Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the 41st Commanders' Conference of the Bundeswehr on March 10, 2008, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

11 March 2008 · 41st Commanders' Conference of the Bundeswehr · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 41st Bundeswehr Commanders' Conference in Berlin on March 10, 2008, outlining Germany's defense transformation and overseas missions.
Main themes
Bundeswehr transformation, foreign deployments, NATO and transatlantic alliance, networked security, parliamentary support for military missions, Afghanistan and Balkans operations, post-Cold War defense policy, civil-military cooperation, European security and defense policy, White Paper 2006, gratitude to soldiers and civilians
Duration
~39 min
90th percentile
Words
4,726
90th percentile
Sentences
234
92nd percentile
Readability
45
49th percentile
Grade
11.8
43rd percentile
Syntax
3.01
49th percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
21st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 66%62%
  • Institutional 17%16%
  • Ceremonial 9%8%
  • Social 5%4%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

234 sentences in 71 paragraphs

Dear General Inspector, dear Mr. Schneiderhan,

dear NATO Secretary General, dear Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,

dear Governing Mayor, dear Mr. Wowereit,

dear Minister and colleague, dear Franz Josef Jung,

dear Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces,

dear colleagues of the German Bundestag,

esteemed participants of this commanders' conference,

I am very pleased to accept the invitation to speak here today at the commanders' conference of the Bundeswehr for various reasons. General Schneiderhan, you spoke about the assessment from a political perspective. But I would like to start with a word of thanks.

I would like to thank the soldiers, the reservists, the civilian employees in deployment and for their service in the Bundeswehr, which they often perform under difficult conditions. I say this very deliberately in light of the fact that the Bundeswehr has been in a permanent transformation process since the end of the Cold War, since German reunification. After the end of the Cold War, the initial impression was that this might be the end of history, as a Japanese author suggested. However, we were then thrust into completely new realities – politically and also regarding the tasks of the Bundeswehr.

This transformation process is taking place at breathtaking speed in part, while at other times it is difficult for all of us to fully recognize the patterns in which the major conflict lines of the 21st century run. Therefore, it has not been entirely easy to make assessments for the Bundeswehr. In any case, it took from 1994 until 2006 for a new White Paper for the Bundeswehr to be drafted by the federal government and, I believe, also adopted with full conviction by the Cabinet. At that time, we were very consciously guests at the Federal Ministry of Defense to show: Here is the place where important political decisions are made. With this White Paper, we also arrived at new positions. Just think of the definition of the concept of security, of the concept of networked security. All of this requires a change in thinking.

This means that you, who bear responsibility today, and those who have borne responsibility since 1990, are accustomed to being in a previously unknown, very rapid transformation and change process. This is not easy for an institution like the Bundeswehr, which, if I may say so, functions smoothly, although this smoothness expects a certain predictability. I ask you to convey my thanks for not only bearing this without complaint but also for shaping the transformation confidently and with commitment to all in the Bundeswehr, to the civilian and military employees.

There is therefore a necessity to redefine the tasks of the Bundeswehr. This must, of course, happen in the government, it must happen in Parliament. We have experienced that during this transformation we have repeatedly been confronted with difficult and very difficult decisions. I predict: This will remain the case. Neither the government nor Parliament closes its eyes to the risks associated with the new tasks of the Bundeswehr.

If I focus today very strongly on our deployments abroad, I do so with the awareness that the entire apparatus of the Bundeswehr stands behind it, meaning that I also address everyone. For I am well aware that while the areas of responsibility today are different, the defense of our country encompasses the options for defense from within the country and abroad.

We want – this has always been our approach, this is what the Federal Minister of Defense fights for, this is what I fight for, and this is what the members of the federal government fight for – to achieve as broad a support as possible for what the Bundeswehr does, because we believe that we can achieve the deployment of soldiers in foreign missions to the best of our knowledge and belief whenever the support is as broad as possible. That is why there is also a very cooperative collaboration with the German Bundestag. I would like to thank everyone who engages in discussions there, as there are many questions to be answered, and that is not easy. This means that a high level of professionalism is required both in political discussions and in the military execution of tasks.

We are present in Afghanistan, we are in the Balkans, we are off the coast of Lebanon, at the Horn of Africa, and also in other regions. We secured the elections in the Congo, conducted a time-limited mission there, which showed: Not all missions are long-term, but some can also be carried out in the short term. Our soldiers are involved in working side by side with other NATO forces or taking on tasks within the European Union and under the mandate of the United Nations. Just that already requires very different approaches. In all these dimensions, professionalism must, of course, be developed.

The operational capability of and the close cooperation between the transatlantic alliance and European security and defense policy are, I believe, of existential importance for Germany. Therefore, we never perceive and define European security and defense policy as a contradiction, as competition, as a tool against NATO. Rather, NATO and European security and defense policy must go hand in hand. This arises from the international situation alone, from the threats to our security that have dramatically changed in the last 15 years.

These include, as a significant feature, international cross-border terrorism and religious fanaticism, with which we are dealing with the phenomenon of completely asymmetric threats.

There is the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as we see, for example, in connection with the conflict with Iran. We want to prevent further proliferations and have seen how diplomacy can be successfully employed in dealing with North Korea.

These are regional conflicts and failing statehood, which can always be the cause and starting point for later terrorist attacks.

These are the disregard for fundamental human rights and a lack of the rule of law in certain regions. As a keyword, I would like to mention Sudan/Darfur.

These are today also the effects of drinking water shortages, migration, epidemics, and plagues, which can in turn be caused by global threats. At this point, I would like to remind you of global climate change.

This means there is a whole bundle of new challenges that we did not know to this extent during the Cold War or that we did not address as thoroughly as we do today, as our world is becoming much more interconnected, people's attention is much more pronounced, looking away or closing one's eyes in the age of the internet and modern media is no longer possible, and the question of our value-based life certainly does not end at the borders of Germany but relates to the entire world. This presents us with new challenges: Where do we want to take action? When do we intervene? Certainly, there will still be many discussions to be had about this.

With our German foreign and security policy, we want to contribute to a peaceful world, to a free world, to stability and prosperity not only for ourselves but overall in the world. It is clear to us: Politics is built on values. We are firmly convinced that this value-oriented policy is also the best policy to assert our interests in the world. This means that interest-driven and value-based politics go hand in hand. Freedom, the rule of law, and human dignity are the guiding principles of our actions.

How can we now implement these values – of course only step by step – in the globalized world of the 21st century? What role does the military component, for which you feel responsible, play in this?

I would like to mention four approaches:

First:

A preventive and value-based policy must be coordinated as broadly as possible internationally. Above all, we must seek dialogue with our allies and partners in Europe and in the transatlantic community. Purely national solutions help us only in the rarest of cases. Even for a power like the United States of America, it is now clear: No one can solve problems alone without allies, also without political support. This means that everyone in the world needs partners because we also have a universal, comprehensive understanding of security.

What does "comprehensive understanding of security" mean? It means more than classical diplomatic, intelligence, and security policy instruments. It now also relates – this is a new dimension – to social, cultural, and ecological aspects as well as to economic development. This means that the concept of security has expanded in light of the challenges of the 21st century that I have mentioned. It therefore requires, in part, a new approach to solve the problems as a whole and to ensure the success of the military component, which is necessary and indispensable.

This networked approach is very well illustrated in the 2006 White Paper. We believe that it is the prerequisite for contemporary crisis prevention, contemporary conflict resolution, and contemporary peace consolidation.

Second:

We must pool our national capabilities and better coordinate them. The formula we have found regarding Afghanistan is: No civilian reconstruction without security, no security without civilian reconstruction. We must consistently pursue this path. It is now also manifesting itself in certain structures, for example, in that four federal ministries – the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Development – are continuously and consistently coordinating, so that the concept of networked security does not remain some theoretical construct but is integrated into practical action. If we look back ten or twelve years, we know that the partnership between the Bundeswehr and development organizations is, in a way, still uncharted territory for the Bundeswehr, even if it may not be talked about much.

Third:

We have – this follows on from that – learned that the expertise of non-governmental organizations can be an important complement in the preparation and execution of crisis prevention and management. I believe, by the way, that the Bundeswehr is making excellent efforts – even if this is sometimes laughed at by outsiders – to continually try to immerse itself in the cultural circumstances of the deployment areas. This was of extraordinary benefit in preparing for the Congo mission. One did not simply go somewhere and assume that our emotions and opinions would immediately be understood, but one immersed oneself in the culture of the country. This served both the safety of our soldiers and the acceptance of the mission in the deployment area.

I believe that old enemy images between non-governmental organizations and perhaps also military authorities have collapsed, that today much knowledge and experience for crisis areas is also shared by non-governmental organizations, and that any remaining apprehensions must be dismantled. But we have already made many steps forward in this regard.

I also say: Not only will the Bundeswehr's approach to non-governmental organizations change – this has already largely happened in a broad sense – but also our view of development aid, our view of what we have to do, and the question of how something must actually be organized. Because good will and small-scale non-governmental organizations alone are, of course, not enough to effectively implement civilian reconstruction concepts.

Fourth:

At the international level, the security architecture must be further networked, and the instruments of crisis management must be better coordinated. The United Nations, NATO, and the EU are the main forums where this networking is to be realized. Anyone who has dealt with the practical questions knows how much work remains to be done.

In the European missions, we do not yet have an infinite number of experiences, even though we have gathered many in the Congo. For me, it was a wonderful experience to see in the operations center in Potsdam how naturally the individual participating states collaborated on a common mission, just as we have known for a long time in NATO. But I also say, and I express this cautiously: Some aspects of mission management by the United Nations can still be improved. We will have to continue discussing this.

In this networking, the transatlantic community of values and defense, NATO, remains the central pillar of German foreign and security policy. NATO is the institutional framework. NATO has also decided to transform itself in recent years and will continue to do so. Nevertheless, there is still a long list of questions that the alliance needs to answer.

I want to say that I will continue to advocate politically for NATO, even though it represents a community of values in name, not to be merely a military community in practical reality. Rather, NATO must be the place where central political discussions are also held. Because it cannot be that on one hand we extol the concept of interconnected security, uphold it – I consider it indispensable – and that on the other hand, whenever interconnected security is to be discussed within NATO, skepticism is still expressed from some quarters. That does not fit together. Therefore, the concept of interconnected security must also be reflected as a comprehensive political concept in the daily work of NATO. This works well in some areas, but in others, there is still room for improvement.

Now NATO, like many others, has to answer the question of how far it can still open itself to new members, whether there are limits to NATO membership, and how we shape our relationship with democracies outside the alliance. I only mention Asian countries or Australia. What is the relationship between NATO and the United Nations? How can we involve Russia in solving security issues – the current topic is, of course, missile defense. And how do we shape NATO's strategic partnership with the European Union?

These questions must be discussed and cannot always be decided ad hoc based on some example. Mr. Secretary-General, if I look at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest, we will be dealing with questions of enlargement, with questions that are not particularly controversial, namely the question of enlargement to include Croatia, Albania, and also Macedonia, provided that differences over the naming issue are resolved. I actually have to call it something else, but you know what I mean. I hope that this naming problem can be resolved in light of the historical significance of NATO's enlargement to these countries.

We will also have to discuss the question of how to bring Georgia and Ukraine closer to NATO.

To this, I would like to make just two very general remarks today.

My first remark is: I believe that a country should only be a member of NATO if not only a current political leadership supports this membership, but if there is also qualitatively significant support for NATO membership among the population. We must not take risks – depending on electoral behavior in certain countries where central political orientations are still being formed.

Now my second remark on this – I mean this very seriously: Countries that are themselves embroiled in regional or internal conflicts cannot, in my view, be members of NATO. We are an alliance for the defense of security and not an alliance in which individual members still have to deal with their own security. I do not want to go into further detail today.

The security architecture needs the capabilities of NATO and the European Union. Therefore, cooperation must be established. Here, as always, the devil is in the details. This still causes us great political concern. We now have interesting important European missions: EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the civilian mission EULEX currently being established in Kosovo, and, for example, EUPOL in Afghanistan. Since 2003, we have also had, in my opinion, a very well-formulated European security strategy. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy is currently working to implement it better in practice. He will present us with proposals for this at the end of the year. I believe this provides a good basis for advancing this practical implementation under the French presidency – likely also in connection with the new European treaty.

But I do not want to beat around the bush that the fact that Cyprus is a member state of the European Union and Turkey is a member state of NATO, and that there are still significant problems to be resolved between the two countries, creates many complications in the daily interactions in European security and defense policy and in NATO that we must overcome. This is very important, as we cannot constantly identify individual cases and then be glad when we have achieved a reasonable solution in Kosovo, but then not in Afghanistan.

I also say: We can currently observe in Kosovo how the developing EUPOL mission is being sensibly integrated with the UNMIK mission, which will be winding down. Of course, it is important – I recently discussed this with the UN Secretary-General – that these missions are built up and down hand in hand and that there is no vacuum in between that would ultimately render the entire mission's goal superfluous.

Furthermore, we will also have a new orientation of European security and defense policy simply because the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who is currently solely accountable to the European Council, will in the future also be the Vice-President of the Commission and thus a fixed link between the two. From the establishment of European external representations to the shaping of security and defense policy, there will be many innovations that we must not only politically accompany but also shape from the member countries.

In Germany, there is a tradition that much of what the Bundeswehr has been assigned as new tasks has initially been accompanied critically. This started with the debate on rearmament, continued with the NATO double-track decision, and has also been reflected in a very conflict-laden implementation of our foreign missions.

But despite all this, and even if some things have taken a long time – which may have led our allies to question why some things in Germany always take so long – a tradition and acceptance of the Bundeswehr have developed that have made the Bundeswehr an acknowledged part of our society over the last 50 years. – This is a very important asset that we should never give up lightly. – The principle of the citizen in uniform and, as an expression of practical implementation, conscription are, in my view, the guarantee for this. Therefore, I have repeatedly advocated for the preservation of conscription and do so today – knowing that this will not make some things easier. But it has support in the population. This will prove to be increasingly important over time.

We know: Peace, democracy, and freedom are precious goods. Therefore, we must discuss and also talk to the population about how we can preserve or achieve them and why foreign missions are necessary today. We can try as hard as we want to establish criteria and create a checklist, but there will certainly be no simple yes, no simple no, no full predictability. We cannot predict where, when, and for what reasons a mission will be necessary. What is important, however, is that the missions must be oriented in their objectives towards how we secure our own safety.

So you will always have a component that states: Our security is at the center. But the security of our allies is also at the center. That must also be clear. NATO is a community of values. This means we cannot and must not define member states as first and second class in any way and then say that the security of one is somewhat closer to us than the security of another or that, for current political reasons, the security of one member is not as important to us as the security of another. Rather, there is a willingness to commit to the security of all NATO member states. Experience teaches us that this is no longer only happening within the alliance, but that it is also necessary in parts of the world outside the alliance. This is a huge qualitative leap that must be discussed repeatedly within the population, the Bundeswehr, and Parliament.

Why do we believe it is right that in order to preserve our security, security in Afghanistan and in other regions must also be ensured? Particularly in the case of Afghanistan, we can say very well: Terrorist attacks that are prepared outside the alliance territory can only be thwarted if we ensure political structures in such regions that have temporarily not exhibited stable political structures and have therefore been havens from which terrorist actions could be launched.

The Federal Government has outlined in its White Paper 2006 the framework within which it considers Bundeswehr missions to be possible.

First:

They must be aligned with how they serve the security of Germany, Europe, and our allies. There is the discussion I just mentioned. We must really engage in this. As for the mission in the Balkans, I believe it is now completely clear that security there is also in our central interest. But the same applies to Afghanistan.

Second:

We must be clear – this is not your task on the part of the Bundeswehr, but it is the political task – about what political goals we are pursuing and what consequences this may have for the people living in conflict regions. I think we have good examples when we think of Afghanistan and what has been achieved in terms of reconstruction, among other things, of political structures despite all the problems we have.

In recent years, for more than ten years, there has often been talk about the question of the Western Balkans. There were times when I also had doubts about whether we were really making progress. It has always been right when the military side said: Politically, we cannot solve things for you. But today we can reduce our deployment contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have succeeded in getting Croatia to now strive for membership in the European Union. It was difficult for us – the CDU, then in opposition – to agree to the mission in Macedonia. We believed we knew it would be the most difficult in the history of the Bundeswehr. Ultimately, it has turned out to be one of the most successful. Today, Macedonia is applying for membership in the European Union.

Only the European perspective and only the perspective of membership in NATO have had the power to develop the political conditions in the Western Balkans as they have developed. I am sure: Despite all the difficulties we now have with Kosovo and Serbia, we will still be able to say after 20 years: That was a mission that was worth it and that has pacified the last part of Europe and connected it to Europe.

Third:

We must always see the alliance-political significance of our decisions. We are dependent on partnership. We therefore also want to provide partnership. There are – perhaps not surprisingly – ongoing discussions about our mission in Afghanistan. There are sometimes two perspectives. One perspective is that we say what we have done, that we have continuously completed and expanded our engagement in recent years. I think of the decision to deploy Tornados for reconnaissance over all of Afghanistan or the decision to provide the rapid reaction force after Norway. On the other hand, there is of course the task of ensuring that the entire mission in Afghanistan is brought to success.

I can and will only repeat the position that we have made clear time and again over the past months: At a certain point – this was done in great agreement with the alliance – we decided to engage in the north. Of course, we provide targeted assistance when friends are in need, even in other parts of Afghanistan. But we believe that to the extent that we are engaged there today – by the way, as the third largest troop contributor within the NATO community – we should fulfill our mission in the north in a comprehensive sense and not allow any uncertainties to arise about whether we might leave, perhaps do something in the south, and neglect our work in the north.

I also do not support – I want to say this once again today – that we now enter a race of danger. Those who are engaged in the north know that it is anything but completely safe there. Therefore, we should discuss together how we can make the Afghanistan mission a success overall. I believe that the German contribution is comprehensive and important, and that we should continue to make this contribution comprehensively. We perceive it in the sense of the overall political goal. We have achieved successes. But I also say: We have not been working with the concept of regional reconstruction teams for long. Two or three years is a short time to advance a country like Afghanistan from a quasi-destroyed state structure. Therefore, I believe that here, despite all the successes we have already achieved, we still have much to do.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, we have a military constitution that clearly establishes the primacy of politics over the armed forces. This also includes extensive participation and control rights of the German Bundestag. For the Bundeswehr, this primacy has now become a matter of course; it is a given. This also entails loyalty and fidelity to our democratic rule of law. This is completely beyond doubt within the Bundeswehr. This also constitutes the trust of the population in the Bundeswehr, just as the trust of the Bundeswehr in our state institutions. They need this trust, especially in a time of change, in a time of rapidly changing tasks.

We have increased the defense budget for 2008 by nearly one billion euros compared to 2007. This is an important contribution. I suspect, Mr. Schneiderhan, that when you discuss behind closed doors tomorrow, the praise for this billion will fade in light of new necessities. But I also ask you to keep in mind: It was, albeit a manageable amount, still an important step. You have also participated in the improved tax revenues. But you should also know: I am speaking with the Minister of Defense, and I would like to discuss with the respective branches of the armed forces again soon where the issues are, where in their view the greatest needs for adaptation to modern defense structures exist.

If we want to be a respected international partner, then we must, of course, also be willing to send our Bundeswehr soldiers well-equipped into the world and to exercises, so that others do not look down on us from above. Technology is simply part of it today. That is just the way it is. But I also experience that there is a keen interest in some of what we have in the world. I had the impression, for example, that our beautiful frigates are very popular at UNIFIL. The Leopard is also well received everywhere. So we do not need to hide. Now, with my lack of military knowledge, I have not even mentioned our beautiful Tornados, which also seem to enjoy great recognition.

Germany is on a path that may have only been opened to us through German unity. Germany is aware, Mr. Secretary-General, that it has increasing responsibilities to bear. Over the past 18 years, we have grown into this responsibility, in our view, quite quickly and ambitiously. We also know that we have not yet reached the endpoint in everything. But five years ago, for example, we could hardly have imagined that we would today be protecting the coast of Lebanon and that we would be doing so in agreement with Israel. These are components that must be politically processed time and again.

I would like to thank you once again at the end for the readiness of the soldiers to do so and to say that in a world that is not yet as secure as we would like, we must continue this path together – with a clear political concept and clear values. This is what this federal government stands for, and we will gladly work with you on this.