Speech delivered at the closing session of the VIII Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in the Douro room of the Conference Center of the New Customs building, Porto, Portugal, on the day

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

18 October 1998 · Closing session of the VIII Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government · Conference Center of the New Customs building (Douro room), Porto, Portugal

Context
Castro addressed the closing session of the VIII Ibero-American Summit in Porto, Portugal on October 18, 1998, reflecting on summit discussions about the global financial crisis.
Main themes
Ibero-American integration and unity, global financial crisis, emerging market vulnerability, international liquidity and monetary policy, Keynesian approaches to international finance, IMF and World Bank reform, Brazilian economic crisis, European financial response, multilateral dialogue, new international financial architecture
Duration
~39 min
90th percentile
Words
4,704
90th percentile
Sentences
174
86th percentile
Readability
47
54th percentile
Grade
13.2
59th percentile
Syntax
3.20
72nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
26th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 45%43%
  • Geopolitical 21%21%
  • Ceremonial 18%17%
  • Institutional 12%11%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

174 sentences in 73 paragraphs

Dear members of the delegations present here;

Distinguished guests:

I will try to be as concise as possible; to speak, if necessary, in the form of a telegram. First of all, and with the sincerity with which I usually express myself, I must say that this meeting, in my opinion, has been extraordinarily fruitful. I would dare to say that never in such a short time has so much been done for our aspirations of integration, unity, and development.

The method devised by the Portuguese was excellent: zero speeches

—I was informed, as were others—, maximum spontaneity, dialogue, and exchange of impressions. For my part, I did not write anything. I was to deliver some closing words. I also did not have time to write anything, and it was better that way, because it would have been impossible to write yesterday about the impressions we received today.

We began with the first opening session. We listened to the heartfelt words of President Caldera. Profound interventions from Prime Minister Guterres of Portugal and President Sampaio stirred our spirits. We perceived that the finger was being placed on the sore spot. We moved to the other room. I do not know why the ladies were excluded; the delegations participated. And one good thing: we felt free to speak more intimately; the press was not present.

The experience of many meetings teaches us that there are differences in nuances and tones; there are practically two speeches: when we are speaking to the world, to our country, and to other countries, and when we are speaking among ourselves. However, we will not hide anything from the press.

The pronouncements began. First to speak— and I will not make a complete chronicle— was President Cardoso. I found it excellent that he initiated the interventions, because the world's attention is focused— we could say— on Brazil as a potential gateway into South America and Latin America for the grave crisis that threatens us; the country where a special effort is required, because what happens there will be decisive. It truly brought satisfaction to all of us, and, on my behalf, I can say that especially his profound analysis.

He recounted the history of the three speculative assaults that the Brazilian economy suffered in 1995, 1997, and 1998, which cost tens of billions of dollars to the reserves that the country had accumulated with so much effort; and he presented his ideas, essentially the urgent need to inject the necessary and sufficient liquidity into international finances.

There were some very interesting things he added when he practically raised the need for two policies: one related to the very vulnerable emerging countries at risk of financial crisis, and another for the industrialized countries that possess the necessary resources. If we were to summarize it, I would dare to say very schematically that the idea of an austere, very careful economic policy was proposed for developing countries, that is, in the internal economy of our countries, and a Keynesian policy for international finances. I believe it does not differ much from some pronouncements made very recently by personalities whose decisions are so important for the world economy, such as the President of the United States and the directors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in light of the serious crisis that is developing.

I cannot mention all those who intervened afterward; many made valuable and important contributions. I will mention a few that, in my opinion, encapsulated very important ideas: that of President Frei, related to the message that had been proposed to be elaborated in addition to the Declaration to send to those who have greater decision-making power in international finances. What should the character of the message be? It did not seem correct to have a message that would give the impression of a catastrophic, unsolvable, or pessimistic situation, but rather to frankly present in a realistic manner and without any exaggeration— which really does not require exaggeration— the current financial situation.

President Zedillo pointed out that, even with priority on medium-term solutions or future solutions and those related to a new architecture, the fire had to be extinguished immediately. And another second idea, among several: the need for Europe to react and lend all its support to the measures deemed essential to try to curb the crisis and resume economic growth.

I must mention the intervention of the Prime Minister of Spain, the President of the Government, Aznar: two very encouraging things when he raised Spain's decision to contribute 5 billion dollars to the International Monetary Fund— that is, to lead by example, since a reaction was being requested from Europe in line with the first steps taken in the United States regarding the reduction of the interest rate, which is considered at this moment an essential and key element to begin to awaken confidence and to inject fluidity into international finances— and something very important for Latin Americans: that of these 5 billion dollars, 3 billion would be dedicated to an emergency fund for Latin America, because this is what is being sought: emergency funds to face the situation.

He also spoke about the Spanish policy of continuing to make the maximum Spanish investments in Latin America. It is very important that decisions of this type were made in a meeting of this nature.

In the last meeting, Argentina reported a contribution of 1 billion; that is, 6 billion emerged from this summit, when the developed countries are being asked for the maximum contribution in their interest and that of the Third World.

Previously, an important fact had occurred: another contribution from Spain worthy of recognition: the reduction of 0.5% in the interest rate, that is, double the first reduction of the Federal Reserve System of the United States.

These are, in my opinion, excellent decisions when it comes to winning support, overcoming doubts and obstacles, in order to obtain similar support from the rest of the countries of the European Economic Community.

The content of the message was discussed, that message that had been agreed upon in the morning session in addition to the Declaration, how it should be elaborated; a full consensus was reached on its content. We all came to the conviction that the correct form was that which was proposed to elaborate that message, which was then discussed in the afternoon session.

Perhaps, to clarify things better, I should say that it was decided to continue the dialogue at lunch. The Portuguese managed to bring in some wireless microphones and perform another miracle that seemed incredible at a lunch: the continuation of the dialogue, but this time only among the heads of state and government.

It was there— and I must clarify this— where the issue of the content of the message was discussed; only the heads of state were present. It was an excellent meeting, one of the best I have seen, where the plates did not hinder anything; some consumed more; others, less. I, in the interest of asking many questions to the more experienced colleagues who were addressing the topic, did not even touch my lunch; moreover, I had the tension of the work in the afternoon and this intervention.

There, in our solitude, with the only company of the problems that each of us has on our shoulders and those that we all carry together, we managed to define the content of the message well. There was consensus; but at the same time, it was observed that there was a concept on which opinions were divergent: whether it was possible to speak at this moment of a global economic crisis or a world economic crisis.

It was pointed out that the American economy was in good health, which is very true, that the American economy still enjoys— this still I add— good health— and we hope it continues to enjoy good health, of course—; that the European economy also enjoys good health, and it is expected to continue enjoying good health, supported by increasing integration, and especially by the implementation of the euro, which is already forecasted to have more successes than dangers, although those who read analysts from certain media may perceive hopes that the euro will fail. Could we or could we not speak of a global crisis?

We, the Cubans, had a serious dilemma, and it was about the issue of the theme for the summit in Cuba.

We had already developed the idea of a theme associated precisely with the problem of the crisis, based on the fact that it is developing, that there are countless unknowns, and that we would have to examine what had happened, what was happening, and all the measures that were being taken.

We are living in a situation where events are occurring rapidly, and many times they are surprising; no one knows what will happen from now until January 1999, when we will have in our country a conference of economists from various schools and different countries of the world to theoretically discuss these issues. It is possible that by that date, by January 21, some of those who were thinking differently may have changed their opinions, because we have seen changes of opinions in very important personalities in the brief time of two weeks. For us, it was decisive to define this: what to do with the theme we had developed. A brief title, right?, that always encompasses many things and has to be explained.

We started from certain facts— and I will not take much time with this. On page 23 of that collection of speeches, headed by the report of the United Nations, the report of

Kofi Annan in September, is the speech of President Clinton on September 14, 1998, delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States, which is key. The first thing Clinton expresses at the beginning of the speech is the following phrase: "This is the greatest financial challenge facing the world in half a century." Quite a strong statement.

Later he adds: "It is a great irony that we are at a moment of unparalleled economic strength when there is such turmoil in the world economy."

He then speaks of how for 30 years the United States and the rest of the world have been concerned about inflation. And then he adds: "But it is clear that the type of risk has changed, as a quarter of the world's population lives in countries where economic growth is declining or is negative. Therefore, I believe that the main priority of the industrialized world today is to promote growth." This phrase is very useful to us, because it is what we are requesting, demanding from the industrialized world.

At the end of that well-crafted, careful speech, because just as here the content of the message to Europe was analyzed and there should not be a pessimistic word but a realistic speech, he dared to conclude with unusual and humble frankness: "I do not think it will be easy for us in this room to know what to do."

This speech was delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, a prestigious and well-known institution on foreign policy issues in the United States. Well, this is what Clinton said.

On page 49— I know this by heart because I was very interested in all this— on October 6, 1998, who speaks?: the President of the International Monetary Fund who, as you know, is not characterized by pessimistic phrases, but rather the opposite. In the face of criticisms that there was not enough transparency about what was happening in Southeast Asia and many other things, and the light manner in which loans were distributed without pertinent analysis, favoritism, and the rest that I do not have to repeat, which you have read twenty times in recent months, and on which not a single word had been pronounced before, and where the word transparency emerged again, which comes from the days of perestroika, transparency in information and data, transparency in banks, which everyone was demanding, he defended himself by stating that yes, they knew what should happen, that they warned certain governments, but that they did not disclose it because doing so could create panic and accelerate the crisis.

Today no one knows what would have been better, if even just a little transparency and warning that could have mitigated the severity of that sudden explosion, of that unexpected crisis that so surprised the world. That is to say, he is not a man characterized— I repeat— by pessimistic phrases, he stated there plainly: "Governors, this year our meeting is taking place in the midst of a crisis; a crisis that has already cost hundreds of billions of dollars." If he had been more precise, he could have used a known figure: globally, the stock markets had already lost between three and four trillion dollars. This was said by Michel Camdessus on October 6, just a few days ago, at the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank group. He immediately added that it had also cost "millions of jobs." He did not say tens of millions.

If one reads the reports on the situation in Indonesia, there the unemployment has risen to 40%. He ended the paragraph with the following words: "And the incalculable tragedy that means the loss of opportunities and hopes for so many people, especially among the poorest."

He said much more, two or three more things: "Even countries with well-managed economies have not been spared. We did not foresee the severity of this virus" —he almost compared it to AIDS— "which has spread across the world, attacking, for example, Latin America because Russia faced difficulties."

"Now, after this second blow of the crisis, most developing countries are facing a much more fragile environment, a much lower influx of capital, and a decline in commodity prices."

This phenomenon is mentioned for the first time, very much associated in history with what happened in 1929 and in the months that preceded it: an uncontrollable rise in stock prices and a drop in commodity prices.

Finally, Camdessus said —I believe it was the last thing about the severity of the crisis—: "Let’s speak clearly: this is not about countries in crisis, but about a system in crisis; a system that is still not sufficiently adapted to the opportunities and risks of globalization."

I am particularly struck by the words of the President of the International Monetary Fund regarding the question of whether we could speak of a globalized economic crisis or an international economic crisis. There are evident elements that can produce some confusion.

Today, in the second meeting, President Cardoso said

—I noted it—: "We are living in an extremely serious moment." And this is being said by the President of Brazil, whose experience and knowledge we all know.

These elements were being discussed, and for us they were vital —I repeat— in relation to the theme of the Havana summit.

I asked my colleagues —I do not call them comrades because I do not want to appear as leftist extremist as the President of the World Bank, Mr. Wolfensohn; I would love to find some leftist programs with the text of the speech with which he closed the meetings in Washington on October 8, 1998— to help us, please, and that if as a rule the host countries proposed and decided the theme, I really wanted to consult it with all the others. And I came to the conclusion that we should be more prudent than exaggerated. To say that there is no crisis and that there is not a very serious or extremely grave situation, as Cardoso expressed, would be to ignore the harsh reality; to assert that there is already a globalized economic crisis may seem exaggerated, and it may even be so.

When we drafted a paragraph on the subject, we were trying to raise, in essence, an idea: What has Ibero-America done? Or rather, how has Ibero-America faced —assuming that by that date it has already faced quite a bit, without waiting a year to do so, because no one can wait even a minute— the globalized economic crisis? It was long and we changed it to another phrase: Ibero-America and the globalized economic crisis. After the fruitful discussions held at noon, we were absolutely convinced that we had to modify the original phrase to be more realistic, more objective, and more accurate: Ibero-America and the serious risks of a globalized economic crisis. Those were the words that seemed most accurate to us, and fortunately we found the total acceptance, the full consensus of all those who were gathered there at that lunch. And that remained as the theme of the next summit.

Now, how do we see the strategic situation? I warn you that I am approaching the end of my words; I am getting closer. Thus: we appreciate a decisive role for Latin America. Here it is decided whether the economic crisis is halted and reversed and whether its total globalization is avoided. I have the deepest conviction that if that crisis penetrated Brazil, it would reverberate throughout South America, inevitably curve back to Mexico, and would already affect the stock markets of the United States in an absolutely irreversible way. And if a crisis in Russia, with 2% of weight in the world economy —and I think this 2% is exaggerated, because its Gross Domestic Product is today 450 billion, half that of Brazil and below France, Spain, and many other countries— caused a drop of 512 points in one day in the strongest index of the New York stock exchange, what would a crisis in Brazil and extended to South America be?

It must be recognized with all fairness that Brazil fought alone against that risk. And there are plenty of analyses from prestigious magazines that pointed to Brazil as the next inevitable target of the crisis, after Russia, based on data related to the budget deficit greater than 7% of the Gross Domestic Product; based on a supposed overvaluation of the real, and based on a growing and high deficit in the current accounts, circumstances that speculators use to attack the economy of any country that, in this case, would be Brazil.

From there arises the conviction that the U.S. stock markets could not withstand this; it could become a catastrophe much worse than that of 1929, when only 5% of Americans had their savings and resources invested in the stock markets; now 50% of Americans and almost all retirement and savings funds of the American middle class and those with higher incomes among workers are invested in them. It would really be, in my opinion, something with unimaginable consequences.

Well, that means one thing with all clarity: the United States and the industrialized world are interested in preventing at all costs that this crisis occurs in Brazil and South America; it is of great interest to Brazil, of course, more than anyone else, and to the rest of Latin America.

Who helped it, even with a single word of encouragement, in the four years of the three assaults? No one! It defended itself, among other measures, with the reserves it had accumulated; it managed to raise them to

70 billion, which is really high, and only in August and September, starting from the crisis in Russia, it lost more than 20 billion dollars. Then for the first time some phrases and some words of encouragement and promises of support for Brazil appeared; now it is clear that it is a vital necessity for the United States and the rest of the industrialized world.

That is why I think, first of all, that this should not mean that Brazil and South America, aware of this reality, should sit back with their arms crossed waiting for those who are in great danger to come out and give resources to Brazil. Brazil should not be suggested to make those efforts because it has been doing so for four years, defending the stability of its currency, sacrificing its reserves.

Let me tell you: If we had the reserves that they have had to spend just in August and September, we could count on double-digit growth in Cuba. And it is not such a large amount, if we compare it to what it cost South Korea, 100 billion dollars, or Thailand or other countries. Brazil had to spend more than 20 billion of its reserves in just two months.

I have also read the speeches of President Cardoso, before and after the elections, which has allowed me to gauge even his political talent. I will not add more virtues, because I do not wish to provoke misunderstandings with the left.

We must really recognize, with all fairness, the confidence, firmness, and capacity demonstrated by the President in that solitary battle; but now he is not alone, now he has plenty of company, and good company. He has a good political moment for the direction of the country, with recognized international prestige and excellent relations with many of the main leaders of the financial institutions who appreciate his knowledge; good relations with the leadership of the United States, good relations with Europe, and the record of the battle fought, plus the colossal scare and concern, above all, the awareness of the United States and Europe of the decisive importance of Brazil as the last bastion to prevent the generalization of the crisis.

Cardoso delivered two speeches. One before the elections, on September 24, 1998, in which he really made a bold decision —I say bold and intelligent, audacity alone is not enough—, by proposing the measures he was going to take. To avoid meddling in internal affairs, I do not express any opinion on the measures; I am simply pointing out political tactics and strategies. But tough measures are always tough. To propose them before the elections is not usual in the political traditions of our hemisphere.

I do not have bad relations with the left, even though sometimes it is difficult to maintain relations with leftist forces. Family problems easily arise due to any difference of opinion, and even words that hurt are carelessly pronounced. We are demanded more than the vestal virgins of Rome. Anyone can make a slight mistake; we cannot; be very careful, because before we get up in the morning, and even without knowing textually whether what has been said is true or not, we are already being judged.

Strategically, the position of Latin America is excellent in the current situation. Today we are something. They have to count on us.

In really risky situations, like the one we are living alongside the world, I am convinced that we must seek not only unity among all Latin American and Caribbean countries but also the greatest possible unity within the countries; I do not even venture to recommend it, I simply say what I think. These are political issues very much associated with a great battle for survival, which require the utmost understanding, unity, and even the subordination of national interests to the interests of the whole of our peoples, which are not incompatible, but rather, on the contrary, complement and guarantee each other.

These are the reasons why I base or try to explain this criterion on the strategic situation. And, I repeat, the United States and Europe cannot afford to allow the crisis to penetrate Brazil, nor South America, nor the rest of Latin America. It would be a catastrophe for all.

I already said that this meeting had been one of the most fruitful I had seen in my life. I also try to be realistic, not to get my hopes up, and, I repeat, never has so much progress been made in the unification of thought and on the path of integration in this difficult moment. And, moreover, we enjoyed the joy of the message of peace that in this already historic —I dare to call it that— meeting in Oporto we have received, about something so complicated and so difficult: a solid and well-founded hope for peace between Peru and Ecuador.

Ahead lies the extraordinary and strategically important task of union and integration of South America.

I sincerely confess that it is difficult to resign oneself to the idea of integration confined only to MERCOSUR. And I say here what I sincerely think and believe, and to many European visitors and many friends and political leaders who visit Cuba, often quietly, I always raise the principle that we must help Latin America to unite, that we must help South America to unite. I never tire of preaching that idea. To have more strength, we must unite forces.

Here there has been talk of globalization and regionalization, but I am convinced of the need, first of all, for our union, as the Europeans are uniting. And I must state that under no circumstances can the Caribbean be forgotten. They are a force, they have important political influence in the United Nations; they are very talented leaders, trained in parliamentarism and in grassroots debate, a parliamentary system that has worked for them, very respected in Africa and other parts of the world. We need their support and their strength.

Central Americans cannot be forgotten either, I must say it frankly.

I know a little about the concerns that Caribbean and Central Americans have. Some are not very fond of Cuba, but that is forgotten and we will always forget it, we overlook it. It is not important; what matters are the tasks in which we are committed and in which we are involved. But I defend and will defend the situation of Central Americans and Caribbean people who feel abandoned by the hand of God, because they have seen MERCOSUR advance, the TLC advance, but they have also seen that 150 companies, which were the result of that Caribbean Basin Initiative, have moved to Mexico. The Mexicans are not to blame, it is the laws of the market. One hundred thousand jobs have been lost in the Caribbean, a region I recently visited.

They cannot be forgotten, and they will be in Rio, there with us, alongside Europe, in a meeting as strategic and decisive as the one that will take place between the European Community, Latin America, and the Caribbean, very aware of the importance that the integration of Europe and our relationship with it has for our area. I am not saying this here, we raised it at the WTO when I said: If the euro is going to be a strong, solid currency, if it is going to support the economies of Third World countries, welcome the euro. I heard a general murmur there in Geneva.

We are aware of the importance of the euro and European integration.

When we talk about peace between Ecuador and Peru it is because we dream that one day there will be greater political integration, we all dream of it, we need it. And if Europe has united with such different cultures and where nations fought among themselves for centuries, how can we not unite, so united in language, culture, religion, and history!

We have fifty elements of unity that Europe has not had, and we have been independent for almost 200 years. Conflicts between countries conspire against our unity; that is why we think not only of those conflicts, but we wish for the relations between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru to improve more and more; we wish for the relations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica to improve, and that there be no conflicts over issues as insignificant as navigation on a border river; that new disputes do not arise without knowing how to prevent them in time.

It was also important to include the paragraph related to peace in Colombia. Very important, another achievement of this meeting.

That is what I have to say.

We will see each other in Havana. As during the visit of Pope John Paul II, Cuba will be yours.

I ask for forgiveness and thank you.