Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the first Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff Lecture on May 16, 2019, in Ravensburg:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

18 May 2019 · First Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff Lecture · Ravensburg, Germany

Context
Merkel spoke at the inaugural Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff Lecture in Ravensburg on May 16, 2019, honoring the late CDU foreign policy politician.
Main themes
Foreign and security policy, European integration, rule-based international order, German foreign policy values, memory of World War II and Holocaust, multilateralism, tribute to Andreas Schockenhoff, unity of the West, German-French friendship, transatlantic alliance, democracy and rule of law, long-term political thinking
Duration
~51 min
94th percentile
Words
6,061
94th percentile
Sentences
325
96th percentile
Readability
45
48th percentile
Grade
11.5
39th percentile
Syntax
2.96
42nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
30th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 54%52%
  • Ceremonial 13%13%
  • Social 11%10%
  • Economic 10%10%
  • Institutional 10%9%
  • Environmental 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

325 sentences in 54 paragraphs

Dear Vice President Stephan Harbarth,

Dear Minister, dear Thomas Strobl,

Dear colleague, dear Axel Müller,

Dear colleague from the state parliament, August Schuler, and Mr. Lins from the European Parliament,

Dear Mayor Rapp,

And especially, of course: dear family Schockenhoff and children of Andreas Schockenhoff,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Andreas Schockenhoff and foreign policy – both belong together like the Marienplatz to Ravensburg. Andreas Schockenhoff was a foreign policy politician through and through. I had the impression that he felt not only through his office but also personally responsible to do everything in his power to advocate for peaceful coexistence among peoples and nations. Therefore, he did not limit himself to addressing international issues only in the context of current events. It was very important to him to also pursue the underlying fundamental questions and the long-term trends.

That is why I believe, dear Axel Müller, that this idea of a lecture in honor of Andreas Schockenhoff is truly a good idea, as it provides the opportunity to connect year after year to long-term trends and to observe where changes occur and where we have remained true to our values. Daily discussions often overlook many things. Foreign policy is often neglected in this regard. That is why I find it all the more important to know how our fate, how the question of whether we can live in safety, whether we can live in prosperity, depends on foreign and security policy issues, and that we must continually provide space for this discussion. Therefore, I would like to sincerely thank you for being here in such large numbers today. Now we have a framework with this lecture that Andreas Schockenhoff would have appreciated. I am quite sure of that. That is why I am indeed very, very happy to have come to Ravensburg and thank you once again for the invitation.

For 24 years, from 1990 until his much too early death in 2014, Andreas Schockenhoff was a member of the German Bundestag. He passionately fought as a representative for his convictions, for a strong and united Europe, for German-French friendship, for the unity of the West, for understanding with Russia, and for stability in the Western Balkans. All of these are questions that still require attention and commitment. And in how we answer these questions, the fundamental issues are also reflected: What guides us? What defines our self-understanding as Germans and as Europeans? What role do we see ourselves in the international community of states? What do we want to achieve with our foreign and security policy and with our European policy?

In times of upheaval, such as we are currently experiencing, it is particularly important to reaffirm the foundations and parameters of our daily work. A look back can also help with this. 74 years ago, the civilizational break of the Holocaust and World War II came to an end. Germany under National Socialism brought unspeakable suffering to Europe and the world. We cannot undo the past, of course, but we can learn from it. We not only can but must. This is one of the essential reasons why we engage with history – of course, to learn how things were, but above all, to learn how we can shape the future. We must take this learning seriously again and again, even as we have fewer and fewer witnesses among us, and we owe it to the unimaginably many victims. We also owe it to future generations, to whom we will one day leave our world.

This thought also guided proactive and far-sighted men and women when they set out to build a new international order after World War II. The United Nations were founded in October 1945. Three years later, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. In 1949, NATO and the Council of Europe were established – precisely in the year when the West of Germany received a stable foundation with the enactment of the Basic Law to build democracy and the rule of law. We remember these days, on the 70th anniversary, the enactment of the Basic Law. In France, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman devised a completely new form of cooperation, the European Coal and Steel Community. With it, European integration began.

International organizations, pacts, and agreements were created. In retrospect, it becomes clear that such bitter experiences as those made during World War II were to be prevented by the establishment of an international order. The order matured and became increasingly sophisticated – also supported by mutual trust. Through rule-based cooperation, restrictions could be reduced. Trade increased, and with it, prosperity. Many freedoms that we enjoy today are closely tied to this order. Challenges that many states face in a similar way can only be addressed together within this order. This order is, of course, not perfect; it is often criticized today. But that is why it is still better than having no order at all. It cannot prevent or immediately solve all problems, crises, and conflicts, but it provides, in my firm conviction, essential prerequisites for us to work together to resolve conflicting interests amicably and peacefully. Without this order, to which we orient ourselves, without its principles and mechanisms, a much stronger mutual distrust would return to the world – with all the associated consequences for coexistence.

That is why the entire federal government consistently advocates for an international order – for common rules, treaties, and institutions. We are committed to the territorial integrity of states, to peaceful dispute resolution and the search for compromises, to the protection of human rights, and to the protection of natural living conditions, for free and fair trade. This can perhaps be summarized by saying that we advocate for acting more than ever globally rather than nationally, together rather than alone, open to the world rather than protectionist, multilaterally rather than unilaterally. This is something like a compass in our hands. And with this compass, we must not overlook when our international order and the values underlying it are fundamentally called into question, but we are called to advocate for it decisively. I have a deep feeling that we are currently living in a time – perhaps also because there are no longer many witnesses of World War II among us – in which we all must advocate for this order, in which we must fight again, in which we must explain to the younger generation why this is so and why this imperfection that exists is still better than if we did not have this order.

That is why we must not close our eyes, and we cannot accept when – as in the case of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the unlawful annexation of Crimea – the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of a state are violated. Mr. Ambassador, I am very glad that you are here today. You know that we advocate for these principles. We do this because the essence of international law is being called into question. We are often asked whether this is really so important, given that relations with Russia are so crucial. But I must tell you, when a country like Ukraine, which after the collapse of the Soviet Union even renounced its nuclear weapons to rely on its territorial integrity, is ultimately attacked and its territorial integrity is violated, then that cannot be overlooked. And that is why we act as we do.

We also cannot simply overlook that painstakingly negotiated international treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapon systems are in danger. This includes, for example, the violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by Russia and the Chemical Weapons Convention by Syria, among others. We cannot accept when international security is threatened by the development of ballistic missile technology by states like North Korea or Iran.

In Europe, I want to state explicitly here, we stand by the agreement negotiated with Iran. I am very proud that there is unity in Europe on this matter. Because I believe that even a flawed agreement – and I know that there are many things about Iran that provoke criticism – is still a good basis for cooperation to prevent worse outcomes. Preventing a nuclear arms race is definitely an important task.

In our days, we must also recognize that international organizations and institutions that have proven themselves over many years in crisis management are increasingly under pressure – on the one hand, because there are too few financial resources, as for example for the World Food Programme or UN refugee assistance; on the other hand, because political support is waning, as for example for the World Trade Organization, where the United States unfortunately no longer fills the judicial positions, putting its ability to act as an arbitration body at risk, or for the International Criminal Court or the Paris Climate Agreement, from which some countries have withdrawn, including unfortunately the United States.

When we look at how laboriously international agreements are often negotiated, it is indeed incredibly regrettable when such agreements falter. I myself was Minister for the Environment from 1994 to 1998. My first major political task as Minister for the Environment was to host a Berlin conference that served as groundwork for negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. We later realized that the Kyoto Protocol did not work because it expected legally binding commitments from each member state. After the failure of the Copenhagen Climate Conference – which some may still remember – we worked hard again up to the Paris Climate Agreement, found other mechanisms of voluntary self-commitment, and as a community of states agreed to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees. Today, we sense how important it is to have such an agreement. Especially in climate protection, it is evident that a single country cannot tackle the associated challenges alone. The same applies to the Rio process and the development of the Biodiversity Convention. When we read the figures on species extinction today, we know how urgent the need for action is. Here too – in the protection of habitats and biodiversity – the task is global and cannot be thought of only nationally or regionally. This means that we have to endure setbacks, but we must not simply look away; rather, we must advocate all the more decisively that this international order does not collapse.

Of course, the questioning of a multilateral order is also a major challenge for international trade. Unfortunately, we are seeing an increase in protectionist tendencies. I want to remind you once again that the overcoming of the international financial crisis around ten years ago was only possible because the 20 leading industrial countries decided to jointly implement stimulus programs and develop common rules for dealing with systemically relevant banks. This led to the G20 summit of heads of state and government. If we had not done this together, the consequences of this crisis would have been much more severe. And I am also very convinced that higher trade barriers and trade wars ultimately only know losers.

The great challenges of our time – climate change, the technological revolution, the nuclear threat, global migration, hunger, and poverty – are all things that we can only get under control in the interest of global common good if states cooperate on the basis of international law and do not close themselves off from any compromises from the outset. It is also part of international cooperation that I must have a bit of the ability to empathize with the thoughts of the other. Of course, as the German Chancellor, I must first articulate and represent German interests, guided by our values. But I must also ask: Is it not also in Germany's interest to take the interests of others seriously and to find a compromise?

A phenomenon of our time that causes me great concern and is closely related to the question of international cooperation is the question: What value does compromise hold in our thinking? Compromise is partly mocked today; it is disparaged. A compromise is almost preemptively regarded as a rotten compromise. But if we are no longer able to make compromises, we are no longer capable of action. This starts in the family. The agreement on what to have for lunch or how to spend the afternoon usually requires the ability to compromise. This continues in the local community. Even in a city, compromises must be made in order to live together. Compromises must be made in state politics. It becomes increasingly difficult because more and more compromises must be made, but one can never achieve the cohesion of a society if one is no longer capable of compromise. And this is all the more true in international politics. Therefore, I could, in analogy to Wagner's call "Do not despise the masters," call out: Do not despise compromise. Compromise is one of the essential prerequisites for political action.

Of course, the challenges also change over time. Therefore, we must continually develop our international order – also to maintain trust in it. Because people want solutions. A minimum level of trust is indeed the prerequisite for cooperation to be possible. And I believe that we Germans have all experienced this in a special way. The wounds of the Second World War were still fresh when France extended its hand to Germany for reconciliation – without trust, without confidence, this would have been unthinkable. Helmut Kohl was only able to seize the moment after the fall of the Berlin Wall because he had built trust in Germany among partners. Thus, Bush, Gorbachev, Thatcher, and Mitterrand said yes to a united Germany. That was anything but a given. Trust must be earned anew and deserved – and by all partners.

Andreas Schockenhoff said in his last speech in the Bundestag in September 2014: "Germany's foreign policy is guided by a culture of responsibility. […] We cannot afford a culture of disengagement." That is exactly right. He was guided by this very thought. This culture of responsibility is not least the foundation of the success story of the European unification process. The European Union forms the largest single economic area in the world. Almost 500 million people live here. When we Europeans speak with one voice, we gain considerable attention in the world – and certainly much more than if each individual member state acted alone.

If we take a look at whom we are dealing with in the world, we see the economically and politically very powerful United States of America, the rising China with 1.4 billion inhabitants, and India with 1.3 billion inhabitants. This means that believing we could achieve much alone, Germany as the largest European economy, if we do not stand together in Europe, is an illusion. We must keep this in mind, even if it sometimes takes a long time and is difficult to reach common decisions in Brussels. But this is also not always easy at conferences of prime ministers and at the local level. So, one should not and must not let oneself be discouraged. The strength of Europe is, of course, a topic that occupies us especially now in the days leading up to the European elections.

Recently, we commemorated the 500th anniversary of Leonardo da Vinci's death. It became clear to me once again that for centuries, all significant or at least very many inventions came from Europe. We can no longer say that about today's time. While many inventions still come from Europe, they are by no means the majority that shape our lives. When I talk to the Chinese president, he explains to me that for 1,600 or 1,700 years since the year 0, the Chinese were the largest economy in the world and that they have only been less present in the last 300 years, but are now returning to a normal state. This astonishes us Europeans. But the Chinese perspective is that normality is returning to the world. For us Europeans, however, this is associated with challenges that we must face.

We must work coherently in foreign policy. We have indeed come closer together in foreign policy. – Andreas Schockenhoff would be pleased to see this. – But we are still far from being ready to make compromises, to think, plan, and act in a pan-European manner as would sometimes be necessary. Therefore, I advocate that we also consider the possibility of qualified majority decisions in the foreign and security policy of the European Union. For example, there are also considerations from France and Germany to establish a European Security Council, in which not all EU states are members at the same time, but where there is a rotating membership so that decisions can be made more quickly and bindingly.

We have made important progress – for example, in the area of defense policy with the Permanent Structured Cooperation, now known as Pesco, and with the European Defense Fund. This allows us to proceed more coordinated in the development and procurement of defense goods and thus better close gaps in our capabilities. The French Consul General is among us today. I can say that Germany and France are now embarking on the path to jointly develop an aircraft, also together with other partners, and to jointly develop a new tank. This is a high testament of trust, even if we Germans are sometimes not very easy partners. Our restrictive export policies in the defense sector sometimes leave our partners a bit desperate. Germany will therefore have to be more willing to compromise in order to even be considered as a partner.

Now, international responsibility certainly does not only extend to military capabilities, but also encompasses security policy, diplomacy, and development cooperation. These areas must interlink. We call this the networked approach, which we first practiced in Afghanistan and which we are now applying more strongly in our Africa policy. Therefore, we have also significantly increased budget expenditures for the areas of diplomacy, development cooperation, and military affairs.

At the moment, we are particularly fulfilling our responsibility in the United Nations Security Council. We are a member of the Security Council for the next two years, this year and next year. There, the permanent members France and the United Kingdom coordinate their positions with the non-permanent European members – currently with Germany, Poland, and Belgium. This allows us to also present a European voice there. I am very pleased that the United Kingdom wants to continue to engage in European security policy. Because especially in this area, but of course also in others, we need a close partnership with the United Kingdom in Europe, even if the United Kingdom will leave the European Union. Prime Minister Theresa May has said: "We are leaving the European Union, but not Europe; we remain Europeans." Wherever the United Kingdom is willing to cooperate, we should take the outstretched hand. This will make us stronger. For the European Union of the future 27 member states, we must come together and tackle common challenges even more strongly than before. For this reason, the elections to the European Parliament are of particular importance.

An Andreas Schockenhoff lecture would miss its mark if we did not also address the outstanding role of German-French relations for the European project in connection with Europe. They have proven to be the most important engine of European unification since Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. They are, however, also an engine not because there is always unity upon waking in the morning, but because unity has always been and continues to be fought for. For Andreas Schockenhoff – he was a Romance scholar – good friendly relations between our two neighboring countries for the benefit of Germany, France, and Europe were truly a matter close to his heart. Andreas Schockenhoff was the chairman of the German-French Parliamentary Group for 20 years. On every occasion, he advocated for even more intensive cooperation between the German Bundestag and the Assemblée nationale. With the German-French Assembly, which we recently established, this cooperation has now reached a new level. 100 members, 50 from France and 50 from Germany, will meet twice a year for a comprehensive exchange. This will further improve parliamentary relations.

In January of this year, we signed the Aachen Treaty. This is the successor treaty to the Élysée Treaty. In the Aachen Treaty, France and Germany clarify their common vision of a strong and sovereign Europe of the future. This distinguishes this treaty significantly from the Élysée Treaty, which could not yet address the European dimension in this breadth. Germany and France want to contribute to completing the European internal market, which is the heart of the European Union. We know that there is still much to be done, especially regarding the free movement of people – for example, in the recognition of professional qualifications. A nurse from Marseille must be able to practice her profession in Milan, Maastricht, or Mannheim without bureaucratic obstacles. And a craftsman from Ravensburg who wants to expand her skills elsewhere for a few years should also be able to do so without problems.

Today, we have decided on an amendment to the Vocational Training Act. This will supplement German craft titles, such as "Meister," with an English designation. In Germany, we will continue to use the title "Meister," no worries, but it will be supplemented by the designation "Bachelor Professional." I asked Mr. Wollseifer, the president of the crafts association, if he was serious about wanting this. He said, "Yes." If someone from North Rhine-Westphalia wants to get a job in Belgium, the Netherlands, or Spain, but no one there knows what the "Meister" qualification level is, then a designation that is understood in Europe is needed.

We want – as also stated in the Aachen Treaty – to bring our economies and social models closer together at the highest level. This is indeed a very exciting endeavor. We are not saying we want to merge social systems. But we have certainly noticed that if we have completely different pension systems, if we have completely different unemployment insurances, then the question of comparability of competitiveness can quickly suffer. This desire, especially between Germany and France, to come closer together, to better understand the systems, to learn from each other's strengths, this desire is right and good. But it also requires a willingness to do so.

We want to improve the exchange of information between justice and intelligence services and strengthen the fight against terrorism. These are new challenges that we must face, and which we can only address in the digital world through close networking and data exchange. We want to harness the potentials of digitalization to find new solutions for old and new problems. In a German-French future workshop, we will bring together actors from both states to discuss, for example, the opportunities and challenges of artificial intelligence and also to jointly tackle new projects. Anyone who looks at what is happening in China in the field of artificial intelligence in terms of will and capability knows that we must hurry. Last but not least, the Aachen Treaty also addresses the promotion of bilingualism in border regions. This will bring our societies closer together.

All of this is important to us, France and Germany, because we know how much our two countries are needed for the realization of the European idea and how much Europe is an overall community of fate. Moreover, we know in Europe that alongside the process of European unification for seven decades, the transatlantic alliance has been the foundation of our security and the most important guarantor of peace and freedom in Europe – for the past 20 years also for European states east of the former Iron Curtain.

We are now confronted with a deteriorating security situation. The events in Ukraine were an incredible wake-up call, making it hard to believe that all conflicts would resolve themselves. Therefore, we have drawn urgent conclusions within the North Atlantic Alliance. We have increased the response and defense capabilities of the alliance. There was a time when we thought that Germany's security would be defended at the Hindu Kush – it still is today, in Afghanistan – and that would suffice; the response capability in Europe did not need to be too high, as there were no threats here. However, that has fundamentally changed with Russia's actions.

We have guaranteed reassurance to our Central and Eastern European partners – a very important matter. And we have increased our efforts in security and defense policy. At the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, we initiated the process of fair burden-sharing or breathed new life into it. Since then, all NATO member states have noticeably and responsibly increased their defense spending. We said we want to move towards the two percent target, meaning spending two percent of GDP on defense. Germany is lagging behind in this regard. One only needs to recall that when there is polemics against such a target today, the Federal Republic of Germany had defense spending that was always or for a long time above two percent during the Cold War. After German reunification, we thought that the conflicts of the Cold War would simply dissolve into thin air. But we did not consider that new challenges could arise. Therefore, we must continue on the path we have now taken consistently. This is not easy for us. In budget discussions, this issue comes up repeatedly. We are also criticized for approaching the increase in spending too slowly. Nevertheless, we have made significant progress in recent years. I believe that is absolutely right. And this will need to continue for many years to come.

Moreover, we have not cut back elsewhere – again in line with the interconnected approach of our foreign and security policy – for example, in development policy. Because especially the events of migration in 2015 made it clear to us: If we do not help on the ground in crisis-ridden countries, especially in Syria and Iraq, then the issue of illegal migration will come back to haunt us. We should have supported the World Food Program and the United Nations refugee program much earlier and much more strongly. Then many people would not have put themselves in the hands of traffickers and smugglers, but might have stayed near their homes.

Germany's commitment is not limited to financial contributions. We have also taken on leadership responsibilities in various areas, for example, in the so-called forward presence in Lithuania. – "Forward" means, so to speak, at the border of NATO; that is a somewhat strange formulation, but if you translate it literally back from English, that is what comes out. – We contribute to securing the Baltic airspace. The Bundeswehr has done important work in establishing the so-called spearhead of NATO – this is again related to the eastern partner countries. And here nearby, in Ulm, a new NATO logistics center is being established, which serves to quickly deploy troops and equipment. On this occasion, our partners, when they come here, also look at our infrastructure as a whole and say that even in the civilian sector, the infrastructure is certainly still improvable. However, I do not say this reproachfully towards the state government, but encouragingly with regard to the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan.

This and much more are examples of lived responsibility. They are for us Germans and Europeans also an expression of a profound change in our strategic culture since the end of the Cold War. This does not contradict the fact that we know that lasting security in Europe can only be achieved together with Russia; and indeed, only on the basis of international law, whose central principle is the sovereign equality of states.

It is therefore indispensable that the federal government continues the critical dialogue with Russia, which has also led to the Minsk Agreement with regard to Ukraine. Its implementation is unfortunately very incomplete. The first point of this Minsk Agreement, namely a ceasefire, has not been achieved on any day. This also hinders further progress. Nevertheless, I believe it was right to conclude this Minsk Agreement, because we at least have something in hand and because there is a format for dialogue. We will, of course, do everything we can with the new president to continue with this format. Whether it is about humanitarian issues, the exchange of prisoners, or the release of the still imprisoned Ukrainian sailors – how else can such problems be clarified if not through direct conversation? Therefore, it is important to maintain the ability to talk, even when there are deep differences of opinion.

The dialogue between societies also remains important. Germans and Russians are connected not only by a love of literature. We have much to say to each other in many areas. That is why we have always made sure that the Petersburg Dialogue continues and that civil society remains in an open and critical dialogue with each other. Andreas Schockenhoff repeatedly spoke with representatives of civil society and numerous opposition politicians during his many trips to Russia. As Russia coordinator, he fought against reprisals such as the tightened non-governmental organization legislation in Russia. That was very, very important.

One area of foreign policy has come more into focus in recent years, which did not play such a significant role during Andreas Schockenhoff's time in foreign policy; and that is our relations with Africa. Essentially, our development policy has not changed dramatically, as African states have always been partner countries in development cooperation with Germany, Europe, and many non-governmental organizations. But we have redefined the strategic significance of our coexistence between Europe and Africa. Africa is our neighboring continent, and our security and prosperity depend on its fate.

I firmly believe that illegal migration, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking cannot be combated solely by relying on isolation. This is also a lesson from history. Rather, one must manage to live in a good balance with one's neighborhood. This begins in North Africa and continues further south. We have come to a completely new foreign policy engagement through the French request after the terrorist attacks in Paris to engage in Mali as well. I was recently in three of the poorest countries in Africa – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. And I must tell you that from a German perspective, it is a completely different world there. Here at home, demographic changes are raising our average age. It is around 45 years in Germany. In the three mentioned countries, it is 15 years. We have a per capita income in the Federal Republic of Germany of around 40,000 euros per year. The three African countries have one between 480 and 580 dollars per year. The population of Niger doubles every twelve years. How to manage this depends primarily on whether there are enough schools in Niger and whether girls can go to school and receive an education.

We must ask ourselves whether we need to muster much more strength for such investments and whether we need to be faster. Twelve years – that is about the time it takes in Germany, for example, to go from the idea to a possible realization of a two-kilometer section of a high-voltage line. Twelve years, I believe, were also spent discussing the Elbe deepening in Hamburg. And I do not even want to talk about Berlin's airport, as I do not yet know the exact date of its opening. But in such a period, the population in a country like Niger doubles; and the answer to the question of whether something comes after a year, a year and a half, or three months – for example, the provision of malaria nets or the construction of a road that might connect hostile regions – is crucial for war and peace, for the life and death of people.

When I see how quickly and consistently China acts, I can only say: Europe must do better. Because for our values and words, one cannot literally buy anything if actions do not follow. The slowness that may be manageable here in Germany – but not infinitely so; we too must become faster, or else the world will overtake us – must not be displayed in African countries. This presents us with new foreign policy challenges.

Political discussions are usually discussions about problems and crises, about the need for action, money, and responsibilities. This is no different in foreign policy than in domestic policy. And it is no different in lectures than in daily politics. The solution to especially cross-border challenges requires patience and persistence, consistency, and reliability. We see this on a day like today with a brief look into the history books. 2019 is an anniversary year. Let us think, for example, only of the fall of the Berlin Wall nearly 30 years ago. With the wall, the division of Germany was literally cast in concrete. But the will for freedom of people cannot be cast in concrete and walled in. This was proven by brave women and men in Gdansk, Leipzig, Prague, and Budapest. They tore holes in the Iron Curtain. Patient and far-sighted diplomatic efforts in the East and West helped pave the way for German unity and European integration.

Patient and far-sighted efforts are still needed today. Thus, the long-standing deadlock in the naming dispute between Greece and North Macedonia was finally resolved through tough negotiations. How pleased Andreas Schockenhoff would have been about that. I still remember the NATO summit in 2008 in Bucharest. There, various name proposals such as Upper, Lower, North, South, Up, and Down Macedonia were tossed back and forth like iterations, as one learns in mathematics. There was no way to come up with a name. And later, it was still possible. That is a great joy. Bilateral conflicts could be resolved. And the way to NATO was also cleared. But there is still much to be done in the Western Balkans. We must continue to work on that as well. And that would also be very much in the spirit of Andreas Schockenhoff.

Axel Müller mentioned earlier that we recently hosted the heads of state and government of the Western Balkan countries in Berlin. In 2014, when we commemorated the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the First World War, we considered what else we could do besides the memorial event. We then initiated the so-called Berlin Process with the countries of the Western Balkans. In the meantime, we have a youth initiative there, we have a scientific cooperation, we have infrastructure projects. The heads of state and government are quite proud that they have been able to meet and talk to each other without us since then. Not all problems are solved by any means, but they have come back to cooperating with each other, even if it is laborious.

That Serbian and Kosovar heads of state and government are at least sitting at the same table is also a credit to Andreas Schockenhoff. Because with his long-standing commitment, he significantly contributed to the European Union achieving many practical steps towards normalizing the relationship between the two countries over time. Andreas Schockenhoff knew very well the strong transformative power the European Union can develop in the Balkans and how important it is to truly harness this power.

Many other examples of successful crisis management and proactive conflict resolution could still be cited. They are often quickly forgotten because other questions and new conflicts pile up. But to encourage oneself, one should occasionally think of the successful outcomes.

Perseverance and optimism also characterized Andreas Schockenhoff. No board was too thick for him to drill through it. A good, thriving, and peaceful coexistence in Europe – that was always worth every effort to him. In his commitment, his straightforwardness, and reliability, he remains an example to us.

Therefore, all I can do is wish that today's Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff Lecture may be the beginning of a good and long tradition – and that in memory of what he has accomplished, we always believe that good things sometimes take time, that one should not give up too quickly, but rather keep going and then occasionally achieve results; and if not, one must simply try again. Therefore, thank you for the good idea and thank you once again for the invitation.