Press conference by Mr. François Hollande, President of the Republic, on the preparation of a growth pact and on the future of Greece within the Eurozone, in Brussels on May 25, 2012.

France François Hollande · President of France

25 May 2012 · Informal European Council · Brussels

Context
Hollande addressed a press conference in Brussels on May 25, 2012, following his first European Council meeting focused on a growth pact and Greece's eurozone membership.
Main themes
Growth pact, eurozone stability, eurobonds, budgetary discipline, European Investment Bank recapitalization, structural funds, financial transaction tax, Greece's future in the eurozone, project bonds, energy transition, bank recapitalization, European solidarity mechanism
Duration
~43 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,151
92nd percentile
Sentences
215
90th percentile
Readability
52
69th percentile
Grade
11.7
42nd percentile
Syntax
2.99
46th percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
22nd percentile

Translated from French

This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.

215 sentences in 60 paragraphs

THE PRESIDENT - Ladies and gentlemen, good evening or rather good night. I participated for the first time in a European Council, which was informal in the sense that it was only aimed at preparing the meeting that will take place at the end of June and which should, if the work is done in this direction, prepare a growth pact that could be an additional dimension to what has been built so far. I reminded this Council of what my conception of growth is. It is not about opposing it to budgetary discipline. Budgetary discipline can allow for the recovery of growth, and growth can facilitate budgetary consolidation.

I also provided a conception of growth that should be comprehensive. There are structural reforms that each of the member countries can undertake to improve their competitiveness. There is what Europe can do, what it is already doing to promote the single market and thus allow for more exchanges between member countries. But there is not enough incentive for investment that could allow European countries to regain higher growth rates. This is all the more damaging as today, European growth is zero for the year 2012, or even in slight recession for the eurozone, and the forecasts for 2013 are relatively pessimistic since the growth rate for the entire Union would barely be 1%. So the challenge is indeed to inject energy back into the engine of growth. Regarding the proposals, there are some that can already reach consensus today, and that is already not so bad, on what we call "project bonds," on the recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, on the mobilization of structural funds, currently unused, on the orientation of the European budget.

But I proposed that we go even further, particularly in that European projects should be more targeted on new technologies, on energy transition, on industrial projects, and notably through the globalization of the EIB. I also wished for the perspective of eurobonds to be included, which would be the additional step of integration. As soon as there is a willingness to pool budgetary policies, there is a monetary policy conducted by the Central Bank, it is legitimate that there are new instruments, and eurobonds can fit into this perspective of integration. I also reaffirmed France's commitment to the financial transaction tax. Not because the tax itself would be a factor of growth; it is rare that a tax creates growth by itself, but because the revenues derived from the financial transaction tax could be allocated to a fund that could itself be useful for investment.

Finally, I insisted on the use that could be made of the European solidarity mechanism, which is not yet fully established since the ratifications that were planned for July 1 have not occurred, but in any case, the European Financial Stability Fund could already play this role, so that this mechanism could be useful for the recapitalization of banks in connection with the European Central Bank.

So it was an exchange of views. Not all member countries necessarily share my conception, I must admit, but there are a number of them that expressed themselves in the same direction, others were able to put forward ideas on the best way to take investment spending into account in the calculation of the Stability Pact.

What I wanted is for there to be new instruments that could be proposed, eurobonds, taxes on financial transactions, European solidarity mechanism to recapitalize banks. Nevertheless, I look at what has already been proposed consensually and that the President of the European Council summarized in a document. So, it is a first step that was necessary, but we are not yet at the end of June and there will still be work to be done to convince.

On Greece, a text was adopted to remind the willingness of the member countries of the Union, not just the eurozone, that Greece remains in the eurozone, while respecting its commitments, and while already highlighting the effort that the eurozone has made to support Greece, it was indicated that there would be a mobilization of structural funds to support the growth effort of the Greeks and thus give confidence to Greek voters regarding what may happen after June 17.

That is the essence of what I wanted to tell you; if it lasted so long, it is because all the countries represented at the European Council speak, and sometimes at length. So do not think that there were debates that could have seized one participant or another. No, it was very calm but very long. So I can answer your questions despite the late hour.

QUESTION -- Did you feel that a majority emerged during these discussions on, for example, the theme of eurobonds?

THE PRESIDENT -- There was no accounting that precise. I understood that some countries were totally opposed, others considered it in the very long term, and others could think that it could be closer. But if your question was to ask whether I was alone in defending eurobonds? No, I was not alone.

QUESTION -- I follow up on the question, what was Germany's position, since it is Germany that counts in this debate, since it will have the most to lose, so did Germany tell you of its total, absolute, and definitive opposition to the creation of eurobonds? On Greece, you have rightly pointed out that Greece must meet its commitments. Let’s imagine that universal suffrage, which can reserve surprises, brings to power a government that will not meet its commitments since it has announced that it will not. What do we do? Have you considered any hypotheses and possibly prepared for a bankruptcy, a departure of Greece from the eurozone?

THE PRESIDENT -- First question, it is not for me to speak on behalf of Germany. But what I retain is that Ms. MERKEL does not see eurobonds as a factor of growth but as a distant perspective of integration. If I want to be fair and do not want to interpret the German position in a way that would be favorable or unfavorable to me, I try to understand. I have a different conception; eurobonds are not simply a point of culmination at the end of an integration process, they can be an opportunity to mutualize not past debt but future debt to allow states that today borrow at interest rates of 6% to access the market more easily and, moreover, to use eurobonds for investment projects or those that would be directly carried out by the Union. This would justify modifying the treaties. I agree. I make a distinction with "project bonds" which now seem to be widely accepted but which are more guarantees than new loans, more public-private partnerships than an initiative taken by the Union.

So I still see that, in this discussion, there are first clarifications, progress, and also ongoing debates.

On Greece, first, I am not informed of any simulation by I don’t know what group or subgroup of what a departure of Greece from the eurozone could provoke. I am not saying that there is no place where this should be worked on, perhaps there must be, each country can also conduct its studies. In any case, as far as France is concerned, I am not informed of this type of simulation work and we are not directly conducting this type of hypothesis for France. Why? Because I prioritize keeping Greece in the eurozone, which was indeed the position expressed this evening. What would happen if the new government resulting from the Greek elections refused the memorandum and did not respect the obligations that Greece must currently undertake? I think, and without necessarily sharing this point of view, but I think that the attitude of the eurozone would be to demand strict compliance with commitments. But while waiting and hoping for another situation, I advocate that beyond what the Greeks must apply, that is to say the memorandum, and beyond what the eurozone has already done for Greece, structural funds should be quickly mobilized so that Greece's growth can be encouraged in a very short time, so that the Greeks can have confidence in the solidarity of the eurozone and that they can say that they have obligations to respect but also prospects for a return to growth and an improvement in their living conditions.

QUESTION -- To ensure that the debate on eurobonds does not remain too hermetic to the general public, could you tell us how you defend the idea of a growth pact, what is the interest, in your opinion, of having eurobonds, and is it a new effort of solidarity that should be made towards the most indebted countries, and would it imply a transfer of sovereignty?

THE PRESIDENT -- There are several questions. So that we can speak to the broadest public, Europe, without modifying any treaty, can already use the European Investment Bank. So the first idea is to increase the capital of the European Investment Bank, and thanks to this contribution, this bank will be able to lend more widely to companies to carry out a number of investment projects.

So everyone can understand that without going so far as to issue bonds, the use of the European Investment Bank can already serve to finance a number of projects.

The second idea that adds to the first is "project bonds," which is also an innovation, that is to say, projects that arise from a private initiative, companies raise loans, and the Union provides its guarantee through an appropriate mechanism. There are therefore possibilities for additional investments.

Then the last idea, eurobonds as such have several conceptions; either it is to mutualize past debts, which is not acceptable, we are not going to borrow to cover the debt that has already been incurred in a number of countries, that is not at all my conception. The second conception is to say that eurobonds can serve for new loans of a number of states, this would be desired by those who borrow at very high interest rates, what we call the "spreads," compared to Germany which now borrows at 0%, Spain borrows at 6%. So eurobonds would be a factor of mutualization allowing these countries to borrow at a lower cost and thus also allowing them to move faster in budgetary adjustment and to carry out a number of investments.

Then there is a third conception that would imply, as I said, a modification of the treaties that goes in the direction of integration, since there is a common budgetary policy, we can also imagine a policy of investments that could be undertaken, and at that moment eurobonds become an instrument for Europe, an additional resource.

In this regard, the financial transaction tax can also have a link with eurobonds since it can allow for the repayment of the interest on the loans contracted. But the financial transaction tax is also an idea that allows for raising resources, finally collecting revenues that can then be used to replenish the budget and finance the operations that Europeans can decide for themselves with the control of Parliament.

QUESTION -- Still on these eurobonds, you decided with Ms. MERKEL not to immediately revisit the question of renegotiating the treaty to first discuss the issue of growth tools. Are the two linked, can we imagine that in your mind the idea of inscribing these eurobonds as a perspective is a prerequisite to the idea of reopening negotiations on the treaty?

THE PRESIDENT -- At this stage, to allow for the broadest discussion, we have not mentioned any legal instrument, so ideas are exchanged, and it is at the end of our deliberations at the European Council at the end of June that any potential treaty modifications can be proposed, but at this stage, there has been no discussion on existing treaties that would need to be modified or new treaties that would need to be negotiated.

QUESTION -- Do you wish for that?

THE PRESIDENT -- I will see at the end what can be effectively put in a legal form of a treaty.

QUESTION -- On the train that brought you here to Brussels, you said that you would not present yourself as the savior of Europe, surely referring to your predecessor, and we also sensed that you found that Europe might be moving too slowly to resolve this crisis. However, earlier in this same press conference, you humorously pointed out that the discussions had been lengthy because the 27 had spoken at great length. My question is a bit personal; this is your first summit. Do you ultimately find that the European functioning is in line with current events, for example, which are very pressing regarding Greece and Spain? Should Europeans change their mode of operation?

THE PRESIDENT -- First, regarding the past, this is the 24th summit since October 2008. That does not mean that nothing has been done during the other 23, and mechanisms have been invented, developed, and expanded. Decisions have been made, and that indicates that there is a slowness in the process, but it is undoubtedly linked to the decision-making mode. Work has been done, and today what must count is to give a new dimension, particularly in terms of growth. Then, regarding the mechanisms themselves, I do not want to lecture because I am newly elected, but when we meet with 27, all 27 speak, because when 22 have spoken, why would 5 remain silent? They must account to their public opinion, and they speak for extremely variable durations; some can express their thoughts in a few minutes, while others, who knows why, take part of the night. So it is also about respecting sovereignties; each country matters and must be heard. Perhaps later, when I have attended several European Councils, I will suggest other methods, but for now, I do not want to lecture, so I adapted and was rather brief in my intervention. So that is not where I can be criticized, but I was clear.

QUESTION -- This morning, Prime Minister Mr. AYRAULT, who was on RTL, when asked whether the growth was not meeting expectations and whether the commitment to bring the deficit down to 3% next year could be upheld, he replied, "That is what we wish." Between wishing and a commitment, there is a difference. To restore trust with France's partners, have you been led to clarify France's commitment to its 3% target for next year?

THE PRESIDENT -- No, I said that as far as I am concerned, I want to achieve the objectives that were set, which I myself stated during the campaign, to reach 3% by the end of 2013. Then, what we will learn about the state of accounts will require us to wait until the end of June for the first president of the Court of Auditors to give us his report. We will see; I think everything will depend on the growth rate for the year 2013. That is why the discussion this evening, and especially that at the end of June, is not a theoretical discussion because while the growth for 2012 is already given, the OECD has confirmed it to be around 0.6; we know we will be between 0.5 and 0.7. No surprises. On the other hand, the issue is whether in 2013 we are at 1.3 or 1.7? If we are at 1.7, it is easier to reach 3%.

So all my national policy or my European commitments, my desire to bring growth at the European level, and even in the discussions we can have at the G8, which was done at Camp David and soon at the G20, is to ensure that growth returns faster than expected.

QUESTION -- Yesterday, for the first time, we saw that in China the exchange rate between the euro and the yuan fell to 1 euro equals 8, and two years ago it was 1 euro equals 12. So many Chinese have as their first reflex, "We need to come to Europe to shop." So you see that the crisis in Europe, the European debt crisis, can also lead to a devaluation of the euro and rather favor trade and exports in Europe. What is your assessment of this situation? What could it change in trade relations between Europe and China?

THE PRESIDENT -- I appreciate your presentation of the yuan's revaluation, as if it were a Chinese intention. No, it is the product of a situation we know in the eurozone that causes the euro to decrease in value against the dollar and the yuan. There are not only disadvantages to this situation, but I do not believe that European competitiveness will be found simply through exchange rate adjustments. Efforts in investment and productive recovery will also be necessary.

The European Commission will soon release, I am told, figures on the competitiveness of the different member countries of the European Union, and without knowing these figures, I know what has happened over the past 5 years, if not 10 years, which is that there has been a degradation of the competitiveness of the French economy, notably a deterioration of its trade balance. Therefore, we need to make investment efforts, and we cannot simply base our improvement in the trade balance on the implicit revaluation of the yuan. This will not prevent the Chinese from coming in large numbers, I hope, to spend their holidays in France.

QUESTION -- What chances do you give to the summit at the end of June to achieve a convergence of views between France and Germany, particularly on the issue of eurobonds?

THE PRESIDENT -- For now, from Germany, there is the idea that eurobonds, if I want to give the most optimistic version, can only be a point of culmination, while we consider that it should be a starting point. That is to say what the respective positions are today. But it is true that there is a difference, and it has been noted by the President of the European Council. This is not new. I respect Ms. MERKEL's point of view when she says that eurobonds are not a growth instrument as such. But it is an instrument that can allow growth under certain conditions. So we will have this debate that will continue. It could not be resolved here; in fact, no one imagined that it would be, and therefore there was no, if that is what you were expecting, conflicts or confrontations. Everyone expressed their point of view, and there are countries that have expressed their opposition to eurobonds much more firmly than Ms. MERKEL, dismissing any hypothesis of eurobonds. You have others who are in favor of eurobonds and who are not in favor of the financial transaction tax, for example, Great Britain. And then there are countries against everything; I will not name them, but you can find them; they are against eurobonds, against the financial tax, against increasing the capital of the EIB, against increasing the European budget. That exists.

Then there are also countries that may be in favor of eurobonds, in favor of the financial transaction tax, and in favor of the recapitalization of the EIB. So there is a European Council that will continue to work and undoubtedly seek a compromise; we must always seek compromise. But we are not there yet. What was necessary was to put ideas on the table and clearly state who was for and who was against, so that subsequently the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission could work to bring the points of view closer.

QUESTION -- If the Germans persist in their resistance, can you imagine or consider launching a eurobond project with fewer countries, perhaps without the Germans, and doing this project with certain countries rather than the entire Union? Second question, how do you envision that the European Central Bank could do more for growth?

THE PRESIDENT -- First, I do not place myself in the hypothesis that we should do without Germany or Germany without France. We are seeking positions that can be shared; that is the idea. If more than a month before a European Council that will make decisions, I were already in the perspective that there would be no decision and that there would be a separation, I would not respect the idea I have of what European construction is. So I will work to ensure that it is possible to find solutions that allow growth to truly be a dimension of European action. I spoke of a Growth Pact; the term has been taken up, including by the President of the European Central Bank, and I believe it is now established.

Regarding the European Central Bank, its President was present at our discussions. What I took from it is that he had already allowed for a massive intervention so that banks could find liquidity and that he was looking at the situation without us having to debate the central bank; we did not debate the central bank this evening.

Opinions were expressed; I defended my position, which I recalled, of a recapitalization of banks through the European solidarity mechanism in connection with the Central Bank.

QUESTION -- I would like to return to the question of Greece. You said regarding simulations that we do not conduct this type of hypothesis because I prioritize keeping Greece in the eurozone. But it takes two for that; the Greeks can very well vote against keeping their country in the eurozone. There can be events that happen, "bank runs," a succession of events that put us in a fait accompli. By refusing to place yourself in this situation, do you not risk making a mistake? After all, governing is about anticipating. Do you not risk being reproached for making a mistake that could have serious consequences?

THE PRESIDENT -- Anticipating what? Greece's exit from the eurozone and its consequences? But already, if we were to engage in this reflection, I am not saying that there are no studies; there has been information indicating that there were a number of simulations that could exist. But if I were to publicly speak about the hypothesis of Greece's exit, that would mean we would have already sent a signal. A signal to the Greeks and a signal to the markets. So I prefer, because I have a responsibility, to address the Greeks by saying: "France and indeed Europe want you to remain in the eurozone, that you respect the commitments that have been made, but that we make gestures to show you that we are committed to helping you regain hope." It is in the interest of the Greeks, it is in the interest of the eurozone, and even in the interest of the global economy. At the G8, the American President was interested in the situation of the eurozone, not simply out of solidarity with the Greeks, but because he knew well that if there were, as you say, a "bank run," it would have consequences for Europe and also for American growth. That is why I do not place myself in that scenario.

QUESTION -- You had a bilateral meeting with the Polish Prime Minister. I would like to ask you if, in the 2014-2020 European Union budget, you see sources of growth, sources of investment, especially in structural funds, or will you continue the policy of your predecessor? Second question, are you going to Ukraine for the football championships?

THE PRESIDENT -- Regarding the meeting I had with the Polish Prime Minister, it was quite pleasant. We talked about the Weimar Triangle because it is a common desire of Ms. MERKEL, the Polish authorities, and myself to have these meetings in that framework and also to have a bilateral relationship with Poland, let’s say better than before.

On the budgetary perspective, you are right; there is a debate about it; it took place this evening and will return at the end of June. There are those who are in favor of a larger European budget, those who want less European spending, considering that the less there is in the European budget, the less participation from the states, and there are those who, within the framework of the European budget, want to allocate a larger share to structural funds and a smaller share to the common agricultural policy. From this point of view, I have a consistent position, which is to maintain a high level for the common agricultural policy while also having structural funds.

As for Ukraine, this question was raised in the bilateral meeting; I love football, but what is happening in Ukraine is a problem.

QUESTION -- At the heart of the crisis is the link between banking risk and sovereign risk, and to address this issue, there are discussions at the level of central banks about the possibility of a European banking union. Mr. MONTI in the United States mentioned the possibility of creating a European deposit guarantee fund to prevent contagion in the event of a banking crisis in Spain or Greece. What do you think about that?

THE PRESIDENT -- That is also my position. That is to say, Mr. MONTI and I defended this proposal in the informal Council. I said it myself, I wish for the integration of financial supervision mechanisms and deposit guarantees and crisis resolution. So that is a point we will return to. The more we coordinate, we centralize, the better the response will be on supervision, on crisis resolution, and especially on deposit guarantees. Moreover, on many points, we found common ground with Mr. MONTI this evening.

QUESTION -- This afternoon in Paris, you mentioned alongside these important financial issues a democratic challenge, against the backdrop of the rise of populist movements in Europe, and we could add against the backdrop of increased distrust among European citizens regarding European construction at this time. Did you discuss this tonight, and what did your counterparts say?

THE PRESIDENT - Yes, I emphasize the dual challenge; there is an economic challenge to allow growth to return more quickly, to accelerate the recovery of accounts and improve the level of employment. That is the economic challenge that everyone understands. But there is a democratic challenge, meaning that we today have a double populism that is emerging or consolidating. A populism in Northern Europe, from citizens who no longer want to give, and a populism in Southern Europe from other countries that are frustrated to be forced to endure austerity plans, and we see in local elections or national elections these movements emerging, taking very different names; they can also be movements that are not extremist but reflect a rejection of the functioning of Europe as it is today. When I say functioning, it is not about decision-making modes, it is not about how we speak in European Councils, it is rather about the policies that are being implemented because some, I heard it tonight, believe they have already given a lot. These are the countries of Northern Europe, in relation to the countries of Southern Europe, and in the countries of Southern Europe, there is great concern that, despite all the austerity efforts, they still find themselves with very high interest rates.

I just received the President of the Spanish government. He is not of the same political sensitivity as mine. He mentioned everything that has been decided since the elections in Spain for structural reforms, all the adjustments that have been made, all the cuts in purchasing power that have been accepted. The general strikes he has endured. And despite that, he said, he still has interest rates at 6%. We can clearly see the risk. In Italy, you saw what happened in the local elections, including in Parma, with an argument that is not different from the one I just indicated. Why, when there are so many efforts, are there so few results?

So, there you go, the challenge is also democratic. I even said that it also has a consequence of favoring alternations. I was a living product of that. All this to worry them, for those who had some elections coming up. Because it is true that it is also an element that must be taken into account. Look at what happened in the last elections across Europe. Regardless of the qualities of those who stood for election. There is still a law of series that surely reflects an exasperation.

QUESTION -- I wanted to know if you discussed tonight who would replace Jean-Claude Juncker.

THE PRESIDENT -- Jean-Claude Juncker was next to me, and I did not talk about that.

QUESTION -- Yet it is coming up soon in July?

THE PRESIDENT -- No, this subject was not mentioned at all. Not the subject of appointments to positions. I am not saying it does not exist, but it was not at all the framework.

QUESTION -- Mr. President, two questions, the first, you said that your European counterparts agreed on the principle of a growth pact and on this terminology, what is the legal status of this growth pact? Will it be as binding as the budget treaty? First question, second question, during the presidential campaign, you announced your objectives for Europe. This time it was the first time you presented these objectives to your partners. Are you, therefore, more pessimistic, more optimistic regarding these objectives, have you measured that it is more difficult or less difficult than you imagined?

THE PRESIDENT -- Will the word pact itself be adopted by everyone? Some may refer to a growth strategy or a growth perspective. It will be at the end of the month that we will know if it is a real pact with a set of measures whose legal nature we cannot yet prejudge.

Regarding the difficulty of the exercise, I had anticipated it. The composition of the European Council is known. But what was important, beyond the different political sensitivities or the situations of countries that are not the same, was the idea from all sides that we must make an effort for growth. So, if I want to be fully aware of the realities, it is that behind the word growth, some put structural reforms, competition, the services directive, labor market flexibility, trade agreements with other geographical areas than Europe. That is one vision, and then there is a vision consisting of not adding public spending; everyone knows the state of public finances, but of instruments that can allow raising additional funds. And there, we can find the EIB, the "project bonds," and instruments, even if they do not reach consensus like the financial transaction tax.

There you go, thank you very much for your patience, and see you in June.