PRESS CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON AT THE END OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

25 June 2021 · End of the European Council press conference

Context
Macron addressed press at the close of the June 2021 European Council, summarizing discussions on Russia, Turkey, migration, and international geopolitical issues.
Main themes
European strategic autonomy, EU-Russia relations, Turkey-EU relations, migration and Mediterranean crossings, Belarus situation, transatlantic relations, COVID-19 recovery, Sahel security, EU neighborhood policy, Generation Equality Forum, Libya, European Council conclusions
Duration
~52 min
94th percentile
Words
6,182
94th percentile
Sentences
331
96th percentile
Readability
58
83rd percentile
Grade
9.8
19th percentile
Syntax
2.89
33rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
25th percentile

Translated from French

This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.

331 sentences in 41 paragraphs

Hello Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning to all.

Our European Council was held in a busy international context, as the past few weeks have been marked by the G7 and a NATO summit, which nonetheless allowed the Europeans present to lay the foundations of our strategy, our positioning, a transatlantic re-engagement, and European strategic autonomy. And just a few days before the Generation Equality Forum that we are organizing in Paris in co-presidency with Mexico and UN Women. And I believe that this summit, in a few days in Paris, will also be an opportunity to continue important commitments to our values and commitments that I would qualify as civilizational. This summit is also taking place in a context of a positive evolution of the epidemic on the continent, but which calls for the utmost vigilance; of an advancement of our recovery plans; and obviously, of many geopolitical issues that needed structuring.

That is why, initially, we focused our work on international issues. First, through an exchange with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as early as yesterday noon, then the mention of several neighborhood issues that we had to address. Migration flows, first and foremost, particularly in the Mediterranean, we had a discussion on how to avoid the tragedies we know occur with the arrival of summer, with particularly dangerous crossing attempts. It is first and foremost a moral, humanitarian duty of Europeans; it is also the protection of our external borders. And so we have established cooperation with our southern partners to fight more effectively against traffickers and smugglers, to save human lives, particularly by re-engaging the training programs for Libyan coast guards, and to make progress on these issues.

We then had a discussion on Turkey. I believe our conclusions are clear, they did not suffer from long debates and they are a continuation of our exchange from last March. You remember, we had defined the milestones for Ankara to move out of the escalation attitude it had entered at the end of last year, and to take the path of constructive engagement with the Union. This dialogue of frankness and firmness has paid off, as tensions have decreased and some of the requests we made have been followed by effects. We therefore encouraged Turkey to continue its efforts, particularly by being constructive in addressing the various regional conflicts and by committing to finding a solution to the inter-Cypriot discussions that is in line with the framework set by the United Nations, and I also remind you, the very conditions under which Cyprus joined the European Union. On this, I consider that the last few weeks have been useful, that this calming is evident, and we will continue to be vigilant during the summer, fully supporting all members of the European Union, including Cyprus and Greece, but also to re-engage in joint work. And this is what we have particularly done on the issue of refugees, as we know, Turkey has a responsibility and plays an important role in this matter. That is why we have also clarified our funding strategy on this issue to provide visibility.

We also had, this time, a long debate on the link between the European Union and Russia. This was fueled by the recent report that was presented to us, which outlines the levers of action we have to improve our relationship with Moscow. We agreed on the importance of maintaining a unified approach, similar to the measures adopted in solidarity over the past few months, but also to have a proactive and planned approach, and not to yield, in a way, to the systematic reaction to provocations or aggressions. And with the Chancellor, we proposed to document the entire range of discussions on which we can engage with Russia to structure an agenda that can be an agenda of cooperation and joint work in the coming months and an agenda of clarification or sometimes disagreements. But this must be structured, thought out, and desired by Europeans. There was a long discussion, we will probably return to it in your questions, about the opportunity for a meeting with President Putin. This discussion, for me, is not of primary importance; we meet President Putin as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council continuously and through the summits we hold. On the other hand, we have structured a common agenda and I want to see this as a considerable progress since France initiated this work in August 2019. In any case, with Germany, we have consistently and proactively conveyed this message of a unified, proactive, and fully European approach to this relationship with Russia.

These discussions also allowed us to take stock of the situation in Belarus, Libya, and Ethiopia. The conclusions are clear in this regard, and I refer you to them. We also had the opportunity to discuss major international issues beyond these points.

And I was able, in this regard, to mention the situation in the Sahel, which is a collective security issue for all Europeans. I obviously presented the French strategy as I announced a few weeks ago, which is being worked on with our partners: transforming our deployment, moving away from an Opex logic to a logic of fighting terrorism and supporting Sahelian armies. In no case is this a disengagement, as we will have several thousand soldiers who will remain engaged in the area. And I want to commend here the commitment of all our European partners who have confirmed their presence alongside us for everything that was engaged, particularly in EUTM or Takuba. I even want to commend the choice made by Romania last Thursday to join us, which means that we are now 10 in the Takuba force, before other partners join us, and several Africans in particular are currently working on this file.

I want, at the moment when I mention this Sahelian subject, to express my solidarity with all the soldiers of MINUSMA who have been injured in Northern Mali in recent hours, particularly the German soldiers. The toll is still provisional, but there has been an attack against this United Nations force, and I want to reiterate our full support here.

Next, we obviously discussed the issue of the pandemic and the evolution of Covid-19, with the advancement of the vaccination campaign, which is a true European success. And I want to reiterate here how, by acting as Europeans first, we secured vaccine purchases together, we then developed production capacities together and capacities for innovation and production for the future. The choices, which were sometimes easily criticized by some at the beginning of the year, have proven effective and above all, have saved us from wasting time and a conflict that would have been terrible. We then focused the debate, and in the coming weeks, it will be necessary to be vigilant on this point, on the necessary coordination. First, we must all recognize the same vaccines. The vaccines that have been authorized by the European Medicines Agency. They are fully effective, we know this, including against the latest variants, including the Delta variant. The other vaccines do not have the same degree of visibility, particularly on this last variant. This coordination is also necessary so that our rules harmonize regarding the opening to third countries. And this is key for the European Green Pass, which will come into effect in the coming days, to be fully effective. We have also, in concert and perfectly aligned with Chancellor Merkel, had the same discourse, which is a discourse of caution and vigilance with the emergence of this new variant and of absolutely essential European coordination.

We were also able to revisit our commitments made at the G7. As you know, France has committed to providing 60 million doses by the end of the year. We represent a significant contribution of all the doses that will be given by the European Union. I believe we can still do more, but we have reiterated the necessity for everyone to meet the call of this international solidarity. No one will be fully protected as long as we are not all protected on the planet.

In the continuity of this Covid-related subject, we had this morning a discussion on recovery policies and, indeed, on monetary policy within the framework of a summit of the eurozone in an inclusive format. Recovery plans are becoming a reality, and we can rejoice in that. And here too, it is necessary, on the occasion of this summit, to take stock. A year ago, we did not have a European recovery plan, and less than a year ago, we decided in an unprecedented manner, in addition to our financial perspectives, on a massive recovery plan with a common borrowing capacity. This is now a reality. Emissions began several days ago, national recovery plans have been validated, and we are in the implementation phase. And so, this year has marked the capacity of Europeans to react quickly and well in terms of monetary policy, budgetary policy, and investment. This is what allows us, by the way, to consider the exit from the crisis in a much more serene manner, but with, nonetheless, I would say, issues that we need to embrace with great strength.

First, continue to ensure as long as necessary, a recovery, particularly of supply, to catch up with the growth trend that Europeans had before the crisis. We must not be satisfied with simply regaining the level of Gross Domestic Product that we had before the Covid crisis. We need to not only catch up to that level, which seems to be the case for the beginning of 2022, but also the trend that we had in growth before, which means a willingness from Europeans to finance certain breakthrough innovations but also the sectors that have sometimes been the most affected, so that they quickly regain their strength, and new sectors that create jobs and added value.

Next, we emphasized the need to accelerate the timeline on banking union and capital markets union. These elements are key to our agenda because we need to finance our companies and our recovery more with equity, and we therefore need to complete this work that, in my eyes, is still progressing too slowly. I could respond more exhaustively to your questions, but this is the heart of the recovery and growth strategy that was discussed this morning.

And finally, we had a discussion last night on the subject of European values, on the occasion, as you know - and the debate has been widely public in recent days - of a law in Hungary that aimed, under the pretext of protecting children's education, to conflate all issues, to associate pornography, pedophilia with homosexuality, to fully legitimize homophobia. A law, in short, that is completely contrary to our values and our law. Europeans have shown unity. I will also respond to your questions clearly. But when we all come together, with the exception of two, to clearly state things, there is not much new in the room and there is no complacency. Europe is a project that is primarily political. It began with the Council of Europe. It is this foundation that holds us together, which we then re-embraced within the European Union. And we who defend our values, our Europe, everywhere in the world, what coherence would we have, what credibility would we have if we accepted that these values be undermined within us? And so fighting against these homophobic laws is defending individual freedom, human dignity on our soil and for all of us. There is therefore no ambiguity to have, and I fully support the legal procedure that has been initiated by the European Commission.

But on this occasion, I also clearly stated that we, Europeans, must ask ourselves a question about ourselves. We see in several member countries — Hungary, Poland, and several others — the rise of an illiberal conservatism against our values. It is part of our societies, and we must respect it. But today, it is undermining these values and what has built the heart of our Western liberal democracies for centuries. This is a deep trend in these societies, not just a few leaders, and I say this here because it would be too easy to simply point the finger at a leader like Viktor ORBAN. I do this with a genuine opposition of values, but with great respect for a Prime Minister who is democratically elected. The question we must reflect on is how do peoples arrive at this point within Europe? And so something is happening within us that shows a form of drift, and we must reflect on it, give content, perspectives, and meaning back to our liberal values, in the political sense of the term, in the philosophical sense of the term, and show the strength of our democracies. I do not believe that we have a safer and stronger society when we deny the dignity of one of our citizens. Yet that is the model that is becoming attractive in too many countries. How do we collectively arrive at this point? How can one today believe in Poland, Hungary, or elsewhere, that we defend our history, our identity as Europeans, or as Hungarians or Poles, by stigmatizing a child, a teenager, a young man or a young woman, for who they are and what they have the right to be freely and to become? It is a terrible regression, but it is not so much the regression of laws that we must obviously combat with unwavering determination; it is the regression in minds and mentalities that concerns me. And in this regard, it is a cultural, civilizational battle that we must wage. We will yield nothing on this. The discussions next week, which I hope we will hold in Paris, will allow us to make progress, but I also wish that by involving our partners around the table and doing it again with 27, we continue to make progress on this subject. I will not be longer, and I will now answer a few questions.

Journalist

Hello, Mr. President. Thank you for the question. I have a double question about the Sahel. You just said that it is a collective security issue for all Europeans. You have three points of conclusion tonight regarding the Sahel. Do you feel that you are receiving a sufficient level of understanding and support from your European partners for your policy in the region? The second question that follows. You said on June 10 that for Mali, you believed that ECOWAS had made a mistake that would set a negative precedent. In your conclusions tonight, the Council welcomes the conclusions of the ECOWAS summit of June 19. Does this mean that you now give the benefit of the doubt to ECOWAS?

Emmanuel MACRON

So, on your first topic, as you know, France is engaged, and several Europeans are engaged in the Sahel. Simply, France is engaged through the Barkhane external operation, with more than 5,200 men now for several months at this level. But we have been engaged for now 8 years. Other European countries come in support, either by contributing to MINUSMA within the framework of the UN, or through training operations within EUTM, or by providing logistical support or other to us. The choice we made is largely due to the evolution of conflict in the Sahel, to the reality of understanding by African public opinions, and the greater effectiveness of a system that will now gradually focus on two pillars: cooperation with African armies — and here, in continuity with what we have outlined and defended since the summer of 2017, the joint force of the G5 Sahel, the Alliance for the Sahel, etc. — and a strict operation against terrorism that is structured around the Task Force Takuba that we launched several months ago and that we continue to consolidate. In this regard, all Europeans engaged in MINUSMA or EUTM have confirmed their commitment. Furthermore, 9 other Europeans have already confirmed that they would come alongside France to join the Task Force Takuba, in addition to the African contributions we will have. And I received very clear and explicit support last night from several member states, as I did in bilateral exchanges with Chancellor MERKEL a few days ago, or all my colleagues. So I consider that yes, there is a real level of awareness among Europeans on this issue, a real explicit recognition of France's commitment, an understanding of the transition we are making, and a willingness to remain engaged at the right level alongside us. Prime Minister RUTTE also clearly stated, echoed by Prime Minister LOFVEN, that with NATO disengaging in Afghanistan with several member states, it was legitimate for several of them to perhaps re-engage more in other operations. And I want to thank them for that. We will have the opportunity in the coming days to continue to clarify, to get into the details of the maneuver with a timeline, maps with all our partners. And we will have the Sahel conference that will take place on July 9, which will also allow us to move in the direction of this clarification of operational evolutions, as well as the financial support for this operation.

Second point on ECOWAS. I have always said that we support regional forces and the engagement of regional organizations in conflict resolution, and it is in this regard that we trust ECOWAS and support it. It is absolutely essential for the transition to take place in all these countries and for the timelines, in particular, to be respected in Mali as well as in Chad. Nevertheless, I do not take anything away, and today’s conclusions do not contradict that. I do not take away the fact that I consider for my part that it remains a mistake to have, six months after demanding a real transition from Colonel GOÏTA, recognized him after a second coup d'état? This is a precedent that will weigh on the region. It is a reality. I have always been honest with my African friends. Nevertheless, as you have noted, this is not what motivated France's choices. It simply reinforces our belief that a military operation only exists if there is political support. On the other hand, the coup d'état within the coup d'état led France to suspend joint operations with Mali, and until a discussion has been solicited at the right level by the Malians, we will not change this position on a bilateral level.

Journalist

Thank you for taking my question on the idea of establishing a direct dialogue with Russia. Was the discussion difficult? Are you disappointed, like Angela MERKEL, that a EU-Russia summit was not opened more quickly?

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you for your question. No, the discussion was complex, and that is normal. It is normal because on this subject, we do not have the same histories. I believe that no one underestimates the risks, the conflictuality, the attacks we have experienced. But the geographical and historical reality of certain member states means that there is more tension in some. Then, the debate allowed us to lay things out, as we had in fact done last May, which was, everyone acknowledged, one of the best debates in several years around this table. I am pleased that we have moved away from a purely reactive logic towards Russia. First, because the reactive logic of saying "aggression or provocation, and a response that was systematically sanctions," this logic has proven to be ineffective. We have constantly seen this. In a way, we have put ourselves in a logic that consists of saying "the Russians are doing something, we must react." But do we constrain them, do we influence their behavior? No. And everyone agrees on that. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how we can deter these behaviors, how we can try to prevent them, how we can then respond in a much more effective manner, and how we build visibility.

But the absurdity is that we are today the power that is the hardest on Russia. Yet, they are our neighbors. We witnessed, a few weeks ago: President BIDEN, who met with President PUTIN. I said to my friends around the table: "He did not ask for your opinion. And you, you watch him meet, hold a summit, does that not shock you?" We are quite funny. We let other people talk about arms control on our soil. And we are not at the table. Strange conception of power. And at the same time, are we effective? No. We could be. We represent much more in terms of investments or trade for the Russians than they represent for us. We must not overestimate what Russia is economically. They need us, but we never put ourselves in a position to really constrain them, and as a result, we push Russia to have alternative strategies and to move increasingly towards China. So, I think that today, we do not really have a strategy towards Russia.

We have, on the occasion of this summit, established a strategy, that is to say, the 5 principles that we have all validated. The idea of saying that we do not yield on certain things, such as obviously the Ukrainian question, that of our values and what we defend in Belarus or elsewhere, that alongside that, we have the will to engage in discussions where we can try to make progress on climate, on security issues, on questions of arms control or others, and that we must think about the framework of good constraints and sometimes the red lines we set for Russia. So, I am pleased with this progress because I remember that in August 2019, when France did this, everyone said "You are isolated, you are alone. What a shame to think that we can have a strategy towards Russia?" That was what was reproached.

I find this French agenda that we have been pursuing for months in our conclusions. Finally, we are structuring the beginning of a strategy towards Russia, the awareness of an important neighbor and that we must therefore engage in a strategic dialogue. That is an achievement. And when I look at the last two years, it is a step forward. Then, I am not at all obsessive about a summit of 27 because for a summit of 27, we must first be clear about what we are going to say and be totally aligned and united. And I will speak frankly, I do not need there to be a European Union summit to see Vladimir PUTIN, as far as I am concerned. I have seen him several times since I became President, and I will continue to see him. I simply say that finally, we have lifted the taboo, that yes, there are formats, we will meet as Europeans with him and move it forward. There was no consensus for a quick summit. In my eyes, that is not a drama at all; it is not a drama. The most important thing is that we have finally structured this agenda and that we maintain unity because division is what weakens us. But if unity comes at the cost of inefficiency, we can be reproached for that.

I think we are building a path where unity engages in an active, more ambitious, and demanding dialogue. So, that is a good thing. I always look at the evolution. Sometimes we take small steps, other times big ones, but when I look at things since the beginning of the year, we have moved in the right direction on the Russian question, in my opinion. We must now consolidate this progress, and we must continue to discuss these issues strategically and determine a European position on each of these subjects, with scenarios that we build together. What do we decide to do on such a question together with Russia? What do we ask of them? What do we demand? Where do we set our red lines? That will be the work of the coming months. And at that point, we can have a useful meeting. So, I know there have been many comments on the formats of meetings. I think that generally, here in Brussels, we spend far too much time and emotion on the format of meetings and the question of whether there is a meeting or not. I prefer that we are already clear on the strategies. And there, we were not allowed to talk about them; we are talking about them, and we are becoming clearer and clearer. So there you go, we are more ambitious and we are more united. That is a good thing.

Hello, thank you for taking my question. I would like to return to Hungary with two questions. You say that there should be no complacency with Hungary. There is a procedure that may be initiated by the European Commission; do you consider that these mechanisms that are being put in place are sufficiently effective, and are they not too slow to sanction such behavior? And the second question: do you agree with the Dutch Prime Minister that Hungary no longer has a place in the European Union? Thank you.

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you. Well, the two questions are indeed related. And I think it is an important question. First of all, I invite everyone to reflect and to calm their minds. We cannot always say: geopolitically, Europe must continue to expand. We need to have an accession agenda because when we talk about the Western Balkans, we see the Turks coming, the Russians, the Chinese. We are threatened at our borders, and therefore we must continue to enlarge the club to stabilize it. And as soon as we have a problem, to say: we must exclude. At some point, people will ask us: where are you going? This question simply raises within us the issue of our credibility. Can we continue to tell an Albanian, a Serb: "Make efforts on the rule of law; make efforts to be able to join," and accept within our ranks people who have all the rights of full membership, who are full member states and who are going in the opposite direction? That is our real problem. And that is why I say that the question is not just a question for the Hungarians; it is an existential question for Europeans. Today, we have democratically elected leaders, supported by their people, who are making decisions that contravene the fundamental values of Europe. This is not a small issue. We must think about it and address it. And it is a deep debate. It is philosophical and political; if we do not resolve it, we will continue to waste a lot of time on issues that are merely phenomena. So, to answer very directly, I am not in favor of using Article 50 because when we have a problem with a member state, we try to resolve it, precisely, and to keep in contact, because it is the power, it is the European gravity that allows us to bring people back to our values and our model. If we exclude immediately as soon as we have a problem, we diffract, we diverge, and we will lead people who are thousands of kilometers away from us to think that their values are closer to Russian conservatives and anti-liberals, or even to the Chinese. That is regression. So, no, we must keep them.

Simply, we need effective procedures. So yes, I agree with you. The procedures under our treaties are very long, too long. Now, I think that this work of engagement is a work that we must do on ourselves. And this ties into what I was saying earlier; if we have come to this point, it is because we have allowed things to slowly drift. These phenomena do not happen overnight. And so, these procedures are slow. But we must engage in a close dialogue with the political systems, media, social organizations, and intellectuals in these countries, first to show that we will concede nothing. Then, step by step, sanction the member states that go in these directions but also engage in pedagogy and conviction and show civil societies that this is a terrible regression towards which they are heading and that we cannot build a happier society that corresponds to our models. And we cannot sustainably be European if we go in this direction. And that, we can defend, we can discuss, we can work closely on. So yes, European procedures are very long. I still think they have their effectiveness. They need to be initiated quickly. The Commission has started to do so while respecting sovereignty, so we must be tough with the leaders and convincing with the peoples, if I may say so.

Jean QUATREMER

Thank you for giving me the floor. Four questions, it's brief, on such a rich summit. I will continue on Hungary like my colleague just now. What we can see very clearly is that there is an East-West division. You say that indeed, only Poland and Slovenia have supported Viktor ORBAN, but there has been a lot of silence, and we see that among the signatories of the letters launched at the initiative of Belgium, there are only three Eastern countries, namely the three Baltic states. So, I would often say that silence does not always mean consent. So, there is a problem. We have a major issue here since, basically, all the countries from the post-enlargement of 2004 do not evidently share our values. Now you mention the procedures. Certainly, the procedures do not allow for quick outcomes and perhaps do not allow for outcomes at all because the only procedure we have is Article 7, which requires unanimity under Article 7 of the treaty. And the other is a regulation that will not apply, in any case, to Viktor ORBAN's Hungary, since it is about protecting the financial interests of the European Union. And the Hungarian homophobic law does not jeopardize the financial interests of the European Union. Between excluding and doing nothing, we need to find something because there has been a fundamental change over the past year. We have moved from a system, I would say, of free movement of goods to a system of financial solidarity that we have never had before with the recovery fund. As the Swedish Prime Minister said, "Why should I pay for it?" I ask myself, why should I pay, why should I be financially supportive of a Hungarian who does not share basic values, as you yourself say? So, there comes a moment when the system will explode because we cannot be financially supportive of people who do not share the basic values of our life in society. So, what do you propose besides convincing them? Thank you.

Emmanuel MACRON

There is one point with which I agree, one point with which I am not in disagreement, but I would nuance. It is quite true that there is an East-West division, and it is quite true that there have been silences. Nevertheless, the effective supports have been Slovenian and Polish. And so, that is a fact; I said it earlier, I think we must acknowledge it and face it. This makes a strategy that works through exclusion or stigmatization all the less likely. Because the problem is deeper. I am not sure I would retain your argument about financial solidarity. Of course, I have defended this financial solidarity so much; it gives us duties as well as rights. But I would not condition my demands on the Hungarians on that. Because, precisely, the Hungarians and others will tell you that in a few years, they will become net contributors to the European budget. That is indeed one of their arguments. So, they will tell you: "We, in 2024, will be net contributors." And then they will say: "Since we pay and contribute, do not bother us anymore about values." I will never equate values with money. I think the system is principled. Europe is, I would say, constitutionally, ontologically attached to these values. Even if there were no financial solidarity between us, even if a state were a net contributor, and so this would also apply to France even if, in a way, the Hungarian taxpayer were giving money. It is ontological and principled. I will not link it to the financial question. So the dilemma in which we are plunged is the one you have described. So I think that in relation to this, there is in your observation, the first observation you make and that I share, a beginning of an answer. If we do not make a clear, conscious, and in-depth analysis of what has happened in the post-communist societies that joined the European Union, we will not have the answer. This is not a Viktor ORBAN problem; that is not true. It is a deeper problem. There is a rise of illiberalism in societies that fought against communism, that emerged from it, that then joined the liberal economy, then the European Union, and that today are being attracted by societal models, political models that are contrary to our values. This is a reality. What has happened? Why? And how do we combat it? For me, this is the most important answer; it is not procedural. And so, we must... This is not a question of treaties; this is not a question of money. I think we must re-engage in work with intellectuals, civil societies, and explain, perhaps be much more present in the media of these countries, perhaps provide stronger demonstrations, better support those who defend European ideas in line with our foundational values. But I think we need a strategy in this regard. And it is normal; we have totally disarmed this field. We had disarmed it in relation to the outside and we had disarmed it in our field because, after all, for decades, we have thought that liberal democracy is such an attractive model that people come to it spontaneously, and that is what happened after the fall of the Wall. And something has stalled, which means that today in our societies, people say, "Well, I take the supermarket, but I no longer adhere to the values. I am willing to take from the shelves what is for sale or what is given to me, but I no longer respect the rules of the club. I want another life." We need a deep debate. For me, this is one of the subjects that must emerge from the Convention on the Future of Europe. We must have an answer to this issue. It is political, in the strongest sense of the term, and it is not with our current mechanisms that we will resolve it. And so it is political, which means that we must address the question of our political-philosophical foundation, but also the recomposition of Europe that we must have around this. Something is not functioning today. I do not have an immediate answer, but the problem you raise, that we point out together, is much deeper than procedures. That is the subject that in the coming months we must embrace and which will require answers that, in my opinion, are at least at the level of treaty changes, but which is a profound change for Europe. We must not neglect this answer nor what is happening among us.

Then, in the short term, I think that what we must do is legal work, support the Commission and the current procedures even if they are slow, and strengthen local pressure, that is to say, defend our ideas in public opinions and the media, engage in close dialogue. But there is no better answer than those we have engaged with all the legal tools that are ours and the procedural tools. I do not have a better short-term answer than to respect the treaties and apply them alongside the European Commission. That is my provisional answer. But I share your seriousness, and I would say I share it fundamentally. And for me, this will be one of the most important subjects of this European Convention and therefore the answers we must provide in the coming months. We have done a lot on political and financial issues, and I think that what we did in the Franco-German context and then in the European context last year was a real revolution. And now we must consolidate and deploy it. We have made a revolution on strategic autonomy. When I spoke of sovereignty in 2017, it was a dirty word. There is a change, a conversion of mentalities that is underway. We must continue and strengthen it. We have today a democratic and political clarification to achieve. That is the next battle.

Moderator

Thank you all. We wish you a very good day.

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you very much. Good luck to everyone.