Introductory remarks of the press conference by President Mr. Emmanuel MACRON, following the NATO Summit.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

4 December 2019 · NATO Summit press conference

Context
Macron addressed a press conference on 4 December 2019 in London following the NATO Leaders' Meeting, outlining key outcomes and his push for Alliance strategic reform.
Main themes
NATO strategic direction, European defense pillar, Alliance rebalancing, relationship with Russia, threat evolution, Turkey and S400, counter-terrorism, burden sharing, American posture shift, European sovereignty, strategic review process
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,331
80th percentile
Sentences
126
74th percentile
Readability
43
44th percentile
Grade
13.8
65th percentile
Syntax
3.26
79th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
37th percentile

NATO Summit Statements Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 84%83%
  • Ceremonial 10%10%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

126 sentences in 4 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen ambassadors, gentlemen officers, ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to draw the main conclusions and results of this summit.

First of all, it has been the stage, if I may say so, for debates and a beginning of strategic clarification that I consider, as you know, essential within the Alliance.

I had the opportunity to express myself a few weeks ago, which sometimes sparked reactions. This expression was primarily aimed at ensuring that I do not spend this third summit, as far as I am concerned, discussing solely the budgetary contributions of member states, which was the case in the two previous summits, almost exclusively. Instead, we should be questioning, which I believe is our duty towards our soldiers and our fellow citizens, the strategic purposes of the Alliance. And I take responsibility for having initiated this debate; it seems essential to me for several reasons. The first is the profound evolution of the strategic context, 70 years after the creation of the Alliance and 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Therefore, this summit was a summit of celebrations, which is why it was held in London, and I would like to thank Prime Minister JOHNSON for his hospitality and the organization of this summit. But it is also a summit that must lead us to consider that the threat is not the same as it was 70 years ago or even 30 years ago. Have we drawn all the consequences from this? No. The threats are more diffuse, new actors have emerged, the fight against terrorism is at the heart of the security concerns of Allies, and the relationship with Russia also needs to be rethought – all subjects, I will return to, that we discussed. Furthermore, the evolution of the American posture, which has been ongoing for several years now, proves to be sustainable and ultimately justifies a rebalancing of the Alliance. The Americans have repeatedly chosen to withdraw from theaters of operations considered to be in the European neighborhood for reasons that we fully respect, and the repeatedly reaffirmed choice of the President of the United States, Donald TRUMP, is also the choice to reduce the American contribution to NATO financially, thus asking Europeans to engage more. This is a real change that requires strategic reflection within the Alliance. And then, obviously, there are also questions raised by the choices of certain allies, particularly Turkey, regarding the definition of terrorism and the acquisition of new weapon systems like the S400, which led us to question our coherence. All these reasons led me to express myself, to discuss with Secretary General STOLTENBERG, when he came to Paris a few days ago, the necessity of launching a review, a strategic exercise, which allowed for very open discussions during both bilateral exchanges and around the table this morning on these subjects. The exercise we have begun, which will structure the coming months, has several stakes in my eyes. The first subject, the first pillar of this reflection and what we discussed this morning is the question of how to ensure the security and stability of Europe in the contemporary strategic context. This involves, as I said, for us Europeans, the concrete implementation of the consequences we must draw from the rebalancing desired by the Americans. I said it yesterday during the exchange we had with President TRUMP; we must indeed draw the consequences of this wish, not just from a budgetary perspective but also from an operational capabilities perspective, and it is therefore important that Europeans re-engage. We have been doing this for two years through the structuring of a European defense, and we must embrace it within NATO. And I say this very clearly: this is not an alternative to NATO but a pillar within NATO. And so, as true as it is that I do not propose and have never proposed to substitute a European defense for NATO, I believe that today we do not sufficiently embrace this European defense within NATO. When I see the European Union cited on the same level as the United Nations, I think that is not fair. And so, the rebalancing is only possible if there are these pillars, its North American pillar and the European pillar within this alliance. Next, the security and stability of Europe also depend on the relationship we want to establish with Russia. On this point, I have no naivety. I have even less naivety because I have had to know, if I may say so, and we know the issues of interference, influence policies, and violations of international law that may exist, including on the chemical issue, which historically led France to take its responsibilities under my mandate. I have always been very clear that the security interests and sovereignty of our European partners and allies are an intangible priority. In this regard, during these two days, I was able to meet most of the leaders present, both from the East, the Baltic States, and the Nordic countries, to reassure them about French commitments, the framework in which I wanted to structure this dialogue with Russia. In no case a framework that could, in any way, sacrifice either their security or their interests; on the contrary. We will be there for solidarity, and this must fully integrate their interests. Nevertheless, if we want to move forward and stabilize peace in Europe, we need to re-engage this dialogue. A dialogue that involves credible deterrence and organization, which is why I am pleased that we were able to proceed with the acceptance of the plans that were so eagerly awaited for Poland and the Baltic States, but which also involves an evolution of the posture towards Russia. Our alliance has a history; it also has a geography, as I have said several times. The fact is that the security and stability of Europe can only be solidly guaranteed by establishing a solid and demanding dialogue with Russia. And so we have begun to lay down the terms, and we will continue to work on this with our partners. This also requires progress on certain files, and it is in this context that we will hold a summit in "Normandy" format on December 9 in Paris, which will bring together Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France. This dialogue on security and stability in Europe must also address arms control. I want to reaffirm here France's commitment to existing arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation instruments, as well as to the Alliance's initiatives on this subject. But we must also be clear-eyed, and I consider this debate to be existential for us Europeans. We have all noted Russia's violations of the so-called INF Treaty. Our American ally has chosen to denounce it, as I remind you that this treaty, which is structuring for European security, was a bilateral treaty. I acknowledge that the bilateral arrangements dating from the Cold War on this point are outdated. But very clearly, what I have expressed, shared with all my colleagues, and what we must now collectively advance for the security and stability of Europe, once again, is to imagine a new process that allows us to regain guarantees at least equivalent to those offered by the INF Treaty while taking into account the evolution of contemporary armaments and our interests. Very simply, what does this mean? We need to find a legal framework that protects us from the deployment of armaments on the Russian side that could impact European soil, which was what this treaty protected us against. Secondly, we need to better integrate the defense of several of our partners, particularly the most eastern ones, those who are closest to the border, since, I remind you, those who were less than 500 km from the border were not covered by the INF Treaty. We need to integrate their interests into this discussion. And then we must take into account, as I said, these evolutions: the threat of Iskander missiles on Poland and the Baltic States seems to me to be an essential point to consider in any new exchange on ground-to-ground capabilities in Europe and thus integrate this agenda. What is certain is that we need to define, on this subject, a very clear position among Europeans. I wish, for my part, that Europeans be involved in a new treaty and that we can then discuss it within a NATO framework and be able to exchange on this basis with Russia and China. It is the American wish to broaden this discussion to the Chinese; I think it is relevant. I think, however, that this should not be a prerequisite for an essential discussion with Russia, which primarily impacts Europeans. On these subjects, we have thus had a debate, both yesterday with President TRUMP, Prime Minister JOHNSON, Chancellor MERKEL, and around the table this morning. This is for me the first pillar, security and stability in Europe, and the response to the questions I have just raised is essential within the framework of the strategic reflection that is beginning. The second pillar, the second line of force of the strategic debate that we must conduct on this exercise of redefining our collective defense, is, fundamentally, the definition of its purposes and modalities today. It is the question I posed the other day in a somewhat direct manner when I received Secretary General STOLTENBERG in Paris: who is the enemy? This is a question we must ask ourselves. When the Alliance was structured, the answer was simple: Russia, the Soviet Union. Normal, things were structured that way. They have changed in the last 30 years. Would everyone around the table qualify Russia as an enemy? I do not think so. It is today a threat on certain issues; it is a reality, and we have experienced it in cyber activities, on certain clearly defined issues. It is a threat to the neighborhood; the Ukrainian crisis is an illustration of this, and several conflicts are as well. It is also a neighbor geographically, and that is a reality, once again. It is also a partner on certain issues, on which we are moving forward together, and we have concrete discussions. It is a power with which we work on certain issues on which, again, we are making progress. Since 2014, we have made the decisions that were necessary given the conflict. Collective defense is also that and this pressure, but we need to be able today to define the preconditions and the terms for resuming an essential strategic dialogue for the alliance. I also think we need a much more homogeneous European position within the alliance. This is at the heart of the will I carry, as I told you earlier. I want what France has initiated to first be subject to very strong Franco-German coordination; we discussed this at length yesterday with the Chancellor, and then to an essential European consultation in the coming months. The case of China is necessarily different. While I believe it is fundamental that we have a strategic reflection on the military rise of China, its consequences for the stability of the North Atlantic region, as well as on technological issues, including 5G, in terms of interoperability, I do not believe that China can become the designated object of our collective defense. There are therefore strategic issues that we must address, technological, deeply strategic, but which cannot be thought of simply in terms of a military purpose. Terrorism, on the other hand, particularly that stemming from Daesh and Al-Qaeda, is our enemy, meaning it seeks to kill our fellow citizens without any willingness to negotiate, and our forces are engaged in combat operations to destroy it. Let us be clear, each state has its own counter-terrorism policy regarding what comes from its national soil and the fight against the groups that are active. But we have seen geopolitical territorial projects emerge from these new forms of terrorism: the territorial caliphate in the Levant, which justified an international coalition, engaging allies and NATO within the coalition, and today we see it clearly at work in the Sahel, particularly around the EIGS, and thus with a structured terrorist presence that threatens some of our allies, some of our partners, but also threatens our nationals and our territories, and I will return to this shortly regarding the Sahel. The third axis of strategic reflection in my eyes is that of the rights and duties of the different allies. Indeed, collective defense implies being there, being present when the security interests of our allies are at stake. This is the meaning of Article 5, and I was able to reaffirm to all our partners during these two days, and very clearly this morning, that France would be there for this solidarity without ambiguity, which requires having clarified the purposes beforehand. When we do not share with some the definitions of terrorism proposed, we consider that we are not bound by any solidarity whatsoever. When I speak of rights and duties, this also implies not putting allies in a position of fait accompli when their security interests are at stake.

It is because I respect Turkey's security interests, the heavy toll it has paid to terrorists, and because we are allies, because NATO is a member, as I said, of the coalition in the Levant, that I believe the situation in northeastern Syria must be the subject of enhanced dialogue to prevent any resurgence of Daesh. In this matter, we have lacked dialogue and respect for allies. I welcome the very useful meeting we had yesterday with the British Prime Minister, along with Chancellor Merkel and President Erdogan, which allowed us to clarify the framework of our intervention on this issue and to reaffirm the priority of the fight against Daesh, as well as to reaffirm our joint commitment on the issue of refugees and our joint commitment to a political resolution of the conflict in Syria. I can return to this in response to your questions if you wish. Likewise, these rights and duties involve respecting the sovereignty of allies; I want to clearly support the concerns expressed this morning by Greece in reaction to the agreement signed between the Libyan government and Turkey. I also wish, and in this same spirit of having frank and real dialogue among allies, that we are also able to technically assess the consequences of the sovereign choices of military equipment acquisition by some of our allies and the compatibility, particularly with the alliance's air defense, of these choices. I was able to discuss this with President Erdogan yesterday and reaffirm it this morning in the same terms around the table. You see, all of these axes, these three pillars of reflection, are at the heart of the discussion we had this morning, which was very useful, as well as at the heart of the discussions I have had with all the counterparts I have met, and in a few moments, with my Polish counterpart with whom I am about to have an exchange. But it shows the need to clarify many strategic points for our alliance. We have a strength, an asset: interoperability, the quality of our soldiers, and the work they do together. This asset must not be weakened by the political and strategic ambiguities that exist today, and which must therefore be lifted. Our debates have allowed us to lift some of them, to bring some of the planning to fruition, as I mentioned. It must now lead to the formalization of a mandate in the coming weeks, by the first quarter of 2020, a mandate on the basis of which Secretary General Stoltenberg, accompanied by a group of high-level experts, will proceed with proposals for responses to be submitted to the allies. I want to conclude here, as I mentioned, with a more specific point on the situation in the Sahel. You know, and I presented myself here in London, in a context where we have just lost 13 soldiers in the fight we are waging against terrorism in this region. I wanted to clearly reframe this and share some convictions and the results of the work carried out over the past few weeks. In the Sahel, for the past five years, France has conducted significant work with several victories and positive points. We have been able to help several of our partners and enable them to defend themselves. I think of the work that France has done with Mauritania, truly enabling it to strengthen its own capabilities, to equip itself, and to train its army. We have also conducted, thanks to Operation Serval and then Barkhane, a defense of Malian territory initially, and multiple operations against terrorism, which have profoundly weakened and destabilized many networks and several katibas in the region. This is linked to the courage, professionalism, and commitment of our soldiers, alongside them as well, and I want to thank them, to the commitment of several European allies who have mobilized alongside us from the beginning. This has been made possible thanks to our troops who have been on the ground for now five years. Nevertheless, we must look at the situation today, and my responsibility is to reassess the terms of our presence. First, I believe that the legitimacy of France's presence and our armies is today confirmed in my eyes, and the trust in our armies has constantly remained the same. The legitimacy of our presence and our intervention in the Sahel is indeed confirmed because it is still, for me, an element of our collective security. No region in the world faces the same combination of challenges: terrorism, climate change, demographic growth, and the rise of trafficking. Our responsibility is clearly to face these challenges, but not alone. This is the second point that I consider essential today. We must very shortly reclarify the framework and political conditions of our intervention in the Sahel, first and foremost with the five African states that are members of the G5 Sahel. I expect them to clarify and formalize their requests to France and the international community. Do they want our presence, do they need us? I want clear and acknowledged answers to these questions. I cannot and do not want to have French soldiers on any Sahelian soil while ambiguity persists regarding anti-French movements sometimes supported by political leaders. The second political clarification I expect from our partners relates to the essential political work that must be done on their side in several countries so that the military work we are conducting and the development work we are also conducting within the framework of the Alliance for the Sahel can truly be beneficial. This political work we cannot do in their place, and it is their full and entire responsibility, particularly concerning Mali and Burkina Faso. It is for all these reasons and in order to proceed with these clarifications that I have invited the five concerned and involved African heads of state of the G5 Sahel to Pau on December 16 to provide precise answers on these points. Their responses are today a necessary condition for our continued presence. We will therefore have the opportunity when we go to Pau to pay tribute to the 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment to which seven of our fallen soldiers belonged, and we will then have the opportunity to hold a Barkhane summit allowing for these clarifications. On this basis, and this is in my eyes the third point of this clarification, I wish for us to organize a stronger international presence and structure a new coalition in the Sahel around us in connection with our already present European partners. I was able to briefly mention this subject this morning and discuss it in more detail last night, particularly with Chancellor Merkel. These are the concluding points I wanted to make from this summit and the few clarifications I wanted to provide before now responding to all your questions.