Press conference of the President of the Republic ahead of the G7 and NATO Summits - Opening remarks

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

10 June 2021 · Press conference ahead of the G7 and NATO Summits · Élysée Palace, France

Context
Macron held a press conference at the Élysée Palace on June 10, 2021, to outline France's priorities ahead of the G7 and NATO summits.
Main themes
Multilateralism, G7 and NATO summits, COVID-19 pandemic response, global vaccine equity and Covax, climate action, European sovereignty, France-Africa relations, health multilateral frameworks, fight against terrorism, digital and taxation issues, regional crisis management, international cooperation
Duration
~60 min
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7,212
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Sentences
320
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Readability
49
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Grade
12.0
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Syntax
2.99
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Vocabulary
2.21
53rd percentile

Translated from French

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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 36%31%
  • Economic 28%24%
  • Social 17%15%
  • Technological 7%6%
  • Environmental 5%4%
  • Institutional 5%4%
  • Ceremonial 3%2%
  • Not in focus 13%

320 sentences in 31 paragraphs

I am happy to see you today at the Élysée for this press conference ahead of several important international meetings. I will take a few moments to share with you some convictions and messages, and then I will answer all the questions you may have.

We are gradually emerging, and I say this with great humility and caution, from an extremely severe pandemic period in our country, on the continent, and around the world that has tested our collective ability to react and cooperate. We will, particularly with the new American administration, have the opportunity for a first summit, particularly the G7 summit chaired by the United Kingdom, followed by a NATO summit. This comes a few weeks after the Summit on Financing African Economies that we held in Paris. These deadlines are for me both an opportunity to restart international cooperation on major issues and to advance several commitments and causes on which France has invested a lot over the past four years, as well as moments of clarification on important topics. I would like to focus my remarks around four priorities that have undoubtedly structured our international policy over the past few years.

First, effective multilateralism through causes and commitments, whether it concerns climate, health, equality, digital issues, or taxation. The second axis is that of European sovereignty. The third is that of a new relationship with the African continent. And the fourth is that of managing regional crises, which has, over the past few years, focused on the fight against terrorism, the defense of our values, and respect for the sovereignty of all states. I believe I can say that the current period will allow us to achieve results on each of these axes and also invites useful clarifications.

The first point I wanted to address is that of effective multilateralism. We have often defended it. Over the past four years, European countries have defended, supported, in a way guaranteed this effective multilateralism, while the United States of America decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and renounced cooperation in many areas.

Together, we have championed, and France has played its role with several initiatives and operations, the defense of this multilateralism. And it seems to me that we laid important foundations during the G7 in Biarritz. On health, climate, and equality issues, on each of these points. Biarritz set ambitions and intentions, and a synthesis can be provided to you, which are now finding concrete outcomes in recent weeks and months, and for some, will be finalized at this G7. So, for me, this is really the moment, I would say, of the return of cooperation to allow this effective multilateralism to function fully. I will try to address each of these themes.

The first is health. Obviously, the pandemic has tested our credibility in this area. So, we did not wait for it to defend this multilateralism. I would like to remind you that we had, at Biarritz, expressed the desire to strengthen the multilateral framework in health, emphasizing the importance of funding the WHO and multilateral frameworks, and that a few weeks later, we held in Lyon the financing conference of the Global Forum, which enables vaccination and the fight against major pandemics, particularly on the African continent. We kept our commitments where, at that time, many others had reduced theirs, and thus, whether in Lyon in the fall of 2019 or at our G7, we continued this multilateralism in health from the very beginning of the health crisis. In my view, the most important initiative in recent months has been the so-called ACT-A initiative. We built it with Africans. We defended and promoted it within the G20, and we created an initiative aimed at enabling the poorest countries, particularly in Africa, to withstand the epidemic with tests, diagnostics, treatments, and vaccines, with a commitment to strengthen primary systems and with the commitment to finance them. I will return to each of these points. ACT-A has continued its path and has helped structure the Covax initiative, this donation of vaccines, and this is arriving at a moment of truth during this G7. That is why, on health issues, this G7 is a moment of collective re-engagement and clarification.

First, we need to define a target. We are discussing vaccine issues, many objectives, and I am wary of objectives when it comes to adding billions without a precise timeline and results to achieve. And I must say that the discussions I have had with states, particularly African ones, since I believe that the recipient states are best positioned to qualify the objectives we should set, have convinced me that we must primarily aim for a target percentage of the population to be vaccinated. The African CDC has thus defined 60% of Africans to be vaccinated by the end of the first quarter of 2022, with a target of 40% by the end of 2021. This is a raised target compared to what we had committed to seeing within the framework of Covax, which was only 20%. I believe this is the right target, and it is one that we must endorse within the framework of this G7. France is ready to play its part. As you already know, we have begun to donate doses. We have committed to donating 30 million doses by the end of 2021. As the Germans have committed to donating 30 million doses by that date, this allows the European Union to have at least the target of 100 million. I think we need, based on these agreements, to review these national and regional targets to align them with these vaccination objectives. And what I want France to endorse, in proportion to its share, is this target of 40% vaccinated by the end of the year and 60% by the end of the first quarter of next year. But already, we have made over 800,000 dose transfers via Covax, and 1.7 million will be made by the end of the month allocated to 14 African countries. What I am talking about here are not commitments. These are deliveries already made, and I think it is important to recall them: 800,000 doses already delivered via Covax by France and 1.7 million by the end of the month. I am pleased that the United States is fully joining the initiative and committing in this direction. In the short term, that is the goal: 40% by the end of the year, 60% by the end of the first quarter of 2022 for vaccination.

How to achieve this? In the very short term, for me, the priority must continue to be the donation of doses. This is the path we have decided to follow. This is the one I want us to be able to increase in the discussions of the coming days. And this is the one that seems to me the most effective and the fairest. To enable and strengthen it, we also need to lift all export restrictions. The G7 must allow for the removal of all these obstacles. We know that there have been export bans from several G7 member countries that have blocked production in other countries and sometimes blocked production in middle-income countries, essential for the production of vaccines destined for the poorest countries. I will take just one example, India. India, and particularly the Serum Institute of India, has been blocked in its production by export restrictions on ingredients necessary for the production of these vaccines that came from certain G7 economies. These must absolutely be lifted both so that India can produce more for itself and to quickly provide especially to Africans who are very dependent on its production.

Furthermore, our mechanisms today are not solely made up of dose donations. Others want to buy doses. Some also want to produce to give. This will be the core of the American strategy. All strategies are obviously good as long as they allow us to achieve our vaccination and population coverage goal, in accordance with the World Health Organization's objective. But we will defend a point that seems essential to me in this matter, which is transparency. Today, there is no reference price for the Covax mechanism as for the doses that are purchased by it or regarding the recipient countries. Price transparency is an essential element in terms of justice and efficiency. Today, we do not know how much Covax pays for doses to pharmaceutical laboratories. In doing so, African states, which rightly have also decided to complement these initiatives with their own purchases, often pay two to three times the price that we, the wealthiest states, pay. This is a complete injustice that must be corrected here. We must obtain not price transparency for the contracts that bind laboratories with the wealthiest states or the international community; that falls under business law, and we want to respect it. But for solidarity mechanisms, there must be price transparency that will allow for reference prices for the poorest states for their purchases.

Next comes the question of intellectual property. And it will indeed mark the course of our effectiveness. Why? Because I believe we need to organize ourselves right now, as I discussed yesterday with the NGOs most invested in this issue, to also allow the poorest and middle-income countries to produce for themselves. In the very short term, we need to give and produce to give, but we must quickly enable economies that can to produce for themselves, particularly for Africa. I believe this is a matter of consideration, but it is also a matter of collective effectiveness. Today, Africa represents about 20% in terms of vaccines. It has the production capacity for only 1% of vaccines.

This is the objective I had at the heart of the trip made a few weeks ago, particularly in South Africa after the trip to Rwanda. And we have, moreover, led an initiative that goes exactly in this direction, jointly with Germany, the United States of America, and the World Bank through the IFC. What we need to do, therefore, is to accelerate technology transfers and the capacity building of all countries that can in the poorest or middle-income regions to produce. This will not cover the needs in the next six months. But in the next 12-18 months, we can begin, based on existing capacities, to produce. And above all, this is what will allow us to build our resilience for future pandemics. No one can say what our needs will be over time to face COVID-19 because no one can predict the booster needs we will have. But for sure, we will have other pandemics, and we know well that we have other vaccines to produce. On this subject, we must commit to the World Health Organization, to the World Trade Organization to ensure that intellectual property will never be an obstacle to access to vaccines. And for me, this is the principle that must govern our work. Intellectual property must never block these technology transfers and the capacity to produce. That is why we decided to put on the table with South Africa for this G7 a proposal also allowing us to work towards a limited time and space waiver of this intellectual property. We defend fair remuneration for innovation and respect for intellectual property. There is no great innovation if there is no fair compensation for intellectual property. But the nature of the profits being made today and their magnitude justify that, for countries that can, in limited cases and during the peak of the epidemic, we reflect, we advance, and we work on these waivers in terms of intellectual property that will allow for accelerated transfer of ownership and production. This is an initial proposal from India and South Africa that we have reworked, which we still wish to work on with the WHO, the WTO, and our partners. But I hope it will indeed allow for an agreement during this G7. In this context, and to complement our response on this subject, we also advocate in the short term the idea that the dose donations made by states should be complemented by a donation of doses from pharmaceutical laboratories.

Indeed, I want to remind you here that, in the past, we have collectively defined such commitments for the private sector. We were able, particularly during the H1N1 epidemic, to set donation targets for doses by laboratories with a commitment to give 10% of the doses sold elsewhere. This was what was called the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, which was adopted at the 64th World Health Assembly. This goal seems particularly relevant to us. We are obviously experiencing an international crisis. States, with the money of our citizens, our taxpayers around the world, have massively financed research, the acceleration of research, the purchase of doses for ourselves, the purchase of doses to enable donations. It is legitimate that the pharmaceutical industry contributes proportionately, based on this already existing framework, to this solidarity. These are the main expectations and objectives that France will defend regarding health, which will complement ACT-A and go further, giving, producing to give, and enabling the poorest and middle-income countries that can to produce for themselves.

The second major issue is obviously climate. On this point, the last few months have been marked by the return of the United States of America, and I believe this is obviously the most structural decision for our international agenda. For four years, Europe, in partnership with China, preserved the framework of the Paris Agreement. The return of the United States of America marks a very structural advancement that allows us to strengthen this framework, even though we still have a tremendous amount of work to do, and the goal is now one of implementation and acceleration of that implementation. The European Union has set extremely strong targets in this area in recent months, also raising its commitments for 2030 to a 55% reduction in emissions, and endorsing carbon neutrality by 2050. Last April, the United States of America made its own commitments, and it is on this framework that we will gather at this G7 to prepare for the important meeting of COP 26 in Glasgow. With a few points that we particularly care about, beyond these objectives and now the implementation of both regulations, carbon pricing, and the investments that each geographical area will have to make, we will obviously need to advance on climate finance. I believe the G7 is an appropriate framework, particularly regarding the methodology and standards in climate finance, and we advocate for the idea of having ad hoc standardization, particularly using the OECD. But I think Europeans have an important role to play in this matter. And where we have historically delegated accounting standards to the Anglo-Saxons, I believe our historical role is to endorse the creation of moral standards for our capitalism, whether they are environmental or social standards. This is an agenda I have been advocating since the beginning of my term, which I presented at Davos a little over three years ago, and which is gradually being implemented, particularly with this issue of standardization. This is what we have particularly defended through TCFD, and we will do the same regarding biodiversity. The other point, obviously, is precisely this biodiversity agenda. We have COP 15 in Kunming at the end of the year. We will have the IUCN in Marseille in September, and we wish, anchored in the G7 framework, to fight to preserve biodiversity, which is completely intertwined with our fight against climate change. This is the follow-up in this regard to the biodiversity OPS that took place right here at the beginning of the year.

The third major issue on which effective multilateralism is advancing and will be dedicated during this G7 is the regulation of digital technology. This issue, and we will certainly have the opportunity to discuss it further, is essential for our democracies. We have seen in recent years the disruption of minds at work in the digital realm. I remind you that in the spring of 2017, we launched an initiative to combat terrorist content online with then-Prime Minister Theresa May. Initially, as crazy as it may seem today, we largely failed. And in the name of defending freedom of expression, we were somewhat sent back to our own playgrounds. Things have unfortunately progressed. And after the terrible attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, in the spring of 2019, we held a meeting here at the Élysée in May 2019 called the Christchurch Call, which brought together several governments and major technology and social media companies to establish an initial innovative framework, in which we committed to the removal of terrorist content or content promoting terrorism within one hour, but also to a method of cooperation between states and digital actors. This method has yielded results. We have had concrete results because all the platforms that signed it complied. I can attest to this based on what France experienced last autumn when we suffered attacks. It was the platforms that alerted us and removed that content first, within the hour. Moreover, Europe has come to complement this advancement since we have passed legally binding texts that now impose the obligation to remove terrorist content within one hour. We now need to go further in two respects.

The first is to expand the member countries of this call. In this regard, last May, we made substantial progress since the United States of America confirmed its decision to join the Christchurch Call. This, obviously, given the number of companies present on American soil and incorporated in the United States, is a transformative element, and I am pleased about it.

The second thing is to advance in creating the framework that will allow us, as effectively as we have done for terrorism, to combat all forms of hate speech online: racist speech, anti-Semitic speech, and all forms of harassment. You know that we have pursued this agenda in a Franco-French manner, and we will continue to pursue it to the end. We wish to pursue it at the European level through the directives proposed by the Commission at the end of last year, which are the result of this Christchurch agenda. We also want there to be an international commitment from the G7 to move in this direction. This is what we advocate for truly effective multilateralism in terms of regulating the Internet and its content. This is the only condition for having an effective framework that we will then carry to the G20, which allows us to combat the wilding of minds and communication, and thus the wilding of our new global public order. Algorithms are particularly an essential element that we must target in these regulations. It is both a cooperative framework with these networks and large groups, these major platforms, but we are also always advancing simultaneously on a more binding framework since we are passing national and European legislation to complement it. This initiative is key to avoiding— we can return to this if you wish in the questions— a fragmentation of the global Internet. Because what is at stake is our ability to regulate the global Internet. The risk otherwise is that de facto regulations will impose themselves on us that are structured around Chinese preferences on one hand, and American preferences on the other. What we are fighting for here is to defend our values, those that are precisely at the heart of multilateralism and universalism, built in the second half of the 20th century.

The fourth essential issue of this effective multilateralism, which is almost a continuation of what I just said, is international taxation. As you know, for four years, France has been fighting to correct a deep injustice in our international organization. The fact that large groups that make super profits, because they manage to optimize their activities thanks to digitization in particular, do not pay their fair share of taxes. This is inexplicable for our taxpayers and our citizens. It is unfair to our businesses, particularly SMEs or micro-enterprises that do pay taxes while sometimes being in the same sector. We have carried this agenda. We fought for it at the OECD first. And this agenda, regardless of the remarkable work that the OECD and its teams have done since the beginning, and I want to salute them here, was blocked by the American administration for the past four years. We then decided to carry it at the European level. And it has somewhat awaited the advancements of the OECD. And so, with a few member states, we decided to implement our digital taxes to move forward, which France has done and has taken on. And at a time when we are experiencing progress, I want to reiterate the role we have played, and especially the role that certain French economic sectors have played, which have been somewhat the victims of retaliation. And at a time when we are recording a victory for this international tax, I think of our winemakers and many sometimes modest businesses that, over the past two years, have paid the sanctions of American retaliation because we had implemented a digital tax. That is how it happened, let us not forget. There were people who were against it. There were people who advanced in secret. I am pleased that we did not advance in secret, as far as we are concerned, and that certain economic sectors paid the price. And I thank them because they have been somewhat the collateral victims of our sense of responsibility. That is why it is, I would say, obvious that we are now only waiting for the date when we will have all the assurances that such taxes will not re-emerge.

I believe there is no longer any sense in commercial conflict since we all agree and that we will finally be able to implement this fair taxation that is built around two pillars, as you know, one that allows for taxing super profits, particularly those of large digital groups, and the second that allows for establishing a minimum tax of at least 15%, which prevents tax optimization for large groups. The final technical details will come in the coming weeks, but for the French economy, this will likely amount to something between 5 and 10 billion euros, and for European economies, something around 50 billion euros. And so you see the importance of these advancements that will be real around 2025. Therefore, we must not relent, but tax justice also allows for greater efficiency and, in a way, lightens the burden on other taxpayers. This agreement has been endorsed at the level of G7 finance ministers. We will endorse it at the level of heads of state and government. At the beginning of July, it will be carried within the G20 framework. And it will be finalized in an inclusive framework involving 139 states led by the OECD. Because obviously, such taxation is effective if there is not the slightest leak from tax havens that remain outside this framework. But in doing so, we will complete a work that began after the financial crisis of 2008-2010 and which allowed us to end banking secrecy and then to put an end to tax evasion mechanisms through base erosion. So this is a massive advancement for a more effective and fair globalization.

The last point regarding effective multilateralism is precisely the fight against inequalities. The pandemic has significantly increased these inequalities, and therefore we must commit to strengthening our own investments in this area. France, as you know, is in the process of voting on a trajectory that raises its official development assistance in the very short term to 0.5%, 0.55% of our national production, and we will then bring it to 0.7%, thereby ending more than a decade of decline or stabilization of our official development assistance. And at the heart of this fight against inequalities, we wish to advocate, as we have been doing for four years, the fight against gender inequalities. We had placed it at the heart of the G7 in Biarritz, and the G7 in Biarritz allowed for concrete advancements. I want to mention two: the financing mechanism for women's entrepreneurship, which we launched in Biarritz, called AFAWA, led by the African Development Bank and Angélique Kidjo, has enabled the mobilization of 1 billion euros in funding for women's entrepreneurship projects across Africa. Similarly, we launched the legislative bouquet encouraging each member state to adopt legislation, as we are currently doing. We have done it in France. It has allowed progress in more than 14 partner countries to adopt legislation favorable to gender equality, whether it concerns equal pay or statutory equality.

We obviously wish to continue these advances at this G7, in particular we will make commitments for the refinancing of the Global Partnership for Education that we co-chaired three years ago with Senegal for the refinancing conference, and we will allocate 50% of the funding for the education of young girls. I say this because it is a fight that we have been waging from the beginning with a few others, but in terms of combating inequalities, investment in the education of young girls, particularly on the African continent, is essential. It has regressed in recent months due to the pandemic and the conflicts occurring throughout the region. We will increase our commitment by directing it towards the education of young girls. The other point is that we are obviously preparing the work for the "Generation Equality" forum that we co-chair with Mexico and UN Women, which will take place here in the last days of June and the first days of July, and which will also allow us, 25 years after Beijing, to fight to preserve women's rights everywhere in the world, including in regions that are closest to our country where these rights are often threatened, whether it is the right of women to control their bodies or simply the right to have a fair place in society. At the edges of Europe, these rights are today being called into question and this meeting will be absolutely essential in this regard. That is the main and first point I wanted to address, this G7 summit, as you can see, is a culmination of sorts of the last few months; it is for us, thanks to the return of the American administration that shares the essence of our convictions, and also thanks to the work we have done over the past four years, the possibility of achieving real results in addition to everything we have pursued recently.

The second major focus, and I will be much quicker, which is at the heart of the coming days for me, is that of European sovereignty. You have often heard me defend this concept in which I deeply believe, that of a European Union that needs to build the framework of its strategic autonomy in economic, industrial, technological, and military values. We have a solid track record in this regard in recent years: a defense Europe has advanced as it had not since the 1950s, strengthened cooperations, a European Defense Fund, joint projects particularly between France and Germany that we have expanded to a few other partners who, in recent weeks, have made massive progress. We have succeeded in presiding over a wake-up call in terms of technological sovereignty regarding 5G, but also on essential components, with a Commission that is much more focused on this agenda and particularly in terms of digital, the DMA/DSA directives, and we have built economic and financial sovereignty during the unprecedented crisis, particularly thanks to the Franco-German initiative of May 2020 and then the July summit which allowed us to build a common borrowing capacity and an unprecedented investment plan.

And with this, we arrive at this G7 and this NATO summit with all this legacy and for me the first objective is that our partners recognize this new European reality and that we know how to build a new partnership with the United States of America. A partnership of values, an alliance on certain issues, but also a clear-eyed partnership that consists of saying that it is up to us to manage our neighborhood because we have also learned from history collectively and particularly from the history of the last 20 years. And it is in this spirit that I approach this G7 and this NATO summit. I welcome the American re-engagement in the concert of nations and in this cooperative multilateralism. And for me, the key is that Europeans remain united. And attentive to their common sovereignty and that we can also have our own voice, a community of values, but independence when it comes to our strategy towards China. Independence when it comes to our strategy towards our neighbors, whether it is Russia or Turkey. Responsibility when it comes to managing our neighborhoods, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the African continent.

In this regard, three things are essential to me for the upcoming NATO summit. The first is that precisely these consolidation efforts are respected in the dialogue and that the strategic autonomy of Europeans is recognized. France invested 2% of its gross domestic product in its military defense in 2020. The second thing is that we implement the report of the Wise Men. Here too, the spirit of responsibility and continuity. I was following up on the G7 in Biarritz in the summer of 2019. We need to follow up on the 2019 summit and in a way on this alarm bell that I had sounded regarding NATO. There was a report from the Wise Men. What does it say? NATO must clarify its common values. NATO must build a code of conduct among allies and NATO must clarify its concept. It will be echoed by the work of the strategic compass under the French presidency of the European Union, and then, a few months later, the clarification and finalization of the NATO concept by all its members. I believe that this meeting next Monday should be an opportunity to dedicate this agenda, to advance the fact that NATO must clarify what its role and strategy are in this regard and above all, to anchor this contribution from the report of the Wise Men, that is to say, the rules of conduct among member states. And the third point that seems very important to me in this context is that we Europeans take on the role of being the actors of arms control on our soil. I think this is an essential issue for the months and years to come. The INF Treaty having been denounced by the United States in 2019 and not respected by Russia. We cannot accept returning to a grammar that would be that of the Cold War. Europe is not simply an object or a territory of the distribution of influences. We are a subject of international geopolitics and we must assume it. Europeans therefore have to decide for themselves on the arms control that concerns them. France, as a permanent member of the Security Council and which assumes being a nuclear power and has invested in the nuclear component, intends to carry its values and its place in this dialogue.

The third axis of the coming days is this new relationship with Africa and the New Deal with Africa. I will be very brief on this point, but it is important to me because it is also the common thread of what we have been doing since the beginning of the Ouagadougou speech of the G7 chaired by France, where we first associated African states in the construction of our own agenda. They were stakeholders in this G7 up to ACT-A that we built with Africans and the initiatives for the vaccine that we are building together. I will arrive at this G7 with the same conviction. Here too, Africans must be stakeholders in the ambitions that the international community has towards them. And this is essential. That is why for vaccines, I believe we must take the objectives of the African Union and Africa and we must advance on this agenda with them. The core, beyond what I have already said in terms of health, of what we want to support for Africa is in terms of financing African economies and following up on the Paris summit. Why? Because if Africa has experienced a health shock like all of us, it has also experienced an economic shock of unprecedented magnitude. The closures of economies, the shutdown of international trade, the restrictions have had an unparalleled impact on the African continent compared to ours, and African economies obviously do not have our budgetary capacities. But they also do not have our monetary instruments. All the major economic areas of the world have operated with extremely accommodative monetary policy during this period. China with its own system, the United States with the Fed, and the eurozone with the ECB. Africa has not had these mechanisms and therefore the financing needs created by the Covid crisis are at least $290 billion between now and 2025. And I emphasize at least. This is not just a spirit of solidarity; it is also a duty of efficiency, as with the vaccine. Africa is the youngest continent in the world. 70% of its population is under 25 years old. It is a continent that increases its share of the international population every year. It will represent, by 2050, at least a quarter of this population, of this youth. If we leave Africa to face its financing needs, we would take on the same responsibility that our allies took after the Second World War by leaving Europe to face its debts. This is an element of lucidity for the international community, and particularly for Europeans, at the moment when we talk about helping Africa, to help it for itself and to help it for ourselves, because we must change this relationship, no longer having a relationship of distrust, of security, of migration endured, but allowing African economies to build the future of their youth by giving them the levers to do so.

In the very short term, this involves massive investment in the economies of the African continent. We have advocated since November of last year, during the Global Forum in Paris for Peace, for an exceptional issuance of special drawing rights from the International Monetary Fund. What is it? It is a capital increase of the International Monetary Fund which, in a way, is equivalent to monetary creation for the economies that are shareholders. The new American administration has supported this project. We have therefore built an agreement to have $650 billion in special drawing rights. A historic result. If the IMF's distribution keys are mechanically applied, these represent only $33 billion for Africa, of which $24 billion for sub-Saharan Africa, that is to say one-tenth of the need. To do this, we, the richest countries, need to reallocate our special drawing rights to pass them on to them. This is where solidarity is at stake. France committed at the Paris summit to do this so that at least $100 billion goes to Africans. The truth is that we should aim for $150 billion. We will do our utmost to achieve this consensus. This requires, of course, the agreement of the United States and the decision of Congress and the rest of our European partners. The G7 meeting must allow us to obtain this historic agreement with the goal of having at least $100 billion in special drawing rights going to Africa. This is an essential start. This mechanism should be complemented by an agreement to also sell part of our gold reserves and finance these investments. Why? Because the IMF's gold reserves have increased in value due to the crisis. Because gold has been a safe haven. Let us use this windfall to give it to the poorest countries, particularly African countries, that need it today. Not in 20 or 30 years, but today.

The third point is that we must also work to allow African regional banks to use these special drawing rights, which will enable them to have a leverage effect and be true partners in their development. We advocate that the African Union, the African Development Bank, and other regional banks be able to benefit from these special drawing rights and use them to make more grants and loans to their economies. Finally, we aim to complement this initiative with two elements. The first is massive investment from the private sector. That is why we launched the Alliance for Entrepreneurship and Private Investment, in connection with the IFC, a subsidiary of the World Bank Group, and on the other hand, by reconstructing the international budgetary and financial framework of the IMF and the World Bank. The current rules on deficits, deficit monitoring, and IMF reforms must be reworked in partnership with the recipient states. Here too, out of respect and coherence, all the economies of the world have revised their budgetary dogmas; we Europeans ourselves have lifted the constraints we had imposed on ourselves nearly 30 years ago. Why continue to impose the same framework on African economies when their challenge is even greater than ours given their demographic reality? We need to rethink this framework and accept, as G7 economies, to carry this action. Finally, and I will stop on this point, crisis management, I will not cover them all and I will answer your questions for all those I have not mentioned. But we are talking about crisis management. I also want to continue and conclude on Africa. Crisis management, for us over the past four years, has consisted of following a few red threads.

First, we must engage everywhere where it is necessary to fight against international terrorism, and in particular Islamist terrorism. Because we have been affected on our soil and because they destabilize neighboring and friendly regions. The Near and Middle East, for too many years, with the question, of course, of our involvement within the framework of the coalition in the Iraqi-Syrian zone, but also with the Iranian dossier and on the other hand Africa, since the epicenter today of international terrorism has shifted to Africa over the last two years.

The second principle that has always guided us is to defend our values. And here too, we must intervene everywhere so that the values we defend in the international framework are promoted, defended, and respected.

The third principle is to respect the sovereignty of States. This is a grammar to which, I believe, you have often heard me refer, and I do not think we can substitute ourselves for a sovereign people to build their well-being in place of themselves. We can influence, we can work, we can harden with governments. I do not believe in a policy that consists of substituting ourselves for them. This is how we have constantly worked in the Near and Middle East as well as in Africa. In this regard, as you know, France has been engaged for a little over 8 years in the Sahel after the salutary intervention decided by President François Hollande in Mali, which helped save Bamako and stop the destabilization of the Malian state at the request of that state and ECOWAS. We then established ourselves at the request of the sovereign states of the region and ECOWAS, in a long-term operation called Barkhane, which has structured the protection of these states against Islamist terrorism throughout the region, the threat to their state sovereignty.

Many of our soldiers have fallen. And in saying this, I have a deep thought for them, for their families, because we owe them coherence, the continuation of the mission to the end, and clarity regarding our missions. I had the opportunity to clarify the framework of our intervention during the summit in Pau at the beginning of 2020, to follow up on it at the beginning of this year in N'Djamena. And we are now arriving at a moment that requires us to implement what I had begun to define in Pau, what we had conceived at the end of last year and that I had not shared with our partners because the time has come. The continuation of our engagement in the Sahel will not take place under a constant framework. We will, with our partners engaged alongside us, but also with the countries of the region, because I have always been concerned to involve them and work with them, draw lessons from what has worked, notably the developments that we had initiated precisely in Pau, then in N'Djamena. But we must also draw lessons from what has not worked. The sustainable presence within the framework of France's external operations cannot substitute for the return of the state and state services, for political stability, and for the choices of sovereign states. We cannot secure areas that fall back into anomie because states decide not to take their responsibilities. It is impossible, or else it is a never-ending task.

That is why, following consultations that we will conduct with our partners, particularly our American partners who have played an essential role from the beginning and I want to thank them here, and our European partners, who are also alongside us, particularly within the framework of EUTM, we will initiate a profound transformation of our military presence in the Sahel, the modalities and timeline of which will be specified in the coming weeks and I will do so by the end of June, but I will initiate this work in the coming days. This transformation will result in a change of model. It will involve moving to a new framework, that is to say, the end of the Barkhane operation as an external operation to allow for a support, assistance, and cooperation operation with the armies of the countries in the region that wish to do so and the implementation of a military operation and an international alliance involving the states of the region and all our partners strictly focused on the fight against terrorism. This new framework will preserve our commitments to our partners engaged alongside us in the Takuba force and in the EUTM operation, which must continue to scale up. EUTM will be one of the elements of the training of all partner armies, and Takuba will be the pillar of this force against terrorism. The French armies will obviously be the backbone of this, but they will be complemented by the special forces of the partner armies in the region that wish to and can, and obviously by the special forces of our European partners. Many of them have already committed to working alongside us in this framework. We will work on these developments in the coming weeks, and they will be presented within the framework of the Coalition for the Sahel that we established during the N'Djamena summit, which will meet very soon, and I will present them in detail at the end of June. These are the few elements I wanted to share with you before now answering all your questions.