Press conference of the President of the Republic following the European Council.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

23 December 2025 · European Council press conference

Context
Macron addressed press following the December 2025 European Council, reporting on discussions about Ukraine, Russia sanctions, and the Middle East situation.
Main themes
Ukraine peace and ceasefire negotiations, European support for Ukraine, Russia sanctions, Middle East situation, European Council conclusions, defense industrial cooperation, Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, Coalition of Volunteers, humanitarian aid, European-American alignment, rule of law and financial transparency
Duration
~51 min
94th percentile
Words
6,138
94th percentile
Sentences
312
95th percentile
Readability
49
59th percentile
Grade
11.4
38th percentile
Syntax
2.84
27th percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Translated from French

This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.

312 sentences in 58 paragraphs

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

Thank you very much for your presence at the conclusion of this European Council. We have just concluded discussions on several topics. I will report to you on these before answering your questions.

First, we discussed the situation in Ukraine this morning in the presence of President Zelensky. I was then able to have a bilateral conversation with him. We unanimously reaffirmed our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The objective we share, and we share it with the United States of America, is to put an end to the fighting without delay. In this regard, it must be clear that any negotiation on a ceasefire and peace in Ukraine must take place in the presence of Ukraine, and that Europeans must be involved whenever the security of our continent is discussed. And very clearly, I reiterate here, our collective will is to achieve a robust and lasting peace, as we have reaffirmed from the beginning.

In this context, the recent announcements by President Trump are, in our view, a step in the right direction, as they have made it very clear the reality of the situation, namely a Russia that does not genuinely seek peace, and have allowed for the resynchronization of the European and American agendas on the Ukrainian issue. We all shared today, in our conclusions, our commitment to continue immediate and long-term financial support for Ukraine as our priority, and we have therefore mandated the Commission to work in conjunction with our ministers and treasuries on the various technical modalities to finance this effort. You know that several proposals had been made with debates, and we can return to them if there are questions regarding respect for international law, which we hold dear, and the sharing of risk on proposals that had been made by the Commission. The technical clarifications did not allow us today to finalize this framework. Nevertheless, the will has been very clearly reaffirmed. The mandate has been given to the Commission so that we can have a final agreement in December. Therefore, a significant portion of this support for the years 2026-2027 to Ukraine will be dedicated to military support, with strict criteria related to European preference, and also to further integrate Ukrainian and European defense industrial bases.

Civil support must also be linked to the acceleration of reforms on Ukraine's European path, to financial transparency, and to the consolidation of the rule of law. At the same time that we reaffirmed our commitment to help Ukraine, we also reiterated the necessity of exerting maximum pressure on Russia through sanctions, and I welcome the adoption of the 19th sanctions package which will, among other things, completely prohibit any transaction related to Russian LNG, including purchase, import, and transfer, starting January 1, 2027, and will also better combat circumvention. This sanctions package, which has been worked on for several weeks, as you know, arrives at the same time as American sanctions, which have been confirmed in recent hours, and which target the main exporters of Russian oil, thus hitting the sources of funding for the Russian war effort in an unprecedented manner, with very strong decisions that have been made activating OFAC in America. That is regarding the Ukrainian issue. I will obviously return to these questions.

I was able to speak, as I mentioned, with President Zelensky, and we will hold a meeting of the Coalition of Volunteers tomorrow afternoon, which we will co-chair with Prime Minister Starmer, and which will allow us to review the concrete efforts, with our British and French chiefs of staff, to assess the ongoing planning and also the coordination of our actions to combat the phantom fleet which is, as you know, one of the sources of funding for the Russian war effort.

The second international topic we discussed is the situation in the Middle East. We addressed it this afternoon, reflected in our conclusions. We did so yesterday during dinner with President Sisi, following the summit he held with the President and the Chair. I was able to have a lengthy conversation with President Sisi last night after our exchange. We were able to commend Egypt's role in its involvement in the negotiations, obviously the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, but fundamentally, the issue is very clear in this regard and our determination is unwavering to enable the implementation of the American peace plan and to take into account the priorities that are ours and which were expressed as early as last July, during the New York declaration, adopted, I remind you, by 142 states, and particularly by all the Arab states in the region. Our priorities are, of course, the full respect of the ceasefire by all stakeholders, and in particular Hamas, which has continued to carry out actions that are not in line with its commitments. It is the resumption of humanitarian aid which, today, is not fully effective, with a maximum of 300 trucks per day, which is far from the required needs, and therefore that all humanitarian workers can resume their work.

It is then the establishment of governance specific to Gaza, with a role for the Palestinians and the Palestinian authority in this process that is fully recognized, the deployment of internal security forces and police forces that we are ready to train further, and the establishment of an international stabilization force mandated by the United Nations Security Council. In this regard, the European Union has an important role to play and we have collectively expressed our availability in this matter, notably with the deployment of EUBAM Rafah missions to secure the Rafah crossing points, and also to strengthen our missions in terms of training the Palestinian police so that it can be quickly redeployed in Gaza. In this context, we are working with our British partners and also with all partners in the region to finalize a draft resolution, which is the essential framework that will allow us to structure these efforts and to monitor the implementation of the American peace plan. Again, I could return to any potential questions. I am necessarily lacking in a summary statement. The third major topic we discussed at this summit is European defense. Europe is advancing in building its strategic autonomy, with concrete support for its defense industry, to achieve the goal we all pursue, which is, by 2030, to fill our critical capability gaps, particularly in the 9 priority areas identified at the extraordinary European Council of March 6 and in the White Paper.

Within the work coordinated by the European Defence Agency, we reiterated that we are ready to take the lead as framework nations, with other member states when possible, in capability coalitions in several areas: air and missile defense, artillery systems, munitions and missiles, strategic enablers, space, and again, I am not exhaustive. In each of these areas, we must demonstrate the European added value of the capabilities being developed in full coherence with NATO, and the flagship initiatives proposed must meet the needs of our armed forces and be adaptable to the evolution of threats.

And in connection with the roadmap for European defense by 2030, which we finalized a little over 3 years ago, we propose to mobilize particularly on strengthening our capabilities in air and missile defense, of which the war in Ukraine has shown the necessity. To finance these initiatives, we can rely on the European instruments now available, the SAFE instrument, which we have finalized and in which, by the way, France is involved with several others, but also the EDIP program, for which an agreement has been reached between the Council and the European Parliament, which is an important step forward. These instruments will strengthen our European defense industrial and technological base by organizing and dedicating, which has been, as you know, the subject of much discussion, a European preference that must apply to all our financing arrangements, including those of the BEU. And we place great importance on this European preference, not to make it an exclusivity, but because there are already many programs that allow for mobilizing European or national funding for non-European capabilities, but it is essential, when we talk about innovation and capacity for our defense, if we want to fill our capability deficits, to have this European reference. This corrects biases that have existed for too long in our organization.

On this subject, finally, governance will remain assured by the European Council, in accordance with the competencies enshrined in our treaties, for monitoring our capability and industrial priorities and based on the work of the EU military staff and the European Defence Agency, and our defense ministers.

So, we are also in the process of establishing a new culture among our defense ministers, who will be meeting much more regularly together to discuss these issues. This is the result, as you know, of several months of work, but we have now built the instruments, governance, and axes to move forward. Now, the key is to animate these capability coalitions, to mobilize the purchasing states to give visibility to the industrialists, and to stimulate production so that we produce more and faster in Europe. Finally, we have a whole aspect of innovation that is also planned within the framework of funding. And on this, I want it to really rest on technological capabilities and that we take responsibility for having funding for the capability needs that are ours in terms of innovation and by prioritizing projects and abandoning our old habit, again, of geographical return which creates too much inefficiency.

The other major topic of discussion at this Council was competitiveness, with, as you know, discussions being held based on the Letta and Draghi reports for months, an agenda that we now know and which is perfectly structured. On competitiveness, I have already mentioned several times, we have an implementation issue. We know the different competitive aspects, the simplification of many of our rules, and in this regard, the failure of the vote yesterday in Parliament to accelerate the process must be the subject of a renewed, calm effort and must be resubmitted in November. In any case, that is what we support, because we must succeed in creating consensus on the necessity to simplify and harmonize our rules to resynchronize our Europe with the rest of the world. We also have an agenda for deepening the single market to have a much more efficient Europe in all areas, from energy to telecommunications to finance, and thus simplifying our rules. In this regard, the 28th regime proposed by the Commission is obviously very important. We obviously have an innovation agenda. We must take responsibility for financing more disruptive innovation, to go much faster and much stronger, and to finance them. This must be reflected in our upcoming budget priorities. And in this regard, the union of capital markets is obviously an essential project on which we have reaffirmed our commitment to move forward. But there has been an acceleration in the world in recent months that is quite perceptible.

It comes fundamentally from both sides. On one side, the United States of America, which is much more aggressive: tariffs that are imposed on us, sectors that are also being revisited, on which there is increasing pressure, pharmaceuticals or digital, and also a report and an evolution of the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar which is, in a way, double. And this weighs on our price competitiveness and on many sectors, notwithstanding the fact that American tariffs completely redirect flows from Southeast Asia or elsewhere to the European market, also showing indirect effects.

And the second thing is the acceleration of a trend we have seen since the end of COVID. It is a Chinese economy that produces a lot, that has invested a lot, that is in a logic of assumed dumping, that adjusts the imbalance it has between its domestic market and its domestic production by deploying massive volumes to many other economies, particularly Germany, with massive destabilizations, and in addition to that, exchange rate effects.

In light of this, it reprioritizes what I called for several years ago in The Hague regarding the importance of economic security and the economic security agenda. And this agenda, which is an agenda of protection, not protectionism, but protection, has become even more of a priority. That is why, several months ago, we supported the European Commission's decision to protect and restore fair competition for our electric vehicles. That is why we have pushed hard for safeguard measures on steel, the steel sector being a perfect example of both unequal competition from China and a lot of volumes coming from Southeast Asia that were redirected to the European market in this new context. But we want to go much further in this area. Therefore, we are in favor of accelerating our work on the revision of the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which must become robust, non-avoidable, and preserve the competitiveness of our exports and our industries. That is why, beyond steel, we want to look across all sectors at the necessity of moving forward. That is also why we have requested that investigations be opened to see how we can defend ourselves in a coordinated manner. Thus, we need a much more united European agenda in this regard. We have instruments that we know, particularly in coercion.

We need to open investigations to look into this and have a much more systematic approach to economic security. In this regard, we can clearly see that we have coercive practices coming from both sides. The recent Chinese decision on rare earths, which, since last April, imposes licenses with long wait times for many industries, has left several thousand industries waiting for their licenses since April, and today there is a tightening of these rules in reaction to American tariffs, meaning they can now impose restrictions on any industry that produces using more than 0.1% of rare earth components from China. This mechanism is economic coercion. Therefore, in response to this, we need to have an answer. We see the impact it has on us. We need to be able to provide a response.

Similarly, all attempts to destabilize our regulatory autonomy in the digital realm and in all areas are coercive practices to which we must be able to respond. Therefore, in this area, we have had a long discussion and we are pushing hard to strengthen this protection agenda for our Europe, for our industries. And this applies in all areas, beyond those I have mentioned. Many of our SMEs and mid-sized companies in industrial sectors are currently being shaken by Chinese products that arrive and are completely below profitability thresholds, which is characteristic of dumping. Therefore, we need to be able to protect them with rapid and effective measures.

And then, we also see this in all our countries, with what we call small parcels. France is addressing this in its upcoming budget texts. We, along with a few others, have taken initial measures to impose taxes. In France, in 2024, there were 800 million small parcels. Across Europe, more than 4.5 billion small parcels. These small parcels are below the de minimis threshold, meaning, even today, they are exempt from any tax, any regulation, and they compete with your downtown shops. You see, in many of our villages and small towns, these shops collapsing because more and more of our compatriots are buying directly. This is completely contrary to our decarbonization objectives. We are bringing in things we bought from the other side of the world, and it completely destroys our commercial fabric and our European production fabric. Therefore, in response to this, we have mechanisms for fees that we will implement in advance with several other European countries. We need to establish tariffs clearly and much more quickly. It must be done at the European level, and that is what I also requested during this council.

And then, we also revisited the compatibility and articulation of our climate objectives, our climate ambition with this context. What we must continue to pursue, as you have heard me remind several times here, is fundamentally an objective of competitiveness, sovereignty, and respect for our commitments on climate change. And the three are reconcilable if we approach them proportionately and with the right articulation. We had a long debate on the intermediate climate objective for 2040, which preserves our competitiveness and allows us to be on the path to carbon neutrality.

Therefore, beyond the conditions regarding competitiveness, we reached an agreement on the elements to be considered in the revision of the climate law for 2040: first, to recognize the uncertainties related to the absorption capacities of natural and technological carbon flows, with a review clause in 2030. Why? Because, I do not want to be too technical, but between the gross and net reduction objectives, these carbon flows play a very important role, and it turns out that the figures we had until now have deteriorated significantly. Our forests absorb less carbon than before. This is an established scientific fact. We need to take this evolution into account when we talk about an objective. The second point is to review the sharing of the effort to reduce emissions among member states following a cost-effectiveness principle for competitiveness. The third point is the possibility, as provided for in the Paris Agreement, to use flexibilities, particularly high-quality international carbon credits, up to 5%, and finally to ensure respect for technological neutrality regarding all low-carbon energies, both nuclear and renewable.

These criteria allow us to have a French strategy that is fully compatible with the objectives for 2040 that we have at the European level, and with the elements I just mentioned, are compatible with our competitiveness objectives. This is also what has allowed us to articulate a common position on strategic sectors such as the automotive sector, which is at the heart of our strategic ambitions. We share a willingness, there too, to defend our objectives, but to defend our European competitiveness, with an obligation to green corporate fleets, which allows for a supply shock in this area, to introduce in the regulation for reducing CO2 emissions a minimum rate of European value and a list of critical local components, European preferences, European content, but also to reintroduce flexibilities to meet the 2035 objective, which is included in the texts we decided on in Franco-German agreement at the end of last August, which is this technological neutrality that we believe in. These works will obviously continue at the Council, both on the revision of the climate law and in view of the COP in Belém, so that the European Union can present its emission reduction ambition in its expected contribution.

Finally, the very last point that was raised in this Council, which I want to revisit and which is related to the digital issue I briefly mentioned, is the protection of minors online. We have begun to build a coalition of partners, and with Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Denmark, we have expressed our willingness to the Commission to advance nationally on an age below which minors will no longer be able to access social networks. With the directive we have taken, our act on digital services, it is possible to require platforms to verify the age of users. We are working on technical solutions to do this. And we will try to bring everyone together towards a digital majority at the European level to better protect our children. This is work we have been preparing for several months. We have this first coalition. Our goal in the coming weeks will be to gather as many European partners as possible to implement this decision.

So, ladies and gentlemen. I will now answer your questions.

Journalist

I believe that member states, starting with France, no longer have much financial means to help Ukraine. The European budget itself is running out, and there are not many resources either. So, we understood that the use of the Russian central bank's frozen assets was about the only credible solution to strongly help Ukraine over the next two years. This evening, in any case, this solution was not retained. Is it definitively buried? Can it survive tonight's meeting? And if not, are there other possible options to continue helping Ukraine? And concretely, which ones? What path should be followed?

Emmanuel MACRON

First of all, we already have support programs, some of which are financed by the guarantee we took on the revenues from these frozen assets that we put into the famous ERA program. So, we still have these avenues and means. Our objective is to provide even more visibility at a time when there are uncertainties regarding the budgetary support of other partners. The observation you just made in broad strokes is correct. Therefore, I think that it is still around these technical solutions that we have the main source of funding at this level. Tonight's discussion did not bury the proposal made by the Commission. It simply allowed for the expression of technical questions that need to be resolved. And we know these technical questions. Just to clarify a point, in the Commission's solution, it was not proposed, at any time, to seize the assets of the European system, but rather through a system, if I may say so, of transfer, to take the resources that are in front of these frozen assets and to be able, on this basis, to issue with the guarantee either of the European Union and the European budget in the next two years, or also in a mixed manner from member states.

The question was still pending. But therefore, in no case were we seizing the frozen assets, which meant that this solution was compatible with international law on this subject. And we are very keen on this because it concerns the credibility of Europeans and the attractiveness of the eurozone. We cannot behave in a manner that is not compliant with international law, and I reiterate this here for all our financial partners. Therefore, this solution raises real legal questions that have been raised by Euroclear with the Belgian government. It raises questions of risk sharing, it raises questions of conflict resolution in the end. What do we do with these assets in a resolution? If there is a prior outcome and others have decided that these assets are returned, what do we do at that point with the guarantees? All legitimate questions that need to be resolved technically. And so, I believe we need to approach this with a lot of method and calm. And that is what will be done in the coming weeks. But I consider for my part that it remains the central family of options to provide this visibility to the Ukrainian government and to the Ukrainian nation. That is the work that will now be conducted with the governments, the Commission, and also Euroclear.

Journalist

Hello, Mr. President. The United States, as you mentioned, has decided to sanction two Russian hydrocarbon companies. You speak of action in the right direction. Is this a turning point for the American president who has had back-and-forth relations with Vladimir Putin? Or are you going further and asking him to deliver Tomahawk missiles to the Ukrainians? And a second question on Mercosur. We hear that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz says there is now an agreement on Mercosur at 27 and that we are heading towards ratification next month. What is your reaction?

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you. On the question of Mercosur, our position is clear. The work continues with a view, and we have always said, to finalize. But I thank the Commission, which truly respects the commitments it has made to us. But we have safeguard clauses, we have strengthened customs controls, we have support for livestock farming, we have many accompanying measures, here too, for better control of sanitary and phytosanitary products entering our territory, which are being implemented. Therefore, we await the finalization of all this. Then, we also await the notification to the Mercosur countries of these safeguard measures and this essential support that we have requested to improve the agreement.

And so, the coming weeks will allow us to respond to you definitively. Today, the French government, like the others, is waiting for these answers. But all of this is going in the right direction to protect the sectors that are most exposed and also to protect European consumers. And it is always a bit the same philosophy that we have been describing for some time, which is to have fair competition. On the Ukrainian question and what you mentioned, I think what just happened is a turning point. The United States of America has decided on massive sanctions against the two main actors in Russian oil exports. Until now, the United States had refrained from doing so. And so it is a massive cost that is being imposed on the financing of Russia's war effort, even as we know that for the first time since the beginning of this conflict, the Russian economy is starting to suffer much more. I think this is a real turning point that, combined with the sanctions we have just taken, along with the pressure that has also been put on several other actors, will have its effects. Regarding arms deliveries, I have always considered that these are sovereign decisions, and I think we are more effective when we do not apply pressure through the media. And so I think there have been important exchanges between President Zelensky and President Trump, and everyone knows what they need to do to achieve the desired results. What we want is simple: for Ukraine to be able to resist, to improve its position to build a robust and lasting peace, and to never fall into escalation.

Journalist

Hello, you explained that you consider the use of the anti-coercion instrument against China. What could be the first steps of this measure? And what reception has your proposal received from our European partners, particularly from Germany? Second question, regarding the 2035 deadline for the end of thermal engines, is this date untouchable or could it be subject to change? Thank you very much.

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you. On the question of China, first of all, we have always had a consistent position. We are not in confrontation; we are not for decoupling our economies; we are for reducing our dependencies. And we are for engaging in a strategic dialogue that allows us to address these global imbalances that we are currently experiencing. There is simply an acceleration, and in many sectors, it is the very possibility of Europeans having autonomous production that is now being questioned. So no one can ignore that. By putting the numbers on the table, what I have invited the Commission to do, what I have invited you to do, is 1) to have a united approach, which is not the case today. 2) To open the investigation. We are not immediately looking for measures, but to open the investigation to objectify this. And 3) to engage in a respectful but demanding strategic discussion with China.

It is in this spirit that I intend to engage in the debates myself, but I want to do so in a coordinated manner with my European partners, with the European Commission. Otherwise, what happens? We are divided. We tell one, you will have a factory here, to another, you will have such access to my market, and we do not use what we have learned from these past years. We are a trading power, and so we need to organize what the access to this market of 450 million inhabitants that is the European Union is worth. So, it is the opening of work and the unification of our agenda. On this, everyone has listened; I do not believe so, several have expressed themselves; you are talking about the German Chancellor, he has been extremely vocal on the issue of small packages to say that it was unacceptable and that we needed to react quickly. So, there is an alignment of views, and we have all supported the package on Asia.

On the question of vehicles, we must keep, fundamentally, 3 things. Always with the same objective: competitiveness, sovereignty, climate. The 2035 objective is good because it aligns the actors towards the same goal, it encourages changing practices, and it legitimizes the investments made. Let’s be clear. If tomorrow we abandon the 2035 objective, forget about European electric battery factories. I remember, eight years ago, when I took office, there was not a single electric battery factory in Europe, not one. We now have gigafactories all over Europe. Why? Because we said: we will produce, we will decide to go for it, we will gain autonomy, and we will create a market. It works. If we let go of this matter, we unravel everything we have done on electric batteries. Today, we are making R5s in France in Douai, we are making R4s in Maubeuge because it is electric. Abandoning the electric objective, I can tell you that we will not make them with thermal engines. So, we need to be consistent. People do not see this change happening. And this skepticism we have on this subject is the same that I heard seven years ago when we said, let’s not go too fast, we depend on others.

We are in this situation because the Chinese have gone much faster than us. So, we need to keep a 2035 objective. But 2), we need to be smart. We want to keep our jobs and develop. It should not be a guillotine that falls completely blindly. What we want is to decarbonize our automotive industry as much as possible by 2035. So, we must keep the signaling effect that has allowed us to drive transformation in electric vehicles, but we need to open up flexibilities with more technological neutrality. What does that mean? It means that we may have other solutions that will allow us to massively reduce CO2 emissions, which will allow us to preserve more jobs and industrial capacities in Europe, and which are also very effective. I cannot say it, you cannot say it; it depends on innovations in the coming years, and so we need to allow these flexibilities; that is what we are reopening, and that will allow the automotive industry, with the same final objective, but perhaps to have other solutions than just electric. 3), if we make these flexibilities, what is very important is to defend European content. Because we need to be careful about the division that can sometimes exist between our car manufacturers and their subcontractors. I will not tell you, I will build you a European vehicle that will meet your standards, but continue to source in China. And that is exactly what happened when we imposed our tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles several months ago. We did it for very good reasons. There was not a fair competition. We had Chinese producers coming into our market; they were over-financed, so they came in below the revenue price. We corrected that. But if we do not correct for the entire value chain, we create a lot of displacement effects. And why is that not good? We destroy jobs immediately here, but we recreate dependencies for tomorrow. And so tomorrow, we have someone who has the switch and can decide to cut it off all of a sudden. So we need to keep the 2035 objective, introduce technological neutrality and flexibility, and defend European content and a European preference.

Journalist

Mr. President, before this European Council, you attended a cabinet meeting from Brussels regarding the suspension of the pension reform by corrective letter. Despite this, the socialists still threaten censure, including this evening by their group president. Everyone wants to raise the stakes. Do you still believe in the ability and also the responsibility of both the government and the opposition to pass this budget and avoid censure as the debate begins tomorrow in the National Assembly?

Emmanuel MACRON

Of course. Listen, we are here in Brussels. I preside, the Government governs, the Parliament legislates, and that is how it should be. And then, I think everyone must take their responsibilities. The Prime Minister has been very clear; he has said clear things; he has done what he said. I think everyone must now do the same with one thing in mind: the interest of the country. Look at all the debates we had together earlier. We are talking about the war in Europe and how to finance Ukraine in the face of this challenge. We are talking about Chinese competition that can destroy, that is shaking part of our economies. Here too, we sometimes need to resynchronize our debates. If we want to defend the interests of the French and our economies, the discussion needs to become a bit the same again. I say this to defend our jobs.

Journalist

Thank you so much. Mr. President, my question is about the Middle East. The Iraqi elections are taking place soon. Do you expect this election will be different from the previous ones? What do you expect from the leaders of Iraq after the elections? And the next question: are you following the dialogues between the SDF and the Syrian government? Thank you so much.

Emmanuel MACRON

I will never interfere in an election in a third country, but I have a lot of affection for Iraq. And I think the Prime Minister delivered a great agenda for his country. And as you know, we are a great supporter of Iraqi sovereignty. And I think in this moment of destabilization in the whole region, the stabilization of Iraq, the full respect of Iraqi sovereignty, is a very important pillar. As for the agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government, I think this is a very important step forward and an important move towards the unity of Syria. And as for Syria, our objective has been the same from the very beginning: unity and sovereignty. And I think it's very important that President al-Charaa respects all the components of Syrian civil society and tries to engage with all the different parties. The Syrian Democratic Forces played a very important role in fighting against terrorist groups, and it's very important to build this reconciliation in order to strengthen the unity of the nation.

Journalist

Thank you. Do you plan to visit Iraq this year?

Emmanuel MACRON

I hope so. Thank you very much.

Journalist

Regarding the climate goal for 2040, how important is this goal for you?

Emmanuel MACRON

That's what I said earlier. I do not want to let go of our objectives during this period. I think we need to introduce technological flexibilities because things are advancing. We need to put in more protective measures because we are also being competed against by everyone. But I want to maintain this line, and I think it is also driven by innovation and job creation capabilities. The example I gave earlier about electric batteries or electric vehicles is an important point. And so I think that today, Europe must remain a continent of coherence. It must protect itself much better, it must move faster in its adaptation, it must move faster on the economic security agenda, it must move faster on competitiveness, but it must not give up its objectives. And by the way, when we look at the competition we have with China, the difficulties we face, it is not because we have a China that has given up on climate change. On the contrary, it is because it has been much faster in building original technological solutions, and we have often been too slow. The example of China is a very good example. The other example I mentioned earlier is that when we look at the energy problems we have in Europe today, it is not a problem related to climate change; it is an energy crisis we have suffered due to the Russian aggression war in Ukraine, which was linked to our excessive dependence on fossil fuels that we do not produce, and which suddenly created a price shock that we are experiencing.

And so the agenda of decarbonizing our economies is also an agenda of sovereignty and competitiveness, because the day we are much more independent, with more nuclear, more renewables, and better-integrated grids, we will pay for energy that is much cheaper. So, we need to remain consistent on this agenda. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Good luck and good night.