Speech delivered at the Central event for the 20th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Uprising of September 5, held in Cienfuegos, on

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

5 September 1977 · Central event for the 20th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Uprising of September 5 · Cienfuegos, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed a commemorative event in Cienfuegos on September 5, 1977, marking the 20th anniversary of the 1957 revolutionary naval uprising in that city.
Main themes
September 5, 1957 Cienfuegos uprising, revolutionary history and commemoration, July 26 Movement, naval conspiracy at Cayo Loco, Sierra Maestra guerrilla campaign, Escambray second front, Frank País, Batista tyranny resistance, revolutionary martyrs and sacrifice, Cuban revolutionary war timeline
Duration
~52 min
94th percentile
Words
6,203
94th percentile
Sentences
240
92nd percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
12.7
54th percentile
Syntax
3.25
77th percentile
Vocabulary
2.24
59th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 70%67%
  • Ceremonial 14%14%
  • Social 8%8%
  • Institutional 6%5%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

240 sentences in 87 paragraphs

Dear comrades:

We gather today to dignify the commemoration of the heroic events that took place in the city of Cienfuegos on September 5, 1957, twenty years ago.

It was time to do justice to those events. It was time to speak of the facts of Cienfuegos and to write the heroic history of those events.

Twenty years have passed, and during this time many of those who participated in those events are no longer alive: a significant number died in those days, others died fighting later or were murdered, and others, as is logical, have succumbed to natural causes.

It was not easy to unravel, after so much time, all the details; but there are enough testimonies to try to reconstruct the events.

First of all, the origin of the Cienfuegos uprising dates back a long time. As early as 1956, a group of sailors, that is, soldiers and corporals from the Cienfuegos base, had made contact with the July 26 Movement. And on November 30, when the landing of the "Granma" was approaching and when the uprising in Santiago de Cuba took place, there was already the idea of producing the Cienfuegos uprising. But it was not possible on that occasion.

Later, when we were fighting in the Sierra Maestra, the idea of producing an uprising in Cienfuegos persisted, with the support of the group of revolutionary sailors, to later organize a front in the Escambray mountains. That is, to take the arms from Cayo Loco and advance towards the Escambray to establish a second guerrilla front.

It was first thought of in April; it was not possible. It was then planned for May 28, 1957, and the uprising was very close to occurring.

The July 26 Movement mobilized 35 men, chosen from the best in each municipality of the former province of Santa Clara. And indeed, they concentrated in the city of Cienfuegos on May 28. The military action was planned for 6:00 PM; at the last minute, due to some technical details —issues of posts— it was decided to postpone it to 6:00 AM the next day. But that night the 35 fighters of the Movement, who had gathered in a house rented for that purpose and who were denounced, found themselves surrounded by the police and arrested.

It must be said in honor of those men, some of whom later died and many of whom are alive, that despite being tortured and mistreated by the repressive forces, none of them said a single word. And thus the secret of the group of revolutionary sailors who conspired alongside the July 26 Movement was preserved.

But that event unleashed the persecution against the leaders of the Movement in this city; some had to flee abroad, and the plans were postponed.

No one can imagine the extraordinary help that the uprising planned for May 28 would have meant for the fighters in the Sierra Maestra by opening a second guerrilla front in the Escambray mountains.

And that was perfectly possible. And in that cayo there were around 300 weapons, more weapons than we had at that moment in the Sierra Maestra. Let us say that the idea was indeed correct and, more than correct, brilliant: that the people of Cienfuegos would rise up alongside the sailors of Cayo Loco and march towards the Escambray mountains.

From the city, from right here, those mountains can be seen; they are just a few kilometers away. The Escambray mountains have more depth than the Sierra Maestra mountains, and they constituted an extraordinary natural setting for the opening of a second guerrilla front. For us, that would have constituted extraordinary help.

That very day —if I remember correctly, May 28, 1957— we attacked the Uvero barracks on the southern coast of the Sierra Maestra. It was a very tough battle. About a third of the participants died or were wounded, and our force grew considerably in arms. But after the attack on Uvero, a fierce pursuit was unleashed against our column, which found itself needing to maneuver carefully to avoid being annihilated.

If that uprising had taken place on that same day, or the next day, it is possible that the revolutionary war would have lasted much less time. Because of that almost fortuitous event, the arrest of the 35 comrades of the July 26 Movement, the action was postponed, and the group of sailors continued working in coordination with the leadership of the July 26 Movement of the former province and of Cienfuegos.

Later, at the end of June, on the other hand, a group of young naval officers, some of whom had already been discharged, but who had many active comrades within the Navy, and who had an organization that began to conspire almost from the very first days of the coup d'état of March 10, 1952, made contact with Frank País in Santiago de Cuba. A month later, a representative of that movement met again with Frank País and agreed to join the July 26 Movement and work for the overthrow of the Batista tyranny.

On the other hand, the July 26 Movement in the city of Havana had made contact with a group of aviators from the Air Force, some army officers, and especially sergeants and soldiers from the army, including a core from the San Antonio de los Baños base. This group also had contacts with some members of the Motorized Radio of the Police.

Thus, through different channels, three different groups entered into contact through the July 26 Movement: the Cienfuegos group, the group of young officers, and the Havana group.

These contacts occurred around August. Unfortunately, on July 30, Frank País, who was leading our Movement, was assassinated. But despite everything, the new leadership continued with those efforts and began to organize the final plan. It was quite an ambitious plan.

It was supposed that a warship would set sail from the port of Havana, and as it passed through the entrance of the port, they would bombard the Presidential Palace and the Navy General Staff, and then position themselves off the coast, near a place called Columbia, which was the headquarters of the Army's general staff. It was supposed that immediately the Navy would send other naval units to pursue that vessel, a moment that the revolutionary officers on those ships would take advantage of to take command and join the uprising. It was also supposed that at that moment the Air Force would receive the order to attack the ships, and a group of revolutionary pilots would take flight and, instead of attacking the vessels, would threaten the military camp and demand the overthrow of the government.

Simultaneously, the militias of July 26, also with the support of some elements within the Motorized Radio, would take the Motorized Radio; another group would take CMQ, and other groups would attack the police stations. At the same time, the uprising in Cienfuegos would take place. There were also plans regarding Santiago de Cuba, which could not be coordinated at the last minute due to the arrest of one of the leaders of that group of young officers.

On August 30, the leadership of the July 26 Movement met with the various representatives of those actions. They agreed on the action for September 5. On September 3, they met again and finalized the details, but by that time the conspiracy had grown. At the last minute, a group of higher-ranking officers from the Navy joined. This group of officers met on September 4 —due to those traditional Batista dates— at the Casa Blanca arsenal. These officers, I repeat, had joined that movement at the last minute. They met there and hesitations arose: whether it should be that day, whether it should not be that day. And in that meeting, unilaterally, they decided to postpone the uprising by 24 or 48 hours.

Comrade Castiñeiras, who had remained as the leader of the group of young naval officers, upon learning of this decision, firmly opposed it and stated that there was no time left to suspend the uprising. He fought until the early hours of the morning to try to get that machinery moving again, but it was not possible.

The historical fact is that in the evening hours of that same day, Comrade Camacho Aguilera, selected by the July 26 Movement to lead the action in Cienfuegos, left the capital along with Dionisio San Román, who had been designated military chief in this city by the group of young officers; they headed towards the center of the country. In Colón, they separated: Camacho continued to meet with the leadership of the July 26 Movement in Santa Clara; San Román continued towards Cienfuegos, and they met again here around 2:00 AM.

They received absolutely no notice that the general uprising had been suspended. The pilots of the Air Force received no notice that the uprising had been suspended. The National Leadership of the July 26 Movement received no notice that the uprising had been suspended. The military at the San Antonio Base who were in the Movement also received no notice.

At dawn on the 5th, the action groups and the militiamen of the July 26 Movement were concentrated in Havana, waiting to hear the cannon fire from the frigate, which was the signal to begin the actions, to take CMQ, to attack the Motorized Radio, etc. And no cannon fire was heard. The pilots were quickly summoned, and they were also waiting for the cannon fire. No cannon fire was heard; on the contrary, they found themselves in the bitter situation of receiving orders to come and attack the Cayo Loco base. Of course, not all the pilots were in the conspiracy, but fundamentally those from the F-47 group, which was the first to be sent here and did everything possible to drop the bombs with the safety on, and drop them into the sea and strafe the sea. But, of course, there were other air units that were not in any movement, and they did come and attacked the cayo, and attacked the city.

These factors determined that the solitary uprising of Cienfuegos took place.

Shortly after 2:00 AM, after making contact with Comrade Camacho and San Román, the group of sailors took the posts and command of the posts; that group of sailors, which had been conspiring with the July 26 Movement for a long time. Many men stood out. Painfully, some, like Corporal Ríos, did not continue alongside the Revolution; he left the country after the triumph. We have no news that he has engaged in counter-revolutionary activities; but the truth is that Corporal Ríos had a very prominent participation in the events of Cienfuegos and played a very important role. No one can deny those merits; although later, unfortunately, he did not continue alongside the Revolution. But he, with the group of sailors, took the posts and facilitated the entry of Camacho, San Román, and four other comrades from the July 26 Movement into the Naval Base. And once there, with the support of this group of sailors, they arrested the Chief of the Base, arrested the officers who were not trustworthy, and the vast majority of the garrison of the Cayo Loco base joined them.

There the first orders were given, one of which was to try to arrest the Chief of the Rural Guard barracks, a commander. Due to some details, there was an encounter with the commander's guard, and the commander managed to escape; he could not be captured.

Different groups went out: some, with Corporal Ríos, to take the Maritime Police; others, to take the radio station, the communications, and other sites and to attack the Police Station of Cienfuegos. The Maritime Police fell quickly. The Police of Cienfuegos resisted for a little over an hour, and finally surrendered. The officer who had remained in command of the Rural Guard barracks tried to negotiate with the revolutionary leaders, but in reality, what he did was buy time, communicate with the Tactical Third of Santa Clara, from where they offered him reinforcements and asked him to resist.

From very early on, the people of Cienfuegos joined the uprising. First, there were about 60 or 70 fighters from the July 26 Movement, and then the whole town: men, women, and even teenagers appeared there asking for weapons to fight against the tyranny. And indeed, the weapons were distributed among the people.

From very early on, the first planes appeared —some that did not want to bomb and others that did want to bomb— and began to attack the cayo and the revolutionary positions. Numerous battles ensued, and great acts of heroism.

Around noon, the first reinforcements from the Tactical Third were entering the "Martí" park, and there they were violently repelled by the revolutionary forces.

Naturally, the enemy mobilized as many forces as it could; it sent reinforcements from the Matanzas regiment, another reinforcement from La Cabaña, and a reinforcement from the armored regiment of Columbia, without a moment's pause for the planes to be in the air. The behavior of the revolutionaries, of the fighters of July 26, of the sailors, and of the people was truly admirable.

Around 10:00 in the morning, Dionisio San Román takes the gunboat or the destroyer —whatever you want to call it— 101, and states that he is going to make contact with the frigate "Máximo Gómez." He does not consult this measure or this decision with comrade Camacho.

At 9:00 in the morning, comrade Camacho, seeing that the uprising did not occur in Havana, had proposed the idea of carrying out the original plan; that is, to gather all the weapons and all the men and retreat to the Escambray. There is no doubt that this would have been a correct step; more than correct, I would say it was perfect.

But San Román still had hopes for the uprising in the capital, and he spoke of waiting. Later, from the gunboat, it is known that he communicated with Havana and confirmed once again that there was no such uprising.

Further on, it seems —because no one knows exactly what happened, and it is only known from some testimonies of other people who were on the ship— that a rebellion occurred on board the ship. He said he was going to make contact with the frigate. One of the ship's officers later asks if there is gasoline to take refuge somewhere. But it seems that a rebellion occurs and he is arrested.

What is known after that is that he struggled with those who had arrested him, even jumping into the water; then he is recaptured and locked in a cabin on the ship. The Navy General Staff communicated that a Catalina plane was coming to pick him up, they picked him up and took him to Havana. There, for several days, he was brutally tortured, then he was murdered and, as is known, just like they did with numerous revolutionaries and just like they did with another Navy officer, Alejandro González Brito, from here in Cienfuegos, they took them out to sea and threw them into the water after they were killed.

It is unquestionable that Dionisio San Román made a mistake and committed an offense. He should not have made a decision without consulting with comrade Camacho. That situation left uncertainty about his intentions. But the real fact is that he was arrested, fought against those who arrested him, was taken to Havana, tortured, murdered, and disappeared. In those hours, he was really very depressed because he was unaware of everything that had happened on the afternoon of September 4, and he felt betrayed by those higher-ranking officers who made the last-minute decision to suspend the action.

But the truth is —from what is known— that Dionisio San Román did not denounce a single one of the comrades from July 26 with whom he had had contact.

The best example is the case of comrade Camacho. A few months later, in November of that same year 1957, he was arrested, taken to the basements of the Fifth Police Station, where the infamous Ventura was, brutally tortured, and they tried to find out if Camacho had anything to do with the Cienfuegos uprising, and they could not. They did not know a single word about it. If San Román had mentioned Camacho's name and Camacho's role in that uprising, Camacho would have been irreparably murdered by the henchmen of the tyranny.

That is why our opinion is that whatever error was committed on September 5 by Dionisio San Román, his right to be considered a martyr of the Revolution cannot be denied under any circumstances. In the same regard, we must consider the other officer Alejandro González Brito, who was also tortured and murdered.

There are painful things. The relatives of some of these martyrs later ask: But why does the name of my father or our loved one not appear on the list of the martyrs of the Revolution? And it evidently seems like an injustice, and it is not that anyone wants to commit an injustice, it is that in the revolutionary work, in the daily struggle, all these issues have not been able to be clarified properly and in sufficient time; but as we delve deeper and learn the facts, the Revolution will not deny anyone the role that corresponds to them in history.

It is not pleasant to have to mention names that stood out one day and then deserted; there are a few of them, a few of the sailors who participated in the uprising, about four, and a few from the July 26 Movement, just a few. Over these 20 years, either they deserted or did not continue alongside the Revolution for various reasons; but we should have no fear in mentioning names when recounting historical facts, such name or that name of those who fulfilled their duty that day. But only a few, very few —I repeat— of those who participated in those events, among the sailors and among the fighters of July 26, deserted after the Revolution.

Throughout the day on September 5, there was fighting in this city, and they fought against the new reinforcements for many hours. By evening, the comrades from the Movement who had remained the whole time and even under the bombs on the cay, meeting with the leading group of sailors, agreed to retreat from the cay. After San Román took the destroyer or gunboat 101, Ríos was again in charge of the sailors. And it must be said that Ríos protected the retreat of comrade Camacho and the other leaders of the Movement when they left the cay.

They then intended to head to the Escambray, took a boat, arrived at Cayo Ocampo —anyone who knows a little about the bay and knows Cienfuegos knows that if you reach Cayo Ocampo, you only have to navigate a little towards the back of the bay and it is very close to the Escambray; but the truth is that Camacho had only been in Cienfuegos twice, at night and clandestinely, he did not know Cienfuegos— their idea was to take a boat there to enter the Escambray through Trinidad, the boat was under repair, they did not know how close they were to the Escambray. And then they return to Cienfuegos where a real slaughter had broken out and miraculously they were able to survive and escape from the fierce persecution that broke out afterward.

The sailors took refuge in the San Lorenzo school. There was Lieutenant Dimas Martínez who acted like a true hero. Night was approaching and they urged the July 26 fighters to retreat; in this, two ideas could influence: one, they had less military practice and there were very few bullets left; another, perhaps the idea that civilians would be murdered and sailors would not. But the truth is that they asked the July 26 fighters to withdraw, and thanks to them, several of those comrades saved their lives.

They remained fighting until the early hours of the morning, besieged. No one knows how it ended, because not a single sailor survived, none made it. We think that they would have run out of ammunition, in the end, and the last fighters, wounded and without ammunition, were surely captured and murdered. That was a law that never failed among the henchmen of the tyranny, they always, always!, murdered the prisoners. But the fact is that not a single one of those who fought in San Lorenzo until the early hours of September 6 survived, not even wounded. Perhaps if we dig a little deeper, if we investigate a little more, we can discover what really happened. Some people say that the next day they were cleaning the stairs and floors of the building from the amount of blood that flooded those places; others maintain that they were finally machine-gunned. Our experience —from the way things always happened in Cuba, the spirit and habits, and the style of the henchmen of the tyranny, because we remember many other events and above all we remember Moncada— is that the few sailors who might have survived were murdered.

Our people know perfectly well how different the conduct of the revolutionary fighters has always been, and throughout the history of the Revolution, from July 26, 1953, until today, there is not a single case of a prisoner murdered by a revolutionary fighter; just as there is not a single case in all these years of the Revolution of a single prisoner tortured by a revolutionary fighter, because above all, the principles of the Revolution, the morality of the Revolution, the discipline of the Revolution, and the dignity of the Revolution have prevailed. No one can be told to surrender only to be murdered afterward; but it is also a stupidity, who would surrender knowing they are going to be murdered?

In our war policy, whenever we offered surrender to any enemy garrison —and there were dozens and dozens of garrisons that surrendered to our forces— our word was never violated. We encountered very difficult cases, where in a besieged garrison there was some henchman who had committed serious crimes, and we had to choose between the idea that justice had to be applied rigorously in any case or making some concession, since it was necessary for that garrison to surrender completely and not cost us more lives, and hand over their weapons to continue the offensive or insist that the henchman had to be executed. And in those cases, we even negotiated and said: well, those who have no crimes will have no problems, but none of those who have crimes will be executed; they will be judged and punished, but not executed. And the Revolution never violated a single one of these commitments.

How different is the history of the henchmen and those who repressed the people, how many incredible cases of crimes, of people disappeared, everywhere, in all places, what unheard-of tortures they applied to the revolutionaries. And that is the same as what usually happens in all countries: the reaction filled with hatred against the revolutionaries always behaves criminally and repressively; but to the honor of our people and our Revolution, for its greater glory and purity, on a day like today when we need to talk about these issues, we can proclaim with pride and deep satisfaction that the Revolution never murdered a prisoner, nor tortured a prisoner regardless of their crimes. And the Revolution was firm, it knew how to punish its enemies through laws and through courts; but it never stained its hands with crime or torture.

In the early hours of September 6, the resistance ceased. I do not remember exactly, it was possibly the afternoon of the 6th, but I do remember that our guerrilla column with more than 100 men was moving through the mountains, in difficult and inhospitable places, and one afternoon —almost certainly it was the 6th, we would have to check if the news was broadcast that day, because we received the news by radio— we received the news of the Cienfuegos uprising.

It is true that this possibility that was created in this city could have constituted an extraordinarily greater help for the fighters in the Sierra Maestra if the plan of May 28 had indeed been carried out; or if, upon confirming that the uprising was isolated, everyone could have been persuaded that the correct thing was to retreat to the mountains of the Escambray. But in any case, even though this did not happen, the fact of the Cienfuegos uprising meant an extraordinary moral boost for the fighters in the Sierra Maestra. The tyranny could no longer continue talking about the unity of its armed forces.

It is worth noting that this phenomenon that occurs in Cienfuegos is extremely interesting, because undoubtedly the tyranny was supported by the armed forces.

Furthermore, when the attack on the Moncada Barracks occurred, the campaign that the enemy waged, a lying, slanderous, infamous campaign, was that we had penetrated the hospital and slaughtered the sick soldiers. And it is true that the military hospital was entered by mistake; but as soon as it was seen that that facility was not one of the barracks, the men were immediately withdrawn from the place, and no one died, no one died. That was practically in the lobby of the hospital. And I remember that I personally entered and ordered the comrades to withdraw from that place.

However, that fact was taken as a pretext to raise a great slander, that the revolutionaries had entered the hospital and murdered the sick. And Batista made many soldiers believe, and made many police and sailors believe that the revolutionaries were a kind of criminals, that we had slaughtered the sick in the hospital, thus creating the deepest hatred against the revolutionaries. Batista's demagoguery was based on these springs: these are criminals —they told the soldiers—, they have slaughtered our sick comrades in the hospital.

Of course, all this was to incite the thirst for blood and hatred of the soldiers, who then committed incredible crimes with the greatest tranquility in the world.

The truth is that many prisoners were taken at Moncada, and none of them received even a blow. That is the reality. But Batista waged a strong campaign in the armed forces against the revolutionaries and against the July 26 Movement, to maintain unity and hatred against the revolutionaries.

That is why the fact that, over time, some military elements began to join the July 26 Movement is so significant; when they started to uncover all the lies and intrigues, when the just revolutionary ideas and the dissemination of revolutionary ideas began to make their way in the country. This developed even further during the war, when we took hundreds, no, thousands of prisoners who were well treated and released.

At first, the Batista soldiers resisted a lot, a lot, because they thought they were going to be killed, that they were going to be murdered. When they began to discover the truth and the behavior of the Rebel Army, then the prestige of the Rebel Army began to grow within the enemy ranks. Later, when they fell prisoner, they were sent to another front, they were sent to Las Villas, and there were soldiers who surrendered to our forces three times. And those who initially resisted, later did not resist much and surrendered their weapons.

In short, when we attacked a barracks, what interested us was to seize the weapons. That was the tactic, and not to instill fear of death stupidly among the soldiers. Many of those men were ignorant people, who did not know another era, had no contact with revolutionary ideas in a neocolonized country, in a country where there was so much unemployment and a corrupt and corrupting regime that used thousands of men for those activities. But the conduct of the revolutionaries and the Rebel Army earned the trust and even the prestige in the enemy ranks.

That, of course, grew a lot later; in the end, there were countless, hundreds, perhaps thousands of military personnel who wanted to conspire with us.

But it is very remarkable that as early as November 30, 1956, a group of sailors from Cienfuegos was already working alongside the July 26 Movement. And that on September 5, 1957, they fought alongside the fighters of July 26. This shows that when an idea is just, a cause is just, it makes its way even within the enemy ranks.

The war, of course, lasted many months after that, almost a year and a half later. Our forces developed and in the end achieved victory; with the overwhelming support of the people, on January 1, 1959, the 70,000 men that Batista had under arms were disarmed. At that moment, more than 14,000 soldiers in the former province of Oriente were surrounded and had no escape. The island was cut in two and Che's column was attacking the city of Santa Clara.

When we started that struggle, we had no weapons. What did we have? Reason, the ideas in our favor. We could not yet say that we had the people. We knew that the people would support us historically, and according to the laws of history, the people, the working masses, the humble masses always support the just cause. And they had been doing so since our wars of independence. We revolutionaries had confidence in the people, but we did not have a single rifle when we began. We had to go through all those difficult, bitter stages: the Moncada, the Granma, the uprising in Cienfuegos, all those episodes in which the enemy had more strength, in which the enemy had more weapons; but in the end, with the support of the people and the selfless struggle of our fighters, we had more strength, we had more weapons and we crushed the tyranny.

And today we are very strong, we are invincibly strong: with an organized, conscious, disciplined, prepared people, with as many weapons as necessary, and capable not only of defending ourselves, but also of providing our solidarity support to other peoples.

This is what our struggle has led us to, this is what these sacrifices and those heroic episodes have led us to, which were written then and have continued to be written every day. Because later, heroism was necessary in Girón; the struggle against mercenaries and bandits in the Escambray was necessary; a struggle against imperialism and its agents, and its hired assassins, and its saboteurs was necessary; heroism in international solidarity was necessary. Thus, the history of our homeland and our Revolution has been written, with heroism.

And that is why it is so just that we pay this profound national tribute to the brave and heroic people of Cienfuegos, to the eleven militants of the July 26 Movement who died that day in this city, to the five who died in Santa Clara, to the four who died in Havana, and to the twenty-six sailors who heroically gave their lives that day in this city fighting against tyranny, wearing the armband of July 26 and fighting for the Revolution.

Today we walked through those places of the events. We went to the cemetery where a modest mausoleum has been erected, there where the victims are buried: those who died fighting, and the citizens who died victims of repression and indiscriminate bombing.

I think that someday something better will have to be done, someday in this city a monument will have to be erected to the people, to the revolutionary fighters and to the fallen sailors. It is true that the Revolution lacks many monuments — we have said this before —: there is a need in Santiago de Cuba, there is a need in many places. But in these arduous years of consolidating the Revolution, of daily work, we have had little time to dedicate the attention that those events deserve and to perpetuate the memory of those who fell, of those who sacrificed themselves and who must never be erased from the heart and thought of future generations.

As we passed by the cayo, and as we passed by the San Lorenzo school, the "Martí" park, and the Town Hall, we remembered those days. It seemed to us that we were seeing the people filled with revolutionary fervor; it seemed to us that we were seeing the jeeps and trucks loaded with fighters, sailors, and the people. I felt like I was witnessing those hours of anguish, and those bitter hours at the end, of defeat.

But today we saw an enthusiastic, joyful, happy people, and we said: "Well, we could not hold the cayo then; we could not hold the San Lorenzo school, nor the Town Hall, nor the 'Martí' park, nor the city." But as we passed by that cayo, we saw our gallant revolutionary sailors there today, the equipment of our Navy. And as we passed through the streets, we saw our soldiers, our militiamen and police, our people, and we said to ourselves: "We did not take it then; but we took it later, and our people have it now definitively and forever". And we took all the barracks, all the fortresses, and all the weapons. And today we are masters of our homeland, not only because we knew how to conquer it, but also because we knew how to defend it with dignity and heroism.

Those beautiful traditions belong to all our people, and those examples encourage us in the struggle.

Perhaps there are young people who lament today not having lived then; but no one has to lament anything. Living now is also a wonderful privilege for our people and for our youth. It is a wonderful hour of creative heroism, of heroism in work and in the permanent disposition to do whatever is necessary always in any field: today building schools, hospitals, factories — like those that are abundantly being built today in this city — working, educating future generations. It is a true privilege for our people to be able to dedicate themselves to that creative task.

A few days ago we talked about the idea of organizing the Internationalist Pedagogical Detachment "Che Guevara" to serve as teachers in Angola.

Thousands of revolutionary fighters are providing their services in Angola and in other lands of Africa and the world. Thousands of doctors, technicians, and civilian workers are providing their services beyond the borders of our homeland. These are the fruits of the heroism of Moncada, of November 30, of Granma, of March 13, and of September 5. These are the fruits of the heroism and the examples left to us by those who preceded us. And each generation has its task. They had to storm barracks and die in the streets of cities and fields; they did not have the privilege of building factories and hospitals, of building schools; they left us that legacy, and each generation has its hour, each generation has its task.

Twenty years have passed since September 5, 1957. When we see the photos of some of the witnesses and participants — many of whom honor us with their presence today at this podium — we see that some gray hairs and some lines are visible on their temples and faces. The years have passed, but we also see in Cienfuegos many young people and many students. They are the new generation. Those who preceded them are satisfied with the progress of the homeland, but above all, they are satisfied to see those who grow and are educated in ideas so different and in conditions so different from those of the past.

We do not believe ourselves to be monopolizers of the history of our homeland. Others wrote a lot of history before us; we have written a modest part of that history, but perhaps the greatest, most beautiful, and most promising history is still to be written: the history that you, the young people, will write.

The Cienfuegos of today can be proudly compared to the Cienfuegos of yesterday. Everywhere we see constructions, creations, works, new things, in the material order. The Cienfuegos of yesterday was enthusiastic, revolutionary, brave, and heroic; but the Cienfuegos of today — who does not know it — is an enthusiastic, very revolutionary, brave, and heroic Cienfuegos.

For reasons we have explained before, this city is experiencing enormous industrial development; not because of its merits, because the Revolution cannot distribute industries according to merits, but because of its natural and geographical possibilities, Cienfuegos is developing more than any other city in the country. We are pleased that this responsibility belongs to citizens like you.

Let us march forward to build the future with the same courage, the same audacity, and the same heroism as the fighters of September 5!

Glory to the heroes and martyrs of September 5!

Long live the heroic city of Cienfuegos!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!