Speech delivered to the soldiers and officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces who will take part in the 10 Million Harvest, at the MINFAR Theater, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

4 November 1969 · Revolutionary Armed Forces address on the 10 Million Harvest · MINFAR Theater

Context
Castro addressed Cuban military officers and soldiers at the MINFAR Theater on November 4, 1969, urging their near-total mobilization for Cuba's ambitious 10-million-ton sugar harvest.
Main themes
10 million sugar harvest, military mobilization, Revolutionary Armed Forces participation, national defense readiness, counter-revolutionary threats, wartime preparedness, homeland defense, revolutionary commitment, labor and combat duty
Duration
~81 min
98th percentile
Words
9,764
98th percentile
Sentences
365
97th percentile
Readability
48
56th percentile
Grade
13.2
59th percentile
Syntax
3.32
83rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.17
42nd percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 57%49%
  • Geopolitical 19%16%
  • Social 14%12%
  • Ceremonial 7%6%
  • Institutional 3%2%
  • Technological 2%2%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 13%

365 sentences in 174 paragraphs

The Revolutionary Armed Forces constitute a decisive factor in the 10 million harvest.

The participation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in the harvest in past years has been significant, but we cannot say it was yet a decisive weight. On this occasion, the comrades from the Ministry have made a maximum mobilization effort for the harvest, within technical possibilities, in order to preserve only the cadres and personnel strictly necessary for the maintenance of the equipment, some units in full combat readiness, and also some courses in which, due to the great need we have in the armed forces for cadres, we have tried to preserve as much as possible, although in any case they will also have their participation.

So, as in a war, our Revolutionary Armed Forces have been mobilized for the 10 million harvest. That is to say: an almost total mobilization.

Does this imply that we will be left unarmed? In reality, we will never be unarmed; there will always be forces available for any attempt to aggress us. And, moreover, what remains most important is the capacity to mobilize all the armed forces and the entire people quickly in the event of a large-scale aggression.

In times called of peace, since here we speak of the army in peacetime and wartime... But certainly during these 10 years we have had to live in almost permanent combat alert. In fact, we have not had 10 years of peace, far from it.

In the event of war, all reservists and all the forces that our armed forces must mobilize will be called up — in the case of an official war, since we have suffered another type of war during all these years, of threats that have forced us to keep a considerable number of men armed, men who are among the youngest comrades and the most prepared comrades we had from the beginning of the Revolution.

So, a huge part of the comrades from the early days, a huge part of the comrades who participated in the initial struggles in the mountains, have remained in the armed forces during these years.

That is to say that our country during this period has had to dedicate the best of its energy and its best contingents of men to the defense of the homeland, in a situation of permanent danger and threat of aggression.

Now, simply, a large number of men take up the machete, but the weapons remain within reach! And if, of course, we were forced to interrupt the harvest to face some aggression, I am completely sure that for what it would pain us all and it would pain the people to interrupt an effort for which they have been working for so many years, without a doubt, the fervor, the hatred, and the determination with which they would fight could not be surpassed by any other circumstance.

Some counter-revolutionary spokesmen talk about little invasions, infiltrations, and things like that. We already know perfectly well the recipe for some of those actions.

And we remember when the counter-revolutionary bands of Escambray, in which for some time the illusion persisted that guerrillas could be organized against a revolutionary people, forced us to mobilize many men, to invest many resources in the task of liquidating those bands. But they were eradicated definitively and totally, because those who got involved in those adventures against the Revolution knew what awaited them!

In the same way, if in the midst of this harvest, they propose to create interruptions for us, if in the midst of this harvest they carry out some infiltrations in our country, what we can assure them in advance is that none will come out alive! What we can assure them in advance is that those who do not die in combat will die before the firing squads!

Our soldiers in combat are dedicated to exterminating the enemy in battle, and when they surrender, they take them prisoner. That is a norm and a historical practice from the beginning, from the first nuclei of revolutionary fighters, which has always been maintained and will be maintained.

Our soldiers do not usually shoot at an individual who raises their hands, because from that moment on it is no longer their task; from that moment on it is the task of the Revolutionary Courts and the laws! But the laws will be applied with particular rigor to those who attempt to interrupt the work of a people that is wholly, body and soul, committed to a decisive task like this.

So let this serve as a warning to the charlatans and the adventurers of counter-revolutionary ventures.

And now, let us focus on the fundamental issue that has motivated this afternoon's meeting.

Here are representatives from all the units that will participate in the harvest. There are already numerous contingents in the sugarcane fields, and others are preparing to march, and others will be joining throughout the harvest.

In total — and we will give some figures — the Revolutionary Armed Forces will incorporate in the first period, starting in November, 54,612 men; in January, 67,632 men will be incorporated, and in the decisive and final stage, 75,240 men will be incorporated.

These figures only account for a part of the officers and soldiers who will participate with the combined Henderson. Here approximately half of that personnel is counted, who in that first stage will participate as macheteros, while the combined units that will be available in this harvest are completed.

So, counting those comrades, they total approximately 80,000 men.

But there is also a reserve — which we want to truly consider as a reserve — to be used in critical places when the maximum effort has really been made in each of those places concerning the resources available. We have a reserve of approximately 25,000 more men.

It is to be expected that at a certain moment during the harvest, a significant part of those reserves will be employed.

We have classified them by a priority order, so that in some circumstances having to employ all the reserves would be painful since some of them are made up of personnel working in very important activities. And of course, we hope we do not have to employ all the reserves.

I truly have the deep conviction that if we work well, if we correctly employ the resources we have, there will be no need to mobilize all the reserves. Undoubtedly, it will be necessary to mobilize a part, but in our view, it would not be necessary to mobilize all 25,000 men to carry out the 10 million harvest.

But approximately 100,000 men from our armed forces will participate in this harvest. And that is a respectable figure.

Of course, our armed forces have a respectable size when considering the size of our country. But also, among all revolutionary countries, among all socialist countries, in our country there is a peculiar circumstance, and it is that we are located 90 miles from imperialism, that is, from the most powerful imperialist power; a power that carries out its wars of aggression even 15,000 and 20,000 kilometers from its coasts. And we have had to live these years and will have to live many more years in the face of that reality that we cannot neglect or forget for a single moment.

We are at a huge distance from socialist countries; we are here alone, geographically, 90 miles from the United States. And that is one of the causes, the fundamental cause that has forced us to have a powerful army.

Sometimes it is published that the army of Cuba has so many and so many men, so many and so many weapons, and that it is the most powerful armed force in all of Latin America. If analyzed by the number of men and by the technology we possess, it is undoubtedly the strongest; but if analyzed further, which is the technical preparation, the revolutionary content of that force, the objective of that force, the spirit of that force, and, moreover, if the rest of the people is counted, it is undoubtedly an objective reality that no other Latin American country can be compared to our country from a military point of view.

And that, of course, has not been in the least a fondness for arms, but has really been a very special necessity of our country.

But even so, the fact that at a given moment 100,000 men from our armed forces participate, not counting the Ministry of the Interior — which also has an important contribution, to the extent of its possibilities, to the 1970 harvest — amounts to saying that the bulk of our armed forces will be engaged in this battle of the harvest.

This has a series of implications: revolutionary implications, economic implications, and political implications.

First of all, nothing satisfies us more than knowing that they will participate in this decisive battle of the Revolution. Because the Revolution sometimes has to fight battles with arms in hand and other times it has to fight them, very importantly too, with the instrument of work.

And the economy is an essential part of the Revolution, and the economy has been one of the fronts where the enemy has tried to hit us and crush us; the economy was the front where imperialism tried with its blockade to sink us, to sink the Revolution; the economy is a very important front of the Revolution and one of the fronts that has received the most attacks from the enemy.

So when a revolutionary army participates in that front in a decisive way, it is waging a battle, it is waging an action that cannot be considered less important than the action it has to wage with arms in hand in the face of a case of aggression, in the face of a case of invasion.

So we, revolutionaries, must know that there is not just one front: there are several fronts. At some moments the battle is being fought on a certain front and at others, on another. For the military front, we must always be prepared; for the economic front, we must always be working in that direction, because that is a struggle that does not wait for events but is constantly present.

And nothing is more satisfying than to think that our armed forces have such a decisive participation in this battle.

We cannot help but remember the origins of our armed forces, the origins so modest at first, of such small contingents of men in an initial stage, and how over these years of struggle a wealth of experience has been accumulated, a wealth of organization, a tremendous wealth of technique; how it has grown nourished by the people, and how it has grown as the needs demanded.

But undoubtedly it is a triumph of morale and a triumph of the Revolution and a triumph of our cause the fact that for us constitutes a reason for pride — much more than the magnitude of our strength, much more than the magnitude of our technique — and it is the fact that we can say on this continent that our armed forces, an essential part of the Revolution, an essential part indissolubly united to the people, is an institution that participates in the tasks of development in a decisive way.

In other countries of Latin America, some so-called civic participations of the armed forces have been tried, and these have been limited to building a little road, a little school.

From a historical point of view, from a social point of view, from a political point of view, it constitutes a highly revolutionary event the fact that in a underdeveloped country like ours, in a country that has to face hard tasks, our armed forces do not constitute a privileged sector of the population, as happens in almost all countries of Latin America, do not constitute an unproductive sector of the country, but rather the armed forces constitute fundamental factors in the development and work of the country.

This fact, more than our weapons, more than our technique, more than our magnitude, marks the essential difference of our armed forces with the armed forces of the rest of the countries of Latin America.

It is worth noting that there is a country at this moment where the armed forces are playing a revolutionary role, and that country, as you know, is Peru. Undoubtedly it is also a very important event since the armed forces were the instruments in those countries that imperialism always used to maintain its privileges and maintain its hegemony. And that is why we must observe with deep interest the development of the political process in Peru, where undoubtedly a new and important phenomenon has occurred. That is why when I speak of other countries, I do not say all countries, but I say: “almost all countries in Latin America,” because it is necessary, it is even good, it is even satisfying, to be able to mention some exceptions.

But also these circumstances of the role that the armed forces play in our country constitute an example for the rest of the underdeveloped world, they point a way. Because undoubtedly all underdeveloped countries, due to the problems they have with colonialism, with imperialism, will have to pay special attention to their military defense and will have to have strong armies. Countries that do not have a developed industry, that do not have a developed economy, and for whom undoubtedly the need to have strong armies constitutes a considerable burden in their effort.

But our country shows the way: it indicates the new type, the new character of the revolutionary armed institutions. Armed institutions will have to exist for a long time; as long as imperialism exists, armed forces will have to exist in revolutionary countries. Thus, the illusion that at some time revolutionaries or some revolutionaries may have harbored that once class exploitation had disappeared, the people could dedicate themselves entirely to work and that the expenditure of energy and resources on armed institutions would no longer be necessary, those illusions undoubtedly lack any basis whatsoever.

As long as imperialism exists and as long as the country has to defend itself from external aggressions emanating from imperialism, even when the Revolution has been fully consolidated in the internal order, even when the society of exploiters and exploited has disappeared, even when the fundamental role of armed institutions in those societies, which has been to maintain the dominance of the exploiters over the exploited, has disappeared, even when those internal circumstances have completely disappeared in any country, the international circumstances compel revolutionary countries for an indefinite time to pay special attention to the problem of armed institutions and to have numerous and strong military contingents.

Now, in our country, that contradiction between the poverty of the country, between the underdevelopment of the economy, between the enormous demand for energy and resources to face in a few years what other countries did in 100 or 200 years, that contradiction has been resolved precisely with this decisive, fundamental participation of our Revolutionary Armed Forces in the tasks of development.

And that is why, in this case, at this decisive moment, in this decisive battle, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba will also play a decisive role.

We have spoken of the number of men. The whole country has mobilized great forces for the harvest: civil organizations, a huge number of workers and peasants have been mobilized through the Party and the CTC; the youth have been mobilized through the Centennial Youth Column; middle school students have been mobilized; so that the decisive forces of this harvest, the fundamental forces are the mobilized workers and peasants, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Centennial Youth Column, and the students from technological and pre-university institutes. Those are the decisive forces.

Regular cane cutters, as you know, are very few. That category of worker has not been replenished with new elements since the triumph of the Revolution. Many of the former regular workers were already workers who were 55, 60 years old or even older; tens of thousands of the former cane workers are already retired. There were times when even in our country labor was imported to carry out the harvest. Many other cane workers participated in the revolutionary process, joined the ranks of the Revolution, and became revolutionary soldiers, workers of the Revolution; many also joined the Ministry of the Interior; and, in short, we have constant evidence of this: suddenly a group of comrades organizes a micro-brigade of cane cutters and then some extraordinary macheteros begin to stand out, comrades who are in escorts, comrades who are in State Security, comrades who are in different activities.

And then we say: “Well, why is that?” They immediately explain: “It’s because he was a machetero,” “he was born in a sugarcane field,” “he has been cutting cane for so many years.” And constantly one of the former regulars appears who cuts 500 and cuts 600 and cuts 700 and is currently in other functions.

Many other macheteros, as was logical and just, became tractor drivers and operators of various equipment.

In our country today there are 50,000 tractors, and there were 5,000 or 6,000 before the Revolution. A large number of those equipment operators came from the ranks of the regular macheteros; many others have become agricultural technicians, have become inseminators, and have entered technological institutes.

Because, how could one deny, when a school for equipment operators opened, the right to become an equipment operator to a man who spent 10 years, 15 years, only cutting cane?

Thus, that category has been constantly reduced, so that you arrive at a chucho — the chucho number such — where 200 macheteros are needed and there are seven regulars, six regulars, five regulars, fifteen regulars.

So now the regulars in this 1970 harvest, after 11 years of Revolution, constitute perhaps 10% or 15% of the workforce for the harvest.

The very phenomena of the revolutionary process created the conditions through which many of the regular workers moved to other functions and others — as I said earlier — grew older and could no longer work.

Even when the Revolution triumphed, with the problem of retirements, which was very bad, that they paid seven pesos in retirement to a cane worker, there were men who were past the age to cut cane and yet, in order not to starve, they had to continue in the sugarcane fields. And many of them, with the Revolution and the retirement laws, took advantage of those possibilities. And, moreover, 11 years have passed.

That is why the regular worker no longer exists. And that process occurred before the man could be replaced by machines in cutting cane.

We must keep in mind this: the essential contradiction that the regular machetero disappears with the Revolution and the possibilities created by it for the workers. A category of worker that was at the lowest scale of living conditions is disappearing.

It was the worker who waited for months, impatient, anxious, full of debts, for the moment to arrive when he would be allowed to cut 100, 150 arrobas every day, not everything he could cut. Because at that time, with the enormous army of unemployed that existed in our country, even the rationing of the daily cutting quota was done. And the macheteros did not always cut what they wanted, but with those restricted harvests and a mass of half a million unemployed, many of them received their quota of cane that they could cut daily. And they not only had to cut it by hand, but also load it by hand!

Thus, there were a large number of aspirants to be cane cutters.

In Camagüey, tens of thousands of workers spontaneously came from Oriente, Las Villas, and other provinces to cut cane during the harvest.

Now, that could only have been replaced with machines. But as sugarcane agriculture is in tropical areas, fundamentally in underdeveloped countries, and almost all countries had the same problems that Cuba had, that machines could not be introduced because it would have meant unemployment, and the same thing happened with bulk sugar and many other activities, that you will remember the strikes that workers were forced to carry out against machines simply because they displaced them from work and threw them into hunger.

In that situation, the mechanization of sugarcane was not developed practically in any country.

In a country like Hawaii, which is U.S. territory and where they have sugarcane, they developed a lot of different methods that are not applicable to our country. They used bulldozers to bulldoze the cane; then they had to use enormous amounts of water washing it, huge investments in all that. And moreover, each company developed its own different technique.

That is why, being a crop difficult to harvest... It was not like with rice. You see how simple it is to harvest rice with a combine, because the harvesting of rice has been mechanized for a long time. The mechanized harvesting of corn, of wheat, has been developed in industrialized countries, but suitable machines for cutting cane were not developed.

Here we had to start inventing, to initiate that difficult and long path with the first combines, with all the problems, derived not only from the harvest but from the terrain, the stones, the stumps. Many of the Camagüeyan areas have to be bulldozed virtually again, because the stumps remained, because those lands were cleared with axes for decades. And other irregular terrains.

And that has been the process. The first combines were made in the Soviet Union, then some Cuban designs were made, until a strong, not very complicated machine design was finally achieved, which apparently has the greatest possibilities of solving the problem combined with the collection center.

Because the first combines cut and cleaned, but in fact, each combine had to have almost a collection center on top. Because it had to have enough fans, belts, equipment, to clean the straw. They were complicated and fragile machines.

The collection center that was made to increase the productivity of the machetero turned out to be the ideal equipment to combine it with this new machine, which cuts the cane but does not clean it.

So at this moment, even above the Libertadora — because the Libertadora was still the old concept without the collection center, that is: the machine with the collection center on top — now with the Henderson, a bulldozer, which has a device, a strong machine, that cuts the cane and takes it to the collection center.

By that path, we can advance with the collection centers. Therefore, the program has been established to build 300 collection centers next year.

That is a tremendous effort, what it means in industrial assembly, bringing electricity and solving all the problems that accompany a company of that nature, trying to set up about 300 centers every year. And by 1973, practically the whole country would have the collection centers.

Logically, first we will have the collection centers than machines for all areas. You know that we still have a lot of sugarcane in hilly terrains, where no machine can be used.

In the coming years, to reach one hundred percent, areas will have to be transferred, even dismantling some mills, building some new mills to reach one hundred percent mechanized. But first we will reach one hundred percent with collection centers and then, finally, one hundred percent with collection centers and machines to cut the cane.

The machines have to be mounted on bulldozers. The acquisition of all those bulldozers implies a hard task. The construction of all those machines involves a task of years.

And we plan to build for next year, for the next harvest, no less than 600 machines and try to reach about 1,000 machines per year. That means importing 1,000 bulldozers per year just for the sugarcane combines.

But in short, it was a difficult task, really difficult, that had no precedent in any other country and that had to be resolved. But it took more years than it took for the category of the regular machetero to disappear.

So in total during this harvest, at a certain moment there will be about 350,000 men cutting.

It must be said — as we pointed out at the beginning of the harvest — that the calculations were made based on relatively low yields per man cutting; that the calculations have been made with yields practically of 100 to 105, 110 arrobas initially.

If we are going to talk about the problem of the productivity of the macheteros, we must say with all sincerity the following: that these phenomena serve to demonstrate the fact that in our country there really were no work habits. Let’s not talk about work discipline.

Discipline is difficult to find in a country where a large industry has not been developed. Industry contributes a lot to discipline the worker due to the productive processes it entails.

A country with very few industries, a country with an immense majority of peasant population, accustomed to working with the ox, with the hoe, could start one day at one hour or another, waiting for the rain... Thus, in an uncertain situation, uncertain factors to develop work, the conditions that promoted the habit of work did not exist.

The harvests were made with relatively low yields because, as I explained earlier, there were excess macheteros. And in the country, there were no habits of organization or work.

When the harvester is introduced, when the truck is introduced, when the tractor with the carts is introduced, all that requires great control, all that requires organization, all that requires maintenance, all that requires precision, all that requires discipline.

You know it from the experience with new military techniques: that modern weaponry, electronic equipment, tanks, modern weapons have a series of demands that did not exist by far when we were a guerrilla army, which was the problem of whether a little can of oil to put on the rifle from time to time, the bandolier, the few bullets that could be carried, the backpack, a little food, and a small squad, a platoon, sometimes a column. And we did not have all those enormous problems of services, supplies, maintenance that modern technology requires.

To acquire the current levels of discipline of our armed forces, it was necessary to impose the task of mastering that technique and to have a new and demanding technique.

It must be said that this technique has decisively contributed to the rapid development of the organization and the discipline of our Revolutionary Armed Forces, because otherwise they could not be used, they could not be managed in peace, let alone in war, all those means of combat and all those units.

In the same way, the introduction of loaders, trucks, tractors, almost all the hauling is no longer done with ox carts but with tractors, the combines, all of that requires discipline, precision, accuracy. Those habits did not exist.

And we must say frankly... Because every country must be aware of its virtues and also of its defects. This is not about the derogatory concept with which reactionaries used to qualify our people, justifying themselves by saying: “he who works progresses,” “the whole people are lazy,” all those things. It is not about that. Because the people, on the contrary, have given multiple, infinite proofs of their spirit of sacrifice, of work, of willingness for everything.

The problem is a problem of habits, discipline, precision. And those habits really did not exist.

What historical factors contributed to that? Many factors.

It must be said that for almost four centuries the institution of slavery existed in our country. And then all the rigorous and hard work was done by chained men, under the fierce whip of the foreman.

When, as a result of our independence struggles, that odious institution disappeared — then came conditions in which our country became a semi-colony — on many occasions they imported labor to carry out that type of task. Or the conditions of hunger, of misery, relegated a large part of the masses and forced them under difficult conditions to carry out those activities.

But for a long time the philosophy persisted that he who worked was a fool, that he who worked was a brute. That the clever did not work, that the clever did politics, that the clever invented a business. And so for many years, until the Revolution, physical labor was practically despised and denigrated by many people. And it became a philosophy for many.

The conditions of capitalist exploitation, corruption, political maneuvering, for decades instilled the poison, practically the contempt for work, which was seen almost as a punishment.

All those historical conditions influenced, plus underdevelopment. The artisanal methods of production greatly influenced the fact that in this country work habits were not acquired.

With the Revolution, consciousness was acquired, enthusiasm was acquired. But enthusiasm alone does not solve the problem, consciousness alone does not solve the problem, although it is fundamental. To create work habits, organizational habits, even precision, a culture is required, a level of culture that our people did not have. Because with a man who did not know how to sign, with a man who did not know how to add, it is difficult to calculate anything, it is difficult to organize anything.

And many of the tasks are complex: the tasks of directing all the traffic in a sugar mill, the itinerary of the trains, the program. In such a way that we are now analyzing, even trying to produce a first computer that daily in each sugar mill indicates what the optimal itinerary of the trains should be. Because a program is made but the circumstances change constantly.

So that is a problem that to be solved adequately does not even suffice to have accountants there, well-prepared men who make calculations, because no one could assure what the optimal calculation is. And the number of factors and elements that must be managed every day is very large to be able to optimize that program. And yet, there is the possibility of managing through computers in each sugar mill the itinerary of the trains and the distribution of the means of transport.

See how even our traditional and historical sugar industry needs modern technology, needs electronics, needs computers, to be able to carry out the work under optimal conditions.

The level of preparation of the population, which was very low, the level of culture, did not help and could in no way help organization, precision, discipline, and work habits.

Because sometimes a man, if he stops at a corner with the tractor or with the truck, or if he neglects the dispatch of the trains to the chuchos, or makes a wrong calculation, creates difficulties of all kinds. Currently, to be able to fulfill the task in a chucho, the transports, the carts, the loaders must be ready, and, in addition, the cars in those chuchos, to be able to fulfill that task every day.

If trains are missing, the macheteros logically have to stop; if loaders are missing, the delayed cane accumulates in the fields; if the hauling equipment is missing, if it is a problem of any kind... Practically anything interrupts the process.

And in our country — I repeat and insist — those habits did not exist. And those habits are being created. And I would say that in this stage of the 10 million one of the most important things, one of the most important by-products that we are going to acquire is a much greater work habit, much greater organization, and much greater discipline.

It is a truly remarkable circumstance, historic for our country, the fact that that hard work that slaves did yesterday or that unemployed men threatened by hunger did in a recent past, today those men are not the ones who guarantee a harvest that by its magnitude will astonish the world.

It will be truly a great source of pride for our country that this harvest is done today — and a historic change that completely turns around, completely changes the concepts that prevailed in our country for four centuries — by men who are not driven by hunger, by unemployment, by misery, and that it is the participation of the people through the workers mobilized by the CTC, by the MINFAR, by the Youth Column, the students, entirely new forces.

And there is no doubt that this constitutes something that has been produced little by little, but that does not cease to be a truly historic event: hard work persists, but it will not be done by slaves; hard work persists, but it will not be done by men threatened by hunger.

And that fact will undoubtedly bring us something very important for the future: discipline, work habits.

It will no longer be just the overflowing enthusiasm of wanting to do things as one pleases, it will no longer just be the desire, it will no longer just be the consciousness, but the organized consciousness, the effort used in a more intelligent way.

And even when in the not too distant future all these activities will be done with machines, it does not mean that once the problem of mechanization of the cane, of cutting cane is resolved, activity in this country will stop. On the contrary, our country enters new stages of economic development, in more complex stages; the needs are enormous in all areas, in construction and in industry. We are entering a phase of true industrial development.

The enemies of the Revolution have tired of saying nonsense about whether Cuba attempted an accelerated development of industry and then abandoned all that and went to monoculture. And they will not take long to awaken from their illusions, because never has there been less monoculture than now. It is that 10 million astonishes them and they believe that we are dedicated only to cane.

Agriculture will diversify significantly. And it must be said that, for example, in 1980, the cane, which was almost 80% of the gross product of agriculture, will become 20% or 25% of the gross product of Cuban agriculture. And I do not say sugar — which is even less — I say cane, because there will be many more canes than for 10 million and they will be dedicated to other uses also related to agriculture, such as livestock, the production of milk, beef, poultry, pigs. That is to say that cane will be the fundamental base for concentrates to overfeed cattle and pigs and chickens.

In short, sugar, sugar, approximately in 1980 will be 15% of the gross product of our agriculture; the cane in total will be a little more because it will also participate in supporting other branches of agriculture.

So that never — paradoxically — has there been less monoculture than with the 10 million tons of sugar.

The rice plans are currently gaining tremendous momentum, so much so that — as we said a few days ago — in 1971 there will be another phenomenon: there will be a surplus of hundreds of thousands of tons of rice, after eating all the rice we want; it is another of the plans that is advancing rapidly. The transformation of livestock with insemination and other techniques. In short, work is being done in all branches of agriculture. And regarding food production, much progress has also been made in fishing, which has had tremendous growth in these years.

But we are entering a phase of serious industrial development.

It was correct to emphasize the effort in agriculture. It was necessary to guarantee food first and foremost for the whole people; that was essential. But important industrial facilities have been built, especially in energy, in electricity, in cement, mechanical industry, fertilizers, etc.; of course, still not in all the volume that our country needs. But the industrial development of the coming years will be approximately equal to how agriculture has developed in these years.

And agriculture will continue to develop naturally and will need many industries to process the products, but industry in general will have a tremendous boom in the next 10 years. So that we, with a secured food base, are already entering serious industrial developments that we have talked about in general terms, we have not wanted to be very precise, simply because we do not want — many of our plans are under study, under analysis, but they are well advanced — simply to alert the imperialists about the fundamental objectives we pursue so that they do not dedicate too much time to sabotaging what we want to do.

Although it must be said that the blockade is increasingly discredited and the blockade is increasingly perforated, and practically the prestige of our country, the attention that the officials of the Revolution receive everywhere they go to inquire about industrial technologies, the attention they receive is tremendous.

But in any case, we are seriously studying the development of the country from 1970 to 1980 and that will be fundamentally industrial.

What does that mean? Well, that we need more and more organization, more and more work habits.

It will no longer be the problem of manual cutting of cane, but it will be the development of a series of activities that require a population with a high technical level, that requires work habits, discipline habits, even if it is no longer the physical work of cutting cane.

So that all this that we are going to accumulate in these years will be decisive for the country in the future.

Then it must be said that the productivities with which the cuts have been calculated are low. Everyone who has cut cane knows what it is to be two hours, three hours, four hours, eight hours, and even ten hours cutting cane; everyone who has cut cane knows what an average man cuts in an hour, in four hours, and in eight hours, not a kind of super-cutter, no — as we said the other day — one of those Eastern soldiers who in the month of August averaged over eight hundred arrobas, the brigade that averaged more than 800 arrobas — we calculated that in the climatic conditions of the East, the heat of the East, in the month of August, without a doubt it is a great feat — but average men know what they cut in an hour, in four hours, and in eight hours.

And anyone knows that when they have a little training in cane, when they pass the first days — because cane has its traumatic moment, that moment when all the bones hurt the cutter, when all the hands have blisters, when the straw, everything, is a hard task — those first traumatic moments; but when the first calluses appear on the hands, when the body adapts a little to the activity, any machetero without rushing, in a cane that is not out of this world, cuts in four hours 120 arrobas just a few days after being in the cane field, just a few days!

Anyone knows that even a figure of 200 arrobas in a day is not a great effort even for an old man, not even for an old man!

A young comrade, 20 or 25 years old — it is possible that maybe men already 40, 50 have harder bones, as they say — undoubtedly if we see that comrade walking, doing a sport, we see that that young comrade does not get tired.

When they put athletes in training, they have them doing tremendous exercises for four hours. And a young man who cuts for eight hours, if he has no problems with his spine, if he has no organic problems —we are referring to cases of normal people—, who cuts seriously for eight hours, cuts 200 arrobas within two or three weeks of cutting sugarcane and cuts 300 when he has two months. If not, let him submit to a test one day: let 30 men be chosen at random, let them be subjected to an examination in a specific type of cane, normal cane —not cane in optimal conditions, no; not a super-developed Azul Casa Grande of 18 meters; no, in normal cane—, a man working seriously, for eight hours, cuts 200 arrobas and easily surpasses 200 arrobas without extraordinary effort.

Now, it is necessary that the man who is going to perform a task for two hours, three hours, four hours, does it seriously, goes to it. If he turns the sugarcane field into a club, into a place where everything is discussed, everything is talked about, then productivity greatly decreases; if he does not concentrate on the cane, logically productivity decreases.

But a man working seriously for eight hours can easily surpass, not for the collection center but for the crane, easily, an average man, the 200 arrobas.

A little willpower is required, a little tenacity is required, and a little philosophy is also required. If one understands the importance of this, if one understands that this work now is what will free us in the future, through the use of machines, from that type of physical effort; if one understands that this work must be done by us —the people—, that we do not live in the era of slavery, fortunately; that in our conditions our people, if they want to advance, if they want to develop, must seriously and resolutely face these obligations, and that we do not work for the owner of a sugar mill or a large estate, that we work for the country —for the whole country— and that every cane cut will benefit the entire country, and that this work is taken with a spirit, let’s say even sporting, with enthusiasm...

Because after all, whenever a man has to face something, it is a test for that man: it is a test of his character, it is a test of his will, it is a test of his integrity as a revolutionary and as a man. And the concept of man implies the willingness to face tests and work. And it is true that work is rigorous, just as it is rigorous to climb a mountain, to walk long hours through the mountains climbing hills. We have sometimes seen when university students went to the mountains, in the first days, traumatized, and when they had already spent a week, two, they adapted and carried out that task.

All of us have had to climb hills, and the hills always tire, the hills are always heavy, especially when carrying a backpack. And yet, when there was no obligation to climb hills, we often felt the desire to climb hills, to go through those same labors again, to climb the slopes with the backpack on, to walk long kilometers. And we always felt satisfied every time we remember the opportunity when we faced this task and overcame it.

And we will always remember with pride every effort made. And we will always remember with more pride what cost us more, not what cost us less. We will always remember with more satisfaction the difficult, and not the easy! For our soldiers, I am even sure that this type of work helps to temper their spirit, to strengthen their character, to make them tougher, to make them better revolutionaries and better fighters.

It is no longer just a test of courage to face a risk. Another type of courage is needed: the courage of perseverance, the courage of tenacity, the courage of resilience. It is a significant moral issue. It is precisely this that brings us closer to the true concept of revolutionary, to the concept of man. And more than man, of revolutionary, which —as Che said— is the most honorable title, the highest position to which a man can aspire, to be a revolutionary!

This is what brings us closer to the men who have made history, this is what brings us closer to our mambises. Ten years fighting under such difficult conditions against better-armed, better-equipped armies, suffering terrible hunger, terrible miseries of all kinds, ten years! and we always admire that tenacity with which our mambises resisted for 10 years and persisted; and those who fought in the 10 years fought again in 1895. For what? To see the homeland snatched away. To see the homeland in the hands of a Yankee interventionist. To see the homeland in the hands of shameless politicians, thieves of all kinds. They did not even have, after so many years of struggle, the satisfaction of saying: This is our country, we are the owners of this land and these resources, we are the owners of our future.

And our generation has fought, our generation made sacrifices. But it cannot be compared —I say this with all sincerity—, it cannot even be compared to what other less fortunate generations than us did; it cannot be compared to those who fought for 10 years. Our struggle was shorter, our effort was smaller.

We have worked, yes, these 10 years. It is not only the war that counts. The war was at one time the measure of the people's willingness to serve their country. In these years, it has sometimes been war, but many times it has been work the measure of that willingness to serve the country and to serve a cause.

But we have had a special privilege: we have inherited the effort of those who fought for 100 years. We have had the privilege of seeing this homeland of ours not in the hands of an interventionist, not in the hands of the rude owners of the sugar mills, of the lands, who came for a few pesos and bought entire caballerías, bought the land by maps with miserable pesos, where they then enslaved through the economic conditions of capitalism the fighters, the descendants of those fighters, enslaved our people.

We have had a rare privilege: we have freed ourselves from all that. We can have an administrator who may be inefficient and we suffer, but he is not Mister so-and-so or Mister such-and-such, and we try to teach him or change him if he is not suitable for the position. The things we suffer are different, but it is in our hands to solve them, no one at all prevents us or can prevent us: only our own limitations, only our lack of vision, only our lack of capacity to solve problems can prevent us, only our technical levels, our levels of culture, for which we have fought, we are fighting, and we will have to fight much more in the future.

For the first time we say: That land, that factory, everything our eyes can see is Cuban. Everything our eyes can see belongs to the people. It has no other owner than the people; the benefits that are achieved are all for the people.

And that is the privilege that this generation has had: It has been a generation that reaps the struggles of Cubans for a hundred years! It has for the first time the opportunity.

Of course, the generations that come after this will have other tasks, they may have an easier path, they will have other living conditions made precisely by this generation. But what less can we do, we who receive the fruit of the sacrifice and effort of the Cuban revolutionaries over 100 years, we who have had this opportunity, than to honorably fulfill the duty that corresponds to us, to do something for the present and to do everything we are doing for the future? This is how everyone: soldiers, workers, students, young people of the Youth Column, and the few regulars that remain in our country, must take their task in relation to the 1970 harvest.

In recent days we explained the decisive economic importance of this harvest. Not only the political importance, but economic, and fundamentally economic. We do not want the 10 million for the pride of saying: We have produced ten million! For a matter of honor? Yes: honor is at stake in this. For a matter of word? Yes: the word is at stake. But it is decisive for the economy, it is decisive for the future, it is what will open the way to the great progress of the future. And it is in this that we must think. And fulfill the task with enthusiasm, thinking about its content. And thinking —as I told you— about what brings us closer to the mambises, to the revolutionaries. It is what brings us closer to all that we have admired. It is what brings us closer to the fighters who gave their lives in the mountains during the war or in hiding, to the fighters who gave their lives in Girón, to the fighters who gave their lives in the Escambray, to the fighters who gave their lives in Bolivia or elsewhere, serving the cause of the Revolution.

It is what brings us closer to the good revolutionaries, to the heroes, to the martyrs of the history of our country. It is what brings us closer to those who fell, to those who gave more than we did, because they gave everything. Because they could not even live this moment of starting work, the moment of starting to cut the cane of the first sacks; the infinite satisfaction of cutting the cane of the last sacks of this task, of this victory of the economy of our country, which will undoubtedly make a profound impression on the whole world.

Millions of people are anxiously and eagerly waiting for Cuba's success in this endeavor. From places as distant as Vietnam, representatives of the fighters will come to cut cane with us. Five fighters from South Vietnam, from the Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam will come to cut cane with us, and five fighters from North Vietnam. They who there have to face a million Yankee soldiers, in this magnificent, extraordinary, moving gesture, take five men from their combat battalions to come cut cane with us.

What a magnificent example! And what a symbol of the importance that other peoples give to the current effort of our country!

From Europe, numerous young people want to come cut cane. From the United States, hundreds of students want to come cut cane for the 10 million harvest. Imagine how sour and bitter that gesture of the American youth is in relation to those who wanted to sink and drown our country!

In recent days, hundreds of Soviet technicians and diplomatic officials also went to the sugarcane cuts to participate in the 10 million harvest.

And I am sure that if they had the means for all the young people in the world who would be willing to participate with us in this endeavor, whose significance is not lost on them, to come to our country, we would possibly have an excess of cutters.

But more: we believe that if we put a little spirit into it, with those we have, we have enough. If we put a little spirit into it, we can put the grinding norm at one hundred percent for the mills, especially as the first weeks pass and we approach the period when the cane has the optimal sugar yield.

And all of you, the comrades who are going to direct these activities and coordinate them, must keep in mind the need to move, to make all the necessary arrangements so that all the factors that affect the fulfillment of the cutting program, in the delivery of fresh cane to the mills, the transport of carts, trucks, the harvesters, the railway cars, all those things, everything that can be done even within certain limitations, even within certain shortages in some of those means —still in the early times we are going to have some problems with harvesters, because the harvesters corresponding to the deliveries of 1969 are just arriving now—; but in everything we have, achieve the best use, the most organized use, and be attentive to all those details, to all those organizational factors, so that you influence, act, move in things that often will not even depend on you.

The army, the armed forces are the institution disciplined par excellence, they are the ones with the most experience in organization, they are the ones with the most discipline. It is necessary that the positive influence of that spirit of organization, of discipline, the experience they have, be constantly contributed. Every time you see something that is interrupting the task of the cutters, that is slowing them down, that is affecting the freshness of the canes, all those factors, keep them very much in mind. And you can do a lot in that sense.

Goals have been set that, by the way, the ones set for what they are going to cut in Camagüey are greater. But in reality we must consider those goals as minimum goals. And I trust that those goals will be surpassed!

The goals are higher than in other years, but I can tell you fully aware that those goals are still modest.

It has been calculated that the armed forces will cut 18% of the cane. We believe that with the use of the reserve, and putting in the spirit of combatants, aware that it is a battle like the one they would have to fight against an invasion in a trench, they can surpass that figure of 18%. And I sincerely believe —and I do not exaggerate, I am not utopian— that it can be stated that with the forces you mobilize, you could cut up to 30% of the 10 million harvest!

Logically, if the other forces —such as the Column, the technologists, the workers, and the peasants— if the other forces put in their maximum effort, then you will not be able to reach that 30%. Because there are enough people to make it difficult to achieve it even if you put in all your spirit. That is to say, you have the strength to achieve that, although I am sure that if the other participating forces do their utmost, it will be difficult for you to have room to reach the 30%.

You understand me perfectly well: if the Column raises its standards, if everyone raises their standards, then everyone will have a high participation in the percentage. But you have the strength for 30%, including the use of reserves not at one hundred percent, but of about 15,000 or 20,000 men.

That has enormous significance.

The enemies believed that by threatening us, harassing us, forcing us to employ large human resources to have armed forces adequate to the situation, they would create tremendous damage to our economy.

But, what a lesson! What an example for our enemies! What a lesson for imperialism! What an example for the other peoples that we can say that, in this historic battle, the Cuban armed forces played a decisive role, played a fundamental role!

So the contradiction they created for us is resolved by this revolutionary path.

And we can truly be sure that this victory will hurt the imperialists more than that of Girón, more than that of Girón!, because it will disarm their lies, their sophistries. It will disarm them ideologically, the reactionaries, the imperialists, the capitalists. Because they have tried to make the world believe that man must be a slave, that man must be spurred on by hunger to work, that man is incapable of living in a more fraternal and more humane way. They have tried to combat revolutionary ideas, socialist ideas, and communist ideas, with the sophistry that man can only accomplish a task through the strongest material pressures.

They have bet everything on the idea that we cannot. They have believed it impossible, and they are convinced that it is impossible, that a people where there are no habitual macheteros can produce a harvest of 10 million.

And what that lesson will mean politically, morally, and revolutionarily is worth —without any doubt— much more than the 10 million tons of sugar. It will be a great ideological victory for the Revolution and the revolutionary camp! It will be a victory that will be celebrated not only by Cuba but by hundreds of millions of people! It will be a victory that all socialist peoples will celebrate, a great moral victory, a great ideological victory over imperialism, over capitalists, over reactionaries!

There are many things at stake at this moment, there are many things being played at this moment.

And for our fighters, for our officers and soldiers who are now going to join that battle, we wish for them to be like the fighters of Girón, like the fighters of Escambray, like the fighters of the October Crisis, like the mambises when they charged with their machetes. We wish for them to behave as they would if the enemy invaded our shores, to behave as they would in the midst of a war: With all the heroism, with all the courage, and with all the selflessness of which they are capable when they defend their homeland, when they defend their cause, when they defend their flag!

And let us do it in honor of all the fallen, in honor of all those who made this homeland possible, in honor of all those who made this privilege of seeing the country master of its own destiny possible!

Let us do it in honor of the fallen comrades who have given their lives here and in other lands!

Let us also do it in honor of the great thinkers! Now that we are going to be the standard-bearers of the best of Marx's thought and the best of Lenin's thought, let us also do it in honor of Lenin, who this year celebrates his first centenary!

We are now standard-bearers of those ideas, standard-bearers of that cause. Let us defend it with all the dignity and honor of which we are capable, and carry it to victory!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!