PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AT THE END OF THE G5 SAHEL SUMMIT

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

16 February 2021 · G5 Sahel Summit · N'Djamena

Context
Macron addressed journalists at the Élysée Palace on February 16, 2021, presenting preliminary conclusions following the G5 Sahel Summit held in N'Djamena.
Main themes
G5 Sahel summit outcomes, Islamist terrorism in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane and French military presence, Three Borders region security, counterterrorism strategy, Franco-African military partnership, Takuba force, democratic progress in Sahel states, EIGS and RVIM armed groups, regional stability in West Africa
Duration
~23 min
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Sentences
113
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Readability
42
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Grade
13.6
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Syntax
3.04
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Vocabulary
2.40
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Translated from French

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 78%77%
  • Institutional 8%8%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

113 sentences in 18 paragraphs

Hello everyone. We are here in the Salle des fêtes at the Élysée with the journalists present and virtually connected with the concerned African capitals. I thank you for your presence. We have just completed our discussions at the N'Djamena Summit, following exchanges that took place yesterday behind closed doors with the leaders of the five Sahel countries and myself. I wanted to take stock before answering your questions.

First of all, this summit comes one year after Pau and the summit we held at the beginning of 2020, which was a moment of clarification. In Pau, we were able to first clarify the request from our Sahelian partners to maintain our military presence and their willingness to take their part in the fight against terrorist groups. We also clarified, or rather reminded ourselves, of the enemy we were facing - and I think this was one of the important points of that meeting.

France, indeed, is not, as some have sometimes said or tried to manipulate this information, involved in ethnico-communal wars. No. Our presence on the ground has been requested by the States. It supports the sovereignty of these States, and we are fighting against a common enemy that has also already struck us on our territory, whose agenda is international and which has made the Sahel its main area of growth, threatening the stability of all of West Africa. This enemy, of course, is Islamist terrorism, and we have very clearly identified the target of the EIGS, which is our main enemy on which we have focused during this period. Indeed, the agenda of the RVIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the EIGS is not simply Kidal or Bamako, but to strike further, tomorrow Abidjan, Dakar, other horizons, and to continue to prosper. And I want to remind here that the main victims of this terrorism are the civilian populations of the Sahel States and then the Sahelian military and our military.

In Pau, we also very clearly clarified our operational priorities, which are the consequence of this definition of the enemy. In the face of the urgency of the moment, our military effort has been concentrated in a specific area that you can see on the map, which shows the bases and the presence of Barkhane. Our military effort has been concentrated in a specific area, which is the Three Borders region, and against, as I said, a specific enemy: EIGS. This prioritization has allowed us to achieve results. I will come back to this, but it has not prevented us from continuing to fight, as I said, against different factions of the RVIM, including Ansar Dine in the northeast, the Katiba Macina in central Mali, and subsidiary enemies with real military victories, the neutralization of DROUKDEL, the military leader of the RVIM last June. And also, we can come back to the neutralization of Bah Ag MOUSSA last November. All these groups have faced military pressure, and several of their highest-ranking members have been killed during these sometimes recent operations. This military effort defined in Pau has thus allowed victories, has enabled us to achieve results, and has saved the Sahel a second time.

The situation of November-December 2019, I want to remind you, is a triangle of Mali-Niger-Burkina that was on the brink of collapse, heavily hit armies, Sahelian armies that were also largely demoralized. Pau followed a visit I made a few days before Christmas to Niger, which had just lost more than 80 soldiers, killed or wounded, just after the very hard blow we ourselves had suffered in November. Alarmist messages from our interlocutors were reaching us about the political consequences of this situation.

The resurgence decided at Pau allowed for a reversal of the military balance of power, but also a moral recovery of the armies in the region and the relaunch of their operational dynamics. The success of this strategy, as we defined it in Pau, is a partnership. We deepened our coordination with the Sahelian armies through a joint command mechanism in Niamey, the relaunch of large-scale joint operations like Bourrasque and Éclipse. Our European partners have also played their part through the strengthening of the Takuba force, which I will also come back to, and they are now engaged alongside us and the Sahelians in combat operations and not just in training actions.

And the success of Pau is not only a military success; it is also a democratic success. Two Sahelian States have conducted or are in the process of conducting an electoral process peacefully, which few had envisioned a year ago, like Burkina Faso, which has completed its elections. I was able to congratulate President KABORE on his re-election, and Niger is in the process of completing it with a first round that took place calmly and a second round scheduled for April, allowing this country to experience, I also say this because it is an extremely important moment, its first peaceful democratic transition since independence in the context we know, and it is a collective political victory.

The coup d'état in Mali last summer has penalized the implementation of the Pau roadmap, but the establishment of transitional authorities clearly opens a new window of opportunity. The coup d'état of August 2020 in Bamako interrupted the implementation of this roadmap, as it was preceded by a long political crisis that led to a period of stagnation before the coup, then legitimate uncertainty with regional and national discussions, until the establishment of transitional institutions. The Malian transitional authorities are now realigned with the three fundamental axes we expect from them. And I was able to appreciate this during President N’DAW's visit to Paris. The ECOWAS roadmap for holding elections within 18 months. The Pau roadmap in terms of fighting terrorism. All commitments made for the FAMa have been fulfilled by the transitional authorities. I say this here with great clarity. And the relaunch of the implementation of the Algiers agreements, as evidenced by the symbolic holding of the follow-up committee in Kidal on February 11, which was the commitment made by the transitional president to me and which has been scrupulously honored and which, I believe, is a recommitment of the political authorities, particularly in the extremely sensitive Kidal region, which is extremely strong. In a few months, I must say that these transitional authorities have given more guarantees than the previous authorities in three years. This realignment with the new Malian transitional authorities, fully observed during President N’DAW's visit to Paris, combined with a post-electoral situation in Burkina Faso and Niger, opens a window of opportunity for military, civil, and political breakthroughs.

It is in this context that I wanted to clarify that we will hold this N'Djamena summit, which is a moment of amplification of the Pau dynamic. First, an amplification of the military dynamic. Indeed, we were able to act in the weeks leading up to the N'Djamena summit, and then in yesterday afternoon's closed-door meeting, a consolidation of the military strategy that I just mentioned and that we had defined a year ago. First, a consolidation of the gains made in the Three Borders region. This is the meaning of the deployment of the Chadian battalion that left Chad last week, which will be positioned in the coming days in the region and will help consolidate the advantage gained over the terrorist groups in this area. We have seen the images. We are clarifying with the President of Burkina Faso in particular the positioning of the Chadian battalion, but it will help to complement the Barkhane system and the involvement of the G5 Sahel joint forces in this area that I mentioned, on which we have concentrated our efforts since last year, particularly in the northeastern Burkina Faso that you can see on this map, an extremely sensitive area of lawlessness around Markoye that has been structured, on which the Chadian battalion will come to support.

Next, a convergence for a targeted effort on the high hierarchy of the RVIM. Specifically, in recent weeks we have consolidated a convergence with our interlocutors from the G5 Sahel to consider that Iyad Ag GHALY and Amadou KOUFA are enemies and in no way interlocutors. They are terrorist leaders who bear the responsibility for the deaths of thousands of civilians and our Sahelian, European, and international soldiers. The objective is not to produce in northern Mali a symmetrical effort to that which we have produced in the Three Borders area. The characteristics of the two groups and the two situations are clearly distinct and remain so. It is about continuing and completing the disorganization of a command chain already very weakened by the disappearances of DROUKDEL and Ba Ag MOUSSA, which I mentioned earlier in June and November.

We have also agreed to strengthen military pressure on the Katiba Macina with an extension of the operational dynamic in the western zone that is currently being planned through discussions between the Malian and Mauritanian staffs within the framework of the G5 Sahel joint force. This priority, this fight against terrorist groups, this continuation of our action, is obviously the top priority on the military level. It is complemented by a consolidation of the G5 Sahel joint force, which has made immense progress over the past year. I will not detail them here, but we can come back to them beyond what I have already told you.

Our goal now is to consolidate this G5 Sahel joint force through sustainable funding. We have also had many discussions on this. The European Union was present to meet its financial commitments allowing for equipment. The UEMOA has also made some initial commitments that it has honored. We must continue to finance this joint force, whose annual operating costs have been identified at 40 million euros, and obtain from our international partners, particularly from the Gulf, the region, Europe, and the United States, and our goal is also to obtain a UN mandate under Chapter 7 in the coming months for this G5 Sahel joint force and enable sustainable funding.

Alongside this amplification of the military dynamic, N'Djamena has allowed, this is the second point I wanted to highlight here, the triggering of a civil resurgence to complement the military resurgence. Indeed, the observation we can make is that the military pillar has produced the expected results at the expected pace during the past year, despite the Covid crisis. The resources for a push on the development axis are there.

The Alliance for the Sahel, which was formed in July 2017, has gathered a portfolio of 900 projects and 16 billion euros. We have also remobilized international funding for the Great Green Wall at the beginning of the year, right here, with the Mauritanian president. But there is a missing link, which is the minimal level of state presence in the most vulnerable areas. It is this failure that the momentum from N'Djamena must correct. Very concretely, this involves a deep re-engagement of Mali, Burkina, and Niger to deploy for civil action a system comparable to that which has been put in place for military action, that is to say, an inter-ministerial action, led at the highest level by the heads of state themselves, weekly steering, very close coordination to identify all projects, ensure good governance of these projects, and allow for the return of the state and development projects once military victory is achieved. This is the implementation of the spirit of Pau where, I remind you, we defined four pillars.

First pillar, the fight against terrorism. I just mentioned it. Second pillar, strengthening Sahelian military capacities with the G5 joint force. Third pillar, the return of the state and administration in all its components. And the fourth pillar, the development policy. It is around these pillars 3 and 4 that we must now have the same strength, if I may say so, politically. Because as soon as we liberate an area, the state must return, the state services. All of this, of course, concerns the entire region.

But we have identified clear short-term objectives with the deployment of internal security forces, magistrates, the reopening of schools, and also with cases, if I may say, fully measurable and objectives that we have set for ourselves: Kidal, where we know that the return of the State has been awaited for years, and therefore a return of all the services of the Malian State is expected. We then have a challenge on the Mopti/Gao axis, which is well known; you can see on this map that, there too, it is a return of the State in all its components that must be built. Then the Ouagadougou/Kaya/Dori axis, where again, it is a return of the State in terms of security, justice, and education. And I would mention the quadrilateral Téra, Dori, Douentza, Gao, Ménaka, which is essentially the very heart of the Three Borders area, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and where we need to concentrate these actions for the return of the State. Why? Because if we want, in the long term, to gain the support of the civilian populations, once we have defeated the jihadists, it is essential to restore security to the hands of the sovereign State. It is essential to ensure justice to prevent all abuses and impunity, and it is essential to reopen schools. In the North-East region of Burkina Faso, we currently have several thousand schools, classes, that are closed. And so it is on this aspect that we have decided to make this surge, this will to move forward very clearly with weekly points that will be led by the special envoy that I have appointed in support of these initiatives and the G5 Sahel.

Finally, and this is the third point I wanted to make, it is an amplification of the collective dynamic that we held in N'Djamena. Pau marked the advent of an international coalition in the Sahel to fight against terrorism. This is what we are pursuing with very concrete advances. First, on the military front, the participation of an unprecedented number of partners at this summit, particularly the contributing states to the Takuba task force. Takuba, I remind you, is our desire to bring together European special forces to have a support force for the Malian Armed Forces in combat. France will have a pivotal role where we will be very invested with several hundred fighters, but also to aggregate around us Europeans, internationals. Launched on March 27, 2020, the Takuba task force now includes 9 partners: France, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, and the Netherlands. And it is attracting the interest of a growing number of countries, particularly from Eastern and Southern Europe; I also had here, just a few weeks ago, the confirmation from the Serbian president to join this effort. We also have several European countries, Hungary or Greece, to name just a few, who are willing to join this task force. We have also proposed to states, particularly from the region and coastal states, to join the operations carried out by international forces.

Then, during this summit in N'Djamena, we clearly received a first signal of re-engagement from the new American administration with a video message from Secretary of State BLINKEN. We also received confirmation of Algerian and Moroccan re-engagement, which I welcome, as it is important for the stability of the region. We were able to establish a High Representative of the coalition who will be a Sahelian face to ensure the good progress of the pillars at the same pace and to encourage additional commitments for the benefit of the Sahel. The operational priority, to conclude, for the coming months is to give ourselves all the means to support this dynamic and to produce irreversible advances. Significant changes will undoubtedly be made to our military setup in the Sahel in due course. But they will not happen immediately as they will first be the result of a collective discussion with our Sahelian partners and with the partners who have agreed to follow us, and they will depend on the results obtained and the degree of effective commitment of our partners. It would indeed be paradoxical to weaken our setup at a time when we have a favorable political and military alignment to achieve our objectives. That is why specific milestones have been set. We will therefore have weekly points on the implementation of these commitments. A new meeting with the heads of state of the G5 Sahel will be held in the spring to take stock of all these pillars, and a coalition summit will be held before the summer to review the concrete advances and funding. I do not want to be longer, but I wanted to detail both the achievements following Pau and the advances from this summit. I will now answer your questions.