A selection of statements during the meeting with a group of people from Khorramshahr and Abadan and members of the Khorramshahr Reconstruction Headquarters.

Iran Ali Khamenei · Supreme Leader of Iran

27 October 1985 · Meeting with a group of people from Khorramshahr and Abadan and members of the Khorramshahr Reconstruction Headquarters

Context
Khamenei addressed residents of Khorramshahr and Abadan and reconstruction officials, reflecting on the Iran-Iraq War's liberation of Khorramshahr four and a half years after its occupation.
Main themes
Liberation of Khorramshahr, Iran-Iraq War, resistance against ceasefire pressure, faith and perseverance, popular mobilization, rejection of negotiation under duress, global political pressure, military operations, reconstruction, lessons of the Arab-Israeli conflict
Duration
~8 min
28th percentile
Words
971
28th percentile
Sentences
30
18th percentile
Readability
48
57th percentile
Grade
14.6
72nd percentile
Syntax
3.43
91st percentile
Vocabulary
2.14
35th percentile

Translated from Persian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 93%93%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Institutional 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

30 sentences in 9 paragraphs

In those early days of the war and the first weeks of the war, after Khorramshahr had been occupied by the enemies and Abadan was under siege, and the entire island of Abadan was under enemy fire, when I looked at the map of the island of Abadan and the city of Khorramshahr, it felt as if a strong hand and a powerful grip were squeezing my heart tightly. Inside our office — the war room, in that place of irregular battles — there were various maps; since irregular and guerrilla operations were being carried out in that area of Abadan, the map of the island of Abadan was completely present there; whenever my eyes fell on this map, my entire soul was under pressure from the thought that dear Khorramshahr and these houses and these alleys and these streets and these palm groves were under the feet of the usurping and invading enemy.

All the pressure we exerted that day for equipment was due to the hope we had. Unfortunately, everything we heard from those who had the authority was a verse of despair. Some had come to believe that we had lost Khorramshahr and believed that we should sit down and negotiate with the enemy who had entered our home so that under the shadow of this negotiation, we could gradually and step by step reclaim our homeland. Now, how long it would take, only God knows.

The global effort was also for this reason. The global effort was to drag us to the negotiating table, to declare a ceasefire, and then, once our excitement subsided, once our people's motivation was exhausted, once we laid down our arms, they would say, "Alright, in a fifteen-year, ten-year plan, we will take these privileges from you, and your lands will be given back to you inch by inch"; that was the plan. You saw that from all over the world, a number of people came to us with pressure to make peace, to accept it, and that was why they wanted to force us into this disgraceful and humiliating negotiation. Of course, some of these negotiators who came from abroad had no ill intentions, but the global policy was this. We spoke firmly with those who came.

Before we took responsibility, the liberals and their wrong policies were based on the idea that we should accept a ceasefire as soon as possible; they would say this repeatedly. They did not dare to say it openly in their speeches, but they would say it in meetings, and their opinion and policy were this. When we took on the responsibility, they came again.

We told them we had a bitter memory of ceasefires; we had seen the ceasefire between the Arabs and Israel. The biggest mistake of the Arabs in the occupied Palestinian territory — whether in the Syrian part, the Jordanian part, or the Egyptian part and the Sinai desert — was that they accepted the ceasefire; once they accepted the ceasefire, the enemy considered itself in control there; now when they tell the enemy to leave, it says, "I will not leave unless you give me concessions"; it takes concessions and retreats, and even then, it does not retreat! You saw how humiliating the concessions given to the enemy at Camp David were, to push back this vast desert inch by inch. We said we could not sit and watch the enemy impose itself on us inch by inch and step by step from eighty kilometers of Dub Hordan to the border, constantly demanding concessions from us and retreating; we would push the enemy back with strength.

They smiled, saying — in their body language — that it was not possible, that we could not do it. The general opinion was that we could not. Their argument was that they said, "Well, there is a force here that is asleep and unaware, and that other force will come and advance eighty kilometers in half a day, but now that you want to push that force back, it is in the trench, it is on the ground; how can you push it back?"

Even when we conducted operations during the command of that liberal conciliatory line, our operations confirmed this experience; why? Because they did not rely on popular forces. We conducted operations in Dezful, lost forty to fifty tanks, retreated; we conducted operations in Ahvaz, the same; in the area of Khorramshahr, the same; in various regions. Operations that do not rely on the people, that do not rely on motivation and faith, that are not passionate, that do not have hope, it is clear what the result will be; thus, in those meetings where we wanted to passionately say this is how it should be done, they would smile calmly and say, "Alright, now you can be stubborn; in another year, two years, you will have to give more concessions and accept this same talk and this same ceasefire."

Today, four and a half years have passed since that day; by God's grace, we see that the hopes of that day have been realized with something even greater; this is a miracle; the miracle of faith, the miracle of perseverance, the miracle of unity, the miracle of tireless work, the miracle of a believer in God. In addition, this is a lesson and an experience for us.

That day we said that experience has shown us that accepting the enemy's imposition means emboldening the enemy; if we had accepted that day, the enemy would have become bold. Today, we have learned this lesson in our revolution and in this war as a lesson of definite experience. By God's grace, with the same spirit that Khorramshahr was reclaimed, the right of the Iranian nation that has been usurped must be restored.