthless but less effective warfare by the torpedo; and it has been largely driven from using the torpedo to the laying of mines, magnetic and others, in the approaches to our harbours. The ordinary moored mines were familiar to us in the last war, and we had at one time upwards of 600 vessels engaged solely on the task of sweeping them up and keeping the channels clear. The use of the magnetic mine produces an additional complication. There is nothing particularly new or novel about it, although mechanically it is very nicely made. I feel entitled to say that we see our way to mastering this magnetic mine and other variants of the same idea. How this has been achieved is a detective story written in a language of its own. Magneticism is a fairly exact science, and its complications and refinements can all be explored and measured. To be modest, we do not feel at all outdone in science in this country by the Nazis. There are, of course, two stages in the process of dealing with the magnetic mine. The first is finding out what to do, and the second is applying this knowledge to practical conditions upon a very large scale. We are now far advanced upon the second stage, and although we must expect, perhaps in the immediate future, further much heavier attacks upon us by this method, we believe we shall find ourselves equipped to deal with them.
To cope with the mining attack, we have had to call upon the fishing fleets and upon the fishermen. Although this year we shall have about a quarter of a million sailors at our disposal, we had at the end of November to call for many thousand volunteers for mine-sweeping duties. There was a most willing response, but the engagement was for only three months. It is now clear that it must be greatly prolonged. The service is, of course, not only dangerous but arduous in a very high degree. However, our volunteers from the fishing fleets seem to have taken a liking to it, probably because everybody knows how very necessary it is to the country and that the job has to be done by men bred to the sea. In many sea ports over 75 per cent. of those who volunteered for three months
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in November now wish to continue for the duration, and the Admiralty are going to meet their wish.
In their attack upon our shipping and neutral shipping the Germans have broken every rule hitherto accepted by the world for the regulation of mining warfare. But then, besides, there are the outrages they have committed upon the fishing fleets and upon small unarmed merchant vessels and upon the lightships which warn the mariners of all countries off the rocks and shoals. So execrable has been the behaviour of some of the German aviators in attacking harmless, unarmed vessels, in machine-gunning their crews when in the boats, and in describing on the radio what fun it was to see a little ship "crackling in flames like a Christmas-tree," that we have had to set about arming all our fishing boats and small craft with the means of defending themselves, because it was found that nothing gives better results in respect to one of these raiders than to fire upon it at once. We have reason to know that several of them have sheered off very quickly when even only fishermen newly given a weapon have fired back upon them. Thousands of guns of all sorts and sizes are being issued to our merchant and to our fishing fleets. The Nazis have retorted by saying that this entitles them to break all the conventions which they had already broken many times over. They may, of course, apply their methods on a larger scale, but they have not for some time been able to descend to any new levels of cruelty and disgrace.
I suppose the House realises that Herr Hitler and his Nazis have quite definitely exceeded the worst villainies which Imperial Germany committed in the late war. This brings me to a point that I should like to put to the House. One of the most extraordinary things that I have ever known in my experience is the way in which German illegalities, atrocities, and brutalities are coming to be accepted as if they were part of the ordinary day-to-day conditions of war. Why, Sir, the neutral Press makes more fuss when I make a speech telling them what is their duty than they have done when hundreds of their ships have been sunk and many thousands of their sailors have been drowned or murdered, for that is the right word, on the open sea. Apparently, according to the present doctrine of neutral States, strongly endorsed
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by the German Government, Germany is to gain one set of advantages by breaking all the rules and committing foul outrages upon the seas, and then go on and gain another set of advantages through insisting whenever it suits her, upon the strictest interpretation of the International Code she has torn to pieces. It is not at all odd that His Majesty's Government are getting rather tired of it. I am getting rather tired of it myself. For my part, I say without hesitation that in the interpretation of the rules and conventions affecting neutrals humanity rather than legal pedantry must be our guide; and, judging by the "Altmark" episode, which gave so much pleasure last week, this seems to be the opinion, not only of the British nation, but of the civilised world.
We must be very thankful that we have our sea power, that we have our Navy, the champion of freedom across the centuries, strong enough and fierce enough to beat down all this wickedness and degeneracy, strong enough to enable us to help our Allies by land and air in their splendid effort—this great institution, which has lived through so many wars, but is still the foundation, in spite of all the changes that have taken place, of our ability to survive and to serve the causes which are now at stake. But let us look at the foundations upon which our sea power rests. Some people think that great battleships are no use at all, that they are only anxieties at sea and a useless burden in port. Everyone sees this war being fought from day to day by the small craft, and they see that the little ships have always to go ahead to protect the big ones, so they ask, "Why have the big ones at all?"
But this is a very superficial view. If we had not got at the present time an unquestioned superiority in battleships, the German heavy cruisers would come out into the Atlantic Ocean and, without fear of being brought to account, would be able to obstruct, if not to arrest, the whole of the enormous trade without which we could not live. They might make temporary bases in distant quarters of the globe, they might establish themselves in positions where we should have no means whatever with which to attack them, and in this way they would soon bring about our mortal ruin. Happily, we have far greater strength in capital ships than the enemy; and if at any time
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they break out, as they may do, we are always ready to meet them with much larger forces and bring them to battle and destroy them, as we did in the isolated case of the. "Graf Spee," although, of course, this would have to be on a much larger scale. Without a superior battle fleet we could not exercise any command of the sea, nor even keep ourselves alive in food.
During the last war we had to keep always ready 30 or40 battleships, with all their attendant squadrons and flotillas at short notice, in order to fight a main battle with the enemy at any time. But now this preoccupation is greatly diminished. The enemy have only two really big ships, and they cannot attempt to form a line of battle. We, on the other hand, have at least three, if not four, possible lines of battle, not one of which the enemy could face in a fought-out engagement. Therefore we are able to dispose our ships much more widely about the oceans, and at the same time to keep ample forces at hand and always at sea ready to engage his principal vessels should they present themselves, and it is upon this fact that the whole of our sea control depends.
However, it must be remembered that at this moment there are no modern battleships in action. Many are building in various countries, but none is in commission. Through the various Treaties into which we entered, and upon which I have sometimes expressed my opinion in former times, all our capital ships are old. Some have been rebuilt, but all except three were approved by me when I was last at the Admiralty more than a quarter of a century ago. In fact, we are fighting this war with the battleships of the last war. This does not affect surface fighting, because our new ships will come along as soon as theirs, and in much greater numbers. In a short time the Fleet will be reinforced by five modern battleships of the King George V Class, against which the enemy, in a similar time, can only bring two. Therefore, we shall not be at any disadvantage so far as surface fighting is concerned.
But the fact that we are using old ships at this present time adds to our anxiety, because the attack from under-water or from the air has become far more formidable since they were built, for the torpedoes, mines and air bombs of 1940 are applied
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to the structures of a bygone generation. Where one torpedo with a 500 lbs. head was fired in 1915, six may be fired in a volley with much heavier heads in 1940. The air bombs descending almost vertically are also a menace which ought not to be underrated, and which did not exist when most of our battleships were built. But the new ships which we are building, which we have accelerated, and which will be ready in time, are capable of standing up to the air bomb, and are far better adapted to under-water explosions than anything we have to-day. I do not wish, however, to raise any undue apprehensions about the strength of our existing ships. When the "Barham" was hit by a torpedo, although an old ship, she stood up well to the heavy blow, and was able to proceed under her own steam. She will soon be repaired and ready for sea. Again, when in the early part of December the "Nelson," the Home Fleet flagship, a more modern ship, but still 15 years old, was damaged by a magnetic mine, she was able to return to harbour under her own steam. She too will soon be rejoining the Fleet. This secret, of which many thousands of people were necessarily aware, was very well kept and has only just leaked out into Germany after it has ceased to have any importance. Apart from the "Royal Oak" and the "Courageous," no other large ship has been damaged or sunk—
