Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the measures to maintain the stability of the currency union and the upcoming special summit of the Euro countries on May 7, 2010, in Brussels ...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

5 May 2010 · Special summit of the Euro countries · Brussels

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on May 5, 2010, presenting a government statement on emergency measures to stabilize the eurozone amid the Greek debt crisis ahead of a Brussels euro summit.
Main themes
Eurozone stability, Greek financial crisis, EU bailout package, Germany's financial responsibility, future of Europe, IMF program, currency union preservation, European solidarity, national legal obligations, political-historical significance
Duration
~28 min
79th percentile
Words
3,325
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Sentences
182
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Readability
41
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Grade
12.2
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Syntax
2.82
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Vocabulary
2.20
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Translated from German

Content
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  • Economic 55%52%
  • Geopolitical 22%21%
  • Institutional 20%19%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 0%0%
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  • Not in focus 4%

182 sentences in 62 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

The Federal Government has passed a law for the stabilization of the currency union in Europe on Monday against the backdrop of the crisis triggered by Greece. The basis for this law is an ultima ratio, that is, an emergency situation. The emergency situation consists in the fact that Greece has effectively lost access to the financial markets. This would have had repercussions on the stability of the Euro as a whole. The existence of this emergency situation was determined by the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund. This emergency situation is to be addressed with a program from the IMF, the EU Commission, and the ECB.

The program has a duration of three years, like all programs of the International Monetary Fund. It has a total volume of 110 billion euros. The International Monetary Fund will take on 30 billion euros of this. The Eurozone will take on 80 billion euros; Germany's share of this amounts to 28 percent, which means around 22.4 billion euros over three years. Of this, 8.4 billion euros will be incurred in the first year, and a total of 14 billion euros in the years 2011 and 2012. The program is designed in such a way that loans are granted. In Germany, this is done through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. The federal government guarantees these loans, and thus ultimately the taxpayer, that is, all of us.

These are the bare numbers, data, and facts of the draft law that is before you today in its first reading. These bare numbers, data, and facts do not even begin to make clear why we have come together here today. We have come together today because we must decide in the first reading on a law that has enormous significance. It is – this cannot be stated clearly enough – of enormous significance for Germany and for Europe.

The title of what we are discussing – "Measures to Preserve the Stability of the Currency Union" – inadequately expresses this significance. What we are actually talking about when we discuss measures to preserve the stability of the currency union in this house must be unambiguously named: It is about nothing more and nothing less than the future of Europe and thus the future of Germany in Europe.

This places an extraordinarily great responsibility on all of us who represent our people in the German Bundestag, whether in government or in opposition. Such situations are rare.

Such situations are rare in which,

first

, without historical precedent,

second

, with immediate effect for the moment, and,

third

, with far-reaching consequences for the future of our country and Europe must be decided.

Today is such a day. No one can take this responsibility from us, the elected representatives of our people.

The responsibility imposed on us becomes even clearer when we realize: Europe is looking at Germany today. Without us, against us, there can and will be no decision. Without us, against us, there can and will be no decision that is economically viable and fully meets the legal requirements with regard to both European law and national law. In a word: With us, with Germany, there can and will be a decision that takes into account the political-historical dimension of the situation as a whole. I am firmly convinced that Germany will live up to this responsibility.

Allow me today to repeat a sentence that I said in my government statement on March 25 of this year, that is, in my government statement before the last EU Council of Heads of State and Government:

"A good European is not necessarily the one who helps quickly. A good European is the one who respects the European treaties and the respective national law and thus helps to ensure that the stability of the Eurozone is not harmed."

Warnings, skepticism, and doubts about whether it was right to grant Greece access to the Eurozone were abundant in the year of decision, that is, in the year 2000. The poor competitiveness of Greece was pointed out, as well as an overall overburdening of the country to make the necessary adjustments under the umbrella of the single currency. Nevertheless, a political pre-decision in favor of Greece's accession to the Eurozone must have been made early in 2000.

To avoid any misunderstanding: I mention this not to enter into any form of discussion about blame and responsibility. I mention this not to enter into a discussion that could be directed at the then red-green government regarding the decision at that time.

Dear colleagues, I do not conduct such a discussion because it is first

, backward-looking.

Second

, it would be completely unproductive; for it would not free us in any way from the facts that the current government and the current members of the German Bundestag have to deal with.

I mention these warnings, this skepticism, and the doubts for another reason. I mention them because it helps us to have no illusions about the seriousness of the situation, that we confront the seriousness of the situation. This can be summarized in one sentence: Europe stands at a crossroads.

With Europe, all 27 member states of the European Union and the 16 member states of the Eurogroup stand at a crossroads. Europe must decide whether it wants to continue on the path of the past. This path too often consisted of problems rarely being named directly, which were consequently not addressed consistently enough, and too often hoping that everything would somehow work out. Good intentions were not always well executed.

Europe must decide whether it wants to continue on this path, especially under the conditions of globalization in the 21st century, or whether it recognizes that a time has come for the Union of 27 member states when it might be overestimating its own strengths, living beyond its means, and being caught up by past misjudgments that can no longer be concealed, but rather can only be remedied through a consistent uncovering, through a ruthless analysis of the situation, and a subsequent therapy. I am convinced: This time has come at the latest now.

The Federal Government has therefore chosen the second path. It has decided on the second path because it is convinced: A good European is not necessarily the one who helps quickly and thereby perhaps only gives the impression that he is solving the problem. A good European is rather the one who respects the European treaties and the respective national law and thus contributes to ensuring that the stability of the Eurozone and the entire European Union is not harmed.

Only in this way can we succeed in breaking the cycle of ever faster and ever higher piling problems. Thus, we end the life of living beyond our means. Thus, we serve the well-being of Europe and Germany.

On this basis, the Federal Government has made it clear in negotiations with Europe at all political levels from the very beginning that we will only provide assistance to Greece in strict accordance with European law and German constitutional law, that is, only under the following four conditions:

First

condition. The key to solving the crisis lies in Greece. We insisted that Greece commit to comprehensive self-help efforts. A consolidation without maximum self-help from Greece would have contradicted the principles of the stability community secured by our Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence and the European treaties. Such a thing was not negotiable for me. The Federal Government, no matter how strong the pressure in Europe and Germany was, strictly rejected this from the very beginning.

Since Sunday, the Federal Government has had the details of the planned agreement between the International Monetary Fund, the 15 member states, and Greece. This agreement makes it clear: Greece commits to comprehensive, maximum self-help efforts. The country must do everything and is doing everything to reduce its exorbitant national debt. The agreement provides for drastic measures. The program is ambitious. It aims to increase Greece's competitiveness so that the country can reduce its debt on its own. Only in this way can the trust of the capital markets be regained. This program therefore fulfills our first condition.

I add: I trust my Greek counterpart, Prime Minister Papandreou, to implement this program, even though it is a truly monumental task, with the support of European partners and the IMF.

Second

condition. The International Monetary Fund must be involved. We insisted on this, even though we were initially in the minority in the European Union with this position. It is the International Monetary Fund that, with its experience, provides a valuable – I say: indispensable – contribution to the successful implementation of the Greek reform program. Without Germany, there would have been no involvement of the IMF.

The truth of today also includes another point: We would never have achieved the program for Greece with the necessary self-help efforts if Germany had agreed to financial assistance at an early stage, as almost everyone demanded, without a sufficient decision-making basis. Rather, we would have achieved the opposite. Early assistance without a sufficient decision-making basis would have only raised expectations that highly indebted members of the Eurozone could quickly expect generous assistance without their own consolidation efforts. This would have led to similar destabilizations as a fundamental refusal of assistance to Greece. The involvement of the IMF, with its long-standing experience in the restructuring of highly indebted states, in the development of a restructuring program, and in the consistent monitoring of the implementation of the program counteracted this.

Only in this way can we return to the usual paths in Europe and not quickly believe that a problem is already solved when it is quickly resolved, even though it is in truth growing larger and will one day catch up with subsequent generations, like us today. With the inclusion of the IMF, which was decided on March 26 at the Council of EU Heads of State and Government, the second condition was thus also fulfilled. I add: It has already proven itself, as we can see.

Third

condition. Greece is no longer able to refinance itself on the international capital markets. This is not just a problem for Greece, but the starting point for unforeseeable consequences for the entire Euro area.

Therefore, the

fourth

condition applies: The aid to be decided for Greece is indispensable to ensure the financial stability of the Euro area. We are thus protecting our currency when we act.

In this regard, the European Central Bank and the European Commission have made it unequivocally clear: The immediate assistance is the last resort to ensure financial stability in the Euro area as a whole. It must occur to prevent a chain reaction in the European and international financial system and to prevent contagion to other Euro members. After the worst of the financial crisis of 2008 has just been overcome and the Euro area is on the path to recovery, any systemic disruptions in the financial markets would nullify this recovery. A renewed financial crisis would lead to noticeable losses in prosperity and higher unemployment even in Germany.

Moreover, it becomes clear: As right as it is to do everything to curb reckless speculation in the markets and to subject rating agencies to clear rules, it is equally imperative to face the whole truth. The cause or trigger for the situation in Greece and the consequences for the entire Euro area were not solely reckless speculation in the markets and the behavior of the rating agencies. The day of the whole truth was rather April 22 of this year. On that day, Eurostat reported a further upward correction of the Greek budget deficit. It became clear: The interest rates to be paid by Greece rose to exorbitant heights. A refinancing of Greece on the capital market became practically impossible. Thus, Greece's insolvency was imminent. One day later, on April 23, Greece sought help.

The European Council of Heads of State and Government offered Greece assistance for such a situation on March 25 of this year under exactly the mentioned four conditions. All four must be fulfilled; not a single one of these four conditions is dispensable. The analyses of the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Union leave no doubt: All four conditions are now fulfilled. They are the basis of our decisions this week, and they politically and legally mark their framework.

In addition, there is the clarification of the involvement of creditors. The federal government wants to make a decision this week that also makes the responsibility of banks and other creditors clear. The Federal Minister of Finance has held discussions on this matter. Banks and creditors must not evade their responsibility. Therefore, I welcome the fact that there is obviously a willingness among banks and creditors in this regard. Particularly important in this context is that the financial sector plans to maintain existing credit lines to Greece and Greek banks until 2012.

However, I would like to add: If the banks hope for such a voluntary contribution to relieve them in return for a bank levy or other measures, then they are thoroughly mistaken.

At this point, I would also like to say a word about the international financial transaction tax. The then Minister of Finance and I advocated for such an international financial transaction tax to become a reality at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh. Subsequently, there was a G20 resolution that asked the International Monetary Fund for proposals on how to involve banks in this responsibility. In the meantime, the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund for the next G20 meeting in Canada are available. The International Monetary Fund supports the idea of imposing a bank levy, as Germany envisions. The International Monetary Fund rejects the idea of an international financial transaction tax.

The International Monetary Fund points out that an international financial transaction tax also affects the real economy and instead recommends taxing the profits and salaries of banks. I believe we should pay great attention to the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. I also ask the opposition to engage with these proposals.

I also say to the banks: If anyone in our society has to provide a counter-performance, it is not the state towards the banks, but rather the banks towards the state and thus towards the people in Germany. We will not release them from this responsibility.

Therefore, we will vigorously advocate for further regulatory measures on derivatives, hedge funds, and short selling in Europe and worldwide; because the primacy of politics over financial markets must – this is my goal, this is the goal of the federal government and certainly also of this esteemed house – be restored. We must work on this, and we will not rest.

A second point must be crystal clear: The measures now to be decided for Greece cannot be the end of it. The stability of the euro must be secured in the long term. Repetitions must be avoided. Economic and financial policy coordination and mutual surveillance in Europe must be improved. This must also become an element of the new growth strategy 2020, which we will adopt in June. I cannot imagine, for the life of me, how we can adopt this growth strategy in a few weeks without it clearly demonstrating, in concrete form in a timeline and initial measures, that and how Europe is learning the lessons from this crisis. There will need to be a will for stronger economic and financial policy cooperation.

I cannot spare anyone the fact that particular attention will be directed to those member states that do not have sufficient competitiveness. This is not about assigning blame, to say it upfront; rather, it is once again about averting damage for the entire euro area. This defense against damage is – this is my conviction – only achievable through a path of openness, clarity, and also ruthlessness.

We have a duty to ensure that the Economic and Monetary Union is placed on a stable foundation in the long term. This includes a faster and stricter application of sanctions against euro member states that do not meet their obligation to reduce the deficit below three percent. This includes a discussion about enhanced and, above all, effective sanctions in case of violations of the Stability Pact.

I say it unequivocally: Part of these sanctions must also be suspensions from the EU budget. Those who do not adhere to the Maastricht deficit limit forfeit part of their structural funds or agricultural funds. Ultimately, this means nothing less than temporarily depriving notorious deficit sinners of their voting rights. In the most extreme case, a procedure for an orderly insolvency of a member state must also be developed.

In a nutshell: If contractual changes are unavoidable for the permanent increase of the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union – which is highly likely – then the federal government, and I personally, will advocate for this with all determination. No matter how laborious and lengthy such a process may be, that must not prevent us from doing what is right.

I am convinced: We owe this to the citizens of our country, we owe this to our future generations. I said it: Europe stands at a crossroads. The developments in Greece have dramatically shown us where unsound budgetary and financial policies can lead. It also proves to be pioneering for our own national approach that we included a debt brake in our constitution last year; it will take effect next year.

Mr. President! Dear colleagues! The solution path now proposed, including the quarterly reviews of the implementation of the Greek program, offers more opportunities than any other alternative. It provides the best possible assurance that the German taxpayer, who guarantees the loans of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau through the federal government, will be spared from being called upon.

In 1997, the federal government of Helmut Kohl, Theo Waigel, and Klaus Kinkel insisted that the European Stability and Growth Pact be introduced. The task of my government and all members of this house today is to insist that this stability pact is enforced, to defend it, and to further develop it as a lesson from this crisis. We must shape it in such a way that it can no longer be circumvented, but must be strictly adhered to. Just as the Helmut Kohl government had to overcome great resistance in 1997, so too must our political generation today overcome significant resistance.

Germany, the strongest economic nation in Europe, has a special responsibility in this situation, and Germany is fulfilling this responsibility. The fortunate history of Germany after the Second World War, the development into a free, united, and strong country, cannot even be thought of separately from the parallel history of the European Union. European unification, in turn, is inconceivable without German participation. Germany lives in the European Union in a community of fate. We owe decades of peace, prosperity, and consensus with our neighbors to it. The war, which – not least due to German guilt – has repeatedly devastated Europe, has spared our continent for as long as never before in recent history.

We citizens of Europe are united for our good fortune. Every German government – from Konrad Adenauer to today – has worked for this conviction. We work for a strong Europe that takes its role in the world united and decisively, that confidently defends its values and interests. This has been, is, and will remain Germany's and Europe's future.

I ask for your approval of the bill before us today. With it, we protect the citizens of our country, with it, we make the necessary decisions for Germany, for the citizens of our country, and with it, we together with our partners in Europe contribute to a good future for Europe – because it is about the future of Europe.