Navy Estimates, 1940.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · First Lord of the Admiralty

27 February 1940 · House of Commons debate on the Navy Estimates · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on February 27, 1940, in the Navy Estimates debate, reviewing the Navy's first six months of war, praising its crews and reporting low shipping losses.
Main themes
Tribute to Royal Navy heavy ships and cruisers, Commander-in-Chief Sir Charles Forbes, Home Fleet as guarantee of sea control, contraband control and Navicert system, Northern Patrol cordon, German ships running the Norwegian coast, balance between blockade and neutral interests, losses of warships and merchant shipping in first six months of war, comparison with 1917 shipping losses, imports and exports tonnage, command of the seas
Duration
~10 min
35th percentile
Words
1,188
35th percentile
Sentences
39
24th percentile
Readability
51
67th percentile
Grade
13.9
66th percentile
Syntax
3.25
77th percentile
Vocabulary
2.16
40th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 64%64%
  • Economic 18%18%
  • Ceremonial 15%15%
  • Institutional 3%3%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

39 sentences in 13 paragraphs

Certainly, all who are concerned with the engine-room, the stokers, and the engine-room parties equally. I am very much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for including them specifically, because certainly the House wishes to express to all of them, stokers-as well, the sense they have of the fine achievement which has been produced by

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their devotion in the actual running of our ships since the outbreak of the war.

I have several times spoken about the destroyer and submarine Flotillas, and the Coastal Command Air Force, which is their ally and friend, but to-day I ask the House to pay its tribute especially to the officers and men in our heavy ships and cruisers who are nearly always out on the rough waters, amid the mines and torpedoes, some of which must often be only very narrowly avoided, and some of which we never hear of at all; and I ask the House to think of them, and particularly of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Forbes, upon whose indomitable shoulders the direct impact of prolonged and wearing responsibility week after week descends.

When people wonder that we can move so freely about these dangerous seas, and move great masses of men and material from one far point to another, let them recognise that the Home Fleet is the supreme and final guarantee. Upon this our contraband control is erected. The Straits of Dover are, of course, closed and sealed. The Northern patrol is maintained by a strongly supported cordon from Scotland to Greenland. But the distance is 1,000 miles, 800 miles of sea. During the winter when fearful gales blow and snowstorms, rainstorms and mists descend upon the sea, when it is night for three-quarters of every 24 hours, it is not surprising that a certain proportion of enemy ships manage to run the gauntlet, and, striking the Norwegian Coast in the Far North, wriggle their way down the 800 miles of territorial waters which carry them into close protection of the main German naval and air forces. Nevertheless, the majority of German ships that have tried to come home have either scuttled themselves at some point on their journey, or have been captured by us as prizes. Now and again a raider has broken out, has lain quiet in the Atlantic for some time, and then crept back. There was one that did not even creep back.

Neutral shipping in the main comes voluntarily into our contraband control stations, or in many cases avails itself of the convenience of being franked for the voyage by the Navicert documents which can readily be obtained at the port of departure. There is a very little doubt that the whole of this Northern system of

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contraband control will become more efficient as our forces increase, as the long nights turn into long days, and as summer weather enables our amphibian aircraft to range constantly over the whole area. For the rest, the efficiency of our contraband control, whether in the North or in the Mediterranean, depends not upon the Navy but upon political decisions; concessions made rightly to neutrals, trade agreements, and the like. There would be no difficulty from a naval point of view in making the blockade more severe. It cost us no more in naval exertion to add the control of German exports to the control already established since the beginning of the war on German imports. But no one must neglect the serious character of the political decisions which must rule and which are dictated by our relations with various neutral countries. A balance has to be struck between the full efficiency of naval control and the hardships it might inflict on friendly neutrals. This is not a matter for the Navy but for the War Cabinet, and it has of course to be reviewed from time to time.

Where then, Sir, do we stand at the end of the first six months of war? We have lost 63,000 tons of warships, or about half the losses of the first six months of the last war. We have lost on the balance of loss and gain less than 200,000 tons of merchant shipping, taking new building and prizes on the one side, out of a total of 21,000,000 of all types-or 17½million in ocean-going shipping, flying the British flag. This figure of less than 200,000 tons in six months may be compared with 450,000 tons net loss in the single deadly month of April, 1917 We have captured more cargoes in tonnage destined for the enemy than we have lost ourselves. During the first two months of war there was inevitable dislocation. But each month there has been a steady improvement in spite of the deterioration of the weather, and in January the Navy carried safely into British harbours, in the teeth of the U-boats, of the mines, and of the winter gales and fog, considerably more than four-fifths of the peace-time average taken over the whole, summer and winter alike, of the three preceding years.

Our exports, measured in tons—and it is with tonnage that the Navy is concerned—were equal in December and January to our exports coming in in those

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months of the last peace-time year of 1938. But now with spring and summer at hand, there is to be expected a considerable normal seasonal increase in the volume of traffic by sea, and apart from any new development of enemy action, a matter which can never be overlooked in any provisions for the future, there is no reason why we should not improve upon these figures. When we consider the great number of British ships which have been withdrawn for Naval Service, or for the transport of our Armies across the Channel or across the globe, there is nothing in these results which—to put it mildly—should cause despondency or alarm, or which justifies the idea that we cannot carry on our national life and the war upon which the national life is centred, with increasing vigour. Any reductions and austerities in home consumption, which we have found, or may find, it necessary to impose upon ourselves, are not due to any failure of the Navy to keep the seas open, but to the need of making prudent preparations against the unknown, and of raising our war effort to the highest pitch.

In 1915, speaking from this Box, on the Motion, Mr. Speaker, that your predecessor should leave the Chair—which he did—I was able to say that our command of the seas was more thorough than ever before in our history, and—although I was not allowed to preside over it—it so continued for more than eighteen months. I will not make any prophecies about the future which is doubly veiled by the obscurities and uncertainties of war. But personally I shall not be content, nor do I think the House should be content, if we do not reach and maintain a control of the seas equal to the highest standards of the last war and enable the Navy once again to play a decisive part in the general victory of the Allies.